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Whether as a distinct cultural form, or as a problem exaggerated and imagined by 
a paranoid interpretive bent, “rumor” (al-ishāʿa) claims a place in the writings of many 
Egyptian intellectuals, littérateurs, journalists, and politicians in the twentieth century that 
has yet to be adequately addressed and theorized.  At the intersection of cultural studies 
and Arabic literature, this dissertation investigates rumor as a fiercely contested mode of 
reading and writing public culture in Egypt since 1952.  Eschewing the legislative trend 
in the modern social and clinical sciences that has positioned rumor as an object to be 
combatted, or reduced it to the mechanisms and motives of mass psychology, I examine 
some of the many ways in which it generates, animates, or interferes with scenes in the 
lives of social actors as they move between the centers and peripheries of power.  Rumor 
possesses both affirmative and destructive powers, often inseparably, and in order to 
theorize its complex imbrications with character, community, and culture beyond the 
urge to evaluative critique, I develop a host of concepts – such as noise, play, paranoia, 
and parody – capable of bringing this oft-neglected ambivalence into view. 
Notoriously resistant to analysis, whether due to is conceptual vagueness or 
ephemeral phenomenological status, rumor and the scenes it makes require a rethinking 
of the modes of scholarly writing that dominate the humanities and social sciences.  A 
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degree of mobility and eclecticism, drawn from the object itself in its flight across history 
and culture, imbues the organization and style of this dissertation: rumor is the object, 
and inspires the mode, of my investigation.  Each of the three Parts of the dissertation 
investigates a different field of public culture in post-1952 Egypt.  Part 1 analyzes the 
rhetoric and interpretive practices deployed by state actors in their confrontation with 
what they call “rumors.”  Three historical events are taken as significant: the rhetorical 
and dramatic performances of the Free Officers in the early revolutionary period (1952-
1954), the social scientific celebration of “planning” (takhṭīṭ) in 1964, and the Mubarak 
death rumors of 2007.  While here rumor comes into view as the object of state discipline 
and paranoid interpretation, the remaining two Parts investigate its role in the 
performances of artists, littérateurs, and bloggers.  Part 2 analyzes the literary texts of 
Gamal al-Ghitani, which are unique in their simultaneous recording and performing of 
rumors in Egyptian cultural politics at the turn of the millennium.  Finally, Part 3 
examines intersections between play, parody, and the paranoid style of interpretation in 
cyberspace, including an investigation into the blogging campaign “Mubarak Mat” 
(“Mubarak has Died,” 2008) and Ashraf Hamdi’s response to rumors spun by the 
counterrevolution (2011-2012).  While rumor, across these many contexts, is deplored as 
a destructive force, it also, I contend, salvages possibility from necessity, explores 
alternatives to the status quo, and serves as an unexpected catalyst for innovative cultural 
and political forms.  As noise, it creates disorder and generates a new order.  It is at once 
in public culture, and making public culture. 
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“Egypt is a country of gossip!  A country of gossipiness!  A country of rumors!” 
– ʿAmr Adib, “Cairo Today” (March, 2010) 
 
“We live in a society that fires rumors like bullets.”  
– Muhammad ʿAbd al-Wahid, Intellectuals for Hire (2005: 318) 
 
“Our history is nothing but a rumor.” 




“Why is Rumor here?”  The question is posed by the beast itself who, “painted full of tongues,” 
appears in, and as, the induction to Shakespeare’s Henry IV, Part Two.  Rumor, the plaything of 
the “wav’ring multitude,” is the carrier of “slanders” and “false reports.” He and/or she – the 
personification of windy speech is afforded a rather ambiguous gender – blows into the ears of 
men, and is blown itself by their “surmises, jealousies, conjectures.”  Let us, as groundlings in 
this theater, surmise: Rumor is here, in Henry IV, because of war and rebellion.  In the opening 
act, the Earl of Northumberland eagerly awaits for news of the Battle of Shrewsbury, in which 
his son contends with the army of the king.  Matters of fate are being determined by the minute, 
but the battlefield is distant and enveloped in a fulgurous epistemic fog.  In the absence of 
reliable eyewitnesses – or rather, with their proliferation and mutual contradiction – it is the 
voice of Rumor that makes itself heard, swift as Mercury, arriving at the Earl’s gates before the 
battle has ended; it carries hope, then consolation, then condolences, before the slow truth is able 
to mutter a word.  So Rumor is here, at the gates; Rumor is also ere, that is, before: it is the 
introduction to the play, setting a scene and creating an atmosphere, not simply destroying order 
but giving birth to one that is new and beating with life. 
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 Rumor’s question, posed broadly beyond the confines of Shakespeare’s play, challenges 
the audience to consider a knot of issues related to epistemology, discourse ethics, power, and 
social change, as well as their representation in myriad cultural forms from theater to everyday 
conversation.  This dissertation offers one response through an investigation into significant 
scenes in Egyptian public culture over the last sixty years, and the actors that have made them.  
By way of induction, I direct the question to the three quotations above: in each of these 
statements, terse aphorisms or shrill laments, Why is Rumor here?  These are the voices of 
disparately placed actors: a rambunctious television personality in Cairo; an insider escaped from 
Egypt’s Ministry of Culture; and a renowned Syrian poet.  Each in his own way has pushed, or 
been pushed by, al-ishāʿa (“rumor”) onto different but overlapping stages: “Egypt” or the 
television audience so addressed; Egyptian “society” and in particular its “intellectuals”; and 
lastly, Arab national(ist) history.  Each has, in other words, encountered rumor as a significant 
problem – a question, an object of concern, an anxiety – lodged in, indeed constitutive of, these 
overlapping realms of action, experience, knowledge, and affect.  Why is al-ishāʿa here? 
 The first quotation was shouted by ʿAmr Adib, host of the talk show “Cairo Today,” in 
one of his characteristic nighttime rants on the loquaciousness and gullibility of his viewers, the 
television-bound people of Egypt.  On this occasion in March, 2010, Adib was performing an 
enraged denial of the recent flurry of rumors about the death of President Husni Mubarak, who 
had fallen ill during a trip to Germany.  Doctors in Heidelberg University Hospital diagnosed the 
president with “chronic calculus cholecystitis,” which had necessitated the removal of “both the 
gallbladder and duodenal polyp, safely”: but medical jargon proved not to be a convincing 
rhetorical strategy, and the regime and its allies – which included Adib – found themselves 
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bracing against a tide of public skepticism and curiosity.1  This was not the first time that reports 
of Mubarak’s death had mobilized the president’s apologists into action.  Nor was this Adib’s 
first jab at combatting rumors: viewers of his show may recall his repeated attempts to verbally 
resuscitate the major political, religious, and cultural icons of Egypt’s incumbent gerontocracy, 
whose rumored passings prompted at least four episodes of “Cairo Today” within a one-year 
period.
2
  This was yet another opportunity gleefully exploited by the newsmonger to broadcast a 
common stereotype: “Egypt is a country of rumors,” and “Egyptians” are porous vessels of 
hearsay.  This stereotype is undoubtedly given currency by rumor outbreaks like those that 
consumed ʿAmr Adib in 2010.  More fundamentally, however, it is a perception enabled by years 
of secrecy and military rule, which have built into public life hierarchies of suspicion and wide 
gaps of information; by paternalistic modes of address that position citizens as “children” in need 
of “upbringing” (tarbiya) and “guidance” (irshād); by the lingering syntax of developmentalism 
that subjects the “masses” to half-serious campaigns of “consciousness raising” (tawʿiya); by 
self-styled intellectuals both foreign and Egyptian, who earn a living by portraying the “Arab 
Street” as a zone of radical epistemological alterity, vulnerable to infiltration by folk beliefs, 
fundamentalists, and foreign conspirators.  At the confluence of these many streams, ʿAmr Adib 
speaks, and grabs “rumor” as an object of cultural lament. 
 The second quotation is excerpted from Intellectuals for Hire (Muthaqqafun taht al-
Talab), an “exposé” of the Egyptian Ministry of Culture under the eccentric Faruq Husni, 
published in 2005 by one of the minister’s former media advisors.  Muhammad ʿAbd al-Wahid, 
the author, reproduces ʿAmr Adib’s lament, but narrows its object in two senses.  First, his 
                                                 
1 “Mubarak on the mend after successful gall bladder surgery,” France 24, 3/6/2010. 
2 From mid-2009 to mid-2010, “Cairo Today” performed rituals of denial on the deaths of Husni Mubarak, Fathi 
Surur (the Speaker of Parliament), Pope Shenouda III (the Patriarch of Egypt's Coptic community), and ʿAdil Imam 
(the froggish cinema and television actor).  At the time of writing, they are rumored alive – with the exception of 
Pope Shenouda III. 
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concerns are focused on the intellectual and political classes – in particular, those absorbed in the 
Ministry of Culture – and not Egyptian society as a whole (though, of course, this wider 
implication is also made).  He declares that for “intellectuals … slander and entertaining 
conspiracies seem to be the elixir of life and a savory pastime,” but contends that the “real” 
scandals in “Egyptian culture” – to which he is privy, but does not divulge – exceed those passed 
around by word of mouth (318).  Second, whereas Adib speaks of rumors that have erupted 
seemingly spontaneously, taking advantage of a gullible public, ʿAbd al-Wahid speaks of rumors 
as “bullets” – that is, they have not only fixed form, but also agents, clear trajectories, and 
targets.  Rumor is here as a form of sabotage, a weapon deployed by morally depraved culture 
workers against their opponents.  Yet what is truly striking about both Adib’s rant and ʿAbd al-
Wahid’s critique is that both men are implicated, in the same moment, in the very practice they 
are condemning.  Adib, for his part, spoke loudly as a mouthpiece for the Mubarak regime’s own 
rumors and propaganda; ʿAbd al-Wahid, it seems, does not realize that his exposé of Faruq Husni 
is by definition the stuff of gossip and slander.  This is a perennial paradox in the politics of 
rumor: those who most fervently denounce it are also its most avid and skillful practitioners. 
 Finally, the third quotation, “Our history is nothing but a rumor,” is taken from a free-
verse elegy of that name by the Syrian poet, Nizar Qabbani (1923-1998), in his collection 
Marginal Notes on the Marginal Notes, 1967-1991 (1991).  The “history” of which the poet 
speaks he had received as a child in school; its major themes were the “bravery,” “sacrifice,” 
“pride,” and “magnanimity” of his forefathers.  In his old age, he has discovered that all this was 
nothing but ishāʿa, “a rumor.”  What Qabbani, or his poetic persona, has thus achieved is a 
subversion of Arab nationalism’s historical metanarrative, with its claims of ethnic superiority 
rooted in a glorious past, and canonized in school textbooks and performed in national media.  
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By refiguring this metanarrative as rumor, the poet dissolves its consistency, authoritativeness, 
and aesthetic sublimity into the ephemerality, distortion, and vulgarity of reported speech.  The 
dominant myth is not simply a lie, but belongs to that peculiar mode of discourse, al-ishāʿa, 
which is not merely false (or uncertain), but phenomenologically unstable, with no certain 
temporal or spatial coordinates.  Written during the Second Gulf War (1990-1991), the poem may 
be read as a specific inversion of the rhetoric deployed by authoritarian regimes in the region, 
such as Iraq, that dismissed opponents both foreign and domestic as agents of “rumor.” Instead it 
is the Iraqi regime itself that, unable to support its myths of contemporary and historical 
grandeur, is exposed as the true teller of tall tales.  In yet another sense, “history is nothing but a 
rumor” because, as Yoav Di-Capua has demonstrated for Egypt, historians of the postcolonial 
Arab World have had their efforts seriously undermined by government secrecy, the lack of 
official records for major events, and the suppression of voices that refuse to repeat the official 
narrative.
3
  As a result, rumor, hearsay, and smuggled documents are the only materials available 
to reconstruct the past.  This is of course not only the case for the writing of history, but for the 
interpretation of contemporary events as well: official secrecy drives readers of the present, from 
ordinary citizens to salaried pundits, to listen to rumor’s many tongues.  Whatever the specific 
sense of his line, Qabbani has placed rumor here as an epistemological problem for many Arab 
countries.  While my focus in this dissertation is on contemporary Egypt, Qabbani’s poem points 
to wider areas of investigation and comparison for future studies to consider. 
Why, then, is Rumor here?  I have begun by casting a very wide net, in order to offer a 
brief glimpse of the broader significance that may accrue to this object in its flight across 
different fields of practice in the Arab World – journalism, politics, history, aesthetics.  The focus 
                                                 
3 See, for example, Di-Capua (2009: 325) and (2012: 88) on the problems posed to historians by secrecy and the 
lack of state archives. 
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of this dissertation, however, is considerably narrower.  Setting the place as Egyptian public 
culture, and the time as that marked by the beginning of military rule in 1952, I ask not only why 
rumor is here, but what it can tell us about the actors who produce it, as well as the actors that 
attempt to combat it.  On the one hand, rumor is a distinct cultural form, a fantastical narrative 
bite written to varying degrees by different people in order to make sense of an obscure event, to 
express latent social or psychological tensions, or simply to play.  As Luise White has argued, 
rumor can “reveal an intellectual world of fears and fantasies, ideas and claims that have not 
been studied before” in the texts of literature and history (2000: 86).  Rumor may also be used as 
a tool of sabotage, as a weapon of both the weak and the powerful (e.g. Scott 1990), and thus 
allows us to theorize “politics by other means,” beyond the formal sets of action and agency 
offered by traditional political science.  On the other hand, “rumor” is not a specific thing in the 
world, but a problem that is feared, interpreted, and combatted by groups and individuals at 
particular moments of social crisis, real or perceived.  In this sense, rumor is difficult to define, 
but the reactions it provokes in its problematizers are recurring: paranoia, seduction, and 
confusion.  Studying rumor in this sense can help us understand how practices of interpretation, 
such as the “paranoid style,” are deployed in specific contexts.  As both a cultural form and a 
problem, rumor has persisted as a significant, but largely unexamined, presence in the writings 
and performances of some of the most prominent figures in Egyptian literature, politics, and 
religion over the last sixty years.  To recognize and to theorize this presence is necessary for a 
more thorough understanding of the making of public culture in modern Egypt beyond the 
relative autonomy and ontological stability of those forms privileged by contemporary Arab 




But rumor is a slippery thing.  It is with the actors themselves that I must begin; their 
voices, and their cultural products, multiple and cacophonous, are the solid ground from which I 
work.  In this dissertation, I follow the Free Officers in the early revolutionary period (1952-
1954), as they put rumor on trial; later, I analyze a social scientist electrified by the success of 
developmentalism’s Plan, manifest in the recent construction of the Aswan High Dam (1964).  I 
follow Gamal al-Ghitani (b. 1945), a novelist, journalist, and editor, whose “fictional” texts both 
record and perform the flow of rumors through the chatter houses of the Akhbar al-Yawm 
Foundation and the Ministry of Culture.  I follow Muhammad Sayyid Tantawi (1928-2010), the 
former Shaykh of al-Azhar, who, like ʿAmr Adib above, exerted considerable rhetorical efforts to 
combat rumors of President Mubarak’s death, but unlike Adib, has left behind numerous attempts 
to theorize al-ishāʿa in terms adapted from religious and social scientific discourses.  I follow 
Ibrahim ʿIsa (b. 1965), yellow journalist and novelist, who has over the last fifteen years been 
accused, to borrow ʿAbd al-Wahid’s phrase above, of “firing rumors like bullets” in his 
confrontations with the Mubarak regime.  Lastly, I “follow” bloggers, Facebook users, and 
Youtube artists, whose creative engagements with rumor coincide with some of the major 
national political events before and during the Revolution of 25 January.   
What binds these disparate actors together is rumor, as cultural form produced, or a 
problem to be confronted, or both.  In its most potent manifestations, al-ishāʿa feeds off an 
unresolvable tension in public culture between the relative destructive and affirmative powers of 
speech spread broadcast.
4
 Rumor destroys reputations, but it also makes them; it undermines the 
                                                 
4 I borrow the terms “destructive” and “affirmative” from Linda Hutcheon’s study of irony, another noisy form of 
speech.  Hutcheon uses these terms when discussing the much debated ethical edge and “political function” of irony, 
which some scholars argue is “destructive” (irony is elitist, it cynically cuts down innovation, it divides), and others 
argue is “affirmative” (irony builds solidarity between individuals and groups, it relieves psychological tension, it 
resists domination) (1994: 26). 
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cohesion of the community, but it is also the “social stuff” that brings it together.
5
  Does rumor 
destroy, or create, community, reputations, power, the self?  It is sometimes said that rumors 
“strike” (taḍrib) Egyptian society.
6
  By this it is meant that rumors are a destructive force, and 
indeed the bulk of scholarly and non-scholarly writing on rumor in Egypt is decidedly negative.  
It is a virus that needs to be combatted, along with other social illnesses like illiteracy, religious 
fundamentalism, or drug culture.  However, in Arabic, ḍaraba, “to strike,” can also mean “to 
create” or “fashion,” as in ḍaraba mathalan (“to make an example/proverb”), ḍaraba khaymatan  
(“to pitch/set up a tent”), or ḍaraba nuqūdan (“to mint coins”).  Taken in this sense, rumors not 
only “strike” the community – Egypt, “us,” or Cairo’s chatter houses – but also create and 
constitute it.  These affirmative, creative qualities, I argue, are just as important as rumor’s 
demonic, destructive qualities: together, they constitute an unresolvable ethical and political 
tension, which I theorize below as “noise.”  To think of al-ishāʿa as noise (or the French 
parasite) means to leave room for the often surprising positive effects produced by a negative 
social, aesthetic, or political phenomenon.  Philosopher Michel Serres has expressed this 
inexhaustible generativity of parasite through a suitable aphorism: “The town makes noise, but 
the noise makes the town” (1982: 14). 
Although this dissertation is limited to public culture in modern Egypt, my understanding 
                                                 
5 In Publics and Counterpublics (2002), Michael Warner briefly alludes to the possibility that “gossip” and 
“scandal” might create the sort of “cross-citational field” and form of address that make a public (78-79).  Paz 
argues that rumors and gossip may “contribute to a sense of discursive community” by virtue of their repetition and 
indexical association with a marginalized social group (2009: 120). Similarly, Neubauer suggests that the Roman 
Fama – a close relative to our “rumor” – “creates and maintains something like a collective consciousness” (1999: 
24) for those who pass her on.  Most often, however, rumor is characterized as a threat to the community.  ʿAbd al-
Hamid and Naguib, for example, locate rumor as “the secret behind the continual flow of blood in the Arab Umma” 
(2009: 13).  Speaking in yet more grisly terms, Shaykh ʿAli Mansur Sanad laments, “When we speak of the present 
reality of the Umma, we find it to be weak and tattered, beset by a gaping wound that exudes fresh blood [daman 
ʿabīṭan] as the result of this weapon thrust into its body” (2009: 16). 
6 See, for example, Nabil ʿUmar, “City of Rumors” (“Madinat al-Shaʾiʿat”), al-Ahram (9/5/2007).  Discussing the 
recent rumors of President Mubarak’s death, ʿUmar complains that “rumors are striking [taḍrib] the clubs, soirees, 
and gossip sessions of Cairo.” 
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of rumor is developed in dialogue with studies in folklore, cultural history, literature, and 
anthropology that deal with different cultural and historical contexts.  This dialogue is necessary, 
not only for comparative purposes, but also because of the paucity of works in Arab cultural 
studies
7
 on the subject.  This paucity is remarkable, given that rumor has so often been 
positioned as a significant object of concern by intellectuals and artists not only in Egypt, but in 
the wider Arab World.  The few studies that exist, valuable and insightful though they are, 
approach rumor obliquely, as an addendum to other conceptual or theoretical concerns.
8
  In 
contrast, I foreground rumor itself as the principle object of investigation, following the traces it 
leaves across myriad cultural forms in order to find new ways of looking at the intersecting 
domains of culture and politics.  It is indeed my intent to “let rumor take over,” as an earlier 
reviewer of this section commented.  By this I mean that this dissertation, while by no means 
abandoning the strictures of scholarly convention in the humanities, does not, and cannot, resolve 
its object into a single conceptual framework, teleological narrative (such as that which 
celebrates the ruptures and rendings performed by the triumphant postmodern on the so 
regrettable modern), or the necessary epistemological violence committed by the cult of the 
“argument.”  There are many conceptual frames, narratives, and arguments to be found here, but 
rather than tethering myself to one, I tether the writing to rumor, and allow the principle issues, 
implications, and investigations to accrue to this beast of many tongues as so many flies to sticky 
paper.  This reorientation is experimental, and entails considerable risk: not only is “rumor” a 
                                                 
7 Following the scholars assembled in Arab Cultural Studies (ed. Sabry, 2012), I understand the field at its most 
capacious to include communication studies, media studies, anthropology, folklore, social and intellectual history, 
and literature. 
8 In anthropology, Borneman discusses how rumor mediates the relationship between an anthropologist in Syria and 
the intelligence agencies (2009: 246-250); Mittermaier has a beautiful short but thick description of a rumor of the 
mahdī and a breast-feeding moon (2011: 31-35); Wynn (2007) investigates rumors in Egypt about SCA head Zahi 
Hawass and Saudi princes as “social facts.”  In literature, Bedde (2011) discusses rumor in Naguib Mahfouz’s novel 
Midaqq Alley, and Di-Capua (2012) has a brilliant analysis of gossip and the production of knowledge and memory 
in the archive, as staged in Sunʿ Allah Ibrahim’s Dhat. In cultural studies, Mai Ghoussoub (2000) analyzes rumors 
of aphrodisiac chewing gum in Egyptian newspapers. 
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notoriously difficult thing to capture in its flight across the city; conceptually, too, it is quite 
recalcitrant, and has been known to drive the analyst mad.  Therefore, before elaborating on 
“noise” and other theoretical concerns, it is necessary to establish a basic understanding of what 




The English word “rumor” and the Arabic al-ishāʿa (also: al-shāʾiʿa) cover a similar semantic 
field, and I use the two words interchangeably throughout this dissertation: it behooves the 
reader to learn at least this one Arabic word now.  The specificity of the Arabic word – its 
etymology and conceptual genealogy – will be dealt with in the next section.  To keep things 
simple, I propose the following broad definition: “rumor” is a widespread piece of news, the 
veracity and authorship of which are uncertain.  Of course, we know that things are not so 
simple: some rumors can turn out to be true, or are thought to be true at a given moment; 
sometimes the authors is known, or alleged; its precise range may be difficult to determine.  
They are often strangely fantastical (“The king is drinking the blood of infants!”), but can just as 
often be mind-numbingly mundane (“The neighbors have adopted a cat!”).  Given this 
conceptual shiftiness, one is not surprised to find it a virtual sine qua non of rumor scholarship 
that the analyst begin with an expression of angst, bordering on self-doubt, about what exactly he 
is looking at.
9
  It is discourse to be sure, but discourse without any of the conventional anchors of 
                                                 
9 About rumor, a cultural studies scholar submits that the “concept’s definition is up for grabs” (Harsin 2008: 479, n. 
5).  Of gossip, an anthropological study says that it is “notoriously difficult to circumscribe in the abstract, and this 
difficulty is a direct reflection of its inherent ambiguity: what a third party calls ‘gossip’ is ‘information exchange’ 
for those who engage in it” (Besnier 2009: 12-13).  Besnier’s note is elaborated by Paz’s “perspectival” and 
“processual” definition of rumor: how different groups contend over the labeling of speech, in the process of 
establishing community and discursive authority (Paz 2009).  The sociologist Muhammad Talʿat ʿIsa begins his 
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authorship, audience, structure, or context: these are all unknown, hidden, or a matter of 
contention.  Qu’est-ce que la rumeur?  
 Rumor may first of all be distinguished from other kinds of illicit, subversive, or low 
speech. Because the differences are a matter of degree, I propose three conceptual axes that 
situate rumor as more or less similar to other illicit speech forms.  They are: the axis of space, the 
axis of time, and the axis of modality.  Along the axis of space, one end represents more private 
speech forms, while the other end represents more public, or widely-circulating, speech forms.  
At the first end, we may place “gossip” (namīma) and “backbiting” (ghayba), which are usually 
thought of as taking place behind closed doors, or between a limited group of people.  “Rumor” 
(shāʾiʿa: literally that which is public or widespread) falls at the opposite end, for it does not 
recognize spatial constraints: it is said to “fly” through the city streets, into dim alleyways and 
underneath the bed sheets of the powerful, and on through the watering grounds of journalists 
and socialites and back again.  Along the axis of time, one extreme represents speech forms that 
have only a brief duration in the social community, while the other extreme represents speech 
forms of a longer duration.  Rumor, typically a fleeting, ephemeral current of discourse, is thus at 
the one end, while the other end may include any of the various forms of popular tales: the urban 
legend, the folk tale (roughly, the Arabic ḥaddūta or ḥikāya), khurāfa (“myth” or “superstition”), 
mawwāl (a longer folk ballad).  Finally, along the axis of modality, there are at one end more 
serious – we might say “indicative” – speech forms, while at the other there are more playful – 
                                                                                                                                                             
book with a definition of “rumor” (al-shāʾiʿa); however, the stability of the concept is immediately undermined, 
when he attributes this definition to those he calls “a number of trustworthy scholars” (1964:7).  A footnote next to 
this phrase, baʿḍ al-bāḥithīn al-thiqāt, would seem to promise a reference to particular authors – instead, the 
footnote contains only a definition of the word thiqa (“trustworthy”): man yuʿtamid ʿalayhi wa yuʾtaman, wa 
yustaʿmal bi-lafẓ wāḥid li-al-mudhakkar wa al-muʾannath wa al-mufrad wa al-jamʿ, wa qad yujmaʿ fa-yuqāl thiqāt 
li-al-mudhakkar wa al-muʾannath (“he who can be depended upon and trusted; used for masculine, feminine, 
singular and plural; exists also in the plural form thiqāt for both masculine and feminine”).  In this footnote, the 
distinction between scientific tract and rumor breaks down.  Like rumor, a reference is made to trustworthy 
authorities, who turn out to be anonymous and untraceable. 
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we might say “subjunctive” – speech forms.  This axis can be used to separate rumors, told in 
earnest, from jokes (nukat, sing. nukta), told in jest.  Part 3 of this dissertation, in which I discuss 
the overlap between rumor and humor, is an investigation along this axis of modality.  These 
three axes may be used, as a rule of thumb, to separate the widespread, ephemeral, and earnest 
“rumor” from other illicit speech forms; they can be shifted and combined to show how one form 
blends into another.  Gossip may escape the privacy of the salon, a widespread story taken 
seriously by some may be told jokingly by other, and the themes or anxieties encapsulated in a 
folk tale may give birth to a more contemporary rumor.   
However, these external distinctions are not the only ones that matter.  There are of 
course many internal distinctions – many different kinds of “rumor” – that should also be 
clarified.  The most important of these distinctions can be plotted along two axes: the axis of 
truth, and the axis of agency.  First, along the axis of truth, a rumor may be more or less “true” or 
“false”: this is often a matter of perspective, since the person or group damaged by the rumor 
will be fiercely attempting to deny it, while others persist in framing it as a real “scoop” or 
scandal.  Even a “false” rumor, of course, may contain a certain measure of truth, and for a 
period of time nearly everyone may behave as if it were true.  At the other extreme would be 
what Edgar Morin has called “rumour pure and absolute” (1971: 17): a story that is purely 
imagined, with absolutely no event or thing in the contemporary world of experience that could 
be taken as supporting evidence.  Such a rumor may take on fantastical, romantic qualities, like 
those found in folk tales.  Internal differences can also be made along the axis of agency, which 
is just as contested, perhaps more contested, than the veracity of rumor.  At one end of the axis, 
rumors are more “spontaneous”: that is, its sources of authorship are various, and can be located 
in popular reactions to a significant event, as well as the unconscious, or the narrative intertexts 
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of a culture.  Rumors of Husni Mubarak’s death, for example, may have arisen “spontaneously” 
because of the president’s sudden disappearance from state media (an event interpreted 
collectively), as well as popular anxieties and hopes about a post-Mubarak Egypt.  At the other 
end of this axis, rumors are more “weaponized”: that is, they are spread deliberately by hidden 
agents, as an alternative to more direct or open verbal confrontation.
10
  Weaponized rumors can 
often be confused with slander, but to keep our terms in order, it can be said that “rumors” often 
target their opponents more obliquely (a rumor is spread about the opponent’s hometown, instead 
of the opponent himself), and their agents are generally hidden, or think themselves hidden.  
Rumors can be spontaneous, weaponized, or a combination of both: but in each individual case 
of outbreak, the reasons are difficult to locate.  As I will discuss in Part 1 of this dissertation, the 
favored interpretive practice of state actors in modern Egypt has been to declare rumor – 
especially when it touches on sensitive political issues – a “plot,” an organized campaign of 
defamation.  There are certain psychological and historical reasons for this interpretive practice, 
but it remains dangerously reductive.  The remaining chapters of my dissertation, in Part 2 and 
Part 3, develop frames for interpreting rumor that move beyond the obsession with “weaponized” 
forms and “plots.” 
 I have proposed the above axes to help us navigate rumor conceptually, both “externally” 
as it relates to other speech forms and “internally” as the particular form a rumor takes is the 
subject of repeated controversy and confusion.  These distinctions are not exhaustive; I have 
decided to highlight those which matter most for the material to be considered in this 
dissertation.  One could still go further: not a few studies of rumor have exhibited tremendous 
taxonomical flourish.  Some have spoken of “white” (optimistic) versus “black” (pessimistic) 
rumors (ʿIsa 1964: 7-13), and of “grey” and “pink” rumors: the former originate from a source 
                                                 
10 Kapferer’s has proposed a similar distinction between “spontaneous” and “provoked” rumors (1990: 37). 
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that is semi-hidden, and the latter emerge from popular hopes and dreams (ʿAbd al-Hamid and 
Nagib 2009: 27, 28).  Others have spoken of “the crawling rumor” (al-ishāʿa al-zāḥifa aw al-
ḥābiya) – one that spreads slowly and surreptitiously – and of “the diving rumor” (al-ishāʿa al-
ghāṭisa) – one that breaks out at one time, before “diving” into dormancy, and resurfacing amidst 
similar circumstances in the future (Ibid.: 23, 25).  These latter terms irrepressibly evoke in my 
mind the “angels” of Quranic Sura 79, referred to as al-sābiḥāt (“those who swim along”) and 
al-sābiqāt (“those who race”).  This is not a fortuitous comparison, for the analyst who spends 
any great length of time with ishāʿāt, attempting to grab at them as they whir past and all around, 
will inevitably begin to relate to them in a decidedly supernatural manner.  Kapferer, for 
example, talks briefly about the widely shared perception that rumors are endowed with “magical 
circulatory virtues” (1990: 50).  Certain rumors seem to spread with such a velocity, and with 
such a resistance to authority, that only the existence of some insidious, demonic agency could 
explain them.
11
  Risking too personal a disclosure, I might say that I have at times felt ishāʿāt as 
luminous little sprites, similar in manner and appearance to fireflies.  At gloomier moments, I 
feel them in a manner similar to the “rays” (in Arabic, al-ashiʿʿa, from a consonantal root close 
to that of al-ishāʿa) famously described by Dr. Daniel Paul Schreber in his Memoires of My 
Nervous Illness (2000 [1903]).  They invade modernity’s prized possession of human autonomy 
of action, setting the individual off course and filling his mind with alien clutter.
12
  While such 
impressions may appear idiosyncratic, they are not quite so.  As we will see in the next section, 
rumor would seem to inhabit a place in the symbolic order quite similar to that of jinn, demons, 
                                                 
11 Arlette Farge also uses this language in her study of rumors and the popular press in eighteenth-century France.  
So often, she observes, the monarchy “could find only supernatural explanations” for the speech of the “dregs of the 
people” (1994: 25).  Similarly, Parisian chroniclers were astonished by the “almost magical way” in which the 
Jansenists’ journal spread (Ibid: 38). 
12 See, for example, pp. 21-31, 47, and 89. Dr. Schreber also spoke of these mind-control “rays” – sent by God, 
Jehovah, Zoroaster, Thor, or Odin (30) – as a kind of “interference” in the normal workings of the universe; thus 
they are consonant with my idea of “noise” below. 
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fairies, and the like, if for no other reason than that they are all in a sense heard but not seen.  
This can be understood more clearly by way of a tentative genealogy of al-ishāʿa. 
 
A GENEALOGY OF AL-ISHĀʿA 
 
In proposing a “genealogy” of al-ishāʿa, it is not my intention to write the history of a relatively 
stable “cultural form” that has changed and evolved over time, due to these or those particular 
factors over the centuries.  The claims I make are not those of a historian, and while the texts I 
assemble here are presented in a linear manner, it is not linear conceptual evolution that concerns 
me, but the culturally and historically specific resonances that al-ishāʿa might evoke in an Arabic 
(linguistic or cultural) context.  That is, my aim is to map the skein of meanings, memories, 
fantasies, tensions, and narratives that have accrued to al-ishāʿa – the word and the idea – in the 
texts of Arabic literature and history.  This genealogy will help situate the writers I analyze in 
this dissertation, as they come upon this complex object of concern in Egypt’s twentieth century.  
Novelists like Gamal al-Ghitani, and social scientists like Muhammad Talʿat ʿIsa – to name only 
a few writers that I examine in the coming chapters – can be thought of as relatives to this 
genealogy, not in a strictly deterministic sense, but inasmuch as their texts echo and traffic with 
those I analyze here.  Put another way, premodern writers on rumor like Ibn Iyas and al-Jahiz do 
not directly inform or influence later Egyptian authors, but link to them complexly in a textual 
network of possible similarities and differences.  Sometimes, the older texts act as a background 
against which later writers are more or less (un)consciously writing; at other times, the links 
between them are no more than abstract family resemblances that testify to the perennial, if not 
universal, problem of al-ishāʿa in the pantheon of human concerns. 
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 Investigations into the cultural significance of “rumor” in European history can 
confidently begin with classical Greek and Latin literature.  This is the point of origin taken by 
Hans-Joachim Neubauer in his book The Rumour: A Cultural History (1999), which I 
recommend to be read in tandem with the present genealogy of the Arabic al-ishāʿa.  Neubauer 
begins with the goddess Fama, whose “history is that of a literary motif and at the same time that 
of an exemplary model” (36).  Fama appears in Virgil’s Aeneid, and later Ovid’s 
Metamorphoses, as a monstrous figuration for both “time-conquering posthumous fame” (63) as 
well as “rumor” proper (ambiguous news spread widely by the goddess).  Modern translations, in 
fact, often reduce Fama to “rumor.”  Neubauer traces the evolution of this figure into Chaucer, 
who has the “House of Fame” separated from the House of Rumor, thus splitting the classical 
double-meaning of Fama more properly into two: fame and rumor are distinct.  The monstrosity 
later makes its appearance on stage as Shakespeare’s “Rumor,” who introduced Henry IV, Part 2 
as well as this dissertation.  In contrast, classical Arabic literature does not have al-ishāʿa as a 
literary motif or monstrous figure, and in fact the word itself, in the sense of “rumor,” appears 
relatively late – a lexical innovation that I discuss below.  Where exactly, then, can a genealogy 
of al-ishāʿa begin? 
 If we begin with the Quran, we find only two derivations of the Arabic verbal root sh-y-ʿ: 
the first, shīʿa (and plural shiyaʿ or ashyāʿ), means “group” or “party.”  The second derivation 
occurs only once, as the verb tashīʿ (“spread”) in the phrase an tashīʿ al-fāḥisha, “that 
vice/scandal spread.”  The Yusuf Ali translation renders the full verse thus: “Those who love (to 
see) / Scandal published broadcast [an tashīʿ al-fāḥisha] / Among the Believers, will have / A 
grievous Penalty in this life / And in the Hereafter: Allah / Knows, and ye know not” (24:19).  
While the verse does evoke certain elements of the modern noun ishāʿa or “rumor,” it is not 
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precisely “a widespread piece of news, the veracity and authorship of which are uncertain” (my 
definition above).  First, the practice described here is not necessarily talk about vice (i.e. 
“Scandal” in Yusuf Ali’s translation-interpretation), but the delight taken in seeing vice spread 
among the Believers.
13
  Thus it is more akin to schadenfreude: the infidels are encouraged to see 
harm befalling their enemies.  Second, if the practice so described does include talk, then it 
would be more akin to gossip, slander, or the specifically “weaponized” form of rumor – that is, 
talk that has a personal target, and whose authorship is not necessarily contested.  Rumor, in 
contrast, does not necessarily take a personal target (it might be a fantastical story about syringes 
in Pepsi cans); it does not necessarily demand a “vice” (fāḥisha) to consume; and issues of 
authorship and veracity are almost always at the foreground.  In the Quran, the semantic domain 
covered by the modern al-ishāʿa is instead spread out among many different words and phrases 
dealing with illicit speech, processes of verification, and demonic seduction. 
 It is for this reason that Islamic religious discourse, when foregrounding “rumor” (al-
ishāʿa) as an object of concern in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, has run into certain 
terminological difficulties.  False Rumors, and How Islam has Combatted Them, a book 
published in 2001 by the then-Shaykh of al-Azhar Muhammad Sayyid Tantawi, provides one 
example.  Tantawi uses the word ishāʿāt throughout the book to describe discursive acts that 
were not so described in the Quran.  Most of his examples of “rumors” – accusations leveled by 
the nonbelievers against various prophets –are closer to what we, following the definitions I set 
above, would call “slander” or “aspersions.”  The Quran deploys a rich vocabulary to describe 
such acts: nouns like zūr, buhtān, namīm, ifk, and verbs like ightāb, lamaz, and ramā, all of 
which are a mix of lying, backbiting, or slander; Tantawi does not distinguish any of these 
                                                 
13 Though of course many tafsir’s, such as that of Ibn Kathir, have interpreted this verse as implying “talk” (kalām) 
about the vices of others, and sometimes more specifically the gossiping or slander about Aisha (ḥadīth al-ifk). 
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systematically, nor does he reveal how they might differ from al-ishāʿa, his preferred term.  
Other contemporary religious works similarly draw on proscriptions against “slander” in the 
Quran and hadith when writing about “rumor.”  Many verses from Sura 49 – especially verse 6, 
“O ye who believe! / If a wicked person comes / To you with any news, / Ascertain the truth, lest 
/ Ye harm people unwittingly” (Yusuf Ali) – are the most commonly deployed, as in Shaykh ʿAli 
Mansur Sanad’s Rumor (al-Ishaʿa, 2009), a pop-sociological book called Rumors and 
Psychological Warfare (ʿAbd al-Hamid and Naguib, 2009), and virtually any Islamic website 
dedicated to the issue.
14
   
None of this is to say that the concept of “rumor” somehow did not exist in early Islam; 
rather, the configuration of the problem, the social and political context in which it was 
presented, and the words used to describe it, were rather different.  In looking for a single 
articulation of a faceless, diffuse and ambiguous discursive phenomenon more closely analogous 
to today’s al-ishāʿa, we must look elsewhere.  To locate this phenomenon in the beginnings of 
Arabic literature, we must look beyond religious texts, beyond speech attributed to human actors, 
and into the spritely figures of folk mythology. 
Some of the most renowned udabāʾ (“men of letters” or “littérateurs”) of the ninth and 
tenth centuries – such as al-Jahiz (781-869), al-Masʿudi (896-956), and Abu Faraj al-Isfahani 
(897–967) – could point to a mythical figure that dramatizes some of the enigmatic 
phenomenology and psychology of “rumor”: al-hātif.  Today in the Arab World, the term has 
been revived – against European lexical competitors – by the guardians of linguistic purity to 
signify “telephone,” but for the epistle-mongers, poets, and chroniclers of centuries past, al-hātif 
                                                 
14 Among these, Sanad (2009) in particular draws on the rich fund of hadith dedicated to calumny and slander.  “He 
who falsely accuses (bahata) a male or female believer, verily God shall blast him into the mud of corruption [ṭīnat 
al-khabāl] until he repents his saying.  And I said: What is ‘the mud of corruption.’  And he said: Pus excreted from 
the vulvae of prostitutes” (34, 122). 
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was an invisible spirit, literally a “caller,” a sub-species of jinn.
15
  The precise nature of this 
creature, indeed its very existence, is disputed in these early sources.  Basically, as al-Masʿudi 
describes it in his compendious Prairies of Gold and Gems of Old (Muruj al-Dhahab wa 
Maʿadin al-Jawhar), al-hātif “calls out in an audible voice, from an unseen body” (v. 3: 323), 
usually to individuals alone out in the wilderness.  In different cases, al-hātif may offer a vision 
of the future, send someone on a quest, or transmit news from distant places.  In the story of the 
famously besotted lover Majnun Layla, as transmitted by al-Isfahani, a hātif that only Majnun 
can hear calls out to him the name of his beloved Layla (v. 2: 54).  In his epistle “Squaring and 
Circling” (“al-Tarbiʿ wa al-Tadwir”), al-Jahiz mentions the “poetry” (ashʿār) recited by the hātif, 
as well as “the news [akhbār] heard at night” (454).  Again in his Book of the Animal (Kitab al-
Hayawan), al-Jahiz speaks of the hātif among the jinn that “transmit news,” sometimes from 
distant places – as when word apparently reached Basra of the death of the Caliph Mansur in 
Mecca – or to lucky individuals served specially by a news-mongering spirit (v. 6: 203). 
 In its uncanny news-transmitting capacity, al-hātif presages the ambiguous origins, 
“magical circulatory virtues,” and other elements that characterize the anonymous species of 
ishāʿāt in modern societies.  Those who hear these voix mystérieuses are never quite certain 
where they come from, whether they are human or jinn.  In the case of Majnun Layla, the 
protagonist is even unable to ascertain whether those around him can hear what he is hearing.  
Such is the question posed by the anonymous rumor: Who said so?  Who or what is the agent 
behind the disembodied voice?  These are not simple questions; they are questions shot through 
with panic, self-doubt, and paranoia.  Locating the origin of a rumor (or al-hātif) is an incredibly 
vexed process, and is usually without fruit to bear.  What it reveals is not the true responsible 
agent behind the noise (if even there is one), but the rhetorical strategies, interpretive practices, 
                                                 
15 See EI article. 
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and deep-seated anxieties of the analyst.  While some readers of rumor will be convinced that it 
is the work of a demonic conspirator, others will have more tolerance for the complexity, and 
even irresolvability, of the phenomenon.  Also like al-ishāʿa, the news of al-hātif spreads with a 
“magical” velocity, reaching, for example, Basra from Mecca in an instant despite the absence of 
modern telecommunications.  Thus it is commonly said, in Arabic as well as English, that rumor 
“spreads like wildfire” (yantashir intishār al-nār fī al-hashīm) or “rolls like a snowball” 
(tatadaḥraj ka-mathali kurat al-thalj). It is a “disease,” it is “viral,” and so on.  Or, rumor seems 
to be the work of angels, demons, “rays,” et cetera.  These are all on par with al-hātif as 
figurations of the enigmatic, unseen agency or agencies that drive rumor.  This common 
perception that rumor is magical or supernatural derives in part from the very real velocity and 
range attained by important and ambiguous news; in part, it derives from the paranoia of the 
analyst or victim of the rumor, who is caught by his inability to grasp the irascible thing either in 
the concrete or the abstract.  It is beyond his control, always controlled by others, and might be 
lurking around the next corner: there it is, gone, fort und da. 
 In addition, these premodern Arabic writings on al-hātif echo what social scientists in the 
twentieth century would later call the “psychology” or rumor.  The question here is “belief” in 
fantastical stories or phenomena, such as those transmitted by al-hātif: news, song, poetry, 
warnings, and so forth.  It is al-Masʿudi, in his Prairies of Gold, who offers the furthest 
speculation on why certain people are “hearing things.”  It is in particular the nomadic Arabs (al-
ʿarab) who hear al-hātif, due to their habit of “isolation in desolate places and seclusion in 
valleys, and their treading into treacherous wasteland and inhospitable wilderness” (323).  Al-
Masʿudi explains that this isolation, during which one is alone with his own thoughts, breeds 
fear, and this fear breeds “false suspicions and harmful black thoughts” (324).  (The “black” 
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[sawdāwiyya] refers to black bile, the melancholic element in the theory of humors; thus it is not 
accurate to call Masʿudi’s approach “psychological”).  In this state, the Arab is delusional, and 
his mind “imagines for him voices and persons and other impossible things” (324).  In a likewise 
manner, investigations into (false or fantastical) rumors in the twentieth century have often 
sought psychological explanations for why certain groups believe them.  Studies such as Allport 
and Postman’s The Psychology of Rumor (1947) and Muhammad Talʿat ʿIsa’s Rumors, and How 
We Can Confront Them (1964) are typical in their reliance on some version of group psychosis as 
an interpretive framework capable of explaining belief in rumors.  When these works – or, more 
often, derivatives of them – are tapped by more reductive-minded politicians and pundits, 
psychology becomes pathology, and naïve (or pathological) belief in rumors is used to establish 
cultural or epistemological hierarchies.  Thus al-Masʿudi separates urban intellectuals like 
himself from the pathologized desert Arab, who sees and hears things that are not really there.  
Certainly, psychology does play a role in the transmission of rumors (or al-hātif), and not a few 
individuals are willing to believe them.  But it is important to remain attentive to the ways in 
which psychological explanations are used to buttress the power of the analyst (and his social 
group), to exaggerate cultural boundaries, or even to create boundaries that do not exist. 
 In the context of this genealogy, the premodern al-hātif can be interpreted as a close 
relative of the ghostly, anonymous, and perhaps pathologically-motivated al-ishāʿa.  Bristling 
with fantastical qualities, it represents, like rumor “pure and absolute,” one extreme on a 
conceptual axis.  Not all rumors are like al-hātif: some are much more mundane, and much less 
mysterious.  Ultimately, while al-hātif can serve as a model to understand some renditions of al-
ishāʿa, the two concepts are not the same, as the former invariably inhabits the supernatural.  In 
the adab texts of the ninth and tenth centuries, we are still at quite a distance from the specific 
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variety of stories, circulations, and epistemologies gathered in the modern noun al-ishāʿa.16 
 The verb ashāʿa (“to spread” or “to broadcast”) needs to answer no progeny test: it is 
there in the Quran, in early Arabic poetry, in premodern adab.  But as late as the thirteenth 
century, when the famed jurist and lexicographer Ibn Manzur (1233-1312) wrote his Lisan al-
ʿArab (The Language of the Arabs), the noun al-ishāʿa (and its later variant al-shāʾiʿa), have yet 
to come into their own as “rumor.”  In this monumental lexicon, Ibn Manzur’s entry for the 
triliteral root sh-y-ʿ includes a wealth of derivations, including the Quranic words for “group” or 
“party” already discussed, words dealing with the urine of camels, and finally the noun shāʿa 
meaning “wide-spread news or information.”  The word is obsolete, however, and its adjectival 
derivatives – as in khabar shāʾiʿ or “a widespread piece of news” – are not qualified with any of 
the negative epistemological or cultural values that sully the modern ishāʿa.  Moreover, Ibn 
Manzur’s entry goes on to explain that a khabar shāʾiʿ (“widespread piece of news”) is that 
which has “spread widely among the people, having reached every one of them equally with no 
individual knowing more of it than another.”  This is quite distinct from “rumor,” which, as al-
hātif, is usually involved in the politics of cultural and epistemological boundary drawing: al-
ishāʿa is usually something which “others” believe, such as women, peasants, foreigners, or the 
gullible.  At the very least, the spread of rumor in society today is thought to follow particular 
paths, usually among the marginal and the subaltern.  If Ibn Manzur’s definition envisions a 
social imaginary in which every individual is “equally” informed – that is, the most perfect 
“public sphere” – al-ishāʿa in our time so often reveals a shattered epistemic terrain, with certain 
groups in-the-know, others strangely gullible, and others in the dark. 
                                                 
16 There are many other paths that a genealogy of al-ishāʿa might take in the domains of early Arabic literature and 
culture, and while I have privileged al-hātif in my discussion, it is perhaps not the most provocative of the fears and 
anxieties of the time as regards talk.  As Samer Ali has rightly informed me, al-washy (“slander” or “divulging”) and 
related concepts feature prominently in classical Arabic literature, as in the story of Majnun Layla, or any number of 
poems.  On these themes in pre- and early Islamic love literature, see Khan (2008). 
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 So in the thirteenth century, the root sh-y-ʿ yields concepts of circulation and information, 
but not necessarily falsity, alterity, or “magic.”  It is not even yet precisely “talk,” since the noun 
and adjective derivations provided by Ibn Manzur refer to news already in circulation, received 
passively (although the form-IV verb ashāʿa could be used in the active sense of “spreading 
news”).  In the few centuries following Ibn Manzur’s lexicon, the word ishāʿa meaning “rumor” 
would, however, eventually come into its own.  When this happened, and under what 
circumstances, are impossible to pinpoint with any accuracy.  It is interesting to note, however, 
that the Syriac root sh-ʿ-aleph (metathesis of Arabic sh-y-ʿ) produces two words that already 
contain the meanings taken over by the modern Arabic ishāʿa.  The first is shūʿītā, meaning 
“talk, discourse, chatter” or “tale, story, fable”; the second is sheʿyā, meaning “a game, a play, 
show, amusement,” “trumpery, nonsense,” or “jesting, mockery.”
17
  It is as if the older Arabic 
sense of “spreading” fused with the Syriac senses of “nonsense” and “discourse” to produce the 
modern Arabic al-ishāʿa: widespread news, the veracity and authorship of which are ambiguous. 
 While this hypothetical moment of semantic fusion cannot be determined, the earliest 
Arabic source in which I have been able to locate the word ishāʿa is the historiographical work 
of Ibn Iyas (1448-1522).  Ibn Iyas is famous today as one of the fathers of Egyptian 
historiography, which he pioneered in his multi-volume Badaʾiʿ al-Zuhur fi Waqaʾiʿ al-Duhur 
(The Marvels of Flowers in the Passing of Hours), a record of events from the beginning of 
Creation to the time of composition, climaxing with a detailed account of the Ottoman conquest 
of Egypt in 1517.  The work is a linear but non-teleological series of chronicles, arranged by year 
and month, and sometimes with day-by-day recountings of major and minor events.  Most 
significantly, the perspective adopted by Ibn Iyas is not that of a court historian, concerned only 
with news of kings and courtiers; the voices, murmurings, and actions of the broader public 
                                                 
17 A Compendious Syriac Dictionary, Founded Upon the Thesaurus Syriacus of R. Payne Smith (1999). 
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resound throughout the text: “[les] rumeurs trouvaient bon accueil dans le texte des Badâ’i’ al-
zuhûr, du fait de la contamination de la chronique par l’adab” as Benjamin Lellouch has 
observed astutely (1995: 127).  In other words, Ibn Iyas’s “history” was very much a dialogic, 
polyvocal text, “contaminated” with the noise of the city’s center, dregs, peripheries, production, 
excess, and waste.
18
  Here is not only ishāʿa, but ishāʿāt (pl.): they proliferate in the pages 
Badaʾiʿ al-Zuhur, in particular during times of social and political unrest.  The rumors he reports 
on include both the “spontaneous” and “weaponized” varieties, that is, rumors that have emerged 
out of popular concerns or speculations, and rumors that are launched as acts of sabotage, 
respectively.  I will give an example of each, and discuss the theoretical issues that they raise. 
In the year 791 A.H. (1389 C.E.), a revolt was launched against the reign of Sultan 
Barquq, the first Egyptian ruler from the “Burji” dynasty of Mamluks, who had recently replaced 
the “Bahri” dynasty.  Amidst the fog of war, conflicting reports were flowing around Cairo about 
the progress of the battles between Barquq and his Mamluk rivals.  Ibn Iyas records a sequence 
of these reports, each introduced by the phrase thumma jāʾat al-akhbār (“Then news came…”); 
in this way, even though these events happened long before the chronicler himself was born, the 
strained temporal frame of the time is preserved to a certain dramatic effect.  There comes news 
of riots and routings in Syria.  There comes news of victory, of defeat, of uncertainty.  For the 
month of Dhu al-Hijja of that year (November-December 1389 C.E.), Ibn Iyas records news that 
“Barquq had been defeated and fled, and that Aynas al-Yusufi [another Mamluk] had his head 
separated from his shoulders” (421).  Upon hearing this, the people of Cairo engaged in 
spontaneous celebrations for three days, adorning their city as if in holiday.  However, the 
chronicler goes on to say, “all this turned out to be fabricated news [akhbār maṣnūʿa], devoid of 
                                                 
18 Azouqa (2011) seems to think that Ibn Iyas’s text is “monophonic” in comparison to his imitator, Gamal al-
Ghitani, whose texts are “polyphonic” (4).  I do not think such an argument can stand. 
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any truth, merely false rumors [ishāʿāt ghayr ṣaḥīḥa], aimed at placating the soldiers, as was 
Mintash’s intended ruse” (421).  Thus Mintash, one of the Mamluk governors who had risen in 
revolt against Barquq, was revealed to be the source of these reports.  He had launched ishāʿāt as 
a weapon of psychological warfare, and he succeeded: the people of Cairo were taken by the 
story, and the soldiers of Barquq were presumably demoralized that their leader had been routed.   
Specifically, rumor is described here as a kind of “ruse” or “trick” (ḥīla), a word which 
has been used in many works of medieval or premodern Arabic adab to describe the subversive 
acts carried out by special classes of beggars, spongers, fools, and thieves.
19
  An elaboration on 
the various “tricks” (ḥiyal) as practiced by beggars, for example, is provided by al-Jahiz in his 
story of Khalid bin Yazid (in al-Bukhalaʾ, “The Book of Misers”): they conspire, feign disability, 
self-mutilate, howl like dogs, and perform “magic” to earn their keep, since society has closed its 
doors on more respectable options.  Although rumor, to my knowledge, was never included 
among the ḥiyal mentioned in works of adab,
20
 it can be useful to think of it in this way, as a tool 
of trickery deployed by social actors unable, or unwilling, to engage in more conventional 
political games.  Modern social theory has found different ways of framing these kinds of tricks.  
Many scholars, such as Michel de Certeau in postmodern theory (1984 [1980]), and Dick 
Hebdige (2007 [1979]) in the study of subcultures, have redeployed Lévi-Strauss’s notion of 
bricolage or “making do”: the tactics used by so-called primitive, subaltern, or ordinary people 
to make their way amidst a society, a natural order, or a technological infrastructure dominated 
                                                 
19 For an exceptional study of these tricks and the “underworlds” of medieval Islam, see Bosworth (1976). 
20 The one possible exception is the jackal Dimna, in Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ’s eighth-century Kalīla wa Dimna, a “mirror 
for princes” collection of animal fables.  Through tricks of the tongue (bi-ḥīlati dhī al-namīma, “the gossip’s ruse” 
[39]), Dimna, in “The Story of the Lion and the Bull,” manages to convince both the lion and the bull that the one is 
plotting against the other, and thus sets the scene for the elimination of his rival.  However, namīma (“gossip”) or 
(“backbiting”) is not the same as ishāʿa (“rumor”), and the act here is not deception through channels of mass 
communication, but through small, private, backroom conspiracy.  A modern revision of Dimna’s story does 




by others.  Certeau, in fact, compares these “microbe-like operations” (xiv) to the medieval 
Arabic ḥiyal.  In addition, Ranajit Guha (1983) and James Scott (1990) have discussed tactics 
like industrial sabotage, jokes, gossip, and rumor as among the “tools of peasant insurgency” and 
the “weapons of the weak,” respectively.  At issue here is what we count as “political,” and how 
we can think of agency, resistance, and subversion beyond the narrow limits posed by self-
defeating theories of hegemony.  These tactics, ḥiyal, or acts of bricolage let us recognize that 
any system of domination or hegemony is not perfect, and that despite the apparent supremacy of 
elites in the realm of political action, there remains a multiplicity of methods open to the 
“dominated” and the “disenfranchised.” 
However, in Ibn Iyas, as well as in twentieth-century Egypt, al-ishāʿa is not just, as Scott 
would have it, a “weapon of the weak” – it is also a weapon of the powerful, the privileged, and 
the politically “dominant.”  It might be the weapon of any range of actors, with varying degrees 
of “power” and “domination,” however we choose to define such terms.  In the case of Mintash, 
rumor is the weapon of a Mamluk governor, one in revolt to be sure, but who is by no means 
weak or subaltern.
21
  At many points in this dissertation, I will discuss what I call the 
“weaponized” variety of rumors, but rather than assume that its agents are marginal and 
disenfranchised (and therefore, in a sense, to be sympathized with), I focus instead on the kind of 
effects it may or may not produce, and what it reveals about the motives, anxieties, aspirations, 
and prejudices of the rumormongers in question.  A famous author like Gamal al-Ghitani, for 
example, may use rumor to subvert the authority of a relative equal whom he secretly admires, or 
detests, for reasons that would not otherwise be gleaned from his public interviews and 
                                                 
21 I have often thought that it might be easier to call the surreptitious lies of the powerful “propaganda,” and the lies 
of the powerless “rumor,” but it is not at all clear to me that the two are any different.  What difference there is lies 
in the wealth of other means available to each group: state actors, for example, will have the entire machinery of 
state media, intelligence agencies, and finances to spread disinformation, while ordinary citizens may only have the 
power of the spoken word. 
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newspaper articles.  Rumor may still be used by marginalized actors, such as bloggers, but it is 
not used by them only. 
In addition to weaponized rumor, Ibn Iyas also gives many examples of the spontaneous 
variety.  On the 24th of Shawwal, 792 A.H. (October 4th, 1390 C.E.) – a Friday – we are told 
that “Cairo and its extremities shook.” Sermons were cut-off in mid-sentence; the prayers of 
worshipers were spoiled; and shops were closed as commercial areas of the city went into a 
virtual lock-down.  This, we are told, was the result of a rumor: “The Princes and the Mamelukes 
have mounted their horses!” Things had still not settled down since the revolt against Barquq.  
Upon hearing this, the citizens of Cairo condensed into a crowd, and it was everyman for 
himself.  People dropped money and handkerchiefs in the commotion, rushing to get home. And 
yet, when the dust settled, “the rumor [al-ishāʿa] turned out to be false.”  How had it all begun?  
The chronicler reports that the rumor, rather than the conscious conceit of a hidden agent like 
Mintash, arose out of a popular misinterpretation of events.  We are told that, near the Citadel, 
two Mamluks had gotten into a quarrel, during which their donkey was set loose and plunged 
headlong into a stable full of horses.  Startled, the horses stampeded through the streets, and this 
strange sight is what witnesses mistook as the mobilization of the Mamluk cavalry. Thus al-
ishāʿa in this case is not a weapon, deliberately launched, but a rather infelicitous act of popular 
interpretation.  It is of the same manner as many of the rumors studied by Farge and Revel in 
eighteenth-century Paris; as in their cases, “the beginning was always the same: a street scene 
interpreted instantaneously and collectively” (1990: 11).  A police officer harasses a youth on the 
corner, and word spreads that the authorities are kidnapping children and sending them to slave 
colonies.  Or, a stable of horses breaks into stampede, and immediately it is said around the city 
that war has broken out again. 
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 However, it is not sufficient simply to point to the falsity of this rumor, to explain it as 
just a silly “misinterpretation.”  For it was a very specific misinterpretation, the poetics of which 
– the poetics of al-ishāʿa – are to be located, as Farge and Revel argue, in the anxieties and 
aspirations of the community, the whole “hotchpotch of culture” (1990: 112), the social and 
political context in which the rumor could gain credibility.  Egypt had been in a state of war 
since the beginning of the revolt against Barquq, and the likelihood of a cavalry assault on Cairo 
was not at all improbable.  Add to this the fact that in the fourteenth century, the country had 
been ravaged by the Black Death, and the population cut in half.  The city’s nervous system was 
in shock, and it would only take the smallest sign of irregularity to force it into a collective 
spasm.  Thus by looking at rumor, we are able to detect, at least in a general sense, the attitudes 
and anxieties which prevailed among the general population of Cairo at this time, and which 
would have remained obscured had Ibn Iyas not opened his ears to the happenings outside the 
walls of the Citadel.  As Lellouch has argued in his study of the chronicler’s account of the 
Ottoman conquest of 1517, rumors like this were included not simply as trivial amusements, but 
in order to provide something like a thick description of “l’état d’esprit qui régnait au Souk” 
(1995: 129). 
 In Badaʾiʿ al-Zuhur, then, the reader encounters al-ishāʿa as a spontaneous expression of 
popular anxieties, and as a weapon of war.  Thus rumor has come into its own as a cultural form, 
a complex human artifact used and abused, and identified in a single word.  In addition, Ibn 
Iyas’s text records how rumor has become a problem, confronted by both the state and 
intellectuals.  We can see this if we continue with the full account of the “cavalry” rumor just 
analyzed.  After the day’s events, the Wali of Cairo arrested “a group of the uncouth masses, 
singling them out for the crime of “speaking of that which is not his business” (yatakallam fīmā 
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lā yaʿnīh). They were beaten publicly, and the people of Cairo were given a stern warning: “he 
who does not mind his own business will be flogged, and struck with nails” (man taḥaddatha 
fīmā lā yaʿnīhi ḍuriba bil-maqāriʿ wa summira).  This was certainly not the first time in history 
that subversive speech was corporally punished.  For us, its significance lies in its demonstration 
of some of the perennial tropes and tensions in rumor combat.  The first line of attack on this 
ishāʿa is launched by the state: the spectacular punishment of a select group.  In one sense, this is 
a rhetorical strategy: the diffuse problem of rumor is reduced to the actions of a small group, and 
their bodies are used as an example to warn other would-be talkers.  In another sense, this 
punishment is an act of discursive and epistemological hierarchization, whereby the Wali of 
Cairo is able to assert his supremacy.  The Wali has the authority to cast subversive speech as 
“rumor,” the talk of the city dregs (ardhāl al-ʿāmma); his words, by contrast, are truth itself. 
 The second confrontation with rumor as a problem is performed by Ibn Iyas himself in 
the text.  Rumors are uncanny stretches of discourse, offering no explanations themselves on 
their progeny, purpose, or trajectory.  In this case al-ishāʿa is said to have “flown” (ṭārat) all 
throughout Cairo, from center to periphery and back again; but its exact cause remains as a 
question, a problem for the analyst to solve.  The chronicler offers his explanation as fact: two 
Mamluks quarreled, their donkey was set loose, and the horses were frightened into a stampede 
through the streets.  It is a peculiar explanation.  The kind of comical butterfly effect it describes 
(disputeloose donkeystampede of horsesrumorstampede of people) is a common trope 
in folk etiologies, and features elsewhere in Badaʾiʿ al-Zuhur.   In the previous year (791A.H.), 
for example, a legendary feud between two villages is described and traced back to a drop of 
honey, which attracted a wasp, which attracted a cat, which attracted a dog, and an issuing fight 
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in the market (421).
22
  There are of course other ways in which the rumor could have been 
interpreted.  A focus on mass psychology, rather than the causal chain leading to the horses; the 
detection of a plot or hidden agent behind the scenes, responsible for launching the rumor as a 
weapon; the concordance of various popular narratives and expectations about cavalries: these 
are just some of the possible alternative interpretations.  But Ibn Iyas has resorted to the 
interpretive practice closest at hand, which I have called the butterfly effect, or comical folk 
etiology.  To study the confrontation with rumor, then, can reveal several things.  It reveals, in the 
case of Ibn Iyas, a particular interpretive disposition that is not specific to rumor, but is practiced 
more generally and applied to other phenomenon, such as the village feud.  Ibn Iyas has a 
general disposition to deploy folk etiologies; other analysts may tend towards a paranoid style of 
interpretation, which rests on the figure of the conspirator.  In addition, the confrontation with 
rumor reveals a particular way in which an individual or group, such as the Wali of Cairo, 
attempts to reassert his discursive authority in a time of social crisis. 
Badaʾiʿ al-Zuhur represents a significant development in the genealogy of al-ishāʿa.  It 
is, first of all, one of the first Arabic texts where the word appears in its modern sense of 
widespread, anonymous, uncertain news.  It is unlikely that the lexical innovation occurred 
during Ibn Iyas’s time.  The events I have analyzed in his chronicles occur in the late fourteenth 
century; if Ibn Manzur’s lexicon earlier in the thirteenth century did not include the word in the 
sense familiar to Ibn Iyas, then perhaps it is in this period that it began gaining currency.  More 
important than the word itself is the range of concerns exhibited in the text.  Rumor is an 
enigmatic text, a spontaneous eruption and a weapon, and a problem to be combatted and 
interpreted.  Rumor is here, in Badaʾiʿ al-Zuhur, for the same reasons it appeared in Henry IV, 
                                                 
22 A folk etiology, remarkably similar to the one Ibn Iyas gives for the rumor, was used to explain the Great Chicago 




Part 2: social and political turmoil, war, and rebellion.  In fact, the noisy rebellion against 
Barquq in 1389 C.E. very neatly coincides with the rumor-mediated troubles of the historical 
Henry IV, who managed to thwart an insurrection at the Battle of Shrewsbury in 1403 C.E., the 
occasion for Rumor’s entrance in Shakespeare’s play.  Another reason for the appearance of 
ishāʿāt in Badaʾiʿ al-Zuhur must also be the perspective of the chronicler himself, whose ears 
and eyes were open to the wider acoustic economy of the city.  There is a concern for public 
opinion of a kind, the vicissitudes of mass communications, and the noise that might shake and 
fracture an entire city.  These are very modern concerns, and it is from here that al-ishāʿa makes 
its entrance in Arabic history and literature. 
 From here, a study of rumor in Egyptian public culture could turn to any number of 
cultural forms at many different periods.  The genre of historiography pioneered by Ibn Iyas 
would be adopted by countless others from his time through the nineteenth century.  Al-Jabarti 
(1753-1825), for example, followed the earlier chronicler’s penchant for recording popular 
rumors in his ʿAjaʾib al-ʾAthar fi al-Tarajim wa al-Akhbar or History of Egypt.  One might also 
wish to consider further nahḍa-era writers, journalists, and social reformers like ʿAbd Allah al-
Nadim (1845-1896), for whom the khurāfāt or “superstitions” of the lower classes, and the 
ishāʿāt spread among newspaper readers in cafes, became an object of concern.  At the turn of 
the century, as Timothy Mitchell has noted, “noise and confusion” became a common 
civilizational anxiety for writers like Muhammad ʿUmar (d. 1918 or 1919) when bemoaning the 
backwardness of Egyptian society (1988: 117-119).  A study of rumor might also consider in 
greater depth the cartoon character Ishaʿa Hanim (“Dame Rumor”) drawn by the caricaturist 
Alexander Sarukhan in the early 1940s.  Ishaʿa Hanim, who disappeared at the end of the Second 
World War, was a significant “embodiment” of rumor in an Arabic context that resonates vaguely 
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with the distant al-hātif.  “She” also was a female, and a foreigner, and thus performed a 
common stereotype of illicit speech as “other” in terms of gender and ethnicity.  There are many 
other branches that one may include in a genealogy of al-ishāʿa.   
 However, I have chosen to focus in this dissertation on different sites and scenes in 
Egyptian public culture beginning with July 23, 1952.  There are two principle reasons for this 
focus.  The first is that this date marks the beginning of military rule in Egypt.  While ishāʿāt 
certainly existed as a weapon and as an object of intellectual concern prior to this date, the new 
regime can be said to be responsible for a new profusion of writings on, investigations into, and 
uses of the phenomenon in Egyptian public culture.  This would be evident in the new national 
political language crafted by the Free Officers, who in the early years of the revolution, and 
subsequently, spoke often of the threat of ishāʿāt to their “blessed movement,” and identified 
them among the many plots and conspiracies hatched by colonialist and feudalist interests.  In 
December, 1953, Anwar Sadat published a lengthy article on what he called a “new weapon” 
(silāḥ gadīd): “rumors” spread by traitors and conspirators.
23
  Earlier that year, among the many 
show trials staged at the Revolutionary Tribunal, the public prosecutor brought before the judges 
what he called “a new kind of accusation and a new type of accused” (lawnan gadīdan min al-
ittihām wa nawʿan gadīdan min al-muttahamīn): three individuals charged with “spreading 
rumors” (Kayra 1953: 354).  If rumor was not “new,” it was certainly being presented that way, 
as a threat that ordinary people might not quite understand, or grasp the danger it presented.  The 
word al-ishāʿa still meant the same thing as when it was used by Ibn Iyas, but in addition, it was 
now becoming a kind of homogenizing metaphor for all manner of subversive speech, anything 
the regime did not want to hear and could not quite control.  The irony, or the hypocrisy, of this 
new problem was that the Free Officers were in many ways responsible.  They themselves spread 
                                                 
23 Al-Gumhuriyya, 12/7/1953. 
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rumors, lies, and fabrications of all sorts.
24
  But even more important was the culture of secrecy 
that the army had brought with them from the barracks to the organs of state and society.  The 
level of secrecy imposed on the workings of the state, its actors and archives and agencies, has 
not remained the same from 1952 through the present; however, it has, with varying degrees of 
severity, remained a constant feature of authoritarian regimes in Egypt since then.  This has left 
many events of the past and present accessible to the majority of citizens only through 
speculation, gossip, and rumor; al-ishāʿa, in different forms, has as a result become a continual 
presence in Egyptian public culture. 
 The second reason for my focus on the period beginning in 1952 is the flourishing of 
social scientific interest in rumor around this time.  It is here, in the middle of the twentieth 
century, that the Arabic al-ishāʿa intersects most closely with the English “rumor” in conceptual 
and scientific terms.  While it was not the first work of its kind, Gordon Allport and Leo 
Postman’s The Psychology of Rumor (1947) proved to be seminal, serving as a touchstone for 
later sociological and social-psychological approaches to the topic.  Allport’s interest in rumors 
had begun at least in 1942 when, in coordination with the United States government, he 
established what were called “rumor clinics”: diagnoses, explanations, and denials printed in 
national newspapers against widely circulating stories deemed false.  As Neubauer has argued, 
Allport and Postman’s 1947 book, and a number of other social scientific works on the topic, 
were very much the product of the clinics and parallel campaigns in the military.  That is, the 
inception of rumor scholarship arose out of a desire for combat and control; the knowledge 
produced on the subject cannot be considered independently of this fact.  The first book-length 
                                                 
24 The regime’s complicity in such activities is common knowledge.  It was also revealed by Salah Nasr, in a book 
published in 1973. Nasr, the head of Egypt’s General Intelligence Agency until his scandalous fall in the “Case of 
the Dereliction of the Intelligence Services” (qaḍiyya inḥirāf al-mukhābarāt) in 1968, refers casually to “scientific 
methods for spreading rumors” (ṭuruq ʿilmiyya li-nashr al-shāʾiʿāt) as part of the training received by intelligence 
officers (1975: 122). 
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study of ishāʿāt (or rather shāʾiʿāt, a newer synonym) was published in Egypt in 1964, and was 
motivated by this same desire: it was entitled Rumors, and How We Can Confront Them (ʿIsa 
1964).  The appearance of such a book in Arabic, and its successors (cf. Tantawi 2001), thus 
needs to be considered in a global context of “anti-rumor” campaigns lead by governments and 
social scientists around the world.  At the same time, however, this book was responding to a 
problem conceived locally as a threat to a regime’s plans for development and discursive 
hegemony.  Its purpose, along with related scholarship, polemics, and prosecutions, was to 
achieve total control over nature and society.  Its effects, perhaps, amounted to no more, and no 
less, than the manufacturing of an increasingly strident association between “Egyptians” or 
“Egyptian society” on the one hand, and “rumors,” gossip, and idle talk on the other.  Rumor 
would certainly exist without works by ʿIsa and Tantawi.  However, its positioning as a problem, 
and the view that it was in a sense peculiar to Egypt (and in particular the noisy “masses”), could 
not have been achieved without this violent discursive work.  
It is at this confluence of state secrecy, authoritarianism, and social scientific interest, that 
we notice a new attention given to al-ishāʿa in the years and decades following July, 1952.  This 
does not entirely explain why ʿAmr Adib, in the quotation above, said that “Egypt is a country of 
rumors,” but it helps us begin to understand the broader historical, social, and political context in 
which he was speaking.  Of course al-ishāʿa would not remain the “same” problem, or remain 
equally on the minds of all users and consumers of mass media for sixty years: in each of the 
chapters of this dissertation, a slightly different meaning, use, or problematization of rumor will 
emerge, and this can only be clarified in context.  Nonetheless, when al-ishāʿa does appear, the 
tension it provokes in a community of speakers is of a recurring, and probably unresolvable, 
nature.  This tension derives from the power, real or perceived, of widespread, false or fantastical 
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speech.  If the bulk of government, religious, and social scientific writing on al-ishāʿa has 
warned repeatedly that this power is negative and destructive, a closer and more careful look at 
the phenomenon as it is used and abused in different contexts will help reveal its ethical and 




The Latin word “rumor” signified “noise,” and while in English the two terms are not 
synonymous, I use the latter in order to think about the ethical and political ambivalence of the 
former (al-ishāʿa).  “Noise” has a relatively recent provenance in Western social theory, and it is 
perhaps no surprise that, roughly at the same time that social psychologists like Allport and 
Postman were agonizing over rumor, scholars in information theory were coming to a similar 
problem of their own.  The mathematician Claude Shannon, the founder of information theory, 
was probably the first to use “noise” in a technical sense; J.R. Pierce was responsible for 
popularizing the term, which he defined thus: “Any undesired disturbance in a signaling system, 
such as, random electric currents in a telephone system.  Noise is observed as static or hissing in 
radio receivers and as ‘snow’ in TV” (1961: 291).  From this early definition, limited to the 
materiality of communication infrastructures, noise has since been taken by scholars in different 
areas of the humanities and social sciences as a metaphor for disturbances in semiotic, social, or 
political systems.  It is often contrasted to the legible “messages,” “sounds,” “signals,” or “sense” 
of more dominant or mainstream actors: noise is nonsense, confusion, and chaos; it is not 
necessarily a message of its own, but serves rather to interrupt or interfere with the workings of a 
message system, ideology, or technological infrastructure already in place. 
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 Dick Hebdige, for example, has theorized “noise” as “the challenge to the symbolic 
order” posed by subcultural styles like punk, rap, Rastafarianism, and so forth (2007: 133).  To 
dominant social classes, these noisy styles function “not only as a metaphor for potential anarchy 
‘out there’ but as an actual mechanism of semantic disorder: a kind of temporary blockage in the 
system of representation” (90).  In this sense, noise is thought of as a mode of resistance.  It may 
not be entirely conscious, but it forces the dull and complacent members of the bourgeoisie to 
stop work as normal and, the hope is, recognize the contingency of their own style.  At its best, 
noise of this kind throws a symbolic shoe into the regular workings of mass media and 
consumerism, and forces it to reorganize to accommodate or even celebrate the noise makers.  At 
its worst, a noisy style will provoke a clampdown by authorities; however, even in this case, the 
clampdown often leads to an exacerbation (or flourishing) of the noise, and a weakening the anti-
noise authorities.  In another context, Brian Larkin has opposed “signals” – “media and modes of 
rule” – to “noise” – “the unstable consequences media bring about” (2008: 10).  Noise can refer 
to the “interference produced by religious and cultural values, the historic configurations in 
which technologies and cultural forms are made manifest” (Ibid.). Popular superstitions, for 
example, may present a kind of noise or interference to the construction of a movie theater or 
railroad, as they cause people to fear the unknown functions of these technologies and thus avoid 
or sabotage them.  Or, an educational film may encounter the “noise” of an audience whose 
familiar frames of reference and stock of cultural forms prevent them from “receiving the 
message” as intended.   
Rumor might constitute noise in any of these interrelated senses of interference and 
instability.  In an authoritarian context, the patriarch’s attempts to communicate with the masses 
may be frustrated by popular rumors of his corruption, illegitimacy, or false intentions.  Rumors 
37 
 
might distract people’s minds with exaggerations and trivial details, and keep them from 
following the patriarch’s frequent speeches and calls to attention.  Rumors may even confuse the 
patriarch himself, as he receives a barrage of conflicting reports and speculations from his 
network of advisors and intelligence officers.  Of course, these concerns are not unique to an 
authoritarian context.  Even in more democratic societies, rumors are “noise” to the rational, 
deliberative proceedings of the public sphere.  If al-ishāʿa delivers false or frivolous information, 
it is feared that ordinary citizens will be unable to make informed decisions, come to reasonable 
solutions, or realize their true interests.  As such, the noise of rumors represents a kind of false 
consciousness, whose victims are driven to self-defeating actions.  The noise may be innocuous 
too, but in large doses and in high frequencies, it would seem to be nothing but chaos, negativity, 
and disorder whatever the order may be, democratic or authoritarian.   
Noise is essentially a negative, destructive force; however, as Hebdige has argued, noise 
can also deliver positive, or what I will call affirmative, outcomes.  This ambivalence 
surrounding noise, and in particular the unexpected affirmative function of a destructive force, is 
central to Michel Serres’s philosophy of parasite (French for “parasite” and “noise”):  an 
intractable but potentially beneficial nuisance to systems whether human, animal, technological, 
or all three.  Parasite, according to Serres, is more than interference, it is a figure for he who 
“has the last word, who produces disorder and generates a different order” (1982: 15).  The 
question which noise constantly poses is: “are we in the pathology of systems or in their 
emergence and evolution?” (14). That is, does the parasite destroy the host, or does it make him 
stronger and more in harmony with his environment? Serres admits that he doesn’t know, but 
with a quixotic French optimism, he prefers to think it is the latter.   
 Serres’s project is a philosophical one, concerned less with the noise on the street than the 
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noise of the gradual evolution of the order of things.  Its ethical and political ambivalence – 
accented with an irrepressible optimism – can, nonetheless, be useful when thinking about the 
relative destructive and affirmative potentials of rumor.  Certainly al-ishāʿa destroys: it destroys 
truth, reputations, unity, coherence.  But it also affirms.  An argument which may be articulated 
in these terms was made by Georges Lefebvre in what is probably the most famous social history 
written of a rumor.  In his book The Great Fear of 1789 (1973 [1932]), Lefebvre intricately 
traces the social, political, and economic currents which lead to the eruption of a panic (La 
Grande Peur) in revolutionary France.  The panic was most immediately the result of rumors 
about impending attacks by “brigands” on farms, villages, and towns across the country.  The 
rumors were false: they lead to chaos, to riots, to the burning of chateaus, to some deaths.  Thus 
they were destructive.  However, Lefebvre argues that these rumors were significant more for the 
unexpected positive results they produced.  The fear “almost always suspended or diminished 
municipal disagreements instead of causing them” (203); it “tightened the bonds of solidarity 
which linked the town and countryside as well as the towns themselves” (Ibid.); and it lead the 
members of the Third Estate to reach “a deeper realization of their own strength and power” 
(204).  The revolution was not destroyed by these rumors, it was emboldened by them, as 
significant numbers organized themselves in arms against the phantom brigands. 
 Rumor, as noise, is involved in the irony of outcomes.  In the moment of their outbreak, 
of course, it is impossible to determine their relative destructive or affirmative powers.  At the 
very least, as Serres suggests, the attempt to violently eradicate the problem will prove worse 
than any destruction wrought by the noise itself: the parasitic infestation will spread, and the host 
will be killed.  Like Serres, I do not know in advance if ishāʿāt are pathological or productive, 
but I would like to remain open to the latter.  In the chapters of this dissertation, I pose the 
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question of rumor’s ethics and politics repeatedly, in different contexts.  I cannot assume that the 
parasite is an essentially destructive or affirmative force.  I aim for a suspension of the evaluative 
urge, which so often forecloses investigation into the complexity of things like rumor, and forces 
us to miss a full appreciation of the noise of the world. 
 
DIVISION OF CHAPTERS 
 
My dissertation is divided into three Parts, each of which investigates a different field of public 
culture in modern Egypt.  I have chosen these three fields – the rhetoric and performances of 
state actors; the literature of Gamal al-Ghitani; and cyberspace – not because I believe they are 
especially prone to fantasy, distortion, and rumor, but because, for different reasons, they often 
appear to be, or have been framed as, places especially rich in the arts and politics of al-ishāʿa.  I 
have used the term “public culture” to encompass all these fields, because they are not totally 
separate, whether in time or in space.
25
  Many of the politicians and events covered in Part 1, 
such as Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anwar Sadat, and Husni Mubarak, reappear in caricature in Part 2 
when I read literature by Gamal al-Ghitani.  Conversely, I also use the literary texts of al-Ghitani 
in Part 1 for purposes of contextualization and historical documentation.  Also, while Part 3 
investigates performances in “cyberspace,” the events and personalities I cover overlap with 
many of those discussed in a different field in Part 1 and Part 2.  While in this dissertation I 
analyze some of the most well-known figures in Egyptian politics, literature, and history, the 
                                                 
25 “Public culture” was a term proposed by Arjun Appadurai and Carol Breckenridge in the inaugural issue of the 
journal Public Culture (1988).  This is theorized not as a definite social space or set of practices, but as a capacious, 
cacophonous arena in which the unhelpful dichotomies of “high versus low culture; mass versus elite culture; and 
popular or folk versus classical culture” – as well as “national” versus “international” or “transnational” culture – are 
dispensed with, or shown to be constantly contested and refigured by the actors, technologies, and cultural forms 
that interact in public life. See Appadurai and Breckenridge, “Why Public Culture?” (1988).   
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texts, performances and events I encounter belong overwhelmingly to an uncharted domain in 
the lives and works of these actors with, in, and against rumor. 
Part 1 of my dissertation investigates the emergence and re-emergence of ishāʿāt as a 
problem for the projects and personalities of the Egyptian state since 1952, and is divided into 
three chapters.  While the practices that may be grouped under the label “combatting rumors” are 
no less numerous and complex that the object itself (rumor), I focus only on the historical 
moments when this combat between the state and its demons has been noisiest.  This is a study 
of rhetoric, social drama, and interpretive styles.  Chapter 1, “Revolution against Rumors,” 
locates the emergence of rumor as an object of state discipline in the context of the July 
Revolution of 1952.  Through a reading of texts by Muhammad Naguib and Anwar Sadat during 
the period 1952-1954, I analyze the rhetorical and dramatic strategies deployed by the Free 
Officers against rumors, assessing their relative success, and explaining their frequent failure.  In 
Chapter 2, “Paranoia and the Plan,” I analyze what is most likely the first book-length study of 
rumor in modern Egypt: Muhammad Talʿat ʿIsa’s Rumors, and How We Can Confront Them, 
published in 1964.  In my reading of the book, I investigate the historical and psychological 
underpinnings of the “paranoid style” of interpretation commonly deployed against rumor.  The 
repeated detection of a plot or conspiracy behind ishāʿāt, I argue, can be understood in part as the 
analyst’s psychological projection of his ideal notion of agency onto the enemy.  Finally, Chapter 
3, “All the President’s Parasites,” examines how regime representatives responded to rumors 
about the death of President Mubarak in 2007.  I analyze the rhetorical and interpretive practices 
deployed against the rumors, as well as the anxieties that motivate them, in order to compare and 
contrast this “rumor combat” with that of earlier decades.  In these chapters, I analyze rumor as a 
problem, and the reactions to it, mostly avoiding analysis of rumors themselves as cultural forms 
41 
 
– unless for the purposes of contextualization –  which is the focus of my analysis in Parts 2 and 
3. 
 In the chapters of Part 2, I perform close readings of two novels by Gamal al-Ghitani: 
Tales of the Foundation (1997) and Tales of the Treasure Trove (2002).  In many of his novels, 
and especially these two, al-Ghitani has the same acute kind of aesthetic and political sensitivity 
to rumors as the chronicler Ibn Iyas.  The novelist’s view, however, is of the present, and in 
particular the noisy domain of cultural politics in Egypt’s mid-to-late twentieth century.  By 
turning to literature in these chapters, I am able to register the complexity of rumor as a cultural 
form, both spontaneous and weaponized, and assess its ethics and politics.  Chapter 4 focuses on 
a character in the novels called ʿAtiyya Beh, also known as “the Rumormonger.”  I take this 
character as a locus for analyzing what I call the “rhetoric of the rumormonger” – the strategies 
he employees to spread fantastical tales.  I will then turn to an analysis of the rumors themselves, 
unraveling the narrative and psychological threads that constitute their poésie fabuleuse.  In 
Chapter 5, I investigate rumors in relation to the cultural of secrecy, dubbed “the Age of 
Occultation,” that consumes the life of the novels’ characters.  Employees in the fictional 
Foundation, I suggest, are “seduced” by those who are at once looming over them and obscured 
by secrecy.  For many employees, rumor operates here as the pleasurable uncovering of secrets 
about these seductive objects and figures.  By such means, too, they seek to extend their control 
over those who control them.  These rumors also express pervasive fantasies and fears, shot 
through with a not unreasonable amount of “facts.”  Finally, in Chapter 6, I place these two 
novels in their specific social and historical context to reveal how they operate as the author’s 
own performance of rumormongering. Many of the employees of the “Foundation” are thinly-
veiled caricatures of the major players in Egyptian cultural politics that al-Ghitani has rubbed up 
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against in the Akhbar al-Yawm Foundation (the media conglomerate that owns Akhbar al-Adab, 
the literary journal he launched and edited for nearly twenty years) and the Ministry of Culture.  
Thus the “Founder,” for example, stands in for the legendary newspaper tycoon Mustafa Amin, 
just as “Fayruz Bahari” stands in for Faruq Husni, the former Egyptian Minister of Culture.  I 
propose three overlapping readings of the novels as rumormongering. 
 In Part 3, I investigate some of the productive intersections between rumor and humor in 
Egyptian cyberspace.  In much of history, in social scientific scholarship, and in the preceding 
two Parts, al-ishāʿa has been inflected with grave undertones, and kept carefully insulated from 
the conceptual echo of laughter.  There are good reasons for this.  Rumor is destructive, as one 
cannot tire of pointing out, and the damage it inflicts on its victims is anything but pleasant.  
Rumor also would appear to belong to the dogmatic, those who stubbornly refuse to step back 
and enlighten their superstitious beliefs with a little irony.  The terrain of rumor is bleak, as are 
all those who catch it in the ear.  And yet, it is important, I argue, to complicate this picture 
considerably.  Keeping an ear open for the peal of laughter that infuses rumormongering will 
reveal that it is a practice often taken up in jest.  The rumormonger is not naïve, nor is he single-
minded; he may be ambivalent, uncertain, optimistic, pessimistic, technical, or artistic; he may 
be all of these at once.  Moreover, a careful consideration of humor allows space for noticing the 
affirmative functions of rumor, rather than its much bemoaned allegiance to evil.  Rumor can 
destroy, it does destroy, but it also generates possibility, explores alternatives to the status quo, 
and serves as a catalyst for innovative cultural and political forms. 
 My analysis here centers on performances in the “playground” of the Egyptian 
blogosphere and its environs, and I make a number of claims for the affirmative, subversive, or 
transformative functions of these performances.  In Chapter 7, I followed the many iterations and 
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operations of the blogging campaign “Mubārak Māt,” elaborating on theories of “play” to 
accurately describe the attitude of the performers, their sense of space, and the transformative 
potential of their work.  For these artists, play is not belief or dangerous fantasy, it is an 
experimentation with fictions grounded in the real.  It is also a self-reflexive mode, as the artists 
adopt at different moments varying evaluative stances towards themselves, their musical and 
cultural intertexts, the rumors, and President Mubarak.  I insist on the tangible aesthetic and 
political consequences of Mubārak Māt, arguing that it actualizes the fiction it performs, as it 
releases the artists and their audience from the most significant signs of Mubarak’s presence.  
While rumor destroys one reality, it also creates another, and it is this positive, generative aspect 
that needs to be acknowledged.  In Chapter 8, by contrast, I readmit the destructive potential of 
rumor, but investigate an alternative means of confronting it through parody.  Rumors about the 
revolutionary activist Wael Ghonim present a threat to his sympathizers, but they respond in a 
creative fashion.  Parody, as performed by the graphic artist Ashraf Hamdi, includes both 
negative critique and positive play.  Thus while it remains committed to a progressive politics, it 
also blissfully incorporates the paranoid style of rumor into its own work. 
 In closing, I would like to offer a final note on the organization of the dissertation.  While 
the three Parts are interconnected, and most amenable to a straightforward, linear reading, there 
remain more promiscuous links, resonances, trap doors, and slippages that connect each to the 
others.  For al-ishāʿa is not just my object of investigation, it is also the investigation itself.  
Rumor can be a guide for an alternative mode of reading, one that takes seriously the 
hypertextual and the rhizomatic, and the paranoid, to spread across the otherwise hermetically-
sealed boundaries of individual cultural forms, divided from each other both as individual texts 
and in disciplinary terms as “literature,” “sociology,” “religion” and so forth.  In this dissertation, 
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I treat these divisions as largely artificial, as impediments to following the fluidity and 
metamorphoses of the objects of concern.  Thus not only do literary texts by Gamal al-Ghitani 
“interfere” to clarify issues I raise in a reading of newspapers and government communiques, but 
so do many of the figures introduced in my “genealogy” of al-ishāʿa, in particular al-Jahiz, break 
out into my analyses of more contemporary texts.  These rumor-like loops and connections are 
important in order to break out of any excessively cramped notions of cultural and historical 
specificity that may attempt to assert themselves.  They are also important to resist the closure of 












PART 1  
 
CHASING THE PARASITE: STRATEGIES AND STYLES OF “COMBATTING RUMORS” 
IN POSTCOLONIAL EGYPT 
 
 
The strategies of intervention, the interruption of the process or of the thing, observation 
that seeks to clarify… all make complexity increase, the price of which increases 
astronomically. A new obscurity accumulates in unexpected locations, spots that had 
tended toward clarity; we want to dislodge it but can only do so at ever-increasing prices 
and at the price of a new obscurity, blacker yet, with a deeper, darker shadow. Chase the 
parasite – he comes galloping back, accompanied, just like the demons of an exorcism, 
with a thousand like him, but more ferocious, hungrier, all bellowing, roaring, clamoring. 
(Serres 1982: 18) 
 
 
How and why does a state, a regime, or an individual come to chase the parasite – noise or 
rumor?  Doubtless, the process has repeated itself countless times among any and all social 
groups caught up in even the most basic forms of information politics.  In the “Introduction,” I 
examined one instance, recorded by Ibn Iyas, when “rumors” (ishāʿāt) provoked a spectacular 
disciplinary response by the authorities in fourteenth-century Cairo.  Globally, the policing of 
rumor has been noted as an organized activity in ancient Rome, where it was carried out by a 
special class of delatores (Guha 1999: 251); ancient India, where it was among the princely 
duties described in the Arthashastra, a treatise on statecraft (Ibid.: 252); and of course the 
“rumor clinics” described by Allport and Postman (1947) and Neubauer (1999) in the United 
States in the twentieth century.  Such cases could be multiplied endlessly.  However, the precise 
articulation of the problem, the measures taken against it, and the very conception of rumor 
(however vague), cannot be claimed as constants across all contexts.  There is a specificity to the 
plans and practices of “combatting rumors” in postcolonial Egypt, whose basic elements can be 
traced in connection with some of the major political, social, and linguistic ruptures of the 
twentieth and twenty-first centuries. 
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Part 1 analyzes the rhetorical and interpretive practices commonly deployed by state 
actors against rumor, as well as the anxieties that motivate them, while assessing the 
consequences of this “combat.”  As both scholarly and polemical works on rumor have often 
noted, this combat is risky business.  “The negative rhetoric of denial,” as Neubauer observes, 
“often has the exactly opposite effect from the one intended” (1999: 130): in denying a rumor, 
one necessarily repeats it.  Muhammad Talʿat ʿIsa, an anti-rumor strategist writing in the 1960s, 
recognizes that the problem requires a more nuanced approach, since “fire cannot not be fought 
with fire” (or iron with iron, as in the Arabic) (1964: 133).  “Confronting rumors,” he contends, 
is as much an “art” (fann) (114) as it is a science, and only through a careful mix of personal 
intuition, “cultural sociology,” and “psychology,” can the “poison” of rumor be expunged from 
the social body (134).  These remarks resonate with the warning issued by Michel Serres in the 
above passage on “chasing the parasite.”  Going after the noise, especially when this entails the 
use of violence and a vision of total eradication, inevitably leads to the exacerbation of the 
problem.  Rumor, this recalcitrant parasite, devours the too-eager agents of combat. 
 The difficulties are no less for the analyst of rumor combat than they are for its 
practitioners.  When Anwar Sadat, Shaykh Tantawi, or Muhammad Talʿat ʿIsa – to mention only 
a few figures analyzed in the following chapters – speak of ishāʿāt, what is it precisely that they 
are talking about?  Are the rumors they speak of really “rumors” – that is, wide-spread, false, 
anonymous speech – and do they circulate as far and wide as they claim?  It is necessary for the 
reader of these anti-rumor texts to maintain a measure of skepticism, for, as many have observed, 
“rumor” has a tendency to be exaggerated, if not totally imagined, by its victims.  There are two 
principle reasons for this exaggeration.  First, as Patricia Meyer Spacks has argued, the “anxiety 
aroused by gossip [or rumor] derives partly from its incalculable scope, [as one] can never know 
47 
 
quite where it goes, whom it reaches, how it changes in transmission, how and by whom it is 
understood” (1985: 6).  The rumored-about individual, possessed by this anxiety, can quite easily 
begin to “hear things” that have not been said.  Going even further, Madame de Saint-Ange, 
speaking in the Marquis de Sade’s Philosophy in the Boudoir, advises her protégé to ignore 
popular gossip, as it is nothing but “hallucinatory scorn” (2007: 221): it does not exist, or have 
the effects, that one imagines it to have.  A second reason for the exaggeration of rumors, 
especially in the police and intelligence services, is the reward one may receive for their 
detection.  Darcy Grimaldo Grigsby has made this observation about France under Napoleon, 
where, for the police, “the expectation that conspiracy lurked behind each wall led to a pressure 
to reports subversive activities [like rumor] even if they did not exist,” and thus “police agents 
fictionalized rumors and dissent in order to be credited with their discovery” (1995: 33).  The 
fictionalization, or at least exaggeration, of rumor, is probably no less rewarding to the social 
scientist or polemicist, for whom the problematization of an unseen phenomenon offers a 
considerable amount of interpretive authority. 
 For these reasons, in the chapters that follow, I am more concerned with the reactions to 
rumor, than I am with the rumors themselves as identifiable cultural forms, or objects of positive 
knowledge.  I nonetheless discuss many rumors, where the historical documentation allows, in 
order to provide context for particular campaigns of combat.  An emphasis on the strategies and 
styles of “combatting rumors” allows us to better understand the minutiae of state power, its 
fragilities, and the anxieties that possess its actors in postcolonial Egypt.  In Chapter 1, for 
example, my focus is on the rhetoric deployed by the Free Officers against what they called 
ishāʿāt.  Investigating the relative success or failure of these rhetorical strategies offers important 
insights into the fledgling regime’s construction of discursive authority during the chaos and 
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confusion of the early revolutionary period.  In Chapter 2, through a close reading of Muhammad 
Talʿat ʿIsa’s book Rumors, and How we can Confront Them (1964), my investigation into the 
“paranoid style” that the author uses against rumors reveals the psychological underpinnings of 
this common interpretive practice.  Finally, Chapter 3 combines the insights of the previous two 
chapters to analyze the Mubarak regime’s attempt to combat rumors in 2007. 
 A final comment on the organization of these chapters is necessary before proceeding.  I 
have framed Part 1 as an investigation into rumor combat in “postcolonial” Egypt, not because I 
believe this to be an accurate label for a period of time or for an episteme, ideology, or mindset 
that prevails during this time, but because, in most of the examples I discuss below, “combatting 
rumors” is framed by its practitioners as a confrontation with colonialism.  When Muhammad 
Naguib combats ishāʿāt in the 1950s, and when Muhammad Talʿat ʿIsa “confronts” and analyzes 
them in the 1960s, they are in nearly every case attributed to al-mustaʿmir, “the colonizer.” 
(Mubarak’s rhetors, discussed in Chapter 3, do not usually make this connection, but they insist 
on the related idea of a plot or conspiracy).  There are different reasons for this claim, none of 
which are mutually exclusive: at times, it serves important rhetorical functions (Chapter 1), while 
at other times, it is a product of a paranoid style of interpretation (Chapter 2).  Lastly, by 
situating my investigation in “postcolonial Egypt,” I do not envision a straightforward, linear 
history of “combatting rumors,” of a single practice that has evolved or remained stable as a 
result of carefully observed historical ruptures or continuities.  Rather, I focus what I deem to be 
three of the “noisiest” encounters between the state and al-ishāʿa over the period 1952-2007, 
while remaining aware of significant gaps, such as the Sadat presidency (1970-1981).  It is 
important to emphasize the specificity of each encounter’s historical, ideological, and social 
setting, in order that the reader not assume rumor combat to be always at the foreground of 
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Egyptian national politics.  It is tempting to expose the anxieties of the powerful as they agonize 
over ishāʿāt, but the phenomenon, and the means deployed against it, must not be inflated 
beyond their proper proportions.  Among the threats to state power, rumor features sometimes as 
a fatal blow, sometimes as a withering pestilence, sometimes as a blip on the radar, and 








































Chapter 1: Revolution against Rumors: Rhetoric, Risk, and Courtroom 
Drama (1952-1954) 
 
Ahmad ʿAtiyyat Allah’s Lexicon of the Egyptian Revolution, published in 1954, translates the 
key words of a new national political language that had begun cluttering newspapers and radio 
waves since the military coup of July 23, 1952.  What would eventually be called the “July 
Revolution” had not only ushered in a rearrangement of the political and economic order; it had 
also effected a number of linguistic and symbolic transformations that consumers of mass media 
could not miss.  On the same page as shārat al-thawra (“Emblem of the Revolution”) and 
sharikāt al-musāhama (“joint-stock corporations”), the Lexicon includes the following entry: 
 
Rumours [shāʾiʿāt]: 
Or rumors [ishāʿāt], the propagation of statements and stories among the public that lack 
any factual basis. When their aim is to mislead public opinion, they are considered acts of 
national treason. On this basis, accused persons were taken before the Revolutionary 
Tribunal under the charge of ‘Leading a campaign of rumors, intending thereby to harm 
the presiding regime and the pillars and foundation of the Revolution,’ by way of 
misleading public opinion. Campaigns of rumor are often connected with acts of 
espionage by foreign parties. Two so accused were sentenced to hard labor for life, and a 
third was sentenced to ten years of hard labor. 
 
 
ʿAtiyyat Allah’s entry reveals how an ordinary word has been seized and shaken by history, and 
imbued with new, multiple layers of meaning.  Of course rumor was never an innocent word: 
always the handmaiden of insurrection, the bête noire of language and community.  Now it is an 
act of national treason, of foreign espionage, and its perpetrators are condemned in one of the 
greatest performances of political theater in Egypt’s twentieth century.  ʿAtiyyat Allah has thus 
captured the eruption of a problem, and shortly thereafter, its apparent remedy.  At the same 
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time, however, by fitting “rumor” into the clean and compact form of the dictionary entry, he 
masks the confusion and noise which had surrounded its movement in society. 
In this chapter, I attempt to reconstruct the noise against which ʿAtiyyat Allah’s 
dictionary entry is partially insulated, with an investigation into the emergence of rumor as an 
object of state discipline in the early revolutionary period (1952-1954).  Through a reading of 
speeches by Muhammad Naguib and articles by Anwar Sadat, in addition to accounts of the 
Revolutionary Tribunal of 1953, I examine how the public voices of the Free Officers, from their 
very first days on the public stage, feverishly attempted to reign in this peculiar threat to their 
authority.  I engage with previous work on rumors in sociology (Kapferer 1990; Morin 1971), 
cultural history (Neubauer 1999), and linguistic anthropology (Paz 2009) to analyze the 
rhetorical strategies which the Free Officers deployed against rumors.  These strategies include 
“entextualization” – the reduction of rumor to a text – and the “plot theory” – the accusation of 
hidden agents behind the rumor.  Both of these strategies, I argue, involve for different reasons a 
tremendous amount of risk, and are prone to misfiring.  As a result, the battle against rumors was 
taken to another rhetorical level: the grand theater of the Revolutionary Tribunal.  It was here 
that the plot theory, once abstract and speculative, could be embodied in the three defendants 
condemned as “The Trinity of Rumors.”  The common theme running through these speeches, 
articles, and trials, I argue, was, more than an attempt to suppress particular rumors, a significant 
but overlooked process by which the Free Officers attempted to construct their discursive 
authority.  The ability to pronounce on rumors, to frame them, fix them, and discredit them on 
many occasions allowed the regime to inscribe and reinscribe itself at the top a discursive and 
epistemological hierarchy.  In this sense, a study of rumor combat reveals the constant rhetorical 
labor required to manufacture state power, in particular given what previous scholars have 
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characterized as the instability and fractured nature of the Free Officer’s Movement (Di-Capua 
2001; Gordon 1992). 
Before unpacking the elements of these actors’ rumor combat, it is necessary to get a 
better sense of how “stories and statements that lack any factual basis” – as ʿAtiyyat Allah called 
them – seemed to have taken over Egyptian public life since July 23, 1952.  The fragility of the 
new “regime,” its culture of secrecy, and the temporal frame of revolution, I argue, were 
important contributing factors to the pervasiveness and potency of rumors. 
 
Standing in the Dark 
 
 
A State is never a utilitarian institution pure and simple.  It congeals on the surface of 
time like frost-flowers on a windowpane, and is as unpredictable, as ephemeral and, in its 
pattern, as rigidly causal to all appearances as they.  An impulse of culture, spawned and 
pushed hither and thither by disparate forces of the most various provenance, finds 
embodiment in that aggregation of power we call “State,” which then seeks some reason 
for its existence, discovering it perhaps in the glory of a particular house or the excellence 
of a particular people. (Huizinga 1955 [1938]: 175) 
 
 
While I have framed “combatting rumors” as a practice of “the state,” “the regime,” or “state 
actors,” the words of Johan Huizinga remind us of the contingency and complexity of these 
terms in cultural and political analysis.26  Never is the state a monolith, nor are the interpretive 
practices and rhetoric it deploys in the public sphere internally consistent.  Certain patterns of 
organization and authority may “congeal” at certain moments, and are claimed and rationalized 
by the actors involved, but the consistency they have is maintained only by constant material and 
symbolic repair.   
The fragility and internal dissonance which characterize all states is nowhere more 
evident than during social and political revolutions.  Such was the dilemma that plagued the Free 
                                                 
26 For a well-articulated elaboration of this argument as it relates to Arab cultural studies, see Matar (2012). 
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Officers in the days and years following their entrance onto the public stage. While later years 
would witness the emergence of the apparatuses and appearances of a strong, almost totalitarian 
regime, the fragility of this mysterious group of new leaders was at this time apparent to both 
insiders and outsiders.  As Joel Gordon (1992) has argued, the Free Officers had not arrived on 
the scene with a clear master narrative already worked out, let alone a single plan for the more 
minor details of day-to-day administration.  Their rhetoric of socialism and Pan Arabism, and 
indeed the cult of personality surrounding Gamal Abdel Nasser, would congeal only after much 
indecision, miscalculation, and what Gordon repeatedly refers to as “groping about.”  Moreover, 
the regime-to-be had yet to secure its monopoly on all sectors of the national media.  While 
radio, and subsequently television, remained under the control of the state, the press in Egypt 
was not nationalized until 1960.  It is not surprising in these circumstances, with the contested 
and fragmentary nature of the political center, that rumors both true and false would circulate 
unimpeded, unexplained, and unverified.  Certainly multiple perspectives on the “real” could 
erupt spontaneously, and disappear just as quickly, across this ruptured epistemic terrain whose 
ostensible custodians were anything but united. 
 If the officers’ lack of control led to uncertainty and rumors, so did, conversely, their very 
success at imposing constraints and limits on public discourse.  Freud, writing of the First World 
War, made this connection between government control and popular rumormongering: 
 
The state exacts the utmost degree of obedience and sacrifice from its citizens, but at the 
same time it treats them like children by maintaining an excess of secrecy and a 
censorship upon news and expressions of opinion which leaves the spirits of those whose 
intellects it thus suppresses defenceless against every unfavourable turn of events and 





“Secrecy” and “censorship,” in other words, lead people to find news outside of official or 
authoritative channels of communication.  His remarks are echoed by the Egyptian littérateur 
Ihsan ʿAbd al-Quddus (1919-1990), in an article written on September 7, 1953, in the still 
independent periodical Ruz al-Yusuf, which was run by his mother of the same name.  ʿAbd al-
Quddus would later gain fame as a prolific writer of cheap romance novels; at this time, though 
an erstwhile supporter of the Free Officers, his name was associated with the increasing liberal 
discontent with the military’s role in politics.  The article in question, entitled “He who Stands in 
the Dark may Destroy,” is a commentary on the secret negotiations going on between the Free 
Officers – men like President Muhammad Naguib, Gamal Abdel Nasser, and the Minister of 
National Guidance Salah Salim – and the British, whose forces had yet to withdraw completely 
from Egypt.  In response to a complaint voiced by Salah Salim that the public has been taken 
over by rumor, ʿAbd al-Quddus offers his own diagnosis of the situation: 
 
There is a thick black curtain which has descended between the patriotic citizens of Egypt 
and those responsible for liberating the country [i.e., the Free Officers], so that the former 
are no longer able to understand, or to form an opinion, or to take a position.  We do not 
understand the difference between “official communications” and “unofficial 
communications.”  We do not understand the difference between “written reports” and 
“unwritten reports.” … These secrets, these cryptic signs, this confusion that we suffer: 
all this leads to caution, and doubt, and expectation … With people in this state of 
darkness, Salah Salim should not blame them for opening their ears to rumors, and 
becoming victims to them.  People need to hear something to reassure them – and if they 
find nothing other than rumors, they will listen to them and eagerly seek them out. 
 
 
Slipping seamlessly from the third person (“the patriotic citizens”) to the first (“we”), ʿAbd Al-
Quddus densely registers the pain that he and many other users of national media, blameless and 
patriotic, felt in their unfilled desire for proximity to the truth.  The government’s secrecy 
generates a collective affective and psychological state of “confusion … caution … doubt and 
expectation,” which leads, as Freud also observed, to rumors.  If the people are not permitted 
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access to the truth by the government, they will find it nonetheless through their own means.  
Perhaps they will “open their ears” to strange voices, or perhaps they will create their own 
stories.  ʿAbd Al-Quddus is also raising here the figure of the devil – the one who whispers in the 
dark – which is so often associated with false talk and rumors. 
 If certain kinds of rumors would proliferate as a result of confusion and secrecy, others 
may be explained as the effect of the strained temporal frame of upheaval.  Arlette Farge, for 
example, has argued that historical moments like regime change and riots alter “the social and 
mental economy of the people and [force] them into quick reactions to facts [that modify] the 
balance of their lives and aspirations” (1994: 109).  Compared with calmer times, people during 
these “exceptional” periods experience a rapid succession of events, each of which may 
potentially alter their immediate well-being or future prosperity: a street closure, a curfew, a raid, 
an election result.  More frequently tuned in to changes in their environment, listeners become 
exceptionally eager for news whether true or false.  In the events following from the Free 
Officers’ coup, this temporal immediacy, or “quick reactions to facts,” compounded with both a 
general confusion and uncertainty, and an imposed secrecy on the workings of “those responsible 
for liberating the country,” as Ihsan ʿAbd al-Quddus called them.  The unsavory result was a 
sense – both real and imagined – that rumors were barraging the citizens of Egypt from every 
direction.  
 While it is not always clear what “rumors” the Free Officers, or their opponents like 
Ihsan ʿAbd al-Quddus, were alluding to in their statements, there are several principle themes 
which prevailed during this time.  Divisions and quarrels among the revolutionary leadership 
were the topic of widespread speculation, and though the leaders exerted great efforts to deny 
such reports, they were in large part true.  Similar in nature were rumors about the arrest or firing 
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of certain regime members, the noisiest of which erupted after the dismissal, then reinstatement, 
of Muhammad Naguib as president in February, 1954.  Other rumors during this period 
commented on secret pacts made between the Free Officers and the Muslim Brotherhood, the 
Wafd Party, the British, or other major foreign and domestic political forces.  More examples 
could be given: it was sometimes being said that the British were planning an attack to reinstate 
the monarchy; it was being said that the army would never return to the barracks; it was being 
said, even, that Muhammad Naguib had a mad or illegitimate daughter named Fatma.27  All of 
these were ishāʿāt, but just as often, this word was used to refer to any kind of discontent or 
skepticism expressed in the most general manner amongst the public.  Anything that the Free 
Officers could not control, or did not want to admit into the realm of public discourse, could be 
labeled “rumor.” 
 The image I have thus far created is that of rumors emerging mostly spontaneously, as a 
popular reaction to the circumstances.  Of course this is only part of the story.  Rumor could also 
be used as a weapon, and was used as a weapon, not only by “foreign parties” seeking to “harm 
the presiding regime and the pillars and foundation of the Revolution” as Ahmad ʿAtiyyat Allah 
alleged in his lexicon, but also by the Free Officers themselves against foreign and domestic 
rivals.  This hypocrisy should not be surprising: a number of scholars have remarked on 
authoritarian regimes that, while attempting to suppress subversive speech, also actively 
disseminate their own covert propaganda.28  Still, it would be wrong to totally dismiss the claims 
                                                 
27 See “Hikayat Bint Muhammad Nagib,” ʾAkhir Saʿa, 11/11/1953.  The other rumors I have listed here appear, 
obliquely or explicitly, in the texts I analyze below.  
28 Grigsby notes that, while the Napoleonic government was committed to the systematic suppression of rumor, it 
also did “quite acutely and self-consciously attempt to circulate strategic rumors” (1995: 33).  Neubauer, writing of 
the French ancien régime, connects both rumor combat and rumor dissemination to “secret politics”: “while there 
are agents who report to the king what people are saying, there is also a staff which distributes rumours, a procedure 
that demands a high level of secrecy” (1999: 131).  Writing of Haiti in the late twentieth century, Perice argues that 
authoritarian forces use rumor to spread terror, and to this end they “drive speaking out of open public debate and 
into the back alleys of rumor” (1997: 1).  This would seem to suggest that the suppression of public debate is 
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made by the regime that “the colonizer,” too, was spreading rumors – certainly it was, and as the 
Tripartite Aggression of 1956 proved, Western designs against Egypt had not ended with the 
toppling of the pro-British monarchy. However, I have found it important to assert the 
spontaneity of the phenomenon, given that claims about rumor’s calculated design have so often 
been overstated.  Particularly when couched in the language of “plots” and “conspiracies,” the 
common allegation about the authorship of rumor constitutes an important tool in the rhetoric of 
combat.   It is a rhetorical tool among others deployed by spokesmen for the Free Officers, 
whose public speech I now analyze. 
 
Combatting Rumors: Naguib and Sadat  
 
 
On July 24, 1952, Muhammad Naguib went on the radio to broadcast a short message in defense 
of the military coup that had brought him and his fellow officers to power only the previous 
day.29  Viewed from the present, the message reveals much about the new regime’s provisional 
and rapidly shifting sense of its place in the world.  Naguib himself was still General Naguib, not 
yet President of the Republic – the title he would soon adopt and carry until November 1954.  
Collectively, he and his army brethren were responsible for what he called “our movement” – it 
was yet to be dubbed a “revolution.” Even those on the receiving end of his message were not 
yet what history would soon make of them: Naguib addressed his audience as “the sons of the 
Nile Valley,” in partial reference to the Sudan, still nominally part of Egypt, and birthplace of the 
general himself.  The word “Egypt” never occurs in his speech, only “the people,” “the 
                                                                                                                                                             
primarily for the regime to spread rumors; the causal chain is certainly more complex than this, and is anyway 
beyond the scope of this chapter.  It is not only “dictatorial” or “authoritarian” regimes that use rumor to 
manufacture consent and spread terror; the so-called “advanced democracies” deploy the same methods.  FBI chief 
J. Edgar Hoover’s “Responsibilities Program,” launched in the 1950s and 1960s to defame teachers, is one example.  
For a more recent example from the George W. Bush administration, see “U.S. Videos, for TV News, Come under 
Scrutiny,” The New York Times, 3/15/2004.  
29 Al-Akhbar, 7/25/1952. 
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homeland,” and “the country.”  With both sender and receiver of this message still so vaguely 
defined, it is no surprise that the signals it transmitted across space would be offset by a 
considerable amount of noise. 
 The message represents one of the Free Officers’ first attempts to combat rumor – a 
theme that would recur again and again in the speeches delivered by Muhammad Naguib until 
his final days as president.  In this case, the problem, like the speaker and audience, is vaguely 
defined.  “I am eager to speak to you myself,” the general begins, “in order to put a stop to the 
hateful, malicious rumors spread by your enemies and the enemies of the nation.”  Contrary to 
the “weak souls” who “persist in spreading rumors,” Naguib insists that the army’s movement, 
blessed by the people, has good intentions, and aims for “reform” and “purification.”  He 
concludes his brief message by telling his audience not to “listen to rumors,” having thus 
pronounced the word shāʾiʿāt for a magical third time.   
 In at least four subsequent speeches over the next two years, Naguib would return to 
repeat his admonition.  In a speech delivered at the American University in Cairo in March, 
1953, the president waxed indignant about the excess of demands being made on the 
revolutionary leadership.  Speaking in colloquial Egyptian, his remarks were winding, and 
included an abrupt, off-the-collar complaint about “the rumors that are filling the country”: “a 
new rumor every day!  Who are these people, compared to us?”30  In September of the same 
year, Naguib lectured on the dangers of rumors to workers at a General Motors factory in 
Alexandria31, and to crowds in Cairo32.  In the latter speech, the president transcended the 
vagueness of his previous statements to provide a greater amount of detail, if still somewhat 
general in nature, about the threat, its perpetrators, its victims, and its possible remedy.  The 
                                                 
30 Al-Musawwir, 5/5/1953. 
31 Al-Akhbar, 9/3/1953 
32 Al-Akhbar, 9/16/1953. 
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“rumors” (both shāʾiʿāt and ishāʿāt) in question allege that the members of the country’s 
revolutionary leadership are divided and feuding amongst themselves.  The victims are the 
people (al-shāʿb), whose “trust in themselves is shaken,” and whose “trust in their leaders is 
shaken.”  The agents of rumor are “colonialism” (al-istiʿmār), “the colonizer” (al-mustaʿmir), 
“the supporters of the colonizer” (aʿwānuhu), and “the reactionary elements” (al-ʿanāṣir al-
ragʿiyya).  These figurations of the enemy, along with “rumor” itself, featured among the key 
words of the new language crafted by the Free Officers to organize and make sense of a rapidly 
changing world.  They may be interpreted as euphemisms for the British and their local 
sympathizers among the aristocracy, but functionally they signified any perceived adversary, 
foreign or domestic, of the revolutionary leadership.  Having outlined the nature and origins of 
the threat, Naguib then projects an image of the battle to come: “We are concerned about the 
effects these rumors have had on the minds of the weak,” he says, before declaring that there are 
many citizens who still require “national upbringing” (al-tarbiya al-waṭaniyya) and “correct 
guidance” (al-tawgīh al-ṣaḥīḥ).  The broad, open nature of the problem thus allows the 
problematizers (Naguib and the regime) equally broad, open powers of response.  Finally, in a 
fourth speech delivered on July 23, 1954 – the second anniversary of the Free Officers’ coup – 
Naguib repeats this same admonition.33  Yet he is almost certainly outperformed by the master 
rhetor, Gamal Abdel Nasser.  The latter, rather than using so vulgar a word as “rumors,” warns 
citizens against “those who have made doubting, incitement, and cowardly whispering their 
trade.” 
 Over the same period, from 1952 through 1954, Muhammad Naguib’s lecturing on 
ishāʿāt was echoed by the other major public voices of the fledgling regime.  Prominent among 
them was Anwar Sadat, a colonel in the army and one of the few members of the revolutionary 
                                                 
33 Al-Akhbar, 7/23/1954. 
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leadership to so frequently appear on radio, in the newspapers, and on stage.  Before his 
assumption of the presidency upon the death of Nasser in 1970, Sadat was also well known for 
his close involvement in and supervision of the press, including his management of the state-
owned al-Gumhuriyya in the 1950s, and his attempt to pacify Mustafa Amin’s Akhbar al-Yawm 
in the 1960s (cf. Chapter 6).  Two articles written in the former publication offer a glimpse of the 
colonel’s own battle with rumors, which relied on rhetorical tropes similar to those deployed by 
Muhammad Naguib.  On December 7, 1953, Sadat wrote a lengthy piece about what he called “a 
new weapon” (silāḥ gadīd).34  “The politicians,” he alleges, referring to Egypt’s discredited 
liberal political class, whose pre-revolutionary feuds had led many to welcome the military 
takeover, “have since the changing of their fortunes resorted to a change in their strategies.”  
Most dangerous among these strategies is the “new weapon,” rumor.  Perhaps rumors had existed 
before, but with this phrase, Sadat has, like Naguib before him, attempted to manufacture a new 
problem in the minds of his audience, a problem that requires attention, vigilance, analysis, and 
response.  What makes this weapon qualitatively different from others is its special “flash” or 
“blaze” (barīq); it is a “blazing” (barrāq) weapon.  Thus, just as Muhammad Naguib had feared 
rumor’s “effects on the minds of the weak,” so does Sadat claim that “people’s minds have been 
truly susceptible” to the subversive speech of the politicians.  While Naguib had accused “the 
colonizer” of wielding this weapon, however, Sadat accuses “politicians,” whom he identifies as 
members of the Wafd Party and the Muslim Brotherhood – in other words, domestic adversaries 
of the revolutionary leadership.  The same accusations are leveled again by Sadat in an article 
written on March 10, 1954.35  Ratcheting up his rhetoric of demonization, he characterizes the 
rumormongers as “those who have crawled out of their holes to broadcast incitement and spread 
                                                 
34 Al-Gumhuriyya, 12/7/1953. 
35 Al-Gumhuriyya, 3/10/1954. 
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doubt.”  Now rumors have reached such a pitch that he fears they have become “a customary 
trick pulled on the people” (ʿāda tanṭalī ʿala al-nās). 
 The speeches of Muhammad Naguib and the articles of Anwar Sadat rely on two 
common rhetorical strategies to combat rumor: “entextualization” and “the plot theory.”  By 
entextualization, I mean the reproduction of a rumor in a text, such as a speech or newspaper 
article.  In his account of the “rumor clinics” designed by social scientists working for the United 
States government during and after World War II, Neubauer (1999) analyzes this strategy of 
putting rumor into writing.  Rumor clinic analysts would place articles in newspapers to respond 
to certain widely circulating stories, and in doing so, they reproduced the orally transmitted story 
in print.  As Neubauer explains, these articles would 
 
oppose the fleeting, ephemeral and intermittent text of the rumour with the relatively 
constant – that is to say repeatable and recognizable – medium of centrally printed text.  
The space of writing stands against the non-spatial, uncontoured and mobile principle of 
hearsay, which lasts only a moment before disappearing, and then perhaps reappearing 
shortly thereafter.  In the place of the mobile web of drifting variants, versions and 
quotes, in the place of the anonymous series of voices, it publishes a single, reproducible 
text. (139-140) 
 
Placing a rumor in print would in a sense reduce it to print, rather than the unfathomably 
complex social phenomenon that it really is.36  As a consequence, the threat is taken down to 
size, and transformed into a rather simple bite that can be countered and combatted.  Such is the 
effect, too, of the texts cast by Muhammad Naguib and Anwar Sadat to contain rumors of 
government division or incompetence.   
Of course there is an inevitable risk in entextualization.  By citing the rumor, even if it is 
in reduced form, the authors not only repeat its content, but broadcast it to a vastly wider 
                                                 
36 Patricia Meyer Spacks makes a similar argument about the reproduction of gossip in novels: “In being written 
down … [gossip is] stabilized: made safe … Far less dangerous than its oral equivalent, gossip converted to fiction 
keeps its place on the page – not in the air between two speakers, not subject to incalculable elaboration or 
speculation” (1985:  14). 
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audience.  Thus the rumor is like a virus, infecting all those with whom it comes into contact, 
even the agents of “purification” and “guidance.”  This may help explain why Naguib and Sadat 
were sometimes reticent about mentioning specific rumors, preferring instead to make vague 
declarations about their effects on people and the mistrust they were creating between the 
revolutionary leadership and citizens.  This was the case with Naguib’s radio address on July 24, 
1952, in which he merely alluded to “rumors” about “our movement,” without providing further 
details.  Yet his speech of July 23, 1954, makes full citation of the rumor in the form of denial: 
“The members of the Leadership are as one hand, and are not divided” (aʿḍāʾ al-qiyāda yad 
wāḥida wa laysū mutafarriqīn).  We may interpret this act of entextualization as running the risk 
of repetition, and failing in its aim to combat the rumor.  On the other hand, if we consider 
history, it may be precisely the repetition and broadcast of this particular rumor that Naguib 
desires.  Earlier, in February of the same year, Naguib had been forced to resign as president by 
rivals within the revolutionary leadership, before a backlash had him reinstated.  He would 
continue as president until November, but it would have been apparent to many that his role was 
more of a formality than anything else.  “Denying” this rumor about division within the 
leadership – that is, repeating it in a loud voice – was perhaps Naguib’s way of obliquely 
communicating to the nation his disagreement with the impotent role he was being forced to 
perform; it may even have been his way of undermining the regime that would force him out of 
office permanently after a few short months.  Thus the “entextualization” or rumor is a fraught 
process, and one that can equally serve the purposes of containment and communication.37 
The second major rhetorical strategy common to both Naguib and Sadat is the “plot 
theory,” a term I borrow from French sociologist Edgar Morin (1971).  In his words, it is the 
                                                 
37 This is what Muhammad Talʿat ʿIsa, in his book Rumors, and How We can Confront Them (1964), identifies as 
“the condemnatory method” (al-uslūb al-istinkārī) for spreading rumors: a rumormonger expresses his disapproval 
of a particular story, thus introducing it, perhaps for the first time, as a topic of speculation and debate (80). 
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“tendency to localise the cause and origin of the phenomenon in the conscious will, and actions, 
of malicious individual agents” (84).  This, of course, is what the Free Officers repeated in nearly 
all of their public discourses, whether they were discussing rumors or not: the confusion and 
disturbances that had spread in the papers, cafes, streets, and clubs of Cairo were the result of a 
plot.  In the articles and speeches I described above, the plotters behind the rumors were usually 
called out with labels more or less vague.  If Muhammad Naguib’s initial radio address had 
mentioned only “your enemies and enemies of the nation,” stock phrases like “the colonizer,” 
“the supporters of the colonizer,” and “reactionary elements” would soon gain greater currency.  
Morin stresses the important sense-making power of the plot theory.  If rumors are seemingly 
everywhere, ephemeral, and without a clear origin or purpose, the plot theory reduces this 
complexity to a more manageable figure of speech: the effect is to “endow … rumour with form 
and substance, to give it a face, an author, an objective.  The rumour [is] not merely slanderous, 
but a ‘campaign of slander’” (83).  This, indeed, was precisely the language deployed by the 
regime, who, as ʿAtiyyat Allah reported in his lexicon, spoke of a “campaign of rumors,” rather 
than spontaneous rumor outbreaks.
38
  This reduction is important, for it allows the authorities to 
respond to the rumors, indeed to combat them, precisely as one would combat an individual 
slander, or group of slanderers, in court.  One cannot, after all, contend with random noise, only 
sensible and embodied discourse. 
 Morin suggests another function of the plot theory.  His study investigates rumors that 
erupted in the town of Orléans in 1969, to the effect that young girls who shopped at Jewish-
                                                 
38 Morin’s remarks also help explain that commonplace of modern Arabic political rhetoric – “These rumors have 
no basis in fact, and their aim is such-and-such” (hādhihi al-shāʾiʿāt [aw: al-akhbār] lā asās lahā min al-ṣiḥḥa, al-
hadaf minhā kadha wa kadha).  We now see why this tag – al-hadaf minhā – is so necessary: the shapeless and 
unconfirmed stories are given a clear purpose, so they can be combatted with similar purpose.  The effect is also 
achieved by another common collocation, ishāʿāt mughriḍa (“malicious/targetted rumors”).  A reader will find these 
words uttered by a government official in almost every Arabic news bulletin on almost any day. 
64 
 
owned clothing stores were being abducted and coerced into the “white slave trade.”  While 
these rumors had no particular point of origin that could be identified, a “plot theory” was 
quickly hatched that the whole commotion had been launched by a group of Neo-Nazis, or some 
other anti-Semitic faction, with the aim of harming Jews.  The theory, like the rumor, was a work 
of fiction, but it served an important purpose.  Not only would it clarify a complex phenomenon, 
as we have seen, but it also helped to “denounce [the rumor] as something alien to the indigenous 
community, a foreign body that had infiltrated Orléans unbeknown to the town’s inhabitants” 
(84). Jean-Noël Kapferer, also a sociologist, elaborates on the significance of this kind of 
denunciation, which he calls “changing the rumor’s image” (1990: 253). The transmission of a 
rumor, he suggests, depends in large part on the social value it holds for its transmitters.  Once 
the rumor is shown not only to lack such value, but to actually be foreign and enemy to the social 
group of the transmitter (in Morin’s case, it comes from Neo-Nazis), the act of passing on a juicy 
story becomes more akin to passing around rotten produce: something best to be avoided.  The 
rumor’s image has changed, and the result is that for the target population, it has become 
“unseemly to speak of” (250).  This is why, most often, Naguib and Sadat affiliate rumor with a 
foreign group, such as the British, or a discredited internal group, such as the aristocracy or the 
Wafd Party.  It is not my intention to deny that foreign powers, such as Great Britain, did indeed 
have agents in Egypt who were busy spreading false reports and propaganda in order to 
destabilize the new regime.  But the persistent and almost automatic reference to a foreign plot, I 
argue, serves important rhetorical functions, which can be understood with insights from these 
sociological studies of rumor.   
 Like entextualization, however, the plot theory as a rhetorical strategy entails risk.  
Would all members of the public remain so naïve about a claim so often repeated?  Even with the 
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presence of the British on Egyptian soil, might not labels like “enemies” and “supporters of the 
colonizer,” so vague and unsubstantiated, eventually seem to be referring to nothing at all?  
Morin, for his part, argued that the plot theory was in fact the most successful strategy deployed 
against the rumors in Orléans.  The association of the anti-Jewish rumors with Neo-Nazis 
seemed to stick, and residents of the town began shying away from them.  Allport and Postman 
(1947), however, explicitly disapproved of the use of the plot theory, citing the risk of reduced 
credibility.  This was coming from the very social scientists who had participated in the “rumor 
clinics” in the United States in the mid-twentieth century.   
At least one voice in Egypt during this period had a similar response to the regime’s 
rhetoric of rumor combat.  Ihsan ʿAbd al-Quddus, who I cited above as a voice of skepticism, 
would repeat his critique of the revolutionary leadership in a famous article entitled, “The Secret 
Society that Governs Egypt.”39  Published on March 22, 1954, the scathing article would land its 
author in prison.  The “secret society” of the title is the “real” revolutionary leadership, who 
ʿAbd al-Quddus accuses of hiding behind front men like President Muhammad Naguib.  Salah 
Salim, for example, “never appears,” and Gamal Abdel Nasser, the original éminence grise, 
would be photographed “sitting in the third or fourth row.”  According to ʿAbd al-Quddus, 
people in Egypt have become more and more unsettled by the constant surprise decisions 
announced by the leadership, and the contradictory statements they make.  Indeed, he says, 
people “do not trust the leaders when they say that they are combatting reactionary elements and 
the supporters of colonialism, because they do not understand the meaning of ‘reactionary 
elements’ and ‘supporters of colonialism’.”  Quite clearly, then, if we are to believe Ihsan ʿAbd 
al-Quddus, the regime’s plot theory of rumors was falling on deaf ears.  The rhetoric of 
Muhammad Naguib and Anwar Sadat was running the risk of miscomprehension, or worse, the 
                                                 
39 Ruz al-Yusuf, 3/22/1954. 
66 
 
risk of backfiring.  Speculation increased, rumors spread and spread, and something else had to 
be done to put an stop to all the noise. 
 
Rumor at the Revolutionary Tribunal: Indigitamenta of the Trinity 
 
 
In his article, Ihsan ʿAbd al-Quddus also provides a simple, and I think quite accurate, etiological 
sequence to describe the regime’s rumor combat.  “These contradictions,” he says of the 
leadership’s sudden and unexplained public announcements,  
 
have made people lose trust in what they are told, whether it is an official statement or an 
unofficial statement, even if the official were to swear on the Holy Quran.  This lack of 
trust has lead, in turn, to the spreading of rumors and the uneasiness in public opinion.  
And this forced the leaders to use violence, and to establish the Revolutionary Tribunal. 
 
 
Writing in March, 1954, ʿAbd al-Quddus makes a direct connection between the popular distrust 
of military officials, the problem of rumors, and the Revolutionary Tribunal, which was 
established in September of 1953.  It is this connection which I would now like to explore 
further: how precisely did the tribunal operate in the junta’s combatting of rumors?  What 
symbolic work did it perform that had not been achieved by the previous year of speeches and 
newspaper articles, and to what extent did it succeed in its aims? 
 The Revolutionary Tribunal heard its first case in September 24, 1953, and continued into 
the following spring.  While it was not the first court established by the new regime to try 
representatives of the ancien régime, it was distinguished in its authority to hand out real prison 
terms, as well as the death penalty, and thus represented a serious attempt by the revolutionary 
leadership to assert their hegemony over Egyptian politics after a series of embarrassments 
(Gordon 1992: 87).  In terms of political theater, it was a moment for the new leaders to shine.  
Its proceedings were broadcast over the radio, and, as Litvin observes, it was a “running drama 
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[that] featured fine performances by the Free Officers and some of those accused” (2011: 38).  
While much of the drama, as well as subsequent scholarly attention, centered on corruption and 
treason charges leveled against Wafd Party leaders, such as Fuʾad Sirag al-Din (eg. Gordon: 87-
91), a significant part of the Revolutionary Tribunal was dedicated to the prosecution of alleged 
“rumormongers.”  Perhaps, as Ihsan ʿAbd al-Quddus argued, it was even “rumors” that had led 
to the establishment of the tribunal in the first place. 
 Case No. 6 of the Revolutionary Tribunal, which lasted from October 6 to 11, 1953, was 
brought against Ahmad Nasif, an official in the Ministry of Justice; Zaki Zahran, a former 
member of the police, now on pension; and Mustafa Shahin, an official at the Ministry of Social 
Affairs.  The three seem to be rather ordinary public employees, with no particular connection to 
the ancien régime save for alleged family ties, several degrees removed, to the former prime 
minister Mustafa al-Nahhas.  Shahin, the third defendant, had been tried and acquitted of 
corruption charges during an earlier revolutionary court, though the other two defendants were 
making their appearance in the public spotlight for the first time.  Together, they stood accused 
of “treason, and the spreading of false rumors” (khiyānat al-waṭan, tarwīg al-ishāʿāt al-kādhiba) 
(Kayra 1953: 1109-1111).  The court had dubbed the three of them together “The Trinity of 
Rumors” (thālūth al-ishāʿāt) (Ibid: 1108).  Nasif was given a sentence of “hard labor for life,” 
Zahran was given fifteen years of hard labor, and Shahin ten years. 
 Why is Rumor here?  Why does the Trinity of Rumors appear before the Revolutionary 
Tribunal?  At its simplest, the case can be read as an act of embodiment, in which the oft-touted 
threat of rumors, and most importantly the elusive “reactionary elements” alleged to stand behind 
them, are made manifest to the Egyptian public.  The rumormongers are produced in the flesh, 













Figure 1: “The Trinity of Rumors and Lies: Ahmad Nasif – Zaki Zahran – Mustafa 
Shahin”  
(From al-Madbata al-Rasmiyya li-Mahadir Jalasat Mahkamat al-Thawra [The Official Minutes 




rhetors had been peddling to skeptical audiences for months is given some supporting evidence.  
But the spectacle of the trial holds a more sublime symbolic potential, I believe, that can be 
understood quite appropriately as a modern iteration of the Roman indigitamenta, which social 
theorist Johan Huizinga explains thus: 
 
An official rite whereby new divinities were installed in times of violent public 
excitement, with a view to tranquilizing these outbursts of collective emotion by giving 
them fixed form as sacred entities.  It was a brilliant psychological trick for resolving 
dangerous social tensions and exorcising them by projection and propitiation. (1955: 
139)40 
                                                 
40 Indeed, as Huizinga goes on to argue, such rites of personification have not vanished in the modern era.  He asks: 





What Huizinga calls “a brilliant psychological trick” I have framed as rhetoric and drama; the 
effect is the same.  Through courtroom drama, the junta sought to deliver to wide audiences, 
which included the officers themselves, an almost “divine” figure for the “dangerous social 
tension” of rumor: they called it the “Trinity of Rumors.” 
 The full transcript of the trial, published by the Revolutionary Tribunal in the same year, 
allows us to take a seat in the drama and appreciate the symbolic labor of this indigitamenta in 
great detail.  To my knowledge, the transcript has not been the object of previous scholarship, 
even by the otherwise comprehensive account constructed by Joel Gordon (1992) of the Free 
Officers’ politics in the early revolutionary period.  Following rumor has thus led us into an 
otherwise neglected scene of great significance in Egyptian public culture and politics, which can 
contribute to our understanding of the intersections between discipline, spectacle, power, 
performance, and communications technologies in the early revolutionary period.  Future 
scholars can benefit from a closer study of the other cases recorded in this transcript.  I focus on 
the indigitamenta of Case No. 6, which unfolds through successive rhetorical strategies aimed at 
problematizing, fixing, and externalizing the threat of rumors. 
On October 6, the first day of the proceedings, the Public Prosecutor Ibrahim Sami Jadd 
al-Haqq railed against the defendants in a high, moralistic register thick with metaphor and 
Quranic allusions:  “Justices of the People! Today we present before you a new kind of 
accusation [lawnan gadīdan min al-ittihām] and a new kind of criminal.”  He continued: 
 
This tiny group has exploited the mercy of the Revolution, and the noble manner of the 
Free Leaders, by disturbing the order, and spreading corruption across the land.  By 
                                                                                                                                                             
deadly earnest, attributing to it a perverse will, reproaching it and abusing it for its demoniacal obstinacy?” (140).  
This is a quite precise description of the regime’s problematization and personification of the rumor, as a sort of 
living being with a will of its own and a “demoniacal obstinacy.” 
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spraying their poisons, by spreading false, malicious rumors and deceptive, wicked 
propaganda, they have thought themselves capable of obstructing the caravan of the 
Free… (Kayra 1953: 354-355) 
 
 
The prosecutor’s introduction echoes the words used by Anwar Sadat – one of the tribunal’s 
three members – in the article he was to publish only a few months later in al-Gumhuriyya: 
“rumors,” Sadat would later say, constituted a “new weapon.”  What exactly was “new” about 
rumors?  Certainly it was not the phenomenon itself, or its use in psychological warfare.  The 
novelty in this case relates to the rhetor’s assumption of popular naïveté about the origins, uses, 
and effects of reported speech, the assumption that most members of the audience had never 
paused to consider something called al-ishāʿa as posing a threat to the wider community.  Thus 
the bombastic recitation of its effects: rumor “disturbs the order,” “spreads corruption across the 
land,” and “obstructs the caravan of the Free.”  If the public had been unaware that chit-chat was 
such a problem, they were being warned to be more careful in the future.  If they had thought 
talk to be nothing but talk, the rhetor was to instill in them a sense of panic that everyday 
conversation might be tainted with foreign “poisons.”  The claim of rumor’s novelty also has the 
same dramatic effect as the uncovering of a secret.  A rare, hidden problem is found, and it is 
valuable and significant precisely because it had been hidden.  The rhetor shares this discovery 
with the audience, thus creating a certain degree of intimacy with them and, it would be hoped, a 
bond of trust.  At the same time, while rumor is being presented as new and unknown, its 
demonic nature is delivered to the audience in the familiar language of the Quran: they “spread 
corruption across the land” (taʿīthu fī al-arḍ fasādan).  In this way, the novel form is made 
fathomable, rooted in the depths of evil. 
 The prosecution, with the aid of three witnesses, also goes to great lengths to entextualize 
the rumors, presenting them in the fixed and manageable form of testimonies, alleged recordings 
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of the defendants, and copies of letters and calling cards, all of which are preserved in the 
published transcript.  The first witness wastes no time citing the “rumors” word for word. Ahmad 
Nasif, one of the accused, is alleged to have said that the regime “wants to sedate the people,” 
that “the English had occupied the area form Ismailia to Zaqaziq,” and that merchants and 
officers across the country were “muttering and complaining” (338).  The prosecutor refines his 
question, asking the witness what more the defendant had said about “the men of the movement” 
(i.e. the Free Officers).  The move is an obvious attempt to sharpen the rumors, mostly vague and 
general in nature, into directly personal attacks on the very men who had appointed themselves 
judges.  The witness takes the bait, and proceeds to relate a comment that Nasif had made about 
the mother of ʿAbd al-Hakim ʿAmir, a prominent member of the junta (339).  The next two 
witnesses repeat much of the same, while disagreeing about which members of the “Trinity” 
were actually involved.  The “rumors” in question are all variations on the theme of the regime’s 
fragmentation, and the superior might of the British.  Even though the third witness expresses 
some reticence to report what he had heard, the chief judge of the tribunal, ʿAbd al-Latif al-
Baghdadi, demands that “it [all] must be said here” (347).  Thus it is clear that the tribunal is 
eager to have the rumors repeated, not only to grasp them and put them in fixed form, but to 
display the power to have such speech forced out of the witnesses and the defendants.  In 
addition to the rumors themselves, private letters and calling cards addressed to Nasif are 
marshaled as evidence of his collusion with a British man named “Martin.”  The effect of all this 
is obvious: the problem of rumor is externalized through association with foreign imperialism.  
The Trinity of Rumors may be operating on Egyptian soil, but its origins are to be found in a 
zone of otherness. 
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 Another important rhetorical strategy used to solidify the phantom rumormongers is their 
grounding in a socially significant, indeed a stigmatized, topos.  It seems that most of the rumors 
launched in this “campaign” were merely scattered orally in the street, but it was a specific 
location that imbued this speech with demonic powers.  The importance of “place,” as Roland 
Barthes reminds us in his review of classical rhetoric, is to more easily engender a particular 
“association of ideas” in the mind of the rhetor, and thus the audience.  Places are “the 
compartments” in which an argument is “arranged” (1988: 65).  It is alleged that the “trinity” 
plied their wicked trade at a cigarette stand – a topos invested with dark associations of social 
and moral promiscuity, an archetypical rumor-mill.  The prosecutor labels it “the loathsome lair” 
(al-wakr al-ḥaqīr) from which their “rumors of evil flew from borough to borough, then from 
city to city, to cover the entire country, leaving people caught between belief in what they heard, 
and the truth of what they saw” (356).  It is, moreover, alleged that the owner of the cigarette 
stand, a man named Ibrahim ʿUthman, is a “prattler,” a “pimp,” a “drug dealer,” and a “hashish-
smoker.”  “Ibrahim” is an ambiguous figure, at once accused of moral profligacy, and used by 
the prosecution as a major source of information on the defendants.  His role is contested, with 
the defense highlighting his immorality and perpetual state of drunkenness, and the prosecution 
attempting to brush this immorality off onto the defendants by association, while paradoxically 
seizing on his testimony as evidence of the “trinity’s” rumormongering.  The rhetorical intent, in 
any case, is to posit a launch pad for the rumormongers, fixing their origin onto a place deemed 
to have notorious social acoustics.   
What is remarkable about the trial is how articulate and convincing the defense lawyers – 
in particular Zuhayr Garana, who defended Ahmad Nasif – managed to be.  The three witnesses, 
in addition to the cigarette dealer “Ibrahim,” are pointedly exposed as contradictory liars, and the 
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latter as an agent of the secret police.  Much of the prosecution’s evidence – including the letters 
sent to, but not written by, Ahmad Nasif – was supposed to have been “photographed” by 
Ibrahim.  How, asked the defense, had Ibrahim managed to “photograph” these documents, as it 
was supposed, on the staircase?  The prosecution stutters, and suggests awkwardly that Ibrahim’s 
“copying” (taṣwīr) of the letter was by hand, not by camera (378).  This would seem to 
contradict the evidence of the published transcript itself, which includes photocopies of these 
documents in its appendix.  In all, the allegations against the “trinity” seem to have been rather 
shoddily thrown together, and based largely on the evidence provided by security agents, 
including Ibrahim, under pressure to provide some random three individuals to stand in for the 
role of rumormonger that had already been scripted.  The almost obvious disintegration of the 
prosecution’s case shortly after the proceedings had begun could be read as an infelicitous 
performance on the part of the Revolutionary Tribunal.  Any of these potential embarrassments, 
however, would be largely beside the point, as the judges were quick to confirm the sentencing 
of the Trinity only five days after the trial had begun.   
How successful, or felicitous, was the Revolutionary Tribunal in its prosecution of the 
Trinity of Rumors?  Ihsan ʿAbd al-Quddus, in his article on Egypt’s “secret society,” concluded 
his analysis by noting that “the policy of violence succeeded in terrifying the people, so they 
went quiet, and the rumors abated for a time; however, it did not succeed in restoring people’s 
trust in their leaders.”  Joel Gordon, while not mentioning the effect the trials had on rumors, 
largely agrees with this assessment that the Revolutionary Tribunal’s most significant impact 
was its intimidation of opponents.  He notes, however, the many spectators must have remained 
“ambivalent” at best, and “alienated” at worst (1992: 90-91).  Surely it is impossible to gauge the 
accuracy of ʿAbd al-Quddus’s observation that “rumors abated” – which rumors and where? – 
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but it is clear in any case that after the tribunal, the rhetoric of rumor combat practiced by 
Naguib, Sadat, and others would continue.  One may review the dates of the speeches and 
articles I analyzed above, which come before, during, and after the prosecution of the 
unfortunate three rumormongers.  But the rhetoric and drama of rumor combat had another, more 
important function that the extinguishing of particular stories in circulation.  By giving 
themselves the ability to frame, fix, and prosecute rumor, the Free Officers were constructing 
their authority as evaluators of truth and discourse. 
The production of this kind of authority is demonstrated by Alejandro Paz in an article on 
the use of the words chisme (“gossip”) and rumor in a Latino community in Israel.  By analyzing 
the response of a prominent community member to an anonymous attack, Paz shows “how an 
authoritative structure is produced as part of reconstituting a perspective on events with the 
descriptor chisme” (2009: 133).  That is, the successful labeling of an adversary’s speech with a 
word like “rumor” or ishāʿa helps project the interpretive and discursive authority of the labeler.  
The Free Officers were performing this authority over and over again through the repeated 
labeling and prosecution of rumor in speeches, in articles, and in court.  Every time they spoke 
against rumor, they would be indexing their own supremacy as credible evaluators of public 
speech.  The more this supremacy was perceived to be under threat, the more elaborate they were 
in their hectoring, their admonishing, and their drama.  By raising three rather ordinary public 





The prodigious playwright Tawfiq al-Hakim (1898-1987), not long after the death of President 
Gamal Abdel Nasser, wrote a scathingly critical review of what had become of the “revolution” 
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launched on July 23, 1952.  In his attempt to give a straightforward account of the early 
revolutionary period, however, he admits that there remain “many rumors, or facts, that history 
will need to closely examine someday” (1974: 26).  The discursive and epistemological noise 
perceived by Muhammad Naguib, Anwar Sadat, and their opponent Ihsan ʿAbd al-Quddus, 
among many other users and consumers of mass media during the period 1952-1954, thus 
presents as much confusion to subsequent attempts at analysis as it did to the contemporary 
practitioners of combat.  My principle aim in this chapter, however, was not to seek a convincing 
explanation for particular rumors, whether spontaneous or deliberately weaponized, or to 
speculate on their validity.  Rather, I have sought to understand how rumor emerged as a 
problem, and why particular rhetorical and dramatic strategies were deployed against it.  I also 
speculated on the felicity of these strategies, which were prone to the considerable risk of 
misfiring. 
Undoubtedly, as opponents of the regime like Ihsan ʿAbd al-Quddus asserted, “rumors” 
(ishāʿāt) were an observable nuisance to public dialogue, and had perhaps reached endemic 
proportions in the confusion and secrecy that followed from the July Revolution.  However, the 
revolutionary leadership was also in large part responsible for creating the problem, in a number 
of ways.  As ʿAbd al-Quddus argued, the contradictory nature of regime rhetoric, and the culture 
of secrecy they fostered, had created an atmosphere in which ordinary citizens could only make 
sense of things through alternative means.  Rumors, whether as bits of information or more 
complex narratives, offered them what their leaders failed to produce.  These leaders also 
“created” rumor in another sense.  Through a consistent rhetoric of combat, which culminated 
but did not end with the Revolutionary Tribunal, the directors of the new political theater 
attempted (consciously or not) to craft a new language for, and cast new images of, the threats to 
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their authority.  Prominent among these threats was “rumor,” something so diffuse, ephemeral, 
and recalcitrant that it could only be contained through the violent apprehension of an effigy.  
Whether or not the Free Officers were convincing in the specters they manufactured, it is quite 
likely that the material and symbolic labor they performed under the rubric of “combatting 
rumors” had succeeded in casting al-ishāʿa in a supporting, if only occasional, role in Egyptian 
public culture for years to come.  If we are to locate a moment when, in the history of modern 
Egypt, rumor comes into its own as a problem, as “a new kind of crime,” surely it is the 
Revolutionary Tribunal.  If we are to identify one performance that would make al-ishāʿa a star 
– a recurring, if not always constant, figure on the stage of social and political anxieties attended 
by literature, journalism, and the arts (cf. the remaining chapters of this dissertation) – we cannot 
second guess the divinity of the Trinity of Rumors. 
Their efforts were not totally unique.  “Combatting rumors” is a practice which needs to 
be placed in a wider postcolonial context, as other emerging authoritarian regimes in the Arab 
World, such as Libya, Syria, and Iraq, would adopt not altogether different rhetorical and 
dramatic strategies.  The practice, in fact, was as much a product of the times: countries on both 
sides of World War II had targeted “rumor” and “gossip” with systematic campaigns of 
eradication (cf. Neubauer 1999).  At the same time that Muhammad Naguib and Anwar Sadat 
were lecturing to the Egyptian people on ishāʿāt, “rumor clinics” and related campaigns of rumor 
debunking were launched by American government agencies, private corporations, journalists, 
and social scientists.  Indeed, as I explained in the “Introduction,” “rumor” as we know it today 
might be said to have emerged as an object of concern in the early twentieth century, at the 
intersection of state disciplinary practices and “legislative” social science.41  It is no surprise, 
                                                 
41 The designation of certain social sciences as “legislative” is borrowed from Bauman (1992), for whom the label 
signified scientific projects allied with the modern state’s ideology of development, social engineering and control. 
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then, that ishāʿāt would also migrate from the docks of the Revolutionary Tribunal into new 
works of Egyptian sociology and social psychology.  In this migration, rumor would be sustained 
and nourished as a “problem.”  If show trials and government rhetoric lightened up slightly on 
the topic, it is in the work of one sociologist in the 1960s that we are able to register the 












































In this chapter, I analyze what is most likely the first book-length study of rumor in modern 
Egypt: Muhammad Talʿat ʿIsa’s Rumors, and How We Can Confront Them, published in 1964.  
Although it is a marginal work, whose author is not well known and whose circulation is a matter 
of pure speculation, it captures another significant historical moment when rumors re-emerged as 
a problem – a threat and a question, an object of analysis – for state actors.  Specifically, ʿIsa’s 
book articulates the language and anxieties immanent to so-called takhṭīt or “Planning”: the 
teleological project of developmentalist modernity, which had reached its pinnacle in the same 
year with the completion of the first phase of the Aswan High Dam.  ʿIsa’s confrontation with 
rumors is premised on the “noise” or interference that they present to the regime’s takhṭīt, as they 
distract citizen-subjects and set development off course.  
What interests me most in ʿIsa’s book is the author’s insistence on the “plot theory” of 
rumors: the rhetorical device deployed by the Free Officers in Chapter 1 has now attained a 
fervor and persistence that calls for further analysis.  I find it necessary here to challenge the 
sociological interpretation of the plot theory as a conscious rhetorical device, and to refigure it in 
terms of what political scientists and anthropologists have called the “paranoid style.”  Building 
on Hofstadter’s seminal article on the topic (1996), in addition to work on conspiracy theory in 
anthropology (Marcus 1999; Stewart 1999), media studies (Bratich 2008), and political science 
(Gray 2010), I conceive of this “paranoid style” not as a conscious rhetorical device, nor as a 
totalized ideology, but as an interpretive practice conditioned by history and lodged in set of 
dominant ideals about human action and agency.  Muhammad Talʿat ʿIsa applies the paranoid 
style to ishāʿāt, finding them in every case to be the work of robustly agentive conspirators.  
79 
 
While this paranoia is in one sense a reaction to the history of colonialism and foreign plots 
hatched against Egypt or the Egyptian regime, it also operates through a psychological 
mechanism of projection: the “plotting” and “planning” (takhṭīṭ) that ʿIsa finds behind rumors is 
a projection of his ideal conception of the self.  What this case of combat reveals, then, is less the 
peculiarity of ishāʿāt than the interpretive style and anxieties of the analyst. 
There are of course other events and phenomena that provoke the paranoid style of 
interpretation, such as riots, demonstrations, natural disasters, and disease.  Rumor is one 
example among these, and as such, it serves to remind us that paranoia is not a general state or 
permanent outlook on the order of things, but is motivated by only certain occurrences, 
particularly those that infringe most immediately on the individual’s notion of autonomy, or that 
reach a scale, mass, or velocity that are difficult to contain.  Finally, while this paranoia may also 
be read into the rhetoric of the Free Officers I analyzed in Chapter 1, it is in ʿIsa’s book, with its 
equal emphasis on the takhṭīṭ of modern development and the takhṭīṭ of rumors, that displays an 
abundance of linguistic, affective, and narrative symptoms of the mechanism of projection.  
 
Noise against Development 
 
 
A decade after the Revolutionary Tribunal had passed its verdicts, both the press and the film 
industry had been nationalized, and the military regime would seem to have tightened its grip 
over the principle sites of public discourse and the major avenues of dissent.  In addition, the 
“groping about” and search for clarity that characterized the early years following the officers’ 
seizure of power had by now found solutions in a boldly articulated ideology of Pan Arabism, 
grand projects of national development, and the towering figure of President Nasser.  Victories, 
such as the nationalization of the Suez Canal, the building of the Aswan High Dam, and the final 
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expulsion of British forces, could now be paraded as the spectacular signs of the regime’s 
effectiveness and legitimacy.  The robust, unmediated agency invested in the state – its ability to 
mold both nature and society according to its carefully calculated designs – was articulated by 
intellectuals and ideologues in a language of takhṭīṭ or “Planning.”  There would be a mukhaṭṭaṭ 
(“Plan”) to fight colonialism, a mukhaṭṭaṭ to build socialism, a mukhaṭṭaṭ to change the course of 
the Nile: a wedding of state power and legislative social science, such was the ideology of 
developmentalist modernity par excellence. 
Carrying forward this ideology, Muhammad Talʿat ʿIsa (b. 1925), a sociologist and 
regime apologist, would set forth to produce a ten-part book series entitled “The Socialist 
Citizen,” printed by the regime’s political party, the Arab Socialist Union.  Coming at a time 
when Egypt was passing from “the stage of transformation” to “the stage of embarkment,” the 
series was advertised as a “building block” in the further edification of society, and the 
construction of the good citizen.
42
   In other words, the time of revolution is re-envisioned as the 
time of takhṭīṭ.  The books that would be published in this series bear out this general theme, 
with titles such as Socialist Behavior for the Arab Citizen, Youth and National Work, the 
Socialist Leadership, and Public Service in Socialist Society.  But its very first installment, 
published in 1964, would be a book entitled Rumors, and How We Can Confront Them (al-
Shaʾiʿat wa kayfa Nuwagihuha – henceforth Confronting Rumors).   
Even if this book was commissioned by the Arab Socialist Union, we cannot assume that 
it ever held the attention of the country’s leaders.  Nevertheless, its significance lies in its 
situating of “rumor” as a problem – perhaps the problem – for the dominant ideological project 
of the day – al-takhṭīṭ.  At least for Muhammad Talʿat ʿIsa, rumor is the first object that needs to 
be tackled on the path to formulating a socialist society and a socialist citizen.  Why should this 
                                                 
42 ʿIsa, M.T. (1964: back cover). 
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be so?  What makes rumor such a privileged object of study, analysis, and “confrontation” 
(muwāgaha)?  I will demonstrate how, in ʿIsa’s text, rumors operate as a kind of “noise,” 
interfering with the projects of developmentalism. 
 Muhammad Talʿat ʿIsa begins with a definition of his object: 
 
Information or thoughts transmitted orally, or through unconventional means of 
communication such as the joke or newspaper cartoon. Its force is designed to effect an 
excitation in a person’s thinking and imagination, such that he may come to see 
something that is not really there.  This person will then add to it, making it spread and 
circulate more quickly. (7) 
 
Rumors (shāʾiʿāt) are clearly something more than just “unconfirmed news.”  And while we 
have yet to arrive at any explicit reference to criminal activity, as was the case with Ahmad 
ʿAtiyyat Allah’s “definition” in Chapter 1, it is evident that rumors are in a number of ways 
transgressive.  They are false and falsifying, making one “see something that is not really there.” 
They spread “quickly” through media defined as ghayr maʾlūfa – “unconventional” or 
“uncanny.” Finally, although no reference is made to an author – only the manipulated 
transmitter who “adds to it” – there is a sense that the rumor is “designed” or “directed” 
(tuwaggah) from an unknown point of origin.   
Significantly, ʿIsa gives only rather vague examples of actual rumors.  Occasional 
reference is made to false reports about the prices or availability of unspecified commodities, 
insinuations about the “sincerity” of the government, speculation that Egypt is preparing for an 
offensive war, loose talk about the impending nationalization of unnamed companies, and news 
that so-and-so has been arrested or fled the country with his wealth.  Such stories are no doubt 
important, but ʿIsa does not dwell on them.  In part, this lack of detail could be understood as an 
astute recognition of rumor’s contagious quality, as a text which gains greater force with every 
retelling – whether through report, analysis, or denial.  Avoiding the contagious text would thus 
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deprive it of another host or site of infection.  But I would also like to suggest that ʿIsa’s 
vagueness in this area relates to the fact that what matters in rumor is not only its content, but its 
functional noise, its almost supernatural ability to frustrate and spread beyond the powers of the 
state and social science.   
Specifically, in Confronting Rumors, we are given an account of how shāʾiʿāt interfere 
with the teleological project of developmentalism, what ʿIsa calls “Planning” or al-takhṭīt.  
While society tends naturally towards change, “Planning” or the implementation of “the Plan” 
(al-mukhaṭṭaṭ) pushes it towards certain “goals” more quickly, and the achievement of 
“prosperity” for the “contemporary generations” (14). The results to-date are paraded throughout 
the book in the ideological language of the day, and a veritable climax is reached with ʿIsa’s 
celebration of 
 
the revolutionary construction of the High Dam, which brought us our modern glories; 
and our revolutionary industrialization, in which Man asserted his control over Nature 
through faith, struggle and science, putting an end to the myth of our eternal submission 
to Nature’s rule. (126) 
 
 
And yet, the more the revolutionary leaders of Egypt seek to implement their Plan, this positive 
change, the more they are met with the noise of rumors.  As ʿIsa explains, 
 
If the citizens are unable to understand and appreciate the goals of Planned Change, so 
that they accept the transformations required by the path to prosperity, then they will 
become a suitable environment for the incubation and spread of rumors.  Such a public, 




The public, according to the ideology of modern developmentalism, is an object to be acted 
upon, but in this context, it is constantly pushing back with irreverent and frightening obstinacy.  
As ʿIsa goes on to demonstrate, everywhere the government intervenes, rumors are popping up 
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like demons.  Part of the work of development, for example, involves statistical research and 
“data collection” on the ages, health conditions, and other traits of the population; this “incites 
wide areas for the spread of rumors” (43).  These rumors present “obstruction” and 
“impediment” to growth.  Planned Change also requires, from time to time, the assistance of 
foreign experts, and new constraints to be placed on local technicians and scientists: here too do 
rumors “find conditions encouraging for their spread” (42).  Moreover, the struggle to build 
socialism, and the fight against feudalism and other signs of social and economic backwardness, 
require a much greater number of legislative acts relative to more prosperous and developed 
societies.  New laws on the registration of births, deaths, marriages, and divorces; laws 
governing credentials, degrees of expertise, inventions, scientific and literary production; and 
laws concerning religious minorities were all necessary for the success of the Plan, and the 
achievement of prosperity.  “In this intensified legislative atmosphere,” ʿIsa concludes, “rumors 
find fertile areas to spread and disseminate” (45). 
 These passages give a careful, and somewhat sanitized, account of noise.  This is social 
science, after all, in spite of the colorful ideological language evident in parts.  The text relies 
overwhelmingly on a dry analytic style, effecting an air of objectivity, neutrality, and precision 
by drawing on a quiver of earnest analytic verbs like yuwaḍḍiḥ (“clarifies”), yubayyin 
(“elucidates”), yuḥaddid (“determines”), and yaʿriḍ (“put forward”).  A thicker description of the 
noise that ʿIsa attempts to contain can be found in Gamal al-Ghitani’s novel al-Zayni Barakat, 
which I use here not as a literary text but as a social historical document.  Al-Ghitani wrote this 
novel between 1970 and 1971.  At one degree of reading, al-Zayni Barakat is a history of the rise 
and fall of Gamal Abdel Nasser, and thus covers the period during which Muhammad Talʿat ʿIsa 
wrote Confronting Rumors.  At one point in the novel, we read a private communique written by 
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al-Zayni Barakat, the Egyptian ruler who in many respects resembles Nasser.  The communique 
follows an incident in which al-Zayni Barakat had attempted to modernize Cairo with new street 
lamps, a project which soon ran into strange resistance and had to be abandoned.  Confiding to 
the chief of Cairo’s secret police, al-Zayni says: 
 
I have noticed the appearance of stories [ḥikāyāt] from time to time, circulating among 
the people, the purpose of which was to defame some important official, or to defame me 
personally.  This is something that you will agree with me has to be combatted 
[muqāwamatihi] … For example, when I had wanted to light up Cairo with street 
lanterns, a lot of talk circulated about the matter, which was considered a great happening 
to be recorded in the books of history.  I was thus forced to abandon what I had intended, 
what I had already begun.  This did not anger me; what pained me greatly were these 
stories that were circulated on the tongues of the masses.  For they love me, a fact which 
led me to believe that these stories and anecdotes had been concocted. (2005 [1971]: 154) 
 
 
If Muhammad Talʿat ʿIsa’s text gives us a rather distanced account of rumor’s noisy interference 
with the projects of al-takhṭīṭ, this passage from Gamal al-Ghitani’s novel provides a closer, 
more personal reaction to the phenomenon.  Al-Zayni’s project – the installation of street 
lanterns (fawānīs) – is precisely this modern developmentalist project of the 1960s: not only a 
technological upgrade, but an ideological “enlightening” of Cairo (inārat al-qāhira bi-l-fawānīs).  
It has been foiled by the noise of “stories,” “anecdotes,” and “talk.”  Not only has the “plan” 
been derailed, but the leader himself is personally “pained” by the talk of the masses.43  
Consequently, just as ʿIsa declares that rumors need to be “confronted” (muwāgaha), so does al-
Zayni demand that these stories be “combatted” (muqāwama).  Moreover, the leader, like the 
                                                 
43 So it was rumored, too, that Nasser could often take personal offense at rumors and gossip in circulation.  An 
anecdote to this effect is recounted by Sulayman Fayyad in his Kitab al-Namima (The Book of Gossip, 1996).  He 
recalls a private meeting between his friend, the Lebanese author and publisher Suhayl Idris, and President Nasser.  
Led into the latter’s “private quarters,” Idris observed with a mixture of curiosity and dread that the president not 
only had installed a wall of radios tuned to every possible frequency on the planet, but also kept a full collection of 
his own literary journal al-Adab at his bedside (149).  Nasser had taken offense at a poem he had read in the 
journal’s latest issue, which he had banned from circulating in Egypt, and whose publisher he now had in front of 
him to offer some explanation.  “This is what is said about me?!” Nasser reportedly exclaimed. 
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social scientist, is convinced that these stories are “concocted” by hidden agents – an important 
theme that I will return to in the next section of this chapter. 
 The kind of rumors recorded by both ʿIsa and al-Ghitani are a recurring feature in the 
history of both colonialism and postcolonial development.  The intervention of technocratic 
experts and engineers with their strange equipment into local communities has often been met by 
popular anxieties, resistance, and “noise” expressed in the form of rumors.  Vaccination 
campaigns, even in “modern” or “post-industrial” contexts, are an example of this dynamic.44  
Anthropological scholarship on African postcolonial states has also examined rumors that 
emerge as a response to the mystery, violence, and trauma that attends spectacular technological 
transformations, such as radio and television, or grand infrastructure projects like the building of 
roads (Larkin 2008; Masquelier 2002; White 2000).  As Larkin has observed, “wonder, awe, and 
fear are affective responses common to the introduction of technology and mark the reactions of 
Europeans and Americans as much as they do Africans” (2008: 40).  These affects are often 
expressed as fantastical rumors, which the agents of developmentalism – whether they are 
colonial authorities, or postcolonial regimes – blame for the popular rejection of their projects.  
So do the pages of Confronting Rumors record a flurry of shāʾiʿāt taunting the legislative voice 
of the regime at every opening.  If we are not given many details of their content, it is apparent 
nonetheless that they are noise to the Plan, frustrating its telos of a regulated society, a socialist 
citizenry, and a nature subdued to technology.   
 The noise also interferes at an aesthetic and symbolic level, which can be detected in one 
of the few actual citations ʿIsa provides of the menace.  Rumors, he says, are not only bare 
                                                 
44 For a recent example from Egypt, see the short documentary Egypt’s Campaign against Polio (dir. Oliver 
Wilkins, 2005).  Available at: http://vimeo.com/6596286.  In the United States, rumors about vaccines that cause 
autism are also common. 
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propositional statements, but can also lurk behind “unconventional” or “unfamiliar” forms 
(asālīb ghayr maʾlūfa).  He provides as an example the following “popular song”: 
 
yā btāʿit il-bakht, shūfīli bakhti 
O fortune teller, tell me my fortune 
maʿadsh byigi, gara ēh ya khti! 
He don’t come no more, dang tootin’! (67) 
 
What appears, on the surface, to be the prelude to a folksy popular song, may in fact be host to 
an insidious rumor.  ʿIsa explains that while this song most obviously expresses the complaint of 
a woman about her absent beloved, its form may be exploited by a rumormonger to spread 
agitation and distress about the injustice committed by “social, political, and economic systems” 
– in other words, dissatisfaction with the government and its Plan.   
 But besides the obviously subversive content, I believe that this peculiar example has 
been targeted by ʿIsa for aesthetic reasons.  The opening lines of the song exude the exiled signs 
of rural feminine churlishness, since not only is the narrator a woman, but her language is 
markedly “low” and “folksy.”  Against the high register prose of the social scientist, whose 
language is sanitized and cleansed of any obvious affective, emotional, or indulgent qualities, 
this musical dirge represents a kind of contamination or interference.  Even while ʿIsa seeks to 
submit its excesses to the cold and rigid tools of analysis, it nonetheless strikes the reader as a 
jarring interruption in the book’s dominant tone.  In addition, the song’s style and content 
together perform a symbolic subversion of developmentalism’s tightly masculine themes.  In the 
lines above, a complaint is lodged to the foreseer that “he” – perhaps a beloved, perhaps a 
brother or father – no longer “comes” – that is, he is absent (as is the name).  More than this, the 
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phrase “maʿadsh byigi” braces against the memory of the phrase “maʿadsh byigīb” – “he no 
longer comes” in the sexual sense; he is emasculated.  The female narrator, too, is “castrated” – 
for she does not see, she asks the fortune teller to see for her “shūfīlī.” If we conceive of ʿIsa’s 
takhṭīṭ or “Planning” as not only robustly agentive, but also in a sense “masculine” – it is able to 
create, produce, plant the seeds of development – then its antithesis becomes associated with the 
feminine.  Rumors, inasmuch as they interfere with the designs of the civilizing, masculine 
regime, are thus cast into a zone of rural femininity.  The rumor-song encapsulates this anxiety of 
an emasculated self, a desiring self blocked by noise. 
Muhammad Talʿat ʿIsa’s intricate discussion of the rumors’ tricks and turns can help us 
understand the problem they presented to the regime as well as the social scientist.  Naturally, as 
well as aesthetically and symbolically, they interfere with the developmentalist and totalitarian 
teleologies to which they have declared themselves committed.  And yet, while ʿIsa would 
almost seem to recognize this noise as an almost natural response to the many interventions of 
the regime, or as arising from genuinely popular concerns and anxieties, this momentary 
recognition becomes systematically suppressed as he falls back on an interpretive scheme with 
which we are familiar: rumors are the result of a plot. 
 
The Plot Theory: Rhetoric or Paranoia? 
 
 
In a reading of rumors which he repeats in numerous forms throughout the book, ʿIsa argues: 
 
 
The war of rumors [can be understood as] nothing other than the desperate attempt of 
colonial and feudalist interests to regain their lost power … In the manufacturing and 
propagation of rumors, they have found an opening through which to launch their 
destructive thoughts.  In the spread of rumors, they find an outlet for their hopes of 





The faceless rumors that plague Egypt are not spontaneous eruptions of public talk, or popular 
reactions to unstable times.  In Confronting Rumors, al-shāʾiʿāt are always mentioned alongside 
agents: muṣammimū al-shāʾiʿāt or “rumormongers” (literally “the designers of rumors”).  
Moreover, these designers are unequivocally identified in every case as agents of al-mustaʿmir, 
“the colonizer.” If rumors appear to be random, chaotic, and beyond the natural, ʿIsa repeatedly 
assures the reader at every opportunity that they are in fact “organized and planned” (munaẓẓama 
wa mukhaṭṭaṭa; 50).   “Rumor,” he stresses, “is not a matter of mere unconscious eruptions; 
rather, it is the fruit of deeply rooted and carefully planned operations [ʿamaliyyāt muḥkamat al-
takhṭīṭ ʿamīqat al-gudhūr]” (114). 
Here there are clear echoes of the rhetoric deployed by Muhammad Naguib and Anwar 
Sadat, which I analyzed in Chapter 1.  It is, in other words, what Morin and Kapferer had called 
the “plot theory.”  As I have argued above, following the sociological studies, the plot theory of 
rumor – claiming that it is the work of malicious, intentional agents – serves particular rhetorical 
functions: it simplifies a complex phenomenon, and “changes the image” of an erstwhile 
valuable social practice.  We might accept this as the motive for Muhammad Talʿat ʿIsa’s claims 
as well: his book is deploying the common rhetorical trope of the “plot” to convince his readers 
that what appears to be spontaneous, grass-roots, and fairly innocent is in fact otherwise.  
Though the social scientist may in fact have his doubts about the ultimate source of rumors, and 
even dismiss in his own mind the figure of the colonialist mastermind as too simple an 
explanation for all the noise, what matters for him is the effect that these images have on an 




And yet, the very persistence of this trope makes one wonder if more than mere rhetoric 
is involved here.  It is a persistence we see not just in Confronting Rumors, but official 
communiques, press conferences, newspaper articles, radio addresses and elsewhere: rumors are 
“planned,” and they are coming from without (cf. Chapter 1).  I find it necessary at this point to 
complicate the interpretation proposed by Morin and Kapferer, and to reconfigure the “plot 
theory” as the “paranoid style” of interpretation.  The term was made famous by historian 
Richard Hofstadter, who used it to describe the interpretive practices of rightwing movements in 
the contemporary United States, and other groups in American history.  The central tenet of the 
paranoid style is the belief in “a vast and sinister conspiracy, a gigantic yet subtle machinery of 
influence set in motion to undermine and destroy a way of life” (1996: 29).  Quite like the 
“colonizer” or “reactionary elements” of Naguib, Sadat, and now ʿIsa, the enemy as conceived 
by the paranoid style is “a perfect model of malice, a kind of amoral superman: sinister, 
ubiquitous, powerful, cruel, sensual, luxury-loving” (31-32).  In contrast to the vast majority of 
the population, who remain passive victims, the enemy is “a free, active, demonic agent.  He 
wills, indeed he manufactures, the mechanism of history itself, or deflects the normal course of 
history in an evil way” (32).   
Hofstadter’s work has proved generative for many scholars in history, political science, 
and anthropology, some of whom retain his term “paranoid style,” while many others prefer 
terms like “conspiracy theory” (Bratich 2008; Marcus 1999; Stewart 1999) or “conspiracism” 
(Gray 2010).  The choice of terms sometimes depends on how the phenomenon is 
conceptualized.  “Conspiracy theory” or “conspiracism” is sometimes preferred to Hofstadter’s 
“paranoid style” because the latter is accused of pathologizing the practice (eg. Bratich 2008: 4).  
I disagree with this assessment.  Hofstadter was quite clear that by “paranoid style” he intended 
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not to diagnose a disease, but rather to appreciate a “style … much as a historian of art might 
speak of the baroque or the mannerist style” (1996: 4).  This is quite consonant with Kathleen 
Stewart’s conception of “conspiracy theory,” which she argues is not “a prefabricated ideology 
(as if abstract, exegetical ideas were what ruled the world) but … a practice” (1999: 16; my 
emphasis).  I retain Hofstadter’s term “paranoid style,” because for me “style” implies not a 
pathology, nor an ideology (a totalized matrix of ideas into which the subject is always already 
straight-jacketed), but what Stewart called a “practice” and what Hofstadter likened to an artistic 
style.  That is, it manifests itself as a tendency or a disposition to interpret complex actions in a 
way that is paranoid.  The subject (whether he is Sadat, Naguib, or ʿIsa) need not always be 
consumed by this practice, but pursues it rather in reaction to particular circumstances or a series 
of events.45 
  What interests me in ʿIsa’s text is how it can help us understand the motives for the 
paranoid style.  Why is it that the analyst, among other regime spokespeople, persists in his 
perception of a conspiracy behind rumors?  Previous work on the paranoid style and conspiracy 
theory has offered several overlapping explanations for its prevalence.  One that I have already 
considered is that conspiracy theory has important rhetorical functions – that is, as Morin and 
Kapferer argued about the “plot theory,” it helps convince an audience of the threatening, foreign 
nature of a phenomenon like rumor.  This argument is echoed by Gray (2010), who considers 
how certain authoritarian regimes act as “conspiracist rhetors,” strategically deploying 
conspiracy theory to simplify a problem, distract attention from their own failings, and/or 
                                                 
45 I do not find it necessary to explain here that Stewart’s notion of “practice,” or any notion of “practice” in 
contemporary social theory, follows from Pierre Bourdieu’s use of the term.  Just as Stewart opposes “practice” to 
“ideology,” so did Bourdieu famously oppose the “dispositions” of habitus to totalized systems of thought and 
action, such as Chomsky’s early view of language.  In a similar manner, I oppose a dispositional, occasional “style” 
to a paranoid pathology or ideology.  Speculating further on the subject’s ability to escape this disposition – his 
agency vis-à-vis the paranoid interpretive style – is beyond the scope of this chapter. 
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mobilize the public behind a particular policy.  Writing on the Arab World, Gray also argues that 
the prevalence of conspiracy theory in national political discourse is due in part to the real 
history of conspiracies hatched against Arab countries by former or current colonial powers.  
Even with the rolling back of European imperialism – which was an undeniable plot against the 
peoples and governments of the world – the trauma of the experience has conditioned many to 
read conspiracy as the motivator of political action.  Nor has this foreign plotting ceased, with 
the American military’s wars on Iraq, Afghanistan, and its support of autocratic regimes in the 
Gulf states, giving readers of current events every reason to suspect conspiracy.  Long before the 
current Western scholarship on conspiracy theory, Ihsan ʿAbd al-Quddus, our favorite 
protagonist from Chapter 1, made this historical argument in an article published in 1978.  
Entitled “Those who Escape to the World of Secrets,” ʿAbd al-Quddus’s article critiques what he 
calls “the nature of Arab thought,” which  
 
always searches for what is behind the curtain, what is between the lines, what is 
underneath the words, what is hidden inside hearts and minds.  It never settles for what is 
presented before it or what it hears with its own ears.  It always assumes that there is a 
secret agreement, or hidden motives, or a personal interest. (ʿAbd al-Quddus: 85) 
 
 
This kind of thinking is not only Arab, he goes on to say, but pertains to “all generations who 
have lived under the pressure of foreign dominance” (Ibid.).  Conspiracy theory, in other words, 
is a postcolonial problem.  Of course, as Hofstadter demonstrated in his article, it is also a 
Western problem; thus any attempt to pin the phenomenon down to a particular part of the world 
will run into difficulties. 
 Conspiracy theory, or the paranoid style, may thus have rhetorical or historical motives.  
Still other scholars, notably Marcus (1999) and Stewart (1999), emphasize the “pleasure” 
inherent in the practice – an important aspect that I elaborate on in Chapter 8.  In order to 
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appreciate the paranoid style in Confronting Rumors, however, it is important to recognize that 
there is not one paranoid style but many paranoid styles, whose principle claims, motives, and 
methods of presentation can be similar, but are not always the same.  What precisely is the 
paranoid style as practiced by Muhammad Talʿat ʿIsa?  It rests on two claims, made 
simultaneously: first, rumors originate outside the conscious will of the public, in some “other” 
agency; and second, they are the product of deliberate “planning” (takhṭīṭ) – they are “planned” 
(mukhaṭṭaṭa) and “organized” (munaẓẓama), rather than spontaneous, accidental, or 
overdetermined.  While both of these claims appear to be collapsed in the figure of the 
rumormonger, I find that greater clarity can be achieved by separating them in the analysis. 
 The first of these claims is manifest in the repeated portrayal of the public-at-large as 
passive victims to rumor, and the location of blame somewhere beyond their conscious will.  
ʿIsa’s text is swarming with zombie-like citizens, automatons controlled by rumor.  He calls 
them “sociopathic types,” whose minds have been “taken over by a hidden mover, forced into a 
state of sedation similar to that which precedes a deep coma” (58). These possessed masses are 
likened to an animal “herd” (qaṭīʿ); they are “mere herd-like, unconscious crowds” (mugarrad 
ḥushūd qaṭīʿiyya ghayr wāʿiya (59).  Why is the public not the agent of its own rumors?  A clue 
is to be found in the passage from al-Zayni Barakat, cited above.  “What pained me greatly,” the 
Nasser-like patriarch says, “were these stories that were circulated on the tongues of the masses.  
For they love me, a fact which led me to believe that these stories and anecdotes had been 
concocted” (al-Ghitani 2005: 154; my emphasis).  With his conviction that he and his people are 
one, and that he is acting in their interests, the developmentalist patriarch cannot imagine that the 
“stories” circulated against him and his projects could ever come from their conscious will.  This 
conviction that the leader is beloved of his people, an emotional as well as ideological 
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conviction, leads him to the belief that the rumors are coming from without.  Thus for 
Muhammad Talʿat ʿIsa, the rumors that act against the projects of the state, the enlightened 
takhṭīṭ, cannot really be designed by the public.   
 If, on account of their anti-regime content, rumors point to an external origin, it is also on 
account of their manner of circulation that some “other” explanation has to be sought.  This is 
one of the first observations that scholars often make when approaching the subject.  “The 
rapidity with which rumors is propagated is astonishing,” notes James Scott (1990: 144).  
Kapferer similarly remarks on the common perception that rumor has “magical circulatory 
virtues” (1990: 50).  Both scholars explain this phenomenon in terms of the exponential logic of 
the chain letter: one person tells two, who tell four, who tell eight or more, and so forth.  And 
yet, so often, the “magical circulatory virtues” of rumor would seem to point to some multi-
tentacled phantom at work in the social body.  Moreover, the sheer irascibility of the 
phenomenon, and the public’s apparent unwillingness to stop talking, creates the impression of a 
zombie-like, “sociopathic herd” fully enslaved to a parasitic force.   
 The second of ʿIsa’s claims – rumor is the product of conspiratorial designs – does not 
necessarily follow from the first.  If the origins of the noise are somewhere outside the conscious 
will of the public, then the psychological and sociological dimensions to which he gestures could 
be pursued further, but they are not.  Instead an image of a calculative, demonic agency is 
posited as the driving force behind the irruptions of rumor across the country.  The first claim is 
not necessarily paranoid: rumor is a strangely complex phenomenon which, because of its 
velocity and analytic recalcitrance, suggests a range of different forces at work in the social 
body.  But this range of forces is, at the moment of its discovery, immediately reduced by the 
analyst as he seizes upon the figure of the malicious plotter.  Why has he made this decision? 
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Having almost acknowledged a plurality of “other” factors, why has he so quickly proceeded to 
the second claim of a singular, intentional agent? 
 In his article on the paranoid style, Hofstadter offers a helpful hint when pointing out the 
apparent “paradox” that paranoid’s enemy “seems to be on many counts a projection of the self” 
(1996: 32; my emphasis).  Unfortunately, Hofstadter does not pursue this important insight much 
further, going only so far as to show how some conspiracy theorists have attempted to imitate 
their enemy in certain aspects such as the aesthetics of secret rituals, the obsession with 
evidence, and the use of subversive tactics.  But what the paranoid projects from the self onto the 
enemy, I argue, is not just these secondary characteristics but the very idea of conspiratorial, 
direct and intentional agency.  ʿIsa’s text allows us to take this notion of projection further, since, 
as the reader will recall, it exerts as much effort asserting an ideal image of the self – the 
calculative, autonomous agency of the Plan – as it does an image of the enemy.  It is not a 
coincidence that these two images are articulated in precisely the same language. 
The practitioner of the paranoid style, in other words, projects the model of agency he 
holds most sacred, the only agency he understands, onto the enemy.  This projection can be 
detected in the very language ʿIsa deploys.  The takhṭīt (“planning”), tanẓīm (“organization”), 
and tawgīh (“directing”) of the regime find their match in the taṣmīm (“design”) of rumors, 
which are always mukhaṭṭaṭa (“planned”), munaẓẓama (“organized”), and muwaggaha 
(“directed”); the regime’s policies of guided “growth” (tanmiya) are met by the enemy’s 
“incubation” (tafrīkh) of rumors.  Furthermore, the actions of both the regime and the rumor are 
understood through a network of metaphorical flows and blockages: the former seeks to install 
“the necessary [mental] obstacles” (al-muʿawwiqāt al-ḍurūriyya) in the masses, so that they 
become “rocks” incapable of being “swept away” (tangarif) by the flood of rumors; at the same 
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time, rumors throw up their own “obstacles” (taʿwīqāt) and “blockage” (ṣadd) to the designs of 
development, which seeks to “dissolve” (idhāba) the corrupt sediments of colonialism and “melt 
away” (tadhwīb) class differences through its steady stream of consciousness-raising (150, 155).  
In the understanding of the paranoid social scientist, everything is the result of calculated design; 
finding the agent behind the noise is a matter of course, a matter of tracing the flows and rooting 
out the engineer behind the obstacles.  To put it another way, the deep conviction which regime 
ideologues have in their own “Planning” inspires them also to believe a “plan” or “plot” is at 
work in the grand menace of rumors.   
This “projection” is important not only as a sense-making device, but also as a sort of 
defense mechanism against admitting a more diffuse, distributed model of agency into the order 
of things.  If the takhṭīṭ of rumors could be shown to be more complex and less rational, might 
not the takhṭīṭ of the regime also come under some suspicion?  Were the Free Officers really free 
agents?  Wasn’t the Aswan High Dam – like all great projects claimed by the engineers of 
modern developmentalism – in fact the product of many different forces, of international 
cooperation, and quite a bit of luck (and even then, like rumor, somewhat leaky)?  It is quite 
possible that the proclamation of takhṭīṭ as a fundamental property of all action, patriotic and 
treasonous, allowed Muhammad Talʿat ʿIsa the convenience of having to look for another model 
– one that, taken seriously, would undermine the claims he made for the regime’s modern 
victories, and the credit he gave to the calculative, plotting will of the country’s leaders. 
The paranoid style, then, is sustained in large part by an unshakeable conviction in a 
takhṭīṭ-centered notion of agency.  What makes ʿIsa’s interpretation of rumors “paranoid” is not 
necessarily its detection of hidden influences on the masses, but the reduction of these influences 
to an organized plan, whose control of said masses is total and without accident or failure.  
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Rather than investigate the multiplicity of forces, and even the failure of forces, that happen to 
congeal in any particular rumor, the analyst interprets the problem as simply and 
unproblematically as he would interpret himself.  He does not abandon this interpretive ease 
because, in a sense, its abandonment would render his ideal self more complex and 
overdetermined, and indeed other-determined: the robust autonomy of the modern subject 





Muhammad Talʿat ʿIsa’s Confronting Rumors is a singular text, and in many senses an isolated 
one: today it rests neglected in the archives, and ʿIsa himself remains virtually untraceable.  Yet 
it encapsulates what was surely a more widely shared set of anxieties, and the interpretive 
practices deployed to contain them.  In the early 1960s, an embattled but optimistic regime, 
struggling in the postcolonial era to prove its hegemony through a combination of physical 
strength and narrative craft, detected a strange resistance to its efforts.  Things did not always go 
according to plan.  As Confronting Rumors often painfully records, the reach of the regime was 
running into rumors at every instance of action, and the so-called “Planning” seemed to be 
swerving oddly off course.  Even popular ballads, brackish jokes and simple tunes seemed to be 
pregnant with dangerous meaning, and possessed by an emasculating potential.  All this noise 
called for an explanation, and social scientists like Muhammad Talʿat ʿIsa were more than 
willing to rise to the occasion.  In a sense, the explanation he provided had always been there: 
regime rhetors, since the very first days of the revolution, had made good efforts attributing al-
ishāʿa to calculating, foreign agents.  But were these efforts always conscious?  Was the plot 
97 
 
theory only an attempt to convince the audience, or was it also an attempt, unconsciously, to 
uphold a conviction already held by the rhetors themselves? 
 Shifting the analytic emphasis from rhetoric to paranoia, I have attempted to discern the 
motives for the plot theory not in the conscious will, but in anxieties shared by social scientists 
and state actors caught up in an ideology of takhṭīṭ.  Insights from the study of the paranoid style 
and conspiracy theory have led me to posit a mechanism of projection as a likely motivating 
force for Muhammad Talʿat ʿIsa’s repeated invocation of rumor’s careful and calculated design.  
When his ideal of takhṭīṭ ran into noise, when the masses started behaving as rumor-zombies, the 
most convincing explanation was derived from his ideal model of agency, takhṭīṭ.  Other 
examples could have been sought in the idioms of accident, happenchance, or a careful post-
human tracing of “others” and their influence.  But to pursue any of these alternatives would 
mean to acknowledge, at least implicitly, that there were problems with the regime’s own 
enabling fiction of control.  It would mean abandoning the credit taken for the building of the 
High Dam, the credit taken for expelling the British, the credit taken for building socialism.  
Surely all of these things had been achieved by deliberate planning, through the regime’s 
exercise of its robust, autonomous agency in Egyptian, indeed natural, affairs. 
 “Rumor,” Muhammad Talʿat ʿIsa warned, “represents an imminent danger … no 
different from the danger presented by natural disasters or crises” (140).  Certainly all these 
dangers could be explained in the same way.  The paranoid style which I have analyzed here is 
much broader than my focus on rumors will allow, as it has also been deployed against disasters 
both natural and manmade.  All of these phenomena can provoke an interpretive paranoia that 
fetishizes the calculative abilities of the responsible enemy.  However, it is important to 
acknowledge the role of alternative interpretations, to avoid falling into generalizations about 
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“conspiracy theory” and its relation to “the nature of Arab thought” (as Ihsan ʿAbd al-Quddus 
said).  ʿAbd al-Quddus himself represents a skeptical alternative to the paranoid style in his 
critical article.  If we are to locate a specific time and place for the kind of paranoia I have 
analyzed here, paranoia pure and unironic, surely it is within the confines of a regime, and a 








































Chapter 3: All the President’s Parasites: Contested Interpretations of the 
Mubarak Death Rumors (2007) 
 
 
In June 2006, Egyptian parliamentarian Hisham Mustafa Khalil unveiled to the People’s 
Assembly his plan to establish what he called “The National Authority to Combat Rumors” 
(gihāz mukāfaḥat al-shāʾiʾāt). In addition to penalizing any “manufacturer, propagator, or 
endorser of rumors” with a prison sentence of not more than a year, or fine not less than one 
thousand L.E., the legislation envisioned a council of “scientific experts” with the power to chase 
a rumor to its source, exterminate it, and respond to further public inquiries through a nationwide 
network of call centers.   In defense of his plan, Khalil pointed to the recent outbreak of false 
news on the spread of bird flu, which had caused unnecessary panic across the country and led 
poultry farmers into ruin.  To this he was able to add a list of rumors that had “struck” (ḍarabat) 
Egypt in recent years: reports on toxic cosmetics, the death of public officials, foreign espionage, 
terrorist plots, and contaminated drinking water, among other credible improbabilities.  All this 
talk was damaging not only the public standing of individuals, but also, as the refrain goes, “the 
reputation of Egypt at home and abroad.”  The legislation was ultimately defeated: but was this 
because of protests from journalists and human rights groups, or because, as an official at the 
Ministry of Interior explained in a rare moment of candor, “any ‘authority’ to combat rumors 




                                                 
46 “Journalists Reject ‘Combatting Rumors’”. Al-Masri Al-Yawm, 6/16/2006, available at: http://www.almasry-
alyoum.com/article2.aspx?ArticleID=20211&IssueID=304.  See also: “Hisham Beh, Ism Allah ʿAleh,” Al-Masri Al-




The latter is more likely – despite its rhetoric of rights and democratization, the Mubarak 
regime, even in the stupor and decay of its final decade, was careful not to make concessions to 
the advocates of free speech.  And yet, Khalil’s pet project, as a strategy of repression, could 
almost be said to belong to a different era.  The regime imprisoned and tortured journalists, 
bloggers, publishers, and the rest, but this “National Authority to Combat Rumors,” in its 
language, sense of purpose, and audacious scope and trajectory, seemed to resonate more with a 
time and place quite far removed from the present.  What was this time and place?  In what 
stratum of the social and political unconscious had Khalil’s plan originally taken shape, from 
where had it gathered its mass, momentum, and meaning, only to burst forth as a sort of 
ideological hiccup in the twenty-first century?  Put simply, where did he get the idea that 
“rumors” could be “combatted”?  The previous two chapters have attempted to answer this 
question by tracing rumor’s entrance and re-entrance onto the stage of public policy and social 
science.  As a Trinity, as noise, as an undeniable conspiracy against the would-be conspiracy of 
modern development, al-ishāʿa featured prominently as an object of combat in the discourse of 
Muhammad Naguib, Anwar Sadat, Gamal Abdel Nasser (and al-Zayni Barakat), and Muhammad 
Talʿat ʿIsa.  It is surely to this discourse of combat and control that Hisham Mustafa Khalil’s 
project properly belongs.  But with the language of takhṭīṭ and “revolution” long since 
abandoned, and state developmentalism now a caricature of its former self, this new attempt to 
systematize the eradication of rumor simply did not resonate; it did not make sense, except as the 
efforts of an over-zealous regime lackey eager to prove his loyalty. 
Nonetheless, the failure of Khalil’s “National Authority” did not spell the end of 
“combatting rumors.”  Certain stories, woven around, or capable of provoking, deeply-seated 
anxieties in the political and symbolic order, do not fail to incur violent reactions from those 
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most heavily invested in this order.  This chapter examines how regime representatives 
responded to the outbreak of rumors about the death of President Husni Mubarak in August and 
September of 2007.  The political regime at this time adopted a laxer attitude towards subversive 
speech than either the Naguib or Nasser presidencies, and while “rumor” remained a quick and 
easy way to characterize unwanted criticism in press conferences and newspaper articles, the 
obsession which had grown around the object in the 1950s and 1960s had receded considerably – 
thus, the quick dismissal of Hisham Mustafa Khalil’s proposed National Authority in 2006.  
Nonetheless, the anxieties that the Mubarak death rumors provoked, and the rhetoric and 
interpretive practices deployed against them, were remarkably similar to those analyzed in the 
previous two chapters.  Through a reading of newspaper articles, blog posts, and government 
communiques during this period, I explain how the paranoid style suffuses the anti-rumor 
strategies of the regime, motivating its claims of conspiracy, its metaphorical language of 
parasites and demonic possession, and its dramatic prosecution of alleged “rumormonger” 
Ibrahim ʿIsa.  I begin, however, with a recounting of the rumors themselves, in order to speculate 
on the anxieties and desires that gave them their special charge.  At the same time, I argue, it is 
















Rumor: “Mubarak is Dead” 
 
 
It started in the afternoon, around 3 o’clock, it’s impossible to know the source with any 
precision … Of course, the details vary from person to person, but the content is always 
one, especially in grave events like this.  Of course, this is not to deny individual talents, 
like the manner of recounting, or the style of reporting the news, or how it is divulged.  
Big Ben had not yet chimed 2 o’clock when everyone had already learned that His 
Excellency had suffered a “terrible accident.”  This is how it was described in the 
beginning; his private car had flipped over several times, and it seems that he suffered a 
serious injury… 
The whispering is first met with caution.  Who knows?  Maybe the news is false, maybe 
some unknown party broadcast this slanderous report as a sort of test balloon. 
At a certain point, a conviction grows that what is being circulated is not just idle 
imaginings, or rumors, but a true happening… (al-Ghitani 2002: 38) 
 
 
In this scene from his novel Tales of the Treasure Trove, Gamal al-Ghitani captures the genesis 
and mutation of rumors after the sudden disappearance of a corporate executive.  “His 
Excellency,” as the executive is called, could be substituted for any corporate head, celebrity, or 
head of state, whose general veiling from public view is punctuated by conspicuous and 
unexplained absences, whether because of illness, death, accident, or retreat into luxury.  In this 
case, the executive has reportedly succumbed to a traffic accident, and with details scarce, 
speculation and hearsay are rife.  Al-Ghitani goes on to skim the surface of the rumors’ 
psychology: “some are monitoring the situation, some are hoping, while not an insignificant 
number of employees exchanged glances of a special nature!”  What is one to make of these 
popular whisperings?  How to read the rumor?  “Is this a prayer for His Excellency’s survival?  
Or a prayer that what they had heard was correct, so that all would be relieved of His grip and 
odd behavior?  Repressed feelings, forbidden from expressing themselves, looked out from 
people’s eyes” (41).  As always, rumor would seem to feed off a tangle of hope and anxiety, 
which could not be expressed otherwise. 
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I admit al-Ghitani’s text here not to analyze its literary value, but to let it speak as a social 
and political commentary of great perspicacity.  The particular state of confusion al-Ghitani 
describes could apply equally to events that occurred in Egyptian public life both before and 
after the novel’s publication in 2002.  Like the fictional “chief executive,” President Husni 
Mubarak became more and more obscured from public view as his time in office stretched on 
impossibly towards a full quarter-century and beyond.  Due to illness, repeated assassination 
attempts, vacation, or other reasons left unexplained, the president would sometimes disappear 
suddenly, leading to confusion and rumors such as those described in al-Ghitani’s novel.  One 
likely inspiration for the fictional scene was the thwarted attack by terrorists on Mubarak’s 
motorcade in Addis Ababa in 1995.  In the twenty-first century, several bouts of illness removed 
the president temporarily from television screens, most memorably in 2004, 2007, and 2010, and 
the script of the executive’s disappearance and popular speculation repeated itself. 
 My concern here is with the discursive and epistemic quake of August and September, 
2007, whose magnitude surpassed that of any of the previous Mubarak death-scares.  At this 
time, beginning roughly in mid-August, rumors inundated the cafes, blogs, newspapers and 
sporting clubs of Cairo that President Husni Mubarak, then 79 years-old, was dead or seriously 
ill. Upon the eruption of the story, denials were issued in state media; First Lady Suzanne 
Mubarak appeared on television to threaten the nameless agents of false news; and the United 
States Embassy intervened with an unusual and unconvincing statement of innocence.  But talk 
of the president’s death continued unabated, fueled at once by the oblique hope of release from 
nearly thirty years of social and political malaise, and the often violently suppressed anxiety 
about an Egypt without Mubarak.  Text messages and Twitter feeds nourished the rumor with 
104 
 
more lurid details, including the nature of the president’s illness and the advanced psychosis – 
and perhaps sexual deviance – of his wife and son.  The noise sounded something like this: 
 
“According to sources, [US] Ambassador Ricciardonne remarked at one point in the 
dinner that President Mubarak was ‘sick,’ and ‘no longer the major political operator in 
Egypt’...” 




“Ambassador Ricciardone did not at any time – whether in public or in private – express 
worry about the health of President Mubarak...” 




“My husband is fine...” 




“The President in Egypt is a god and gods don’t get sick.  For this reason, the President 
and his entourage of sycophants conceal the truth about his illness...” 




“In a separate case, the state security prosecutor-general charged [Ibrahim] ʿIsa with 
publishing reports ‘likely to disturb public security and damage the public interest’ 
following articles in Al-Dustur about President Mubarak’s rumored health problems. ʿIsa 
was ordered to appear before the State Security Court on October 1...” (Human Rights 




“Adam was deceived by Satan, who rumored (waswasa) to him that the tree contained 
that which he desired, and so he ate from the tree, and was caste from Paradise because 
he had believed false testimony and concocted rumors...” 





“…‘I’m here talking to you and it’s barely 8 in the morning!’…” 
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(President Mubarak [?], as quoted by a journalist interviewing him in the state-owned 





The truth of the situation has never been revealed.  Or rather, many “truths” have been 
revealed repeatedly, but they lack consistency.  The president was not dead, but was he ill?  Was 
he on vacation?  Was he working as usual, spritely and energetic at “8 in the morning”?  The 
answers provided by the regime and its allies exhibited panic, and were unconvincing to many 
consumers of mass media.  The statement provided by the United States Embassy strikes the 
reader as almost absurd – this is because the strategy of entextualization, of repeating the rumor, 
is inherently risky.  I will return to analyze the strategies of response and combat in the next 
section.  Here I would like to speculate on the reasons for this rumor’s emergence and spread. 
 Since the beginning of rumor’s emergence as an object of analysis in the modern social 
and clinical sciences, psychology has persisted as the dominant interpretive paradigm.  
Especially when rumors appear, in the view of the analyst, to be fantastical or false, their 
authorship is alleged to originate in the depths of the unconscious.  This psychological approach 
was made famous, but did not begin with Allport and Postman’s The Psychology of Rumor 
(1947).  To cite only one of many later examples, Edgar Morin’s sociological investigation into 
rumors in the French town of Orléans is conceived, in part, as a journey into “the unexplored 
depths of the collective subconscious” (1971: 13).  More recently, James Scott’s study of 
subaltern forms of resistance has given many examples of how rumor “serves as a vehicle for 
anxieties and aspirations that may not be openly acknowledged by its propagators” (1990: 145).  
Especially in the colonial and postcolonial contexts that Scott investigates, “oppressed groups so 
often read in rumors promises of their imminent liberation” (147).  It is not difficult to propose 
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such an interpretation of the Mubarak death rumors, which were undoubtedly fueled in part by 
the “anxieties and aspirations” of “oppressed groups” – the anxiety of an uncertain future, and 
the hope of deliverance from oppression.  Interpretations of this sort proliferated in the Egyptian 
blogosphere and in the press, attempting to make sense of the phenomenon in a vernacular 
psychological idiom.  In a post written on September 4, 2007, the Cairene blogger Bint Masriyya 
(“Egyptian Girl”), an occasional commentator on public events and personal diarist, produced a 
brief synthesis of these interpretations, proposing that the rumors were “the result of a 
schizophrenic frenzy as the result of a neural shock as a result of the feeling that the man will 
finally kick it and all will be well” (emphasis in the original).47  The blogger goes on to add that 
people’s “patience” (with the reign of Mubarak) has been exhausted, and exacerbated further by 
“the high price of sugar”; her own post was written “in a state of pre-breakfasting delirium.” 
Whether this psycho-chemical chain reaction generates rumor directly, or whether it predisposes 
people to exaggerate a rumor already in circulation, it is evident that a kind of popular psychosis 
is invested with extraordinary explanatory power. 
 There are of course problems with the psychological approach to rumors.  As cultural 
historian Luise White has observed, 
 
suggestions [in scholarship] of … collective psychoses [have] made rumors the speech of 
unified and homogeneous populations who [have] no multifaceted vision of the world; 
such interpretations [have] obscured the contradictory fragments of gossip that [are] 
made into any rumor. (2005: 243) 
 
 
This is not to say that psychological or psychoanalytic explanations have no place in the study of 
rumor.  Rather, the analytic crimes to be avoided when appealing to the unconscious (collective 
or otherwise) are reductionism, reification, and generalization.  Not all consumers of mass media 
                                                 
47 Available at www.bentmasreya.net, 9/4/2007. 
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in Egypt played a role in the transmission of the Mubarak death rumors, let alone believe them.  
Nor does the analytic construct of the unconscious determine, as if it were an all-powerful 
author, the content and circulation of any rumor or fantastical narrative – such a proposition 
would be to fall back into a conspiratorial reading no different from the “plot theory,” the only 
difference being in the figuration of the conspirator (the colonizer, or the unconscious).   
At the very least, what I would like to emphasize here is that the psychological 
explanation of rumor is not a neutral explanation.  Indeed as Neubauer has observed, 
psychological exegesis was among the most important rhetorical tools deployed by the 
journalists and scientists involved in the American “rumor clinics” during World War II.  
“Displaying a sophisticated talent for writing,” says Neubauer, the rumor doctors spoke of 
“sexual inhibitions, suppressed fears and the mechanisms of psychological projection” in order 
to convince the American public that it was human, but also in a sense pathological, to believe 
false rumors (1999: 138).  Psychologizing, and pathologizing, popular stories would thus be 
another rhetorical strategy to “change rumor’s image” as Kapferer said.  It is not surprising, then, 
that supporters of the regime deployed this strategy quite frequently in their response to the 
outbreak of the Mubarak death rumors.48  So had Muhammad Talʿat ʿIsa in his Confronting 
Rumors spoken in a psychologizing idiom when he portrayed large swathes of the Egyptian 
public as “sociopathic types” for having succumbed to rumor. So did Muhammad Sayyid 
Tantawi, the Shaykh of al-Azhar, diagnose rumors as a malady afflicting “the naïve nations” (al-
umam al-sādhija) which lack “consciousness” (al-waʿy) (2001: 8).  In this way, rumor is reduced 
to an affliction of the mind, a disease with roots in the psyche, and other motives – such as 
political subversion, the personal rejection of the president, or ironic play – are brushed aside. 
                                                 
48 See, for example, Dr. Hasan Abu Talib, “al-Masriyun wa Qalaquhum al-Mashruʿ” (“Egyptians and their 
Legitimate Concern”), al-Ahram, 9/5/2007. 
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 I will return to a closer reading of the Mubarak death rumors in Chapter 7, when I shift 
the emphasis from psychology to the aesthetics and politics of humor, parody, and play.  For 
now, it is sufficient to observe the general context in which these stories emerged: an ageing, 
increasingly distant president whose lengthy reign was becoming more and more unbearable – in 
fact, rather boring – to ordinary citizens.  In their attempt to control these rumors, representatives 
of the regimes resorted to psychology.  They also, as I will demonstrate now, responded with 
their own psychosis. 
 
Plotters, Parasites, and Ibrahim ʿIsa: Figuring and Refiguring the Rumormonger 
 
 
Rumor has a tendency to inspire paranoia in the analyst.  It creates an overwhelming impression 
that beyond it lies a sinister “other,” that ordinary people are more its vessels than its agents.  
This may be due either to the strange content of rumors, or their almost supernatural velocity and 
recalcitrance.  Shortly after the rumor of President Mubarak’s death began circulating in late 
August, 2007, opinion pieces in al-Ahram and other pro-regime newspapers began their frantic 
search for its origin.  Much like Muhammad Talʿat ʿIsa’s Confronting Rumors, many of these 
articles are marked by the conviction that the rumor has taken over the public from without – 
because of rumor’s seditious, unpatriotic content, and because of what Kapferer called its 
apparent “magical circulatory virtues.”  More importantly, and also like ʿIsa, the authors of these 
articles held forth with the “paranoid” conviction that a singular, calculative agency was at root 
responsible.  However, by considering more carefully the texts deployed by Shaykh Muhammad 
Sayyid Tantawi in this battle, I argue that the metaphors he uses to pin down the conspiratorial 
rumormonger are inherently unstable, and can be read not only as reductive, paranoid 
109 
 
interpretations of rumor à la Muhammad Talʿat ʿIsa, but also as a more complex, richly literary 
understanding of the phenomenon. 
In al-Ahram, a fairly typical account of rumor’s otherness, and parasitic seizure of the 
social body, was provided on September 6 by Ilham Sharshar – one of the paper’s staff writers, 
and wife of the infamous Minister of Interior Habib al-ʿAdli.  Towing the regime’s line of 
interpretation, Sharshar
49
 begins by installing President Mubarak as the uncontested author of 
Egypt’s past, present and future.  The President “embodies the will of the nation, and symbolizes 
the extent of its cohesion and stability”: that is, where ʿIsa had revolution-speak to assert the 
regime’s work on behalf of the masses, Sharshar has the tropes of Mubarak’s “accomplishments” 
and “gifts” to effect the unity of his interests with those of the people.  These presuppositions, as 
we have seen, lead the regime’s rumorologists to an inescapable conclusion: the recalcitrant text, 
frustrating the common interests of President and people, could only be the work of some outside 
force leaching on the social body.  Sharshar calls out these archetypal and elusive agents 
provocateurs: behind the rumors are “an errant group” (fiʾa ḍālla), “a small gang” (shirdhima 
qalīla), “a bunch of no-names” (asmāʾ maghūla).  Equipped with “fangs … sharper, more bitter, 
and more poisonous than we could have imagined,” the alien rumormongers have torn open a 
“gaping wound” and caused a “painful flow of blood”; they are “wounding [President 
Mubarak’s] long tradition of giving.” Surpassing Muhammad Talʿat ʿIsa’s comparatively 
subdued language of social pathology and poisonous floods, Sharshar serves up a full and fleshy 
image of the parasite: the intruder who takes advantage of a host, and produces an unbearable 
noise.  
                                                 
49 The master of mock-etymology, the 17th-century anthropologist Yusuf al-Shirbini, defines sharshar as “female 
urine,” opposite the masculine ṭarṭar (2005: 250). 
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More important than Sharshar’s “othering” of the rumor is her fixation on the intentional, 
deliberately malicious nature of the rumormonger.  The parasite here is not merely a spontaneous 
infection that has spread through a confluence of factors; rather, it is a fiend, consciously 
executing its peculiar agenda of destruction.   In the previous chapter, I discussed this fixation 
with the rumormonger’s plotting as a sort of “projection,” by which the analyst projected his own 
ideal of agency onto the agent of rumor.  Surely a similar process is at work here: regime agents 
like Ilham Sharshar understand action only in terms of intent and execution, of plan and its 
unproblematic realization.  We are no longer in a time of takhṭīṭ, but the basic ideal of robust 
agency still appeals to all those obsessed with control.  As such, a complex and overdetermined 
phenomenon like rumor is understood only in these terms, as the result of a deliberate plot. Yet it 
is clear in this case that the conviction regime representatives held in the presence of a conspiring 
rumormonger was triggered not only by an internal psychological process of projection.  Faced 
with a specific rumor that posed an immediate threat to the political regime, they would also 
resort to the trope of the conspiring rumormonger out of rhetorical and practical concerns, 
similar to those I argued for in Chapter 1.  Giving the rumor a face and an agenda – and, 
ultimately, a prison sentence – would be a symbolic way to contain the threat.   
During these weeks of confusion, efforts were redoubled in the pro-regime press to 
produce the parasite in the flesh and give him a clear purpose.  Most common were the 
accusations leveled at the American Ambassador, Francis Ricciardone, who had allegedly let 
word slip during a private dinner that President Mubarak looked “ill,” and was “no longer the 
prime mover of politics in Egypt.”50 Ricciardone was a likely culprit not only for his 
representation of the most powerful “foreign interest” in Egypt, but also for his uncanny 
command of Egyptian colloquial Arabic; he denied the accusations repeatedly, choking on the 
                                                 





  Other accusations implicated nameless “external or foreign parties lying in wait” 
(aṭrāf khārigiyya aw agnabiyya mutarabbiṣa).52  Finally, the editor-in-chief of the pro-regime 
periodical Ruz al-Yusuf declared that it was the Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt’s largest opposition 
organization, which was behind the ishāʿāt about Mubarak’s health.  According to Karam Gabr, 
the organization possessed “27 centers across the nation, equipped with the latest instruments” 
for the spreading of rumors; having already “spread 20 rumors this year, including rumors of 
forced religious conversion,” they were “preparing to circulate 500 more rumors.”53 
 As with the Revolutionary Tribunal in 1953, real flesh-and-blood rumormongers needed 
to be produced for all to see.  On September 13, the editors of four opposition newspapers were 
charged with “publishing false news, statements, or rumors likely to disturb public order.” 
Ibrahim ʿIsa of al-Dustur, Waʾil al-Ibrashi of Sawt al-Umma, ʿAdil Hammuda of al-Fagr, and 
ʿAbd al-Halim Qandil of al-Karama were sentenced to a maximum year in prison and fined 
twenty thousand L.E., later reduced.   Most prominent among these was Ibrahim ʿIsa, who for 
many reasons was a very convenient scapegoat.  Though his career in journalism began at the 
state-owned periodical Ruz al-Yusuf, he was and remains more well-known for his loud stints on 
a number of commercial television stations like Dream I and II, OTV and ONTV:  his programs 
were often cancelled or cut short by pressure from the Mubarak regime.  His career in print 
journalism has been no less dramatic.  After the newspaper al-Dustur, where he worked as 
editor-in-chief, was shut down in 1998 for alleged bias and incitement of public opinion, it began 
anew in the twenty-first century and, while attracting some well-respected names like Fahmi 
                                                 
51 The English transcript is available at: http://egypt.usembassy.gov/ambassador/tr022808.html.  He pronounced 
ishāʿāt (“rumors”) as ishʿāʿāt, “radiation.” 
52 The remarks were made by the chameleonic politician and infamous conspiracy theorist Mustafa Bikri.  Many of 
the counter-revolutionary conspiracy theories that I discuss in Chapter 8 were also associated with Bikri. “Shaʾiʿat 
Marad Mubarak Tujaddid al-Tasaʾulat hawl Khalifatihi” (“Rumors of Mubarak’s Illness Renew Speculation about 




Huwaydi and ʿImad Abu Ghazi, was unable to shake its image as something of a sensationalist 
rag.  Through these sites of mass media, ʿIsa’s boisterous presentation style, and his uninhibited 
and colloquial prose, cast him as an enduring thorn in the side of the Mubarak regime, and in this 
case, as a “rumormonger.”   
On the stage of national politics, Ibrahim ʿIsa would play a role similar to the one allotted 
to the Trinity of Rumors in 1953.  And yet, this time, the performance was somewhat less 
convincing.  The junta in 1953 could play judge, jury, and executioner, and had nearly total 
command of the show from the choice of venue, broadcast medium, and script, to the props, 
décor and lighting.  It was still of course a matter of reception, and the directors had to brandish 
the threat of force for the audience to pretend to be amused.  However, to make an egregious 
understatement, the public arena in 2007 was radically different from that in 1953, as was the 
relative involvement of the directors and the audience in the performance.  From the moment the 
charges against ʿIsa were announced on September 4, newspapers and blogs outside the direct 
control of the regime succeeded in reframing the issue not as the trial of a rumormonger but as an 
assault on the freedom of the press.  An issue of al-Dustur that contained speculation on the 
president’s illness was removed from newspaper stands, but the “seditious” articles in question 
were circulated online by bloggers.54  Even the newspaperman’s interrogation by state security 
on September 5 was made publically available by The Arabic Network for Human Rights 
Information (ANHRI), a human rights organization in Cairo.  In stark contrast to the more 
apologetic tone adopted by the “Trinity” Nasif, Zahran, and Shahin in 1953, ʿIsa prevailed with 
his trademark irreverence, outperforming his interrogators on their own stage.  Immediately 
disassociating himself from the myth of the phantom rumormonger – that is, rejecting the role he 
                                                 




was meant to perform – he declared, “I published about the rumor; I am not a publisher of the 
rumor.”  His own commentary on Mubarak’s illness, he claimed, was to reject the false reports 
of the president’s death.  Moreover, in doing so, he had used the same expression as the First 
Lady: “the President is in tip-top shape” (zayy il-full).  Finally, his own newspaper had provided 
its own psychological analysis of the rumors, locating their origin on in the calculating mind of a 
conspirator but in the genuine anxieties of the public.55 
If the staging of the Trinity of Rumors in 1953, carefully planned and buttressed with the 
threat of force, had been at least a modestly serious performance, the trial of Ibrahim ʿIsa, 
constructed in panic and taken over by actors both on and off stage, was transparently absurd.  
The alleged rumormonger himself would eventually be pardoned by the president.  If state 
security, and the pro-regime voices in al-Ahram like Ilham Sharshar and others, had hoped to 
convince the public of their plot theory of rumor, they would be sorely disappointed.  If they had 
been stricken with an acute paranoia about the presence of a sinister, all-powerful rumormonger 
operating behind the scenes, this paranoia was not shared by everyone else.  The source of the 
rumor – or rather, the multiple agencies, influences, and contexts from which it emerged and 
gathered strength – managed to elude their grasp.  Still their rhetorical and disciplinary labor did 
not cease.  During as well as after the trial, pro-regime figures would continue to produce violent 
and polemical works of rumor combat in the press.  Most significant among these were the texts 
of Muhammad Sayyid Tantawi, whose metaphorical religious language held forth with the plot 
theory of rumor, while also undermining it in certain respects. 
 
 
                                                 
55 Even as he denied the role of phantom rumormonger, ʿIsa was also taking great relish in it.  As I discuss in 
Chapter 7, his own discursive authority could be derived from his ability to project this figure of the hyper-






Muhammad Sayyid Tantawi (1928-2010) was appointed by President Mubarak as Shaykh of al-
Azhar Mosque and University in 1996, after having served nearly ten years as the Grand Mufti 
of Egypt.  His tenure at al-Azhar was not quiet: as much a political figure as a religious scholar, 
he was often called upon to produce opinions favorable to state policy, and sent as an 
enthusiastic polemicist to the front lines in the regime’s war against rumors.  To make his claims 
in a religious language, however, would require a certain degree of figuration and, perhaps, 
distortion.  The main reason for this is that the modern word for rumor itself – al-ishāʿa or al-
shāʾiʿa – does not occur in this sense in the Quran.  Rather, as I have discussed at length in the 
Introduction to this dissertation, pre-modern Islamic discourse provides other words and 
concepts like al-namīma (“gossip” or “calumny”) and al-ghayba (“backbiting”), all of which 
have intentional agents.  It is from these discursive wells that Tantawi needed to draw when 
engaging in rumor combat. 
 His first contribution to the campaign against the Mubarak death rumors of 2007 came 
during a sermon attended, it was said, by the President of the Republic himself.  On Laylat al-
Qadar – September 9, 2007 –Tantawi ascended the pulpit at al-Nur Mosque in Abbasiyya, Cairo 
to declare “80 lashes for the rumormongers!” in a widely criticized fatwa.
56
  But if 
“rumormongering” as such (tarwīg al-shāʾiʿāt) does not appear in the Quran or Hadith, whence 
this penalty of 80 lashes?  What Tantawi had done, in fact, was to adapt a religious sanction 
against slander – specifically, falsely accusing someone of adultery (zinā) or sodomy (liwāṭ) – to 
the rather different phenomenon of rumor.  Through this conflation of religious and modern 
                                                 
56 “The Shaykh of al-Azhar Incites the President against Journalism, Calling for 80 Lashes,” al-Masri al-Yawm, 
9/10/2007.  Available at http://www.almasry-alyoum.com/article2.aspx?ArticleID=78843.  “Fatwa” is often given 
more weight than it deserves in Western journalistic and pseudo-scholarly discourse; for a clearly articulated 
discussion of its multiple meanings, see Agrama (2010). 
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political discourse, Tantawi was thus delivering the plot theory: the reduction of rumor (a 
polymorphous, multidirectional chain of discourse) to slander (an accusation leveled by an 
identifiable agent at an identifiable target).  Given a body to be lashed, the phenomenon could 
thus be combatted.  At the same time, the anti-rumor fatwa could easily misfire.  Was Tantawi 
saying that Mubarak had been accused of adultery and sodomy?57  It was indeed quickly pointed 
out in the opposition press that the penalty of 80 lashes was grossly incongruent with the alleged 
actions of Ibrahim ʿIsa, and Tantawi quickly qualified that he had not intended to accuse any 
particular journalist, but was speaking generally about the crime of slander.58 
 The Shaykh’s second attempt to interpret rumor came in the form of two articles 
published in al-Ahram on September 17 and 18.  Entitled “False Rumors, and How Islam has 
Combatted Them” (“al-Ishaʿat al-Kadhiba wa kayfa Harabaha al-Islam”), the articles were 
excerpted from a book of the same name that Tantawi had published by the commercial 
publishing giant Dar al-Shuruq in 2001.59  The overriding form of both the book and the articles 
is historical-religious allegory: a slow narrative procession, paved with long quotations from the 
Quran and Hadith, recounts the ishāʿāt cast around the prophets from Ibrahim to Muhammad.  In 
this way, Tantawi continues with his reduction of rumor to slander, performed earlier in his 
fatwa.  Every ishāʿa derives from a conspirator (“the infidels” or “enemies of truth”) and is cast 
against a fixed target (a prophet).  However, there is another reading of rumor, featured 
                                                 
57 Mubarak was so accused, at least obliquely, by Ibrahim ʿIsa himself in his 1999 novel The Murder of the Big Man 
(for which, see Chapter 7).  An allusion to the president’s latent sodomy (ʿIsa 2000 [1999]: 38), as well as accounts 
of his affairs with female news anchors, appear in the novel, though it is rather unlikely that Tantawi is bringing up 
old news amidst the death rumors in 2007.  In early 2008, Husni Mubarak’s English Wikipedia page was hacked, 
and peppered with references to his alleged homosexual affairs.  During the Egyptian Revolution in 2011, graffiti on 
a police station in Alexandria declared that Mubārak Khawal (“Mubarak is a Faggot”). 
58 Tantawi’s response is available at: www.alarabiya.net/articles/2007/10/14/40344.html. 
59 My citations in this section refer to the book version.  The book, in turn, had originally been published in al-
Ahram as a series of thirty-three articles from September, 1999 to May, 2000. 
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prominently in Tantawi’s book as well as his article of September 17, 2007, that I would like to 
analyze further.  This is the rendering of al-ishāʿa as waswasa, the “whispering” of Satan. 
“The first to have spread rumors,” says Tantawi, “was Satan [iblīs] in his temptation of 
Adam!!” (9). The narrative unfolds: 
 
Satan tempted Adam with his Whispering [waswasa] and False Rumors [al-ishāʿāt al-
kādhiba], saying: “O Adam, shall I lead you to the Tree whose fruit bestows immortality 
and authority that never withers nor wanes?” And Adam did obey Satan, and he did 
believe the rumors he told him [mā ashāʿahu min ishāʿāt kādhiba] about the Forbidden 
Tree, and he did fall under the influence of his Enemy. (13) 
 
 
At a first degree of reading, this passage continues with the plot theory of rumor so beloved to 
regime rhetors.  Satan takes over the role of agent from Ilham Sharshar’s “parasite,” Muhammad 
Talʿat ʿIsa’s “colonizer,” or state security’s “Ibrahim ʿIsa”: in all cases, the rhetorical and 
psychological effect is the same.  A complex web of agency and discourse is fixed in hypostases 
of good and evil, so that the former may claim a clear victory over the latter.  More specifically, 
the prelapsarian setting grafts quite elegantly onto the dominant ideological landscape of 
contemporary Egypt, where President Mubarak figures as God and his rumormongering enemies, 
by default, figure as Satan and his minions.  The product of a paranoid style of interpretation, 
Satan-as-conspirator is thus precisely the “free, active, demonic agent” described by Hofstadter 
in his article on conspiracy theory (1996: 32). 
 However, this first degree reading of Tantawi’s text tells us what we already know: the 
regime rhetor is obsessed with the plot explanation.  If we leave the robust figure of Satan in the 
background and concentrate more on the multiplicity inherent in the word waswasa, we can 
detect a more nuanced figuration of rumor.  Demons and the demonic voice have often been 
championed by French and American postmodernists as expressions of plurality in discourse, 
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textuality, and action, as opposed to the monological tyrannies of God and the Author.  It is in 
this spirit that Roland Barthes, celebrating the intertextual, playful, and open “text” (in contrast 
to the filiated, singular, closed “work”) declares its “motto” to be “the words of the man 
possessed by devils: ‘My name is legion, for we are many’ (Mark 5:9)” (Barthes 1989).  The 
“plural or demonic” nature of the text, for Barthes, shifts the emphasis away from the intentions 
of an omnipotent author towards the multiple, contradictory, and ever-mutating web of different 
voices, authors, and readers.  Thus waswasa, the demonic text, serves as a more faithful 
figuration of rumor than the authoritative, intentional Satan or plotter.  Read this way, it allows 
us to avoid the knee-jerk, paranoid insistence on conscious authorship and appreciate instead the 
many different authorships and agencies, whether psychological, economic, human, non-human, 
discursive, or historical that feed into the rapacious plurality of the thing we call “rumor.”  
Rumor, in other words, is not the work of the Devil, but the work of many demons and their 
waswasa: a duplicitous, duplicating word the repeats itself internally and externally.  Rumor in 
this form, its nebulous and perhaps most common form, cannot be combatted, only negotiated 
with, entered into, and played with (cf. Chapters 7 and 8). 
Waswasa, waswasa: Tantawi’s word carries more than it knows; it is parasited. There is 
yet a third degree reading that it allows us to explore.  In contemporary Arabic, waswasa 
becomes something more specific than the demonic voice.  It is what we might call “finickiness” 
or obsessive-compulsive disorder: paranoia about small, unseen things, and the constant urge to 
keep clean.  This is not just a modern colloquialism, for premodern Islamic thought also 
preserved this meaning.  The religious scholar Ibn Qudama (1147-1223) articulates and extends 
this meaning in his polemical Dhamm al-Muwaswisin wa al-Tahdhir min al-Waswasa 
(“Condemnation of the Bedeviled and Precaution against the Whispering” – or perhaps 
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“Combatting Waswasa”).  The “Bedeviled” (al-muwaswisun) are those who have succumbed to 
waswasa, and become frantic and finicky about matters of cleanliness, nutrition, and in particular 
religious ritual.  Ibn Qudama, though himself a Hanbalite (often considered the “strictest” of 
Sunni Islam’s juridical schools), considered religious fanatics – whom we might today call 
Salafists – to be “bedeviled,” beset by waswasa.  With this diagnosis in mind, we may 
understand how the most significant word deployed by Tantawi in his war on rumors turns 
against him, in a sense.  What better description do we have of the “paranoid style” – this hyper 
vigilance against phantom others, the detection of danger in the most common and benign 
cultural and communicative forms, the overwhelming sense of confusion – than waswasa?  On 
the way to diagnosing the threat, Tantawi has, at the same time, diagnosed the psychological 
style of the response.  Regime representatives, the warriors against rumor, are “bedeviled,” 
paranoid about hidden forces lurking in the dark. 
Tantawi’s texts are at one degree quite typical, and at another degree rather complex.   
They are typical because, in spite of their formal cloak of religious discourse, they share with 
previous acts of rumor combat a common analytic object, a familiar set of anxieties and 
frustrations, and a paranoid style of interpretation.  The very word ishāʿa grafts Tantawi’s 
articles onto the family tree of modern social science and social commentary,60 and their title – 
“Rumors, and How Islam has Combatted Them” – places them as a sort of generic successor to 
Muhammad Talʿat ʿIsa’s Rumors, and How we Can Confront Them (1964).  However, permitted 
a second degree of reading, these texts offer waswasa as an honest figuration of rumor, the 
complex, overdetermined social, psychological, and political phenomenon.  The voice of many 
                                                 
60 Indeed when searching for an operative definition, Tantawi reaches not for the religious texts which otherwise 
dominate his study, but for a modern dictionary: al-ishāʿa hiya al-khabar yantashir wa la tuthbat fīhi (“Rumor is a 
piece of news which spreads, and whose truth is not ascertained”).  He is precise in his attribution: “al-Muʿjam al-




demons, al-ishāʿa cannot be pinned down on a single agent, a fact which makes it both 





It has been said: Through the jinn’s transmission of news, people have learned of the 
death of kings, and other important matters.  This is how word got around in Basra, for 
example, about the death of the Caliph Mansur near Mecca.  And there are many such 
cases. 
 
al-Jahiz (Kitab al-Hayawan, v. 6: 203.) 
 
 
The Mesopotamian littérateur Abu ʿUthman ʿAmr ibn Bahr al-Jahiz (776-869) had an anecdote 
for every occasion, and he does not fail to provide one for this chapter.  If his anecdotes appear 
as no more than delightful sugar lozenges wrapped in exquisitely woven rhymed-prose (sajʿ), 
more often than not, they encapsulate humanistic insights of extraordinary depth and durability.  
On the way to articulating our full argument, let us taste this one: Why do the jinn transmit news 
(rumors) of the death of kings?  This has two parts: Why the jinn, and why the death of kings?  
The second part of the question concerns a recurring historical event of no great mystery:  the 
death of the patriarch (king, caliph, or president) has always been a significant occurrence, and 
has often been presaged and prophesied by rumor.  Readers may recall any number of examples 
from the texts of history and literature, from France in the eighteenth century (Farge 1991; 1994) 
and the twentieth century (Kapferer 1990), to the Soviet Union, to the Latin American novela del 
dictador, to President Mubarak.  What concerns me in this section is the first part of the 
question: Why do jinn transmit rumor? 
Rumor demands interpretation, and quite often, paranoia answers to the task.  This may 
be due to the “magical” way in which it spreads, or its seditious content.  The paranoid reaction 
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is to impose on the phenomenon the figuration of a deliberate, malicious agency: it is the 
colonizer, the parasite, the Devil, or Ibrahim ʿIsa.  A more sensitive reading of rumor’s dynamics 
posits many different agencies at work.  Waswasa, for example, is one figuration that goes 
beyond the reductive, conspiratorial reading of rumor.  Jinn, in this case, would be another.  It 
reflects a much more nuanced understanding of rumor’s multiple, mysterious sources than that 
proposed by the colonizer or the Devil.  For jinn can be both good and bad, and occur in many 
different forms.  Their society is just as diverse, perhaps more diverse, than human society.  As 
figures, they stand in for psychological factors, historical forces, and other influences on the 
emergence and spread of rumors.  I would therefore argue that al-Jahiz (or his anonymous 
source) demonstrates an interpretation of al-ishāʿa that is more felicitous than the reductive 
strategies deployed by the combaters of rumor in postcolonial Egypt. 
 With this chapter, I conclude my investigation into the encounter between the Egyptian 
state and rumor in the postcolonial period.  Whether under the sign of “confrontation” or 
“combat,” the writers of authoritarianism in modern Egypt have intervened with systematic, and 
constantly troubled, strategies to read rumor, the recalcitrant text.  However, it is important not to 
overstate the significance of my object, its perceived threat, or the panic it produces.  What I 
have written here is not a history of a continual obsession on the part of the “state” or the 
“regime” with rumors, but an attempt, fragmented and incomplete, to locate the specific events 
and circumstances when rumor has become a problem, and how and why this has occurred.  It is 
indeed a recurring problem, maybe a persistent one, and yet, with the exception of grand social 
dramas like the Revolutionary Tribunal of 1953, or the trial of Ibrahim ʿIsa in 2007, it has 
survived mostly on the paranoid fringes of power, in the dark and neglected corners of social 
scientists and religious polemicists.  In the twentieth century, who was writing books on rumors?  
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Who was passing laws?  In these chapters, we have seen obscure figures like Muhammad Talʿat 
ʿIsa, or neglected works by more prominent individuals like Muhammad Sayyid Tantawi and 
Ilham Sharshar.  Government hacks, like Hisham Mustafa Khalil, looking for a promotion or 
some sort of recognition, also showed great enthusiasm for the projects and technologies of 
rumor combat.   
 If I am to characterize the emergence and re-emergence of al-ishāʿa as an object of state 
discipline in twentieth-century Egypt, it is not accurate to speak of an uninterrupted sequence.  
Rather, it is better to propose a certain rhythm of ebbs and flows, of recessions and bursts, of 
dormancies and emergencies.  At times, such as the early revolutionary period (1952-1954), 
rumor could shine brightly on the radar, figuring prominently in the symbolic and material work 
of regime-building.  At other times, such as the mid-1960s, it might fester as a wound special to 
a class of scientific ideologues bent on controlling all aspects of nature, from rivers to human 
speech.  It could also, in the early twenty-first century, appear as no more than a jester in the 
long-abandoned court of developmentalism, before unexpectedly taking a lunge at the man on 
the throne. 
In the chapters of Part 1, I have concentrated on the reactions to rumor.  I have largely 
removed myself from the messy business of analyzing rumors themselves – with the exception of 
brief speculation on the origins of the Mubarak death rumors – and the equally messy business of 
analyzing any real rumormongers.  I hope to have shown why such analysis is “messy business”: 
one always runs the risk of psychological reductionism, just as one can so easily fall back on the 
interpretive style of plots and paranoia.  However, rumor is not just an abstract problem, whose 
attempts to understand and analyze it can be so easily dismissed.  Hovering in the lofty position 
of meta-critique, one loses any real sense of a genuinely social, psychological, and political 
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phenomenon whose movements can be traced and – yes – whose agents can be made visible.  
Thus in Part 2, I proceed to take rumors – as well as rumormongers – more seriously as tangible 
things in the world.  To do this, I take the somewhat counterintuitive step of moving to literature, 
in particular the novels of Gamal al-Ghitani.  Literature is in many ways a more appropriate site 
for the study of rumor than the comparatively dry texts of traditional social science.  This is due 
























 THE LITERATURE OF NOISE: READING RUMOR IN GAMAL AL-GHITANI’S TALES 
OF THE FOUNDATION AND TALES OF THE TREASURE TROVE 
 
 
I’ve heard that Cairo is full of rumors, everyone is saying whatsoever he pleases, any 
person might start gossiping whether it’s any of his business or not; some have demanded 
that Emir Tuman Beh, the Acting Viceroy, intervene to silence the tongues, others said 
that would be impossible, any break in the flow of news would mean that something 
terrible has happened, something we don’t dare imagine; Is it possible that such an 
unimaginable thing might have happened? It’s impossible … Matters here are uneasy, 
here in the coffeehouse a man adjusted his turban and asked, Have any of you seen Zayni 
Barakat since the other day?  There descended a silence musty with caution … What has 
happened to Zayni Barakat?  If nothing has happened, then what are all these rumors 
about him? (al-Ghitani 2005 [1971]: 8-9) 
 
 
In this winding passage from al-Zayni Barakat (1971), the first novel and literary masterpiece of 
author and critic Gamal al-Ghitani (b. 1945), an Venetian explorer records the tense epistemic 
fog surrounding the whereabouts and wellbeing of Zayni Barakat, the Egyptian leader who has 
just gone off to war against the Ottomans.  News is profuse, but is any of it true?  The 
speculation goes on, snatching up other voices, perspectives, and literary genres into a narrative 
polyvocality that nearly throws the text, and the reader, off their spine.  This is one scene, from 
one novel, dealing with a particular time (the earlier 16
th
 century) and place (Cairo).  But 
passages similar to this one may be pulled from almost any other novel or short story produced 
by al-Ghitani throughout his long literary career, as they constitute the narrative style that is 
distinctly his.  Reading Gamal al-Ghitani, one is always navigating a careful weave of epistles, 
chronicles, newspaper clippings, stray thoughts, poetry, and, of course, rumors; truth and 
meaning, however, remain elusive. 
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 This distinctive narrative style has not escaped notice.  Many previous studies have 
examined al-Ghitani’s mixing of voices as among the marks of a carefully cultivated 
intertextuality with works of premodern Arabic literature, such as the historiographical 
chronicles of Ibn Iyas (1448-1522), al-Maqrizi (1364-1442), and ʿAli Mubarak (1823-1893), that 
deployed similar techniques.  Their frequent use of passive constructions when reporting news 
(e.g. yuqāl ʾinna – “it is said that” – or yushāʿ ʾanna – “it is rumored that”), and their variety of 
sources, are argued to have helped establish the “objectivity” or at least impartiality of the author 
in his coverage of historical events.  By imitating this style, al-Ghitani, too, is able to establish 
impartiality when narrating events in his novels, especially when they come close to events in the 
real world (Draz 1981: 143; Mehrez 2005: 66-67).  Multiplying his narrative sources, the author 
is also able to avoid personal responsibility for any encroachment on sensitive subjects.  Scholars 
have also examined al-Ghitani’s distinct style as resolutely “dialogic” (Mehrez 2005: 64; Al-
Musawi 2003: 44) and “metafictional” (Azouqa 2011; Al-Musawi 2003: 265-272) – that is, it 
mixes and self-reflexively appropriates other genres in order to call attention to the 
constructedness of all narratives (history as well as literature), and to undermine official 
proclamations of a single truth.  However, I claim, the proliferation of the formal symptoms of 
dialogism and polyvocality in al-Ghitani’s work is motivated by more than these general (and 
already thoroughly argued) ontological and literary concerns.  His narrative style is, in addition, 
a subjective and indeed very personal impression of the flow, fragmentation, and “noise” of 
public communications in postcolonial Egypt.  In particular, it is al-Ghitani’s concern with the 
spread and impact of ishāʿāt (“rumors”) that can appropriately frame a close reading of many of 
his novels, including Hikayat al-Muʾassasa (Tales of the Foundation, 1997) and Hikayat al-
Khabiʾa (Tales of the Treasure Trove, 2002).   
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Part 2 takes the rather unconventional move of turning to literature in order to analyze the 
social.  It is not totally unconventional: studies of Arabic literature, in particular those of the 
Orientalist variety, have often stood accused of ransacking the fictional texts of distant “others” 
for reified ethnographic details, while ignoring the literary craft itself.  In a recent interview with 
The Kenyon Review, novelist and critic Youssef Rakha decried what he called “Western interest 
in ‘the Arab novel’ as political commentary or anthropological source material,” which “can only 
misrepresent contemporary Arabic literature and misread its context.”
61
 These concerns are 
valid, given the practice common among some scholars of scanning Arabic literary texts to 
discern prevalent “attitudes” or “opinions” on gender, sexuality, religion, etc., in “Arab society.”  
Such a practice reduces the novel to a very thin opinion poll, itself a rather problematic, if not 
radically flawed, measure of the social.
62
 This is to say nothing of the commercial use and abuse 
of Arabic literature to promote superficial notions of what constitutes “contemporary culture” in 
Egypt, Syria, Morocco, and so forth. 
But ethnographic reductionism is only one rather peculiar mode of social knowledge 
which the reading of Arabic literature can produce.  It is not “anthropological source material” – 
to borrow Rakha’s derogatory phrase – that the novels of Gamal al-Ghitani allow us to hoard; 
rather, in this Part, I approach literature as a densely-woven medium that helps us register the 
complexity of a social (and political) phenomenon called rumor.  Indeed it is for an 
understanding of complexity – or what is sometimes called mobility, fluidity, or freedom of 
movement – that many social scientists have recently turned to the study of literary texts.  Bruno 
Latour, for example, has argued a similar point in his writings on Actor-Network-Theory, which 
he opposes to “wooden” forms of sociology responsible for reductive understandings of agency 
                                                 
61 The interview is available at: www.kenyonreview.org/conversation/youssef-rakha/. 




and subjectivity. “Novels, plays, and films from classical tragedy to comics,” says Latour, 
“provide a vast playground to rehearse accounts of what makes us act” (2005: 54-55).  He 
encourages social scientists to gain an appreciation of literature and literary theory, to read 
fiction and to write fiction, not because “literary theorists would know more than sociologists, 
but because the diversity of the worlds of fiction invented on paper allows enquirers to gain as 
much pliability and range as those they have to study in the real world” (Ibid: 55).  Literature 
provides, in other words, a richer account of the social, a “thicker description” of the realm of 
human (and animal, and object) action, than many of traditional sociology’s instruments of 
measurement.  Practitioners of cultural studies – or for that matter, social scientists in general – 
should not shy away from literature.  They should go deeper into it. 
Literature in this sense is especially important in an attempt to trace the forms and 
deployments of rumor in the worlds of Egyptian public culture.  It is a notoriously diffuse, 
recalcitrant phenomenon, which the combined powers of the modern state and social science 
have been unable to capture.  Gamal al-Ghitani, perhaps more than any other author in modern 
Egypt, has registered in literature the vicissitudes and volume of public communications, 
epistemological confusion, and rumor in its sundry manifestations.  It is therefore inevitable that 
I privilege his texts, among many others, in my study of the politics and aesthetics of this 
difficult cultural form.  Tales of the Foundation and Tales of the Treasure Trove provide a rich 
site for tracing rumor as a political weapon, as the interplay of narratives and psychology, and as 
the effect of secrecy and seduction. 
 According to the author’s colophon, the twin novels were written over a period of eleven 





  To my knowledge, they have not been the object of any critical attention, with the 
exception of Al-Musawi (2003: 302-305), who briefly discusses the first novel, and ʿAbd al-
Qadir (2003: 145-183), whose review of both novels is brashly polemical, probably the result of 
a long standing feud with the author.
64
  Like many of al-Ghitani’s literary works, Tales of the 
Foundation (henceforth T-I) and Tales of the Treasure Trove (henceforth T-II) are in fact not 
designated with the generic classification riwāya (“novel”), but with another generic label drawn 
from Arabic literary heritage.  In this case, as indicated in the books’ titles, they are ḥikāyāt – a 
term I have translated as “tales,” which may be understood in its broadest sense of popular oral 
narratives, as opposed to “higher” or more canonical forms, and which for medieval littérateurs 
like al-Jahiz (776-868) held connotations of mimicry and miming.
65
  This is an apt description 
for T-I and T-II, which unfold as short and long narrative digressions, often anonymous or of 
contested attribution, about the power struggles within an unnamed “Foundation” (al-
muʾassasa).  The long-deceased “Founder” (al-muʾassis) whose presence haunts the two books 
is the object of nostalgic reverence for some, and a combination of negligence and apathy for 
those who have managed, or yet desire, to occupy his office through intrigue and corruption: 
they are mostly technocrats, bureaucrats, prostitutes, and freaks.  These ḥikāyāt, then, are not 
only “tales” but also acts of comic mimicry in the medieval sense of the term, as the characters 
they treat come to us as obscured, distorted, and often grotesque caricatures of human beings.  T-
I and T-II may be interpreted most broadly as tales of the painful structural transformations 
endured by many “foundations” or “institutions” in the postcolonial world over the last sixty 
years, as the charisma and paternalism of nationalist leaders (“The Founder”) gave way to the 
                                                 
63 Al-Ghitani underwent heart surgery in the period between the two novels, preventing him from writing them 
together. 
64 See also Mona Zaki’s English translation of one chapter from Tales of the Foundation (which she translates as 
The Stories of the Establishment) in Banipal, Spring 2002. 
65 See "Ḥikāya." Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition. Brill Online , 2012. 
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senselessness of military rule, which was in turn undercut by the displacements and disparities 
brought by neoliberal globalization.  Such structural changes have occurred at the level of the 
state – it might be said that maṣr muʾassasa (“Egypt is a foundation,” i.e. too big to fail) – as 
well as at the level of the various organizations that in Egypt are called muʾassasāt 
(“foundations”), from publishing houses and charities to public and private corporations.  More 
specifically, T-I and T-II may be read as narrative caricatures of institutions that Gamal al-
Ghitani has himself inhabited and brushed up against, namely the Akhbar al-Yawm Foundation 
and the Ministry of Culture.  As such, the tales present and perform a very intimate encounter 
with the myriad forms of rumor that have penetrated and propelled import scenes in cultural 






























Chapter 4: “It Still Makes Noise”: The Rhetoric and Poetics of Rumor in 
Tales of the Foundation 
 
Tales of the Foundation (T-I) begins with a nostalgic look back at the days of the Founder, 
whose legendary accomplishments are obscured by hints of a counter-narrative that seeps 
through in the form of terse whispers and accusations.  The Founder had enemies.  Some of these 
were political – we hear of his struggles during the “Totalitarian Period,” and his animosity 
towards “the regime … even the country” (14) – while others were personal.  And yet, “he knew 
how to pick his men” (53).  Among his most dedicated employees, who respect his unwritten 
will and defend the Foundation against threats both external and internal, is ʿAtiyya Beh, muṭliq 
al-shāʾiʿāt, “the Rumormonger.”  The services he renders are among the many ḥikāyāt of the 
Foundation, and unfold over the course of the first half of T-I, before the noise-maker recedes 
into silent obscurity.   
In this chapter, I take ʿAtiyya Beh as a locus for my investigation into the rhetoric and 
poetics of rumor.  First, I seek to understand why and how rumor operates as a weapon, an act of 
discursive sabotage, deployed when more traditional means would seem less effective.  Previous 
scholarship has considered rumor as a “tool of peasant insurgency” (Guha 1999) or a “weapon of 
the weak” (Scott 1990) valued for its ability to mobilize collective action against the dominant, 
while evading surveillance and punishment.  Here, since ʿAtiyya Beh is part of a powerful 
foundation, it would be more appropriate to call rumor a weapon of the hidden:  the particular 
tales he tells can only succeed in convincing the masses if the interested party behind them (the 
Foundation) is not revealed.  Thus al-ishāʿa is an alternative to direct insult or open propaganda.  
It is also an alternative to truthful critique, for as ʿAtiyya Beh says, il-ʿiyār illi ma-yṣibsh yidwish 
– “if the bullet misses, it still makes noise,” an Egyptian colloquial proverb he takes as his 
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slogan.  In other words, a fantastical claim is more likely to have an impact – to make dōsha or 
“noise” – than a more accurate accusation.  ʿAtiyya Beh has certain techniques for spreading 
these rumors, such as personal charisma, the manipulation of Cairo’s traffic, and various modes 
of social crossing: these constitute what I call the “rhetoric” of rumormongering.   
I then turn to an analysis of what Morin (1971) has called the poésie fabuleuse of rumors: 
their fantastical, almost incredible narrative content.  Three of ʿAtiyya Beh’s “loudest” rumors 
allow investigation into this poésie fabuleuse, which I will elucidate with important insights from 
Brunvand (1981), Farge and Revel (1991), Farge (1994), and White (2000, 2005).  Each of these 
scholars calls attention to the ways in which rumors – though they may seem “incredible” to the 
discerning rational gaze – gain popular acceptance through their resonance with local narratives, 
anxieties, and historical experiences.  Thus an investigation into this poésie fabuleuse will take 
us beyond the conspiratorial figure of the “rumormonger” to understand the contextual and 
intertextual webs from which fantastical tales emerge, attain credence, and make noise. 
 
The Rhetoric of the Rumormonger 
 
Like the novel’s other major players, ʿAtiyya Beh secures his position through what is described 
as a “gift” (mawhiba) or “special ability” (qudra nādira) (66).  Others gain prominence through 
their “special abilities” to craft slogans, seduce women, crack secret codes, or fix obsolete 
appliances; ʿAtiyya Beh’s gift for “launching, formulating, and spreading rumors” (iṭlāq al-
shāʾiʿāt, ṣiyāghatihā wa tarwīgihā) (67) is on par with these, though it is primarily for the 
Foundation, and not for his own interests, that he uses it.  In this sense he is reminiscent of a 
character that appears in Gamal al-Ghitani’s Zayni Barakat: a specially gifted “rumormonger” 
employed by the chief of the secret police (2005 [1971]: 93-94).  But Tales of the Foundation 
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reveals more details about the rhetoric of ʿAtiyya Beh, which, I argue, depends on at least two 
elements: 1) his sexual, cultural, and linguistic “crossings,” and 2) his anonymity.  Each of these 
deserves elaboration. 
 ʿAtiyya Beh is a crosser of many boundaries, the first of which are sexual.  “ʿAtiyya” is a 
feminine noun, and although the name is not impossible for a man, it becomes conspicuous 
alongside his other signs of “effeminacy” which he adopts when chatting with women: pursing 
his lips, wiggling in his chair, now and then smacking his hands together then flashing his palms 
(152-153).  There are, in addition, tawdry allusions made to ʿAtiyya’s “love and inclination 
towards the men of the traffic police” (ḥubbihi wa maylihi ilā rigāl al-murūr) and the “need” he 
felt to visit them to “satisfy his desire” (yuḍṭarr ilā al-nuzūl li-ishbāʿ raghbatihi) (150).  This 
language is an obvious flirtation with the stereotyped behavior of “sexually deviant” men, as 
reproduced in novels like ʿAlaʾ Al-Aswani’s The Yacoubian Building (2002), for whom traffic 
cops are thought to be easy game.  Tales of the Foundation does not, however, portray ʿAtiyya 
Beh as a “deviant.”  In a later scene in the novel, his “love” turns out to be for the profession 
itself, which he has secretly pursued as a hobby since his childhood.  Standing in the middle of 
major intersections and taking lessons from the traffic officers, he would mimic their gestures, 
soaking in the unique bodily praxis that made them who they were: he confided in them, and 
they confided in him.  But whatever the nature of his relationships, the reader does not miss the 
“sexual” undertones of “crossing” traffic. 
Many previous studies of rumor, gossip, and loose talk have discussed their association in 
Western language and literature with women (e.g. Kapferer 1990: 98-99; Spacks 1986: 38-45).  
Eve Sedgwick also observed that “the precious, devalued arts of gossip [have been] 
immemorially associated in European thought with the servants, with effeminate and gay men, 
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with all women” (2008: 23).  The association between loose talk and effeminacy – or subaltern 
status more generally – has just as much resonance in the classical Arabic tradition.  These 
associations often arise from an imposed exclusion of gendered others from spaces and practices 
of normative sociality, and the resultant anxieties about these others’ treachery and secret 
discursive power over the heteronormative, male ego.  ʿAtiyya Beh, too, would seem to be 
tainted by such stereotypes.   However, my argument here is that the rumormonger’s ability to 
“cross” between genders is a crucial element in his rhetorical repertoire.  He is in this way able to 
access different spaces of sociality, closed to less flexible types.  The women in the Foundation – 
which the author presents mostly as shallow objects of the heterosexual male gaze – are elusive 
and just beyond the reach of ordinary employees, but they trust ʿAtiyya Beh as he tells stories 
and shares sensitive information.  His relation to the traffic men – which, if not sexual, is 
certainly suffused with the most intimate patterns of homosociality – is probably more important, 
even if the novel does not make this connection explicit.  Though this relationship is presented in 
a context separate from his rumormongering, it is easy to deduce how it helps augment his 
special ability: traffic police have supervision of Cairo’s most important social arteries, in 
particular its several-thousand-strong fleet of taxis.  A word dropped to one is a word dropped to 
all, certain to spread more quickly than through any other medium.
66
  If one typically thinks of 
the Internet and text-messages as the most likely pathways for unconfirmed stories, it is arguable 
that the public transportation of the modern metropolis is more important.  This gives new 
meaning to what Neubauer (1999: 52) has called the “autopoeisis” of rumors: not only do they 
create themselves spontaneously; they also, in this case, spread through “autos.” 
                                                 
66 One need only read Taxi (2006) by Khalid al-Khumaysi.  Taxis have also been the target of security crackdowns 
in Gaza, accused by Hamas of “spreading rumors”: paltimes.net/details/news/130009/ اإلشاعات-سائقي-تؤدب-الشرطة .html. 
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In a likewise manner, ʿAtiyya Beh is able to cross boundaries of culture, class, and 
language.  The first part of his name, which means “gift,” points to Egypt, called hibat al-nīl 
(“the Gift of the Nile”), a common trope in twentieth century Egyptian novels (one is reminded 
of Salwa Bakr's Maqam ʿAtiyya [2004], Khayri Shalabi’s Wakalat ʿAtiyya [2008], or any number 
of character names like Bahiyya and Hiba): in other words, there is the aura of authenticity, of a 
character with roots firmly thrust into the soil of the nation.  The name is born out in the total 
comfort with which he, though one of the Foundation’s most prominent men, is able to sit with 
the “smallest employees,” sharing their nargila and playing tawla (153).  In all the company’s 
public ceremonies, he is the glue that holds together, enables, and respects local custom: during 
funerals he discusses the uncomfortable but essential details of burial with the gravediggers; in 
weddings he pronounces knowledge of all costs and expenses both necessary and sufficient; he 
knows what gifts are to be sent to whom, and has congenial relations with sweetshop owners, 
tailors, and jewelers in popular quarters (152).  Finally, he is able to negotiate with “local 
workers, especially small contractors, event organizers, undertakers, caterers, cleaning staff, 
buffet workers, and in particular those from Upper Egypt” (66).  If these actions mark ʿAtiyya as 
culturally “local” and “low,” he is at the same time comfortably identified with the “foreign” and 
the “high.”  Beh, the second part of his name, is an honorific title of Turkish progeny, once 
common in Egypt but now more evocative of the bygone era of the monarchy, and before them, 
the Ottomans.  Every element of his person exudes the dignified perseverance of a faded 
nobility, from the Armenian suits he has tailored in a fashion “unknown since the forties” (71), to 
his concern for the proper deployment of prepositions and grammatical case endings.  He is 
elegant, with a clean shave, and “redolent of an amber perfume, which he would purchase from 
an old druggist in Al-Hamzawi market, next to Barsibay Mosque” (154).  Furthermore, ʿAtiyya 
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Beh’s cultural crossing is also a linguistic crossing.  While he is painfully precise in his Arabic, it 
is revealed that he is in fact an expert in ancient languages.  Before joining the Foundation, he 
began his professional life as an employee in the Ministry of Public Estates, deciphering old 
manuscripts and specializing in an obscure Ottoman script (71); he also had some command of 
Aramaic and Syriac, and Hieroglyphic and Cuneiform scripts (150). 
Our rumormonger, then, is both authentically local and in touch with the wider world.  
He embodies both of the “storyteller” archetypes described by Walter Benjamin.  As the first, he 
is the “resident tiller of the soil,” the storyteller “who has stayed at home, making an honest 
living, and who knows the local tales and traditions.”  As the second, he is the “trading seaman,” 
who attracts listeners by his knowledge of things far away and unfamiliar (Benjamin 2006: 363). 
Each (ideal) type of storyteller, Benjamin tells us, was able to capture the attention and respect of 
an audience in his own special way.  But ʿAtiyya Beh is more than ideal: playing both these 
roles, crossing between different realms of knowledge and sociability, he gathers up more 
potential vessels for rumor, and opens myriad pathways for its dissemination.  Unlike 
Benjamin’s storyteller, of course, he is engaged in a willful act of deception, rather than cultural 
edification.  In addition, he is decidedly more discrete than either the storyteller or the newsman: 
his game is played in secret. 
ʿAtiyya Beh’s second rhetorical strategy is precisely this: his anonymity.  While one can 
infer something of his movements from the above details scattered throughout the novel, one 
only actually gets a very brief glimpse of him in the act.  It is said that he goes to the clubs and 
meeting places of the wealthy, visits the watering holes of journalists and chatterboxes.  He goes 
to Nadi al-Jazira, the island club; to the Klub ʿAsri cafe in the proximity of al-Husayn; he goes to 
Hagg Ibrahim Nafiʿ’s cafe in Giza (67).  If he is at the Foundation, he sits in the coffeehouse, in 
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the same corner as the day laborers; he keeps their secrets: they trust, they know, that he will not 
inform on them (152-153).  But this is all the reader sees: ʿAtiyya Beh remains, for the most part, 
a hidden agent.  Previous scholars have suggested why anonymity is important for the 
transmission of rumor.  Most often, it is asserted that anonymity or disguise is a means of 
protecting the transmitter from social rebuke or legal prosecution (e.g. Scott 1990: 142-145).  
Certainly, this is important for those like ʿAtiyya Beh who operate in a context of social and 
political authoritarianism.  In a sense, though, this is less a conscious choice than the default 
position for all actors in a foundation (or country) where secrecy, and thus anonymity, pervades 
all levels of social and political action.  Another function of anonymity is proposed by Guha, 
who connects it with the openness of the text: 
 
Being of unknown origin rumour is not impaled on a given meaning for good in the same 
way as a discourse with a pedigree often is … The aperture which [rumour] has built into 
it by virtue of anonymity permits its message to be contaminated by the subjectivity of 
each of its speakers and modified as often as any of them would want to embellish or 
amend it in the course of transmission. (1999: 261) 
 
This does not mean that rumor is completely free to change; rather, as Guha argues, its core 
message is supplemented with minor variations.  In this way, it is made relevant to different 
audiences, who may have slightly different standards of evaluation or ideological concerns.  
Anonymity, then, allows rumor to “broaden its range of address” (262) and circulate far and 
wide.   
 If for Guha, anonymity means the withdrawal of the powerful author, I would like to 
suggest that the reverse is also true: the hiding of the original author means the emergence of a 
more convincing one.  ʿAtiyya Beh is not a public rhetor, performing a speech from a lit stage: 
the process is reversed, with his own person private and unseen, but the audience fully visible 
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and public, exposed to his words.  Stepping aside, he allows anyone and everyone to play the 
role of the speaker.  In the place of ʿAtiyya Beh, the rumor speaks as the voice of your neighbor, 
as the voice of the club, as the voice of someone close to you, the voice of someone you trust.  
For the formula of these rumors is not “ʿAtiyya Beh said…” – who would listen to this? who 
would care? – but rather “she said…” or “they are saying” or even “I heard it from Nasser 
himself…”  The rumor now has the credence of a million voices, or of very important and 
credible voices, who are not in fact its source. The rumormonger is still there, of course, pulling 
the strings from off stage.  This is why anonymity is important: if he did not retreat into the 
darkness, ʿAtiyya would be exposed and these attributions might become impossible.  The 
paucity of detail surrounding his performance in the novel shows how well he has avoided the 
light. 
 The trick of anonymity in this sense can also help us understand the association between 
rumor and the Devil (cf. Chapter 3).  Anonymous rumormongering is synonymous with 
waswasa, which Muhammad Sayyid Tantawi had defined as al-ḥadīth al-khafī (2001: 11), 
“subtle” or “hidden” speech.  Iblis, in fact, is al-waswās al-khannās: the first word, al-waswās is 
the whisperer of waswasa; the second word reinforces the “hidden” or “unseen” aspect of the 
whisperer, and is often glossed as “the one who retreats.”  This is a slight reinterpretation of the 
term: traditionally, as in the Tafsir of al-Tabari (838–923), al-khunūs (the act of al-khannās) has 
been explained as the Devil’s cowardly retreat from the mentioning of God’s name (alladhī 
yakhnis marra wa yuwaswis ukhra, wa innama yakhnis fīmā dhukira ʿind dhikr al-ʿabd rabbihi).  
According to this tradition, then, al-khunūs comes after, and represents the ceasing of, al-
waswasa.  But if the Qur’anic Iblis is understood as this diabolos, this rumormonger launching 
his words from behind the scenes, one can see that al-khunūs is not the failure of his whispering, 
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but a necessary part of it.  The devilish rumormonger needs to be al-khannās, to “step aside,” for 
the success of his rumor: ʿAtiyya Beh cannot show his face.  If he wants people to be convinced, 
he must hide his authorship, or at least his association with the Foundation, which commissions 
these rumors.  Otherwise, the text could not acquire the authority of a million voices, or the voice 
of a disinterested party. 
If we take seriously the preceding remarks on ʿAtiyya Beh’s “gift,” he would appear to be 
no less than a grand magician – indeed, the very conspiratorial rumormonger posited by the 
“paranoid” interpretive practice I examined in Chapter 2.  Crossing borders, appearing to be 
everywhere and nowhere at the same time, he possesses the kind of fetishized agency valued by 
the likes of Muhammad Talʿat ʿIsa and Muhammad Sayyid Tantawi.  In T-I and T-II, this 
paranoia is not unreasonable, as robust agents are everywhere to be found, and nowhere to be 
seen: the Founder, al-muʾassis, for example, embodies this more than any other character in the 
novels.  Moreover, rumors are everywhere in the Foundation, many of them malicious, so the 
concentration on a figure like ʿAtiyya Beh would be a quite reasonable exercise of the inquiring 
mind.  However, having critiqued the fixation on the figure of the conspiratorial rumormonger, I 
believe it is important to shift the analysis towards the rumors themselves and the context for 




ʿAtiyya Beh has an impressive publications list: he is responsible for 1) a rumor that a hotel 
owned by the Foundation could magically ensure fertility, and conception of a male child, to 
wealthy guests; 2) a rumor that a competing corporation was spying on customers in their 
dressing rooms; and 3) a rumor that the Aswan High Dam, built by the regime which 
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nationalized and humiliated the Foundation in the 1960s, was fatally flawed and could flood 
Cairo to its rooftops at any moment (66-72).  These are not just any ishāʿāt.  Readers will 
recognize them as among the “classics,” as it were – some of the most memorable Egyptian 
rumors of the last 60 years.  A closer look at each of these texts seeks to elucidate the force of 
their poésie fabuleuse. 
An enduring question in the study of rumors asks how and why belief in the fantastical 
and supernatural is able to persist in worlds of rational modernity.  Edgar Morin, at the end of his 
detailed sociological study of girl-kidnapping rumors in 1960s France, expressed wonder at what 
he called “that fabulous poetic element” or poésie fabuleuse which still thrived across different 
classes and types of people in the town of Orléans (1971: 167).  There it was being said (and 
apparently believed) that girls who entered Jewish-owned clothing stores were being sold into 
“white slavery” or otherwise sexually exploited.  For Morin, the tenacity of these rumors had 
become “strange beyond belief” (16).  Though the answer remained elusive, Morin suggested 
that the potency of these fabulous stories was due to a deep-seated “feminine anxiety” (176), 
local traditions of anti-Semitism, and the existence of similar kidnapping or slavery stories in 
local folklore.  These suggestive remarks have been taken further by many other scholars, who 
have sought to explain this poésie fabuleuse not as the product of a conspiratorial rumormonger, 
or as simply reflecting the naïveté of the little people, but as the complex interplay of local 
narratives, historical experiences, and persistent anxieties.  Ramsay, for example, places rumors 
in what he calls their “psychological and ideological setting” (1991: xvi) to understand what 
makes them “credible” (xxvii).  The focus on the local narrative intertexts that give particular 
rumors their force has been adopted most productively by Farge and Revel (1991), Farge (1994), 
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and White (2000, 2005) in their studies of seventeenth-century France and (post)colonial East 
Africa, respectively.  As White has persuasively argued, 
 
Circulating stories are not constructed on a moment-to-moment basis, they are drawn 
from a store of historical and contemporary allusions that have been alive and given new 
and renewed meanings by the fractious arguments of diverse social groups … [Such 
allusions] do not “explain” the rumor, but they explain how it was locally credible (2005: 
244-245) 
 
Both historians, Farge and White are employing methodologies very much in line with those of 
folklore.  Brunvand, for example, interprets rumors and urban legends as the recent inflections of 
what he calls “proto-legends”: “a virtual floating anthology of possible urban legends in the 
making” (1981: 175).
67
  In other words, a “new” rumor makes sense because of its resonance 
with “older” cultural intertexts.  In my analysis of ʿAtiyya Beh’s rumors, I draw on these 
important insights, unraveling the culturally and historically resonant narratives and motifs – as 
well as anxieties – that ensure they make noise. 
The first rumor spread by ʿAtiyya Beh came as a remedy to the Foundation’s poor luck: 
having entered the hospitality and tourism market, one of its flagship hotels, located near Cairo’s 
airport but far from any attractions, failed to win many customers.  Soon, however, word broke 
out that any man and woman who engaged in sexual congress on the second and fourth floors of 
the hotel would conceive a male child.  Reported cases were numerous, but one in particular 
stood out: a forty-seven year-old Swiss woman, “never having conceived,” succeeded in bearing 
a healthy baby boy, and the event was heralded as a “miracle” (muʿgiza) (68).  The bounty was 
great, it was (effectively) true, and guests from around the world began flocking to the hotel.  
                                                 
67 Brunvand continues: “While some [stories] are anonymous adaptations of older traditional motifs which come 
alive suddenly and briefly after years of inactivity, others may have a sustained local or regional popularity but 
never catch on with the general public, usually because they are too much the esoteric cultural possession of a 
particular ethnic or occupational group.” (Ibid.) 
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Wealthy oil barons would fight to reserve a room, and multiple international airlines began 
printing the story in several European languages in their brochures.  How can we read this 
rumor?  A concordance of three resonant parts, I believe, lends the text its significance: the place 
or literal topos (international hotel); the theme of magic fertility; and the paradigmatic example 
(the “miraculous” Swiss woman).   
First, al-funduq (“the hotel”) approximates what Arlette Farge, in one of her many studies 
of rumors, refers to as a “highly symbolic place”: a location that “lends itself particularly well to 
amplification.”
68
  Farge’s example is a cemetery, which in 18
th
-century Paris was able to 
generate sundry myths, urban legends, and fantastical tales: “being situated in the middle of 
town, it was a significant link between the living and the dead, and within its walls it enclosed all 
the mysteries of religion and of life.”  The international hotel in Cairo at this time (let us suppose 
it to be the 1960s), while much less sublime and certainly less terrifying than the Parisian 
cemetery, was no less a locus of popular anxieties and fantasies, generating many genres of 
speculation.  Caught up in the flows of world capital, the simulacra and spectacle of a tourist 
industry built largely on tacky reifications of Egypt’s ancient cultural heritage, and thus resting 
(but hardly) in an odd balance between the local and the international, hotels of this sort were 
sprouting up everywhere.  But for all their visibility, they were also nearly impenetrable.  At 
once the playground for stars in many cinematic hits, the international hotel also reproduced 
architecturally the more widespread economic inequality: those it kept out were more than those 
it kept in.  “What goes on inside the funduq” would become even for Gamal Al-Ghitani a topic 
of concern, as reflected in a previous short story of his entitled “What Happened to the Boy who 
Worked in the Hotel” (1995). The story, of a young man drawn into the underworld of the 
                                                 
68 I am paraphrasing the following from Farge (1994: 69): “Events which occurred in certain types of place lent 
themselves particularly well to amplification, for some places had power to dramatize events.” 
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hospitality business, crystallizes fears about a parasitic neo-liberal order, the lost daughters of 
Western culture, and sodomite Gulf Arabs.  The hotel shelters all of these images. 
 This “place” is also a natural store for the second element in this rumor, the theme of 
magical fertility.  Hasan El-Shamy’s encyclopedic studies of Arab and Egyptian folklore note 
“pregnancy induced by abnormal means” as a recurrent motif in many popular tales, jokes, and 
legends (2004: motif T.591.5).  One should also note the resonance of this theme with the many 
medieval Arabic works of erotica, in particular Ibn Kamal Basha’s Rujuʿ al-Shaykh ila Sibahi 
(The Shaykh’s Return to his Youth, 16
th
 century) and Shaykh Nafzawi’s The Perfumed Garden 
(al-Rawd al-ʿAtir fi Nuzhat al-Khatir, 15
th
 century), which appeared in many re-editions in the 
twentieth century.  Like popular speculations about international hotels and cruise ships, the 
stories in these works may have not only satisfied a voyeuristic urge to see what cannot be seen, 
but also played on the lure of participation in the sundry pleasures committed behind high walls 
with hypostases of divine beauty.  But in addition, the fertility of the hotel guests delivers 
something much more important in this case.  For the Foundation, having made this poor 
investment in a hotel in the middle of nowhere, is facing the specter of its own impotence.  
Flooding its rooms with miraculous sexual energy, the ishāʿa launched by ʿAtiyya Beh in effect 
reaffirms the Foundation’s ability to reproduce itself.  The Founder himself is able to claim a 
robust autonomy of agency at a time when it could have been fatally threatened.  We are 
reassured: “At that time,” the anonymous narrator tells us, “The Founder’s grip was firm, 
reaching everything” (68).  This it must be, given the throngs of people competing over 
reservations.  The Founder is pleased with his success, but needs to be firm, and for this reason 
he turns down bribes (or “expensive gifts”) offered by “petro-princes” (read: wealthy men from 
Arab Gulf countries) who want expedited access to the hotel’s magic rooms.  With this rumor, 
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then, the Foundation not only reaffirms its own fertility, but the Founder is able to play an 
international game of biopolitics: he decides who can copulate, and who cannot.  His “grip firm,” 
he controls the very conditions for the possibility of reproduction. 
 Finally, the theme of fertility is instantiated by a very particular token: the Swiss woman 
who had seemed unable to give birth.  The specificity of this image may yield a number of 
possibilities.  It is noteworthy, to begin with, that the husband, partner, or lover is not mentioned: 
this raises at once the specter of adultery, common to the story cycle of sexual acts committed in 
monasteries, universities, lodges
69




, or empty 
lots
72
.  But if it summons a certain moral unease, and even panic, this absence of the male also 
seductively advertises the part to be filled.  It offers, then, the promise of participation in the 
fantasy, with respect to two audiences.  There is a specific interpolation of the Swiss (European 
or Western) female tourist, a call to play the part of the forlorn, uncontrollable woman-to-be-
rescued so stereotyped in the kitsch and bravado of commercial films.
73
  And there is the hailing 
of the wealthy hotel guest, perhaps local, meant to provide the seed of semiotic closure.  Both 
positions advertised, and embodied, an act of signification is born:  mortise and tenon.  In 
addition, celebrity sex scandals in recent years have often allegedly taken place in such hotels, 
such as one involving actors Khalid Abu al-Naga and Nur al-Sharif in 2009, and one involving 
the actress Shirin Sayf Nasr and Saudi prince ʿAbd al-Aziz bin Ibrahim ʾAl Ibrahim in 1996 – 
the latter a year before the release of al-Ghitani’s novel.  In the final analysis, the scattered 
details of romance shed light into the international hotel, furnishing a place of anxiety and 
uncertainty with a familiar story and desirable script.  Guests cannot help but come. 
                                                 
69 Shalabi, Wakalat ʿAtiyya (2008). 
70 Al-Wali, Hikayat Shariʿ al-Bahr (2005). 
71 Idris, “Abu al-Rijal” (2009). 
72 Cf. the Egyptian proverb, tilāʾī il-ʿilʾ ma-tlaʾīsh il-kharāba, tilāʾī il-kharāba ma-tlāʾīsh il-ʿilʾ (Rakha 2011: 326). 
73 Eg. The Danish Experiment (dir. Idris: 2003). 
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 ʿAtiyya Beh’s second rumor was actually a counter-rumor.  We do not know the precise 
business of the Foundation, only that it is eager to create and recreate itself in as many ways as 
possible – having entered the hotel business, it has now sought a piece of the clothing industry, 
in both design and retail.  Here it is credited with at least two innovations, which follow from its 
trademark combination of authenticity and pragmatism: in-home tailoring, so that customers can 
order from catalogues and still have well-fitting clothes; and the broadcast of Quranic recitation 
in the company’s stores, to appease the growing wave of religious sentiment among customers.  
Competing clothing companies become jealous, and they spread rumors.  It is said that the in-
home service provided by the Foundation allows tailors to spy on the private quarters of 
customers.  It is said that the Foundation’s Qur’anic broadcasts are nothing but a cheap gimmick.  
It is said, even, that the Foundation is importing its cloth from the West, and after pressing 
against the skin of customers, it leaves imprinted there magnificently intricate signs of the cross 
(69).  It is time for ʿAtiyya Beh to act: against these malicious bits of hearsay, he launches his 
own rumor.  “Beware” (iḥdharū) these enemy companies, “with elegant stores and Western 
names,” for they are more than they seem.  Customers who enter their dressing rooms are being 
spied on.  They are being filmed.  Men undressing in private are being filmed, women 
undressing in private are being filmed, and somewhere, in the dark, company hands are busy 
editing the tapes to make it appear that the men and the women are in fact undressing together in 
compromising positions: it is pornography.  Haven’t you heard? 
 
It happened that a respectable businessman, who owns a leather goods company, went on 
travel to an Arab Gulf country.  A friend of his there invited him to view a sex film: not a 
European one; it featured Arab women.  From the very first shot, the man was stunned to 
realize that he was in front of his wife, the mother of his children.  A horrendous shock, 
which sent him back on the first flight to Cairo.  Until now, he hasn’t confessed to the 
true reason that made him kill her, dice her up in small pieces, and pack her into empty 
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containers of pineapple juice.  Every day the papers are writing about the hidden motives 
for the crime, while the man himself seems unable to speak … and yet: 
ʿAtiyya Beh knows… (70) 
 
The impact of this rumor is achieved through a complex of four resonant parts.  These include, 
first, the “place” (clothing stores); and then, three principle anxieties, each to be taken up in turn: 
exposure, incest, and dismemberment.  
 Little information is given to distinguish the competing companies’ locations from the 
Foundation’s own clothing stores: we know only the “innovations” introduced by the latter, and 
that the former have “Western names.”  Nonetheless, the significance of this topos, the “Western 
clothing store,” as well as its resident emotive and cultural intonations, may be deduced broadly 
and impressionistically through a journey along the axis of association.  The space inside – 
cramped and curtailed, even in newer stores, since the subtly-repressed archetype is always that 
of the closet or the bedroom – is certainly more accessible than the “international hotel.”  But as 
you enter, you are almost immediately alienated in a thousand different ways.    Strangers follow 
you around, brushing against you, inspecting you: for they are trained to catch thieves, as much 
as potential customers. “Can I help you find something?” means “I am watching you” – it is in 
the training manual.  You might not want to stay very long, but you need that coat, those shoes: 
in essence, just as you need to put something on before you leave the bedroom.  But the items 
with which you would not hesitate to ornament yourself on a regular day are here objects of 
caution, even shame, and you are shy to ask these “others” to put them on your tab.  In addition, 
there is, like the hotel, the prospect of sexual liaison: “Won’t you pick out for me something 
pretty … like your pretty face?”
74
 But it is also a place for families, where sex cannot happen.  
                                                 
74 Mahfuz, Zuqaq al-Midaqq (2009: 52). 
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Sex happens, still.  These contradictions may be suppressed, but they emerge later in storied 
form. 
 In this place, the anxiety of “exposure” grafts itself onto objects, practices, and chambers.  
This is due in part to the alienation I have described: one is alienated from the labor of one’s own 
dress.  The objects you use to cover yourself are monopolized by others, and they can withhold 
them, they do withhold them, and threaten you with nudity.  Moreover, the products in question 
are described as malābis gāhiza (“ready-made clothes”) – not a totally arcane phrase, but one 
which nonetheless suggests a certain unfamiliarity, or touch of the new.  They are thus objects 
whose consequences and possible metamorphoses have yet to be absorbed and mapped out in 
popular cognition – who knows, they might just fall off you at any moment, leaving you exposed 
because you are not accustomed to all the needles, buttons, and zippers you need to fasten, and 
which seem to be sprouting like dandelions in the newer brands.  But the grand act of exposure 
here, of course, unfolds in the dressing room.  This chamber reproduces and amplifies the 
anxieties I have associated with the clothing store as a whole.  It is an uncomfortable mix of 
public and private, like elevators, mall restrooms, grocery store aisles, election booths: the voice 
of the Qur’an, and religious-themed stickers, speak in these places to chase out a number of 
scripts that might unfold.  I think it likely that the terror of exposure, whether in dressing rooms 
or elsewhere, can be understood to derive in part from the basic fear of losing control over one’s 
social and biological integrity to unseen forces.  Walk into a dressing room and you will be 
possessed, and made to expose yourself.  Go to the Foundation’s stores and you regain your 
autonomy in bodily affairs. 
 The second anxiety captured in this rumor, “incest,” appears when the “respectable 
businessman” views his wife in a sex tape.  Certainly, it might seem inappropriate to label this 
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act of imagined intercourse between husband and wife as incestuous, but I believe that it is 
essentially such an act that lends this story its dread.  Having left his wife in Cairo, and travelled 
to a foreign land to seek sexual gratification, the man has effectively cast her into a familiar, non-
sexual role while casting the women of pornographic films as appropriate objects of desire and 
intercourse.  (Indeed, the wife is referred to as “the mother of his children,” which in one sense 
stresses not her child-bearing capacity but her motherly and domestic qualities: in other words, 
someone with whom he cannot appropriately have sex).  In this unnamed “Arab Gulf country,” 
the businessman is then “stunned” (fūgiʾa) and experiences a “horrendous shock” (ṣadma 
muhawwila) when he sees his wife.  This terror, which the rumormonger wishes to instill in his 
audience, may be interpreted essentially as the terror of incest, as in the classical story of 
Oedipus.  Travelling far and wide, the hero nonetheless has found himself in the end married to 
his own mother, just as this leather merchant has found himself inappropriately in an act of 
sexual desire with his “woman” (imraʾa: again, a word which effectively casts her out of the 
sexual realm of the “wife,” or zawga, which is not the word used).  Thus through its arousal of 
this classic theme of unintentional incest, the rumor provokes a deep-seated anxiety in its 
receivers. 
 “Dismemberment” is the ultimate fate of the woman who enters the dressing room.  The 
rumor is paradigmatic, relating to a class of popular tales about gruesome murders, serial killers, 
and freak accidents that might unfold on the pages of tabloids like Akhbar Al-Hawadith.  I 
believe this anxiety of dismemberment in ʿAtiyya’s rumor can also be interpreted figuratively, on 
at least three levels.  It is first, and most obviously, a “massacre” of the Foundation’s enemies: 
those competing stores, and their customers, are to be destroyed in this industrial warfare.  
Second, it is the very practice of the apparel business taken to its logical extreme: for what is 
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tailoring but not “cutting up” the parts and patches of clothing, and putting them into storage?  
Finally, in “dismemberment” we have an accurate representation of the war of rumors itself.  
ishāʿāt, as consumers of national media have seen and heard so often, threaten to spread division 
in the social body: they lead to tashayyuʿ, the fracturing of the public into many shiyaʿ or 
competing factions.  (Why pineapple juice containers?  Perhaps because pineapples must also be 
“cut up” to be enjoyed). 
 These three anxieties – exposure, incest, and dismemberment – are compounded with the 
commonly perceived discomfort of “new clothing stores,” giving this rumor its narrative punch.  
A sinewy composition playing on psychological, discursive, and historical chords, it reverberates 
across a tense theater of consumers who cannot help but get dressed in proper fashion. 
 The third and final of ʿAtiyya Beh’s rumors that I will discuss – “the Aswan High Dam 
will blow” – is built on one principle theme: the deluge.  This theme resonates powerfully with 
narrative and psychological complexes both local and global.  Fears of an apocalyptic flood – 
often connected with the destruction of the Aswan High Dam, either as the result of an internal 
flaw or an air attack from Israel or other foreign powers – have persisted not only in popular 
superstition, but have seeped into a number of literary works.  Gamal Al-Ghitani broached this 
theme himself in his very first short story, “The Papers of a Young Man who Lived a Thousand 
Years Ago” (1969).  Presented as the memoires of a twentieth-century Egyptian youth 
rediscovered by archaeologists “a thousand years” in the future, the story registers the 
atmosphere of terror and balbala (“confusion”) presiding in Egypt during a war with Israel.  
Amidst bits of radio static, scattered intertexts of Qur’anic verses and Pharaonic supplications, 
tharthara (“chatter”) in the cafes, women gossiping, and even the rantings of a butcher with a 
speech impediment, the young man jots down this fear in his journal: “What would happen if the 
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Aswan Dam came down??” (mā alladhī yaḥduth law inhār sadd aswān??; 8).  In his first novel, 
The Book of the Sultan’s Seal (2011), Yusuf Rakha’s protagonist shouts the same question (law 
ḥaṣal wi ḍarabū il-sadd il-ʿālī), and gives us a gruesome answer pregnant with signification
75
; a 
play by ʿAli Salim (Operation Noah, 1974) stages a similar scene.  But ʿAtiyya Beh’s rumor is 
not just a local Egyptian phenomenon, but in fact flows from the most wide-spread (shāʾiʿ) story 
of all: the Myth of the Flood, which folklorists have identified in nearly every time and place, 
from Gilgamesh and Genesis to (now) Gamal Al-Ghitani.  This is the most popular Egyptian 
rumor; it is also the most popular rumor of all time. 
The eminent folklorist Alan Dundes (1988), building on the psychoanalytic work of Otto 
Rank, argued that the Flood is a “male creation myth.”  According to Dundes, the first act of 
creation in Genesis is by a woman: the dark waters of the universe are the waters of the womb; 
the first children are born to Eve.  Seeing these waters, and the pregnancy of Eve – along with 
her bearing of children, which is accompanied by a release of hot fluids – man becomes jealous.  
Thus God, the male creator, feels compelled to unleash his own flood (on Nuh’s or Noah’s 
people), which destroys the woman’s creation and allows him to lay claim to mankind.  
Similarly, ʿAtiyya Beh’s rumor is launched in jealous revenge.  During what elders in the novel 
disparagingly refer to as al-ḥiqba al-shumūliyya (“The Totalitarian Period,” in other words the 
                                                 
75 “If they wiped out the High Dam in one strike, if it blew up and evaporated and Lake Nasser were opened up onto 
the Nile Valley – just imagine all that water kept up in storage – how long would it take before the Flood reached 
Cairo, before the Foundation and the Mugammaʿ and the Radio and Television Building turned up like sinking 
ships, before people found themselves splashing about and fighting with wild fish ‘til their death!  Would there be 
any signs of life above the water, or would we all just go once and for all? I see now gushes like mountains taking 
down the towers along the Cornice and the Circle Road with no effort, or more gentle flows carrying in their arches 
automobiles from Giza to al-Qanatir in one thrust, relieving the congestion and accumulating gasoline in their 
depths, until they sink.  Cairo Tower, the Pyramids, and the Citadel swaying on silken surfaces wider than their 
base, and the entire stretch of the October Bridge a mere tongue bobbing up and sinking in the water that rages from 
desert to desert.  And the asphalt now no more than another layer of floating filth…” (Rakha 2011: 447-448). 
 
Rakha’s description of the Flood, coming immediately after the protagonist Mustafa al-Shurbagi has left his 
pregnant wife, confirms the theory forwarded by Dundes that the myth of the flood is a jealous “male creation myth” 
(see Dundes, below). 
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presidency of Nasser), the Foundation had at first existed in a cool détente with the regime, only 
to be suddenly forced through a painful nationalization process – as Akhbar al-Yawm did under 
Nasser in 1960.  ʿAtiyya’s rumor thus is aimed in response at the regime’s “grand 
accomplishment”:  this is its most visible meta-sign of legitimacy.  The exploding of the High 
Dam is thus, on the one hand, a total destruction, both semiotic and material, of the Foundation’s 
enemies (the regime); it is, on the other, an incredibly potent expression of its own desire for 
creation.  It is significant too, then, that the Flood comes in Gamal al-Ghitani’s first published 
story (“The Papers of a Young Man”): it is his loud burst onto the stage of creation.   
 These three texts together, I believe, are among the most resonant ishāʿāt of Egypt’s mid-
to-late-twentieth century.  Their texture and impact derive from their storying up of the most 
contested sites and signs of modernity and the encroaching mechanisms of globalization.  Hotels, 
clothing stores, and spectacular technological advances (like the High Dam) are topoi of 
seduction and repulsion, of hope and anxiety, and thus lend themselves to all manners of talk, 
speculation, and interpretation.  To paraphrase White (2005), this does not “explain” the rumors, 
but it helps explain why they make noise.  As ʿAtiyya Beh says, il-ʿiyār illi mayṣibsh yidwish, “if 
the bullet misses, it still makes noise” (72): here, I have understood the dōsha (“noise”) as the 

















As is befitting a noise-maker, ʿAtiyya Beh goes out with a bang.  Disgruntled over the 
appointment of the Foundation’s new president, he decides to make his position known on a hot 
summer day that would become seared in the memory of the city’s inhabitants.  In the middle of 
rush hour, everything came to a halt: we hear of Foundation employees grumbling in stalled cars; 
chauffeurs and taxi drivers suddenly becoming irate and speculative; and a train from Alexandria 
stuck on its tracks, with the air-conditioning bust and temperatures shooting up and passengers 
vomiting and passing out.  It is the most complete traffic jam the city had ever known, stretching 
through every street, bridge, alleyway and crenellate.  Motorists waited for hours until the truth 
emerged: “ʿAtiyya Beh is the reason!” (ʿAtiyya Beh huwa al-sabab!)  He is responsible for what 
came to be known as al-ziḥām al-mudabbar (“The Planned/Masterminded Traffic Jam”).  How 
had he managed?  How he had managed:  six discrete gestures, executed in a strict sequential 
manner, at an undisclosed traffic circle somewhere in the capital city, resulting in a complete 
urban paralysis.  “Even the rumors and unconfirmed reports that usually circulate in such 
circumstances,” a voice tells us, “had come to a stop” (142).  This is a classic bit of urban 
folklore: a character in Mohammad Rabie’s novel The Year of the Dragon (2012) refers to “the 
infamous Cairene intersection, which if blocked, would afflict the streets of Cairo with complete 
paralysis.”  ʿAtiyya Beh not only knows the spot, but he is the only one who knows which 
gestures, executed in proper order, will shut down the system.  It is a secret he has learned from 
his sexual and textual crossings with the men of the traffic police; putting it to use, he blocks not 
only these crossings, but the flow of rumors that depends on them.  It is a secret the police are 
unable to torture out of him: he is eventually released from prison, and severed officially from 
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the Foundation, but his friends are confident that the forces of law and order have not been able 
to make him speak. 
 I began this section with a thorough investigation into the strategies that constitute 
ʿAtiyya Beh’s rhetoric of rumormongering.  His “gift,” I argued, depends on his uncanny ability 
to cross borders and spread himself, like rumor itself, through the major arteries of Cairene 
society.  If gossip and its sisters have traditionally been cast as “other,” I have argued that in 
Tales of the Foundation, ʿAtiyya Beh’s intercourse with these others is a source of his strength.  
This is compounded by his discrete anonymity.  While previous scholars have insisted on the 
significance of hiding the author of rumor, I have speculated that in addition, this hiding is what 
allows rumor to speak from many voices at once, reaching a level of persuasion unattainable by 
the exposed agent of the Foundation.  In the second part of this section, I turned away from this 
conspiratorial image of the rumormonger to better understand the poésie fabuleuse or fantastic 
poetic nature of many ishāʿāt.  But an additional qualification must be made about the readings I 
have proposed.  Since rumor by its nature is widespread and given to mutation, its reduction to a 
single text misses much of its noise complexity as it circulates through many different people.  
Likewise, a single reading of a given rumor can only capture some of the psychological and 
narrative threads that give it meaning; I leave ʿAtiyya Beh’s three rumors open to further 
interpretation. 
 Also, my turn to focus on the poésie fabuleuse of rumors in the second part of this section 
brings out a contrast that can be explored further.  It is the contrast between an interpretive 
fixation on the author, and an interpretation that privileges the texts.  In reading Tales of the 
Foundation, is one to believe that the genius of ʿAtiyya Beh is more responsible for these 
rumors, or the narrative and psychological dispositions of the audience?  Who or what really 
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makes the noise?  My analysis has shown these rumors to be immanently part of the social fabric 
woven by many readers and writers of Egyptian business, shopping, and technology.  They need 
not be dictates from behind the scenes; rather, they arise from genuinely popular anxieties and 
hopes about objects, practices, places, and futures of common attention.  Moreover, such rumors 
are, if not universal, then certainly perennial or recurring, since they flow from a global pool of 
stories, myths, and literature.  In the next section, I explore further the difficult issue of rumor’s 



































Chapter 5: Secrecy, Seduction, and Speculation in Tales of the Foundation and 
Tales of the Treasure Trove 
 
In his “Epistle on the Keeping of Secrets and Holding the Tongue,” the Mesopotamian littérateur 
al-Jahiz (776-869) observes how frequently people delight in “spying for the news of kings, and 
publishing their faults, and sanctifying slander [about them]” (1987: 101).  Through his 
martialing of anecdotes and masterful command of rhymed prose, he suggests that such behavior 
springs from “the general population’s envy of kings, who are a gloomy sky to which their eyes 
are fixed, to which their hearts are attached, and to which their desires and fears are devoted” 
(1987: 100).  According to this view, “kings” – or for that matter, any leadership class – are a 
looming, yet obscured, presence over their subjects.  Together with the weather (“a gloomy 
sky”), they are the most observed, examined, and over-examined objects of common attention; 
like the weather, they naturally inspire all manner of speculation, prediction, and legend.  This is 
not radically different from the relationship between the leaders of the Foundation and their 
employees.  Throughout Tales of the Foundation (T-I) and Tales of the Treasure Trove (T-II), 
workers at all levels are held in suspense between the probable and the impossible, and are 
eagerly scanning for signs of the powers that will determine their fate, whether collectively or 
individually.   
In this chapter, I analyze rumors that arise out of a popular curiosity about the figures 
associated with the “presidential floor,” where the Foundation’s current head has his office.  The 
public, as al-Jahiz observed, might be perpetually curious about the powerful, but this curiosity, I 
argue, is aroused in a particular manner by secrecy, disappearance, seduction, and popular 
anxieties and aspirations, which generate rumors of singular potency.  I begin this chapter by 
demonstrating how the frequent disappearances of the chief executive, which increase in number 
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with the onset of “the Age of Occultation” (ʿaṣr al-khafāʾ) – a label employees give to the 
epistemic fog that descends upon the Foundation – ignite popular anxieties, hopes, and fantasies 
about his life and death that find their expression in rumor.  I then turn to a reading of the chief 
executive’s female consorts, as well as the character named Fayruz Bahari, and develop a 
concept of “seduction” to explain the popular curiosity and rumors that are spun around them.  I 
understand “seduction” to operate, following Baudrillard (1990), as the flickering oscillation of 
absence and presence, which draws a spectator towards an object.   Fayruz Bahari, for example, 
is surrounded in secrecy, and employees are expressly forbidden from monitoring his 
movements, but he also makes flashy appearances in the media and at festivals he personally 
designs.  Fayruz thus seduces his spectators, and especially his powerful rivals, who desire to 
know and control him through the accumulation of bits of evidence and the fabrication of 
fantastical rumors.  These rumors are also driven by pervasive fantasies and fears, shot through 
with a not unreasonable amount of “facts.” 
 
Secrecy and the Age of Occultation 
 
 
There is, in the Foundation, something that defies observation.  Something that defies 
recording, and analysis.  In spite of all the studies and analyses conducted by both 
Egyptians and foreigners, in spite of all they have been able to deduce, there is something 
that remains obscured from vision and comprehension, and from successive generations.  
Something that cannot be grasped through logic, and which has not been captured in 
poetry or prose. 
A secret? 
No. Secrets galore! (T-I: 78-79) 
 
Secrecy would seem to be built into the Foundation, whose workings remain as obscure to us – 
“Egyptian and foreign” readers – as they do its own employees.  Even in the days of the Founder, 
who was alternately praised and blamed for his openness – an oft-repeated scene has a stray 
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worker walk in on him engaged in sexual congress with a female assistant – there was much that 
was kept behind the scenes.  Anonymity, of course, was important for the success of ʿAtiyya 
Beh, just as it continues to be for characters like the “pimp” ʿAbd al-Namarsi, who hides himself 
so that his “customers” only pay attention to each other (T-I: 220).  And yet, if the Foundation 
has always been engulfed in secrecy, it is the present time which anonymous voices declare to be 
the “Age of Occultation” (ʿaṣr al-khafāʾ) (T-II: 150).  The Founder has long since passed, and 
his loyal companions, including ʿAtiyya Beh, have now faded into the background.  The 
succession rituals that had once ensured the preservation of the Founder’s work ethic and taste 
for authenticity have been abolished, and the Foundation is overrun by a younger class of 
professionals and technocrats whose business sense is decidedly neoliberal.  Pensions are 
slashed, and hundreds of workers are declared redundant – and yet, little of this is given any 
explanation.  The chief executive, the fourth since the passing of the Founder and known only as 
“His Excellency,” retreats further into the revamped twelfth floor of the central building.  A 
voice asks, “And wasn’t His Excellency the first among those veiled from view [al-muḥtajibīn]?  
Who sees him?  Who meets with him?  We only hear about him” (T-II: 150). 
 Let us plumb the significance of this “Age of Occultation,” this pervasive secrecy, before 
examining how it engenders rumors.  It is first of all a time (ʿaṣr or “age”), beginning roughly 
with the ascension of the fourth chief executive.  Players in the novel, and anonymous voices, 
have the occasional habit of declaring the Foundation to have gone through or entered into a 
certain “time,” such as the “the Totalitarian Period” (al-ʿaṣr al-shumūlī; T-I: 8), another name for 
the Nasser administration; “the Time of Rears” (zaman al-muʾakhkharāt; T-II: 169), marked by 
the ascension of homosexuals and prostitutes; or “the Era of Gladiolus” (ḥiqbat al-gladiyūs; T-II: 
104), named for the influence of a certain flower-woman.  These are most likely instances of 
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phenomenological stock-taking, frames deployed to grasp a realignment in fundamental aspects 
of the world that require definition, evaluation, and response.  Although temporally delimited in 
this way, it is not explicitly stated how this new “Occultation” differs from the secrecy that has 
prevailed since the Foundation’s first days.  Like everything else in al-muʾassasa, it is difficult to 
know whether this constitutes a radical difference, a difference of degree, or merely a 
continuation of the same state under a different name.  A number of spectacular transformations, 
however, may be interpreted as reinforcing the occultation of major figures.  These include the 
tightening of security procedures in the mail room (T-I: 232), the assignment of guards to 
“targeted” individuals (T-II: 82), and a complete redesign of the executive twelfth floor by a 
mysterious Korean company (T-II: 186; employees do not know if it is North or South Korea).  
In addition, “new managerial positions with obscure names and even obscurer duties” are in 
ascendance (T-II: 122).  All of this results in age of khafāʾ, which I have translated as 
“occultation,” but which also may be translated as “hiddenness,” “secrecy,” or even 
“invisibility.”  It implies the existence of something that cannot be seen, but which may still be 
sensed somehow.   
 The chief executive has always been an object of popular curiosity, given the power he 
yields over the fates of employees.  But his occultation – in addition to several periods of more 
conspicuous absence, during which only his wife is said to know his precise whereabouts – 
injects this popular curiosity with worry, confusion, and sometimes bliss, and works fiendishly 
upon the employees’ irritable imaginations.  In one instance, the absence of the chief executive 
from his office fuels widespread speculation.  It is said that there has been a terrorist attack on 
his automobile (39); it is said that shots had been fired from a ’79 model Bijou (40); it is said, 
rather, that there had merely been a small explosion in the front end clip, and the car had veered 
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off into the sand.  As the chain of rumor expands, it gathers up more details, trivia, and 
interpretations.  The design of the chief executive’s car – a black Mercedes – is built up and 
recounted with fine precision, its safety features are enumerated, and its singular ability to tickle 
the passions of avid voyeurs drives it into a side discussion on the perversions of certain 
employees.  Descriptions of the wreck pile up, with some alleging damages and contortions so 
severe that no human could conceivably escape from them alive, and others rumoring that there 
had been so light an accident that the chief executive was able to walk himself to the nearest 
police station and file a report (41).  The truth is never revealed, and when the official 
proclamation is made that the automobile had suffered only a minor problem, it is met with 
popular suspicion and more storytelling.   
 The novel contains heated moments like these, when the absence of the chief executive is 
sharp and conspicuous.  But in fact every word about the chief executive that appears in the 
novel can in a sense be interpreted as a rumor: we do not know who is speaking, and we do not 
know if it is true, but it appears to be widely shared.  Secrecy is imposed on all of his 
movements, and any and every detail that seeps out is contested and reworked by the audience.  
It is the Age of Occultation, and the chief executive, along with those closest to him, are referred 
to as al-muḥtajibīn, or “those veiled (from view).”  It is a rather peculiar adjective, which al-
Ghitani has explained in a recent interview to refer to Egyptian rulers who do not appear in 
public.  He referred to a period discussed by Ibn Iyas, in which the Sultan disappeared and “the 
public became distressed” (taqallaq al-nās min dhālik; al-Ghitani’s paraphrase).  He added that 
the “disappearance” (ghiyāb) or “veiling” (iḥtijāb, the noun form of muḥtajibīn) of the head of 
state is dangerous, and not a “normal” phenomenon in modern Egyptian history.
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  In the 
                                                 
76 See al-Ghitani on al-ʿAshira Masaʾan, Dream TV, 10/2/2011.  Available at: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QKNjqRVTl8Y (from approx. 6:00). 
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interview, al-Ghitani was also referring to Field Marshall Husayn Tantawi, the head of SCAF, 
who was ostensibly in charge of Egypt since the Revolution of 25 January, but who rarely made 
public appearances.  During the latter decades of the Mubarak regime – when T-I and T-II were 
written – the president could also be accurately described as muḥtajib.
 77
  According to this view, 
which al-Ghitani reproduced in his novel, the “distress” felt by the public at the occultation of a 
leader provides dangerous fuel for rumor. 
 
The Seduction of Rumor 
 
The occultation of powerful figures ignites people’s concerns about their collective fate, and 
rumor is an expression of these concerns.  However, it is not just disappearance, or absence, 
which fires the imagination.  While the chief executive is hidden most of the time, other figures 
in the Foundation oscillate between appearance and disappearance, and in this way produce 
(seduce) a prurient desire for knowledge and possession.  My operational understanding of 
“seduction” follows from ordinary language, and can be augmented by writings on the subject by 
the French philosopher Jean Baudrillard: 
 
Seduction does not consist of a simple appearance, nor a pure absence, but the eclipse of 
a presence.  Its sole strategy is to be-there/not-there, and thereby produce a sort of 
flickering, a hypnotic mechanism that crystallizes attention outside all concern with 
meaning.  Absence here seduces presence. (1990: 85) 
 
In the Foundation, most of those who work, tarry in, or enjoy proximity to the executive twelfth 
floor are wrapped in khafāʾ, in secrecy, but also break through, often obliquely, to the public eye.  
                                                 
77 Anxieties about the iḥtijāb of the Egyptian leadership classes have also coincided with anxiety-laden rumors of 
the taḥajjub (“veiling”; from the same root as iḥtijāb) of many Egyptian and Lebanese actresses.  The phenomenon 
has oscillated between panic and somber amusement in the tabloid press, having been read as a sign of Islamism’s 
encroachment on the fiercely secular entertainment industry, or as the mid-age crises of celebrities regretful over 
their youthful profligacy. 
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In Baudrillard’s words, they produce a “flickering” between “absence and presence”; they are 
not totally hidden, but revealed in flashes that “hypnotize.”  Whether or not it is a conscious 
“strategy,” and whether or not its effect is to “crystallize attention outside all concern with 
meaning,” the ostentatious disappearance (or discrete appearance) of certain figures seduces 
spectators with the prospect of hidden knowledge and value.  It is the dominant preoccupation of 
the Foundation’s employees, their irrepressible engouement, to access this hidden knowledge, 
these secrets, and this they manage through that speculative mixture of fact and fiction called 
rumor.  What Patricia Meyer Spacks says about gossip applies here to speculative rumor: 
 
Surely everyone feels – although some suppress – the same prurient interest in others’ 
privacies, what goes on behind closed doors.  Poring over fragments of other people’s 
lives, peering into their bedrooms when they don’t know we’re there, we thrill to the 
glamour and the power of secret knowledge, partly detoxified but also heightened by 
being shared … [This] excitement includes the heady experience of imaginative control: 
gossip claims other people’s experience by interpreting it into story. (1985: 11) 
 
Rumor offers the pleasure of penetrating behind the displays of secrecy to take hold of that 
which is hidden.  It takes hold in both senses, as Spacks says: it is both comprehension and 
control of the object of speculation.  This is one reason why Baudrillard likens seduction to the 
“challenge” of a duel, for the seduced tries also to seduce the seductress, each shifting between 
and denying the subject and object of desire in a way that taunts analysis.  Rumor answers the 
challenge, it cannot resist. 
In the Foundation, upwardly mobile women in particular seduce the curious, and are 
exploited as objects of speculation, with their bodies made into legible texts.  This is captured in 
the expression “veiled nudity” (al-ʿury al-mustatir) that employees used to describe the 
Foundation’s roving seductresses: it is precisely the eclipse of a presence (239). 




In general, whisperings about women in the Foundation never cease, especially the 
beautiful ones … Some men hope and dream, whispering the most intimate of details 
about this or that woman, even going so far as to imagine their peculiar habits and 
customs, such as the quality of their moans … The women themselves are yet more 
curious than the men about the behavior of their female colleagues.  In the seclusion and 
comfort of their private gatherings, they exchange such stories that the wicked authors of 
obscene literature would never imagine [mā lā yataṣawwaruhu khayāl al-fussāq min 
aṣḥāb al-mujūn]. 
There are other reasons for both men and women to monitor relationships, classify them, 
and follow their developments.  For example, people want to know how close a person is 
to the powerful, whether someone has the ear of this or that big name, whether someone 
can whisper directly into the ear of the master of the twelfth floor.  A person’s proximity 
to His Excellency is a measure of this person’s importance, and so imagine how 
significant it would be if whispering became touching and embrace! (T-I: 239-240) 
 
Women and their movements are decoded as indicators of power shifts, in an environment where 
changes in management often come suddenly and without any explanation.  The women 
themselves are mostly silent.  Rumors of their sex lives promise employees not only a raw sexual 
pleasure, but also the fantasy of seducing and controlling those who seduce and control them.  To 
support their fabulous stories, the men and women of the Foundation focus on the particulars, the 
small bits of exteriors that seem to point directly to interiors: “From her posture, from the pace of 
her steps, from the directions in which she glances … from all of this, it was not difficult to 
discern the extent of her relationship to His Excellency, and her most intimate affairs” (T-I: 300-
301).  The small details are then exaggerated and exchanged, and are mixed in with hopes and 
anxieties as they are woven into a plausible narrative.  This is the poésie fabuleuse of rumor, 
glossed here as ultra-mujūn or “beyond the obscene/bacchic,” and which, in accordance with the 
perennial stereotype, the narrator associates with women (even though the surviving mujūn 
literature was written by men).  The knowledge manufactured in this way is not only fantastical, 
however, but pragmatic as well: it can be used to navigate the quickly shifting alignments of 
power and privilege within the Foundation.   
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As readers, we cannot always tell if this knowledge is “true” (that is, if the rumored 
secret, such as a woman’s hidden illness, is real), or if it is merely the fantasied possession of an 
over-zealous analyst.  Some characters, it seems, are better than others at discerning secrets – or, 
they are more obsessed, more seduced by the challenge of penetrating surfaces.  In T-I, we hear 
of al-Ashmuni, the Foundation’s elderly concierge, who possesses a special “expertise” (khibra; 
233) or “physiognomic acuity” (firāsa; 290) that allows him to detect the innermost essence of a 
passerby.  The latter term bestows him with a mystic quality, common to characters in other 
novels by Gamal al-Ghitani that bear the flavor of medieval Sufi literature.
78
  By observing the 
direction of glances, the pace of steps, facial features, and gestures (230), he can see, for 
example, “death encroaching” on certain employees (229).  It is even reported that he was able to 
impress the Founder with his ability to deduce the contents of any envelope with a simple glance 
(233).  In T-II, we hear of ʿAmm Sharaf, the Foundation’s oldest and most skillful chauffeur, 
who possesses a comparable faculty of discernment based on sight and smell.  He asserts, too, 
that he can “determine [by sight or smell] the degree of pleasure each man has experienced with 
his wife during intercourse!” (20). Al-Ashmuni and ʿAmm Sharaf, it seems, have taken 
speculation about secrets – a practice engaged more generally by all employees – and perfected it 
into an art.  Moreover, as members of particular professions, they are well-positioned to apply 
this art.  Al-Ashmuni’s duty, as a concierge, is to watch and wait; ʿAmm Sharaf belongs to the 
fraternity of the Foundation’s chauffeurs, who since the days of the Founder have been both 
valued and feared for their collection of secrets and rumors (T-I: 56).  They are both, indeed, of a 
class with ʿAtiyya Beh, whose “special gift” was the mastery of a practice engaged to a lesser 
extent by many other members of the Foundation.  Unlike ʿAtiyya Beh, however, the concierge 
                                                 
78 Cf. al-Ghitani’s novel Hatif al-Maghib (2008), among many other works. 
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and the chauffeur do not deliberately launch malicious fictions; their art is one of speculation and 
discernment.  This does not mean that the information they glean is any more factual. 
 Ultimately, I believe, it does not matter very much whether the information peddled by 
al-Ashmuni and ʿAmm Sharaf is “true” or “accurate.”  These two characters are important 
because they show in greater detail the practice of speculation that is (at)tempted, and highly 
valued, by many.  This practice, I have argued, is seduced by the prospect of penetrating 
surfaces, obtaining secrets, and tightening one’s grasp of the elusive figures of power.  Some, it 
would seem, are more seduced than others, and are more eager to open the sealed envelope and 
capture a glimpse of the flickering, hypnotic celebrity.  Depending on individual skill and acuity, 
the information they glean may be more or less accurate, and more or less suffused with the 
poésie fabuleuse of rumor.  To gain a better understanding of the seduction of rumor, I will now 
turn to focus on one potent example: the rise and rise of Fayruz Bahari. 
 
The Seduction of Fayruz Bahari 
 
Who is Fayruz Bahari?  His name first appears amidst much noise, as the latest in a series of 
secretive figures promoted to sensitive positions during the term of the fourth and current chief 
executive.  In the middle of Tales of the Treasure Trove (T-II), he is appointed “Head of the 
Fuyūḍāt Sector”: it is a nonsensical word, among the many new position titles that parody the 
illegible, disorienting signscape of the technocratic sublime.  While fuyūḍāt lacks any meaning in 
Modern Standard Arabic, it is a derivation of the root f-y-ḍ, which denotes “excess,” 
“abundance,” “fluidity,” or “flood.”  Quite appropriately, then, Fayruz is a figure that is always 
over the top, but also fluid in his seductive elusiveness: he can never quite be pinned down.  
Moreover, his position makes him responsible for the “Treasure Trove” of the second novel’s 
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title.  This is a labyrinthine vault of artifacts and artworks that are as priceless as they are 
nameless, located beneath the ground floor of the Foundation’s central building.  The word in 
Arabic is al-khabīʾa, which in Egypt has connotations of archaeological digs and Pharaonic 
artifacts, but more generally implies something that is hidden, concealed, or kept secret.  It is, in 
other words, a localized metaphor for the seductive secrecy or khafāʾ that pervades the entire 
Foundation.  Thus Fayruz naturally seduces popular speculation about the treasures he is charged 
with protecting; however, it is his own personal secrets that fuel the rumors I analyze here. 
 It begins with an act of speculation, and a reading of surfaces.  Fayruz, it is observed, is 
“fluent in several languages; handsome; a bachelor despite his nearing fifty; of refined 
composure; foppish” (T-II: 150).  These qualities, the anonymous narrator conjectures, were 
most likely what gave rise to 
 
the rumor which quickly broke out and spread from corporate headquarters to all the 
various branches, and to all the administrations and organizations and clubs associated 
with the Foundation. Within minutes, the affair had reached the coffeehouses and clubs 
and salons and meeting places, into the furthest and most isolated neighborhoods, from 
the established areas to the slums. All this baffled the rumor experts in State Security... 
A single sentence, nearly uniform in content, was whispered and pronounced in secret 
and in the open: “There’s a sodomite [lūṭī] in the new administration.” (150-151) 
 
In this passage, the author captures so well the “magical circulatory virtues” or rumor.  Its 
precise origin is unknown, and its uncanny velocity escapes even the rationalizing instruments of 
the state.  Indeed, the next several pages spend as much time describing the rumor’s spread as 
they do its content.  “After the news was passed around from mouth to mouth, the details began 
to spread, and truth mixed with fabrication” (151).  Next we hear that the rumor 
 
spread with a speed that astonished everyone.  The interested organizations passed it 
around, as well as their branches in major cities and distant villages, all of which 
perplexed the experts at the Center for Political and Strategic Studies.  Government 
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bodies took an interest, as did subordinate groups.  It was followed closely by foreign 
reporters and correspondents, as well as those called “observers” in the news, and agents 
from foreign and regional intelligence agencies.  A statement was released in Helsinki, 
from an organization calling for the legalization of same-sex marriage, in support of “the 
important step taken by an Eastern foundation.” It was also rumored that a photograph 
had been published, depicting Fayruz participating in a peaceful march for sexual 
deviants in the streets of New York … some swore that they had seen the photograph, but 
this was not verified… 
The BBC Arabic service broadcast an item. 
Truly 
For certain, I heard it with my very own ears. (153) 
 
The length taken to map the circulation of this rumor surely makes it one of the “noisiest” in the 
two novels.  At the international level, it seems to draw its force from hopes, perhaps voyeuristic 
desires, of a sexually legible or accessible Orient.  Within the Foundation, however, it draws on 
and inspires a mix of confusion, pleasure, anxiety, and panic.  To understand the unique potency 
of the rumor of Fayruz Bahari’s sexuality, I will analyze the general psychological elements it 
stimulates, before examining how specific individuals in the Foundation are seduced by Fayruz 
into the rumor’s psychological and epistemological vortex. 
 The rumor is fueled by one principle structure of feeling, which may not inappropriately 
be rendered as “homosexual panic.” Literary scholar Eve Sedgwick’s writings on the topic are 
the most well-known, and may be taken as generally instructive.  While “homosexual panic” has 
been deployed, in the United States beginning in the early twentieth century, as a legal defense 
for accused murderers of homosexual men, Sedgwick’s “theft” of the term is intended to explore 
the emotive, psychological, and political dimensions between men in English literature and 
society (2008: 20-21).  It is conceived not as individual psychopathology, but as a structural 
principle that renders nearly all men fearful of the implication of homosexual relationships, 
whether as paranoia about one’s one latent homosexuality, or the fear of being taken advantage 
of by other homosexuals.   Sedgwick historicizes this panic, situating its emergence in the middle 
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of the nineteenth century, when it became “an endemic and ineradicable state” for men, 
specifically those in high-powered professional settings (2008: 185).  While the panic studied by 
Sedgwick, no less than the word “homosexual” itself, may be the object of such analysis that 
rightly aims for a degree of historical and cultural specificity, I will suggest tentatively that the 
term “homosexual panic” is not an inaccurate description of the anxieties which the reader 
encounters in Tales of the Treasure Trove.  This is not only for the sake of terminological 
convenience, but because I believe it is neither productive nor seductive to imagine homophobia 
or homosexual panic as so peculiarly a “Western” or “postcolonial” discursive construct that the 
rest of the world becomes sloughed off into a bin of incomprehensible alterity.  The anxiety I 
wish to describe can best be determined by turning to the text itself. 
 Scattered signs of homosexual panic erupt at random points throughout T-I and T-II even 
before the appearance of Fayruz Bahari, and can be read as the semiotic foreshocks of the rumor 
proper.  The chief executive himself is an early conduit for these signs.  It is said that His 
Excellency had the habit of curling up like a ball in the back seat of his car and, invisible to the 
rear-view mirror, would pose strange questions to his driver.   Once, out of the blue, he is said to 
have asked, “Can a man become a sexual deviant late in life?”  A second version of this question 
is reported: “Can a man, who has not known sexual deviancy in his entire life, suddenly find his 
desire strengthen in the opposite direction, and strive for a man to penetrate him?”  Yet a third 
version of the question is circulated: “Can a man turn into a sexual deviant after fifty?” (T-II: 
76).  We do not know the driver’s response, and the question is as bewildering to the reader as it 
is to the employees of the Foundation.  The chief executive is known to have a wife and children, 
as well as numerous mistresses.  There is no context to prepare us to expect this question, apart 
from the appearance of a “well-groomed” chauffeur who suffers from one of the chief 
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executive’s notoriously capricious an unexplained grudges.  The explanation, I think, must be 
sought in terms of a simmering “homosexual panic,” which Sedgwick, among others, have 
linked to the fear of one’s own latent homosexuality.  This is the fear expressed in the question 
posed by the chief executive, who reveals himself to be insecure about the stability of his 
heterosexual desires.  In particular, it is the potential exploitability of the passive position that he 
fears. 
 This same anxiety finds other outlets for expression, such as an equally random and 
unexpected warning which several parents issue to their children.  In one instance, a secretary 
finds herself caught in traffic, and her mind wanders to concerns about her two sons.  Of the 
youngest, she expresses “her constant fear that someone will play a trick on him, as she had also 
feared for his older brother.  She has tried … to warn them against playing games in which a boy 
must bend over, or in which boys jump over each other” (T-I: 143-144).  An identical warning 
occurs later in a different context, when a stepmother cautions her adopted son “not to take off 
his clothes in front of anyone, not to play English leapfrog, and not to let anyone touch his rear” 
(T-II: 164).  Nor is this the first time that this warning has occurred in a work by al-Ghitani: it 
occurs in nearly identical form in his short story, “This is What Happened to the Aleppan” 
(1995: 446-448).  In all cases, this fear of male homosexual exploitation is localized on the anus, 
which is vulnerable at all moments to penetration.
79
  By extension, the boy (or in the case of the 
                                                 
79 Sedgwick also suggests that “an anal erotic salience of male homosexuality is if anything increasingly strong 
under the glare of heterosexist AIDS-phobia” (2008: 35).  In other words, anxiety-laden conceptions of male 
homosexuality often reduce it to a sexuality of the anus (rather than other organs or practices).  This becomes acute 
amidst fears that AIDS will be transmitted in this way; thus it is perhaps no coincidence that in the chapter preceding 
the entrance of Fayruz Bahari, entitled “Immune Deficiency,” an employee is rumored to have AIDS (T-II: 146).  
Although the employee is female, the specter of homosexuality appears nonetheless in the strange confusion of signs 
common to linguistic communities in late capitalism.  At this point in the novel, the Foundation is in negotiations to 
join global organizations known only by such queer acronyms as COMSA, FIFA, FAW, and BINOLUX.  When 
word spreads that an employee has contracted AIDS, an anonymous voice asks, “What does AIDS have to do with 
COMSA?” (Ibid.).  COMSA (kūmsā in the Arabic) is homophonous with komsā, an Egyptian homosexual argot 
word for “gay,” allegedly derived from French.  Thus the question, alternately rendered, is “What does AIDS have 
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chief executive, the man) loses control, and his agency is parasited by another.  It is thus not only 
the psycho-sexual trauma that is feared, but also the perennial concern of being “other-taken” or 
taken over by an insidious other.  This is perhaps the expression in the sexual domain of the kind 
of paranoia about hidden enemies and conspirators that may be deemed endemic in certain 
leadership classes at certain moments of historical change and uncertainty.  It is particularly 
acute, too, in these two novels, in view of the unexplained promotions, the “veiling” or secrecy 
of the twelfth floor, and the constantly posed question about who is really in charge.
80
  The male 
homosexual predator in this case may be read as the latest in a series of personifications of the 
parasitic menace, coming after such figures as “the rumormonger,” “the conspirator,” “the 
imperialist” or “the freemason” (cf. Chapter 8).
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The preceding symptoms of homosexual panic are not (only) acts of literary 
foreshadowing; rather, they lay bare the psychological and narrative threads from which the 
rumor is woven and on account of which it makes so much noise.  An analysis of such contextual 
threads, as in the preceding, is necessary for a fuller understanding of the emergence and impact 
of a rumor, as they take us beyond more reductive approaches that emphasize pathology or the 
conspiratorial figure of the author.  However, the extent of the poésie fabuleuse in this case needs 
also to be understood as the effects of what I have called seduction.  Fayruz Bahari seduces a 
                                                                                                                                                             
to do with the gay man?”  The anxiety about the male homosexual violator, whose target and sign is the anus, is thus 
expressed obliquely in the few pages preceding the appearance of Fayruz. 
80 This paranoia is directly expressed soon after Fayruz’s appointment, as people ask “Who is planning?  Who is 
making the decisions? [man yukhaṭṭiṭ? man yuqarrir?] It is difficult to determine, what’s happening now is strange, 
deviant [shādhdh] from everything familiar” (184).  Note the language of “planning” (yukhaṭṭiṭ), identical to that 
discussed in Chapter 2.  In this short passage, “paranoia” is directly linked to “homosexual panic” through the word 
shādhdh, which has the general meaning of “deviant” and the specific meaning of “sexual deviant” or 
“homosexual.” 
81 There has been plenty of scholarship on Arabic literature that reads the “sodomite” (lūṭī) or male homosexual 
predator as a figure for foreign exploitation (eg. Guth 1995; Lagrange 2006). Foreign exploitation is too general a 
notion; I suggest that the paranoid style is a more precise description of the anxiety here. 
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number of employees – in particular, his ostensible enemies or challengers – who are eager to 
grasp his secrets in detail both for the pleasure of discovery and the simple urge to destroy.   
Fayruz’s very name mimics the principle strategy of seduction as proposed by 
Baudrillard: the oscillation between absence and presence, between seen and unseen.  In Arabic, 
fayrūz is “turquoise,” a gemstone to be unearthed; baḥarī may occur in the phrase ʿa-l-baḥarī, 
meaning “on display” or “open for all to see,” often with meretricious connotations.  Thus 
Fayruz Bahari is at once a rare, secret stone and a show which bares all; he is once seen, then 
unseen, once in khafāʾ, and once in jalāʾ (the opposite of khafāʾ).  As custodian of the Treasure 
Trove, he stays true to this name.  Many of his actions at the Foundation are ʿa-l-baḥarī, 
including his flashy television appearances, his projects for the renovation and display of the 
Treasure Trove, his proposal to make a film fictionalizing the life of the elusive chief executive 
(180-181), and his organization of what critics claim is celebration for the sake of celebration 
(254-255).  It is even said that Fayruz “takes pride in displaying his condition” (214) – that is, his 
sexuality.  At the same time, however, he remains just as obscure as the Foundation’s other 
major power brokers.  It is decided, after the whispering has become too loud, that Fayruz Bahari 
and his suspected partner shall be officially included among the officials “whom it is forbidden 
to observe, whose movements are not to be watched, and whose calls are not to be recorded” 
(261).  The challenge of the seduction is too much to resist. 
In the Foundation, there is no shortage of those prurient with the desire to expose 
Fayruz’s secrets, though it is a desire stronger in some than in others.  Many employees, it would 
seem, are content to pass on the rumors already in circulation, while others are have their gazes 
fixated on his rear-end (muʾakhkhara), hoping to discern some hidden detail (182, 214).  Others 
are driven totally mad by the alleged impropriety, and exert wild efforts simply to defame 
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Fayruz.  These include a newspaper editorial warning of the dangers of “this type” taking office 
(154), a website that digs up salacious reports on Fayruz’s “deviant” activism (218-219), and an 
older employee who bursts out into the hallway, shouting “anything but this sodomite!” (200).  
Such efforts are in vain.  One particular employee, however, seems to be more seduced than the 
rest.  His name is ʿAbdu al-Namarsi. 
Who is ʿAbdu al-Namarsi?  We hear of him first in T-I, when he is introduced as “ʿAbdu 
the pimp” (86).  He is a grotesque figure who boasts of his ability to seduce any woman, and 
transfer her desires to one of his wealthy clients.  In both novels, the reader hears him recount the 
sordid details of the audio and video recordings he has made of his clients in the bedroom, which 
he desires one day to publish – not necessarily with the aim of destroying reputations, but rather 
to satisfy his interest in a recondite form of scientia sexualis.  The essence of his practice, or 
“gift” as it is called (214), is the same as that enjoyed by the chauffeur ʿAmm Sharaf, the 
concierge al-Ashmuni, and others: the discernment of hidden knowledge.  He is driven by “a 
curiosity stimulated by the attempt to discern what the senses cannot detect” (226).  Accessing 
this secret sexual knowledge serves a double function: the delight immanent to voyeurism and 
analysis, and the ability to control and manipulate the person whose secrets he has found.  When 
Fayruz appears, and pushes al-Namarsi further away from the executive twelfth floor, he does 
not merely make an enemy; rather, he pushes al-Namarsi’s voyeuristic abilities into overdrive, 
seducing him with the flickering prospect of hidden sexual knowledge.  Al-Namarsi is used to 
thinking that it is he who seduces others; he still appears to think this.  But as Baudrillard has 
argued, the dialectics and directions of seduction are not so easily framed:  in seducing, one is 
also seduced.
82
  Fayruz seduces al-Namarsi, though the latter believes it the other way around. 
                                                 
82 “The cycle of seduction cannot be stopped.  One can seduce someone in order to seduce someone else, but also 
seduce someone else to please oneself.  The illusion that leads from one to the other is subtle.  Is it to seduce, or to 
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 We only know this because it is al-Namarsi’s thoughts that we hear, and never those of 
Fayruz: the latter is an object closed to narrative empathy and comprehensibility, and may only 
be accessed by wild speculation, rumor, and the illusion of seduction.  The pimp quickly declares 
his task: “Fayruz’s condition and behavior astonish al-Namarsi, and he is absorbed in 
anticipation of what he will show next.  Despite his aversion to such types, his curiosity is yet 
stronger … From now on, he will attempt to discern the details of the likes of Fayruz” (T-II: 
168).  Everywhere Fayruz Bahari leaves a trace, ʿAbdu al-Namarsi eagerly gropes about for the 
hidden meaning.  He begins, as always, with a reading of surfaces: Fayruz’s rear is thin, he 
observes, as opposed to his partner’s “full” rear (muktanaza – it is full of kunūz or “treasures,” 
169).  Over the course of several chapters, al-Namarsi builds a more and more complete 
narrative, shot through with a poésie fabuleuse, of Fayruz’s sex life, emotional attachment to his 
partner “Farih,” and intimate relation with “Gladiyus,” a “whore” who has the ear of the chief 
executive.  The more he discovers, it seems, the more he is seduced forward.  This process is 
captured neatly in a single phrase: “Fayruz is taken to, but does not give” (fayrūz yuʾtā wa lā 
yaʾtī) (167).  The phrase is to be read, first, as a euphemism for the passive position in sexual 
intercourse (Fayruz receives anal penetration, he does not penetrate).  This is in itself a salacious 
detail in which al-Namarsi finds pleasure.  But it also describes the seduction of secret 
knowledge: the phrase “Knowledge must be taken, it does not come by itself” (al-ʿilm yuʾtā wa 
lā yaʾtī) is attributed to Imam Malik, the founder of one of the four main schools of Sunni 
                                                                                                                                                             
be seduced, that is seductive?  But to be seduced is the best way to seduce.  It is an endless refrain.  There is no 
active or passive mode in seduction, no subject or object, no interior or exterior: seduction plays on both sides, and 
there is no frontier separating them.  One cannot seduce others, if one has not oneself been seduced” (81).  
Baudrillard’s penchant for bold proclamations is fed by the inexhaustible reservoirs of the counterintuitive.  Still, I 





  Thus knowledge of Fayruz must be sought after, for it does not yield itself.  It is 
a seductive challenge that al-Namarsi takes up in total obsession. 
 It is not long before the pimp must begrudgingly admit to himself that Fayruz Bahari is 
not merely an enemy or rival, but a challenger who attracts him in a positive sense.  “Al-Namarsi 
always likes a nice game, even if he is against it” (181), and indeed, when faced with Fayruz, “he 
cannot ignore that hidden sense of admiration that flows through him” (217).  This sense, this 
seductive pull, strengthens every time he hears about Fayruz’s new schemes and projects for the 
Foundation.  It is hardened into jealousy when he hears that Fayruz is beating him at his own 
game: the custodian of the Treasure Trove is able to woo others with his uncanny ability to 
reveal hidden knowledge.  “The breadth of his knowledge is amazing, from color dyeing to the 
interpretation of dreams, in addition to urban planning, the design of gardens, and all so many 
civilized matters and sublime affairs” (243).  This leads his friend and sponsor Gladiyus to 
exclaim repeatedly: “You know everything!” (245). It becomes clear that against such a 
penetratingly intelligent figure, whose “gift” is greater than his own, al-Namarsi cannot win.   
The moment comes when he thinks he has finally caught Fayruz.  He sends him an 
envelope containing sexually explicit photographs captured of him and his partner.  But he is 
already out-maneuvered: “In what newspaper or magazine would you like them published?” 
Fayruz asks his would-be blackmailer (261).  In this climactic scene, several things are 
happening at once.  There is an eruption of homosexual panic, as al-Namarsi is shocked off 
balance by the realization that “sexual deviants” control the press.  It is a glimpse, delivered in 
yellow-dramatic fashion, of the hidden hands that manipulate the order of things in this strange 
post-industrial era.  He has been caught, as it were, from behind.  At the same time, we 
                                                 
83 The saying occurs in a number of sources.  See, for example, the tafsir of al-Suyuti, al-Durr al-Manthur fi al-
Tafsir bi al-Maʾthur (Sura 4: 95). 
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understand – even if al-Namarsi seems unable to recognize it himself – that his special gift, his 
means of seduction, has been rendered obsolete.  What value does his “secret knowledge,” so 
artfully obtained, really have?  Not so much: it is possible that Fayruz is genuinely welcoming 
the publishing of these photographs.  Al-Namarsi has no really valuable information, its power as 
a secret is diffused, and no rumor he would spread could make any difference so far as Fayruz 
Bahari is concerned.  Let all be ʿa-l-baḥarī, he seems to be saying.  Al-Namarsi is frustrated, but 
he is not any less seduced: he fades into the background, and the last we hear of him, he cannot 




In this chapter, I have attempted to elucidate the emergence of rumors in terms of secrecy and 
seduction.  Fantastical stories, in these cases, are put together through acts of popular speculation 
about seductive objects – personalities and props that oscillate between obscurity and 
ostentation.  These acts of speculation have become popular and widespread, due to the 
pervasive culture of secrecy, and the proliferation of seductive figures.  Speculation is also 
refined into an art, deemed a “gift,” possessed by experts such as the chauffeur ʿAmm Sharaf, the 
concierge al-Ashmuni, and the pimp ʿAbdu al-Namarsi.  Often times, the knowledge gleaned 
through speculation is fantastical and distorted through the prisms of hope and anxiety; often 
times, it contains a measure of truth.  Almost always, it is sexual knowledge, or at least simmers 
with a sexual heat (that is, even if it does not deal with intercourse or genitalia, a hidden essence 
seems tinged with erotic possibility). Perhaps this is because, as Foucault has made famous, 
modern society has constituted sex as “the secret” (1990: 35) to be penetrated, analyzed, and 
confessed.  Other topics are there to be discussed and rumored as well – maybe Fayruz Bahari is 
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shipping priceless artifacts abroad (he is shipping priceless artifacts abroad), maybe he’s 
complicit in fraud and bribery (he is complicit in fraud and bribery) – but their circulation does 
not make the same level of noise. 
 At the beginning of this chapter, al-Jahiz observed the popular obsession with secrets and 
scandals of kings.  But in the Foundation, it is apparent that desirous (or anxious) speculation is 
not a practice pursued only by the masses with respect to their superiors.  We should know this, 
of course, were it not for the common emphasis on rumor as a kind of “mass” pathology.  Those 
who inhabit the executive twelfth floor are so often as secretive and seductive to each other as 
they are to those outside, or below.  They speculate and rumor about one another, as al-Namarsi 
does with Fayruz Bahari.  It is also the case – though I have not elaborated on this here – that the 
rulers of the Foundation spy, speculate, and rumor about the employees below them (T-I: 120).  
And the seduction works in one more direction that cannot escape us: the readers.  In the 
following chapter, I examine how the novels seduce the readers themselves, prodding us with the 
prospect of secret knowledge and driving us into the channels of rumor.  This will form part of a 
broader examination of how the novels operate for Gamal al-Ghitani in their particular historical 


















Chapter 6: Tales of Gamal al-Ghitani: Caricature, Noise, and Seduction 
 
“Literature feeds off the blood of gossip!” So blasts the title of a 2006 article in the Saudi 
newspaper al-Sharq al-Awsat.
84
  With much indignation, the author condemns what he labels 
“gossip literature” (adab al-namīma), the special product of downtown Cairo’s “triangle of 
terror”: an area delimited by three cafes where artists and intellectuals gather nightly (“and in 
particular on Tuesday”) to stick their noses where they do not belong.  The occasion for this 
article was the publication of a book, aptly titled The Book of Gossip, by one of the revered 
elders of modern Egyptian literature, Sulayman Fayyad.  But, the author of the article claims, 
“gossip literature” has a history in Egypt which stretches all the way back to the Nobel Laureate 
Naguib Mahfouz himself with the novel Mirrors, released in paperback in 1972.  In his list of 
such works, the author does not fail to include Gamal al-Ghitani’s Tales of the Foundation and 
Tales of the Treasure Trove. 
 A number of scholars have remarked on the similarities that much literature, and in 
particular the novel, shares with gossip.  Orhan Pamuk, for example, observes that both gossip 
and the novel, as forms of discourse, are motivated by a natural, voyeuristic curiosity about other 
people (2011: 61).
85
  But Muhammad Abu Zayd, the author of the above article, has in mind 
something more specific: not a general similarity between all novels and gossip, but particular 
novels whose literary form is nothing but a thin cover for malicious gossip about real characters 
in the real world.  The literary critic Faruq ʿAbd al-Qadir is to be given credit for applying a 
similar label to Gamal al-Ghitani’s T-I and T-II: he calls them “bad-mouth literature” (adab al-
talsīn) and “the literature of ‘you know who, dear neighbor’” (adab iyyāka aʿnī fa-smaʿī yā gāra) 
                                                 
84 www.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=19&article=394285&issueno=10228. 
85 The full argument on the connection between 19th-century novels and gossip is spelled out by Patricia Meyer 
Spacks in her book, Gossip (1986). 
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(2003: 176).  These two novels, and in particular T-II, he says, “made quite a bit of noise,” as 
their author stands accused of “settling personal scores” and taking his novel into “a territory that 
had been restricted to gossip sessions and chattering in the coffeehouse” (147).  The “tales” 
(ḥikāyāt) of Gamal al-Ghitani, continues ʿAbd al-Qadir with his own showing of tongue, are 
more akin to “the prattles of old pensioners in their cafes” (176). 
 Following ʿAbd al-Qadir’s cue, in this chapter I examine how T-I and T-II have earned 
such labels as “gossip literature” and “bad-mouth literature.”  My claim is that there are several 
different ways in which these novels participate in the arts and politics of rumor that I have 
analyzed in the preceding two chapters, as they shoot out at characters in the real world.  First, I 
focus exclusively on Tales of the Foundation (T-I).  Reading the “tales” about the Founder (al-
muʾassis) as “rumors” about the newspaper giant Mustafa Amin, I argue that, pace ʿAbd al-
Qadir, al-Ghitani’s intent is more reverential homage than malicious “prattle.”  This is not only 
because of the mostly benign content of the rumors.  For a manner of homage is also paid to 
Mustafa Amin in the very style which al-Ghitani adopts for the novels: it is the yellow 
journalism for which the founder of Akhbar al-Yawm became infamous in Egypt’s mid-twentieth 
century.  More specifically, I interpret this style as a form of caricature, which aims at humor 
through the deployment of grotesque bodily images, the objectification of women, and various 
kinds of physical and emotional exaggeration.  Al-Ghitani imitates this style, in part, as a tribute 
to his former employer.  After this reading of the author’s relationship to the Founder/Mustafa 
Amin as expressed in T-I, I turn to an analysis of the author’s treatment of another major figure 
in T-II: Fayruz Bahari.  This is a thinly veiled caricature of Faruq Husni, the former Minister of 
Culture, and preeminent adversary to Gamal al-Ghitani.  The salacious tales al-Ghitani tells 
about Husni, I argue, may be read on the one hand as a form of noise, and on the other, as the 
176 
 
effects of seduction.  In other words, al-Ghitani’s rumormongering is to be understood by 
analogy to the practice of ʿAtiyya Beh – who championed the principle, “if the bullet doesn’t hit, 
it still makes noise” – and the exploits of ʿAbdu al-Namarsi, who found himself incurably 
obsessed with the sexual secrets of Fayruz Bahari.  I conclude this chapter by arguing that al-
Ghitani’s text itself plays a game of “seduction” with the readers, tantalizing them with secrets 
and encouraging further speculative gossip. 
 
News of Mustafa Amin 
 
The talk of the town began with the two, Mustafa Amin and ʿAli Amin.  Their birth on February 
21, 1914, as narrated later by a loyal friend, was nothing short of mythical.  Likened to an 
“earthquake,” their entrance into the world happened to be “The House of the Nation” – the 
residence of the nationalist leader and revolutionary Saʿd Zaghlul, whose niece was their mother 
(Shusha 1977: 27).  Mustafa was “plump” and ʿAli was “thin”; when the former seemed to 
become ill, one of the nurses ordered that for his survival, he must be bathed each day in wine.  
“And thus,” the story goes, “wine entered the House of the Nation for the first time,” and 
Mustafa was saved (Ibid.).  Today, it is Mustafa, called “the Giant,” who is the more 
remembered and mythologized of the two brothers; but it was both of them who, in 1944, 
established the foundation Akhbar al-Yawm (“The News of the Day”).  Promising to bring 
Hearst-style journalism to Egypt, it quickly grew into one of the largest and most formidable 
media conglomerates in the country: its history, closely intertwined with, and generative of, the 
major cultural and political transformations of the mid-to-late twentieth century, forms the 
allegorical intertext of Gamal Al-Ghitani’s novel Tales of the Foundation (T-I). 
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The Akhbar al-Yawm Foundation is best known for its weekly newspaper, also named 
Akhbar al-Yawm (est. 1944), and its daily al-Akhbar (est. 1952).  If today these are difficult to 
distinguish in their widely perceived monotony and crabbed regime-speak from other official and 
semi-official papers like al-Ahram and al-Gumhuriyya,
86
 they were for several decades a buzzing 
nest of revolution, counter-revolution, sex, intrigue, and creative force that hosted in various 
capacities the biggest names in Egyptian politics, literature, and arts.  Apart from the Amin 
twins, Akhbar al-Yawm adopted or introduced writers like Ihsan ʿAbd Al-Quddus, Musa Sabri, 
Safinaz Kazim, Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal, and Muhammad Al-Tabiʿi. Even President 
Gamal Abdel Nasser, and Vice President Anwar Sadat, occupied its offices at various points.  It 
is also the place where Gamal al-Ghitani, having already begun his literary production, got his 
start as a newspaper reporter in 1969.  He would later become editor of the literary section of 
Akhbar al-Yawm, before taking over as chief editor of the foundation’s separate literary journal, 
Akhbar al-Adab, when it was launched in 1993.  Al-Ghitani remained in this position until 
shortly before the Revolution of 25 January, 2011. 
Tales of the Foundation (T-I) was published in 1997, the very year of Mustafa Amin’s 
death.  The many points of similarity between “the Founder” (al-muʾassis) and “the Foundation” 
(al-muʾassasa) as narrated in the novel, and the Mustafa Amin and Akhbar al-Yawm of legend, 
may be outlined briefly, before analyzing the form and function of al-Ghitani’s literary gossip.  I 
take my lead from Al-Musawi (2003: 302) and ʿAbd al-Qadir (2003), who both observe 
connections between the Foundation and Akhbar al-Yawm.  The Founder chose for his 
Foundation a plot of land in an undeveloped part of Cairo, and was responsible for the 
subsequent modernization of the area (T-I: 5-7, 15).  So did Mustafa Amin risk ruin by building 
                                                 
86 Whence the joke, ēh il-akhbār? – zayy il-ahrām (“What’s new/the news/Al-Akbhar?” – “Same as Al-Ahram”).  
Akhbar Al-Yawm is officially owned by the Shura Council, Egypt’s Upper House of Parliament. 
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the offices of Akhbar al-Yawm in an underdeveloped neighborhood in Cairo.  According to one 
account, the premises had to be cleared of trash, scorpions, and snakes, as well as slum dwellings 
and feminine “mudslinging” (radḥ), before the area became famous as “Journalists’ Street” 
(Shahin 1957: 18-21); the novelistic rendition does not depart far from this, with a particular 
reference to the snakes (T-I: 204).  T-I also tells of the Foundation’s nationalization (35), and the 
imprisonment of the Founder as a result of a quarrel with the intelligence agencies (264).  The 
details of these two incidents, referred as the “lesser tragedy” and the “greater tragedy,” come 
close to the nationalization of Akhbar al-Yawm in 1960 (cf. Shusha 1977: 241), and the 
imprisonment of Mustafa Amin on espionage charges in 1965.
87
  Finally, the novel repeatedly 
mentions the amorous affairs of the Founder, which often climaxed in a sexual act in his office 
interrupted by the entrance of another employee (T-I: 36, 120, 128, 234, 313-314).  Identical 
rumors of love have long swirled around Mustafa Amin.The singer of the nation Umm 
Kulthum, the actresses Tahiyya Kariyuka, Madiha Yusri, Fatin Hamama, and even Empress 
Fawziyya: the most desired women of Egypt’s mid-twentieth century, all were said to have had 
special relations with the newspaper magnate, often behind the unlocked doors of his offices on 
Journalists’ Street in downtown Cairo (Shahin 1957: 69, 77).
 But what is the reader to make of these correspondences between Amin and the Founder?  
In Tales of the Foundation, are we confronted with a “settling of scores,” as ʿAbd al-Qadir 
suggests?  Was it Gamal al-Ghitani’s intent to write a malicious exposé, laced with poisonous 
insinuation and rumor, of his recently deceased boss?  Even if we are to settle on this reading of 
simple one-to-one correspondences between history and fiction – as I suggest we do – the 
                                                 
87 Amin was released from prison in 1974, reportedly at the personal question of the Singer of the Nation, Umm  
Kulthum.  Though the case remains controversial, both detractors and supporters seem today to recognize that Amin 
had some degree of involvement in espionage.  See, for example, Ibrahim ʿIsa’s fawning but condemnatory article, 
“al-ʿUmlaq alladhi Tagassas” [“The ‘Giant’ who Spied”], al-Dustur, 1/21/2010.  Others whitewash the case (e.g. 
Shusha 1977: 242), and personal adversaries like Salah Nasr blackwash it (e.g. Nasr 1975). 
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evaluative stance of the author (or rumormonger) is rather more complicated than a term like 
“bad-mouth literature” would suggest.  On the one hand, I think, had al-Ghitani’s intention been 
to write an “objective” history of Akhbar al-Yawm, he would have had no choice but to write it 
in this way, that is, in this mix of gossip, epistemic fuzziness, and anonymous report.  As Di-
Capua has argued, national history writing in postcolonial Egypt has suffered from the lack of an 
open state archive, driving many to compose histories out of the only available materials: 
newspapers, hearsay, gossip, and smuggled documents (2009: 325; 2012: 88).
88
  Similarly, 
Akhbar al-Yawm, despite its legendary archive (Shahin 1957: 207), is a foundation whose 
structures of secrecy mimic those of the state.  The novel itself makes this observation in a 
passage I have quoted in Chapter 5:  in the Foundation, there is something that “defies 
observation … recording, and analysis,” and which “has not been captured in poetry or prose” 
(T-I: 78).  Perhaps it can only be captured in the gossipy digressions of al-Ghitani’s ḥikāyāt. 
 The lack of an objective basis for writing a history of the Akhbar al-Yawm Foundation, 
or a biography of Mustafa Amin, might explain the peculiar epistemological instability of the 
novel, but not the author’s evaluative stance that ʿAbd al-Qadir insists is negative.  It might be 
said, first of all, that Gamal al-Ghitani’s relation to Mustafa Amin is one of ambivalence.  One 
finds this sense made explicit in a series of interviews al-Ghitani conducted with the newspaper 
magnate, published in 1983 as the book Mustafa Amin Remembers.  On the back cover, al-
Ghitani remarks that although he does not consider himself part of Amin’s “school” of 
journalism, he nonetheless respects his “struggle for freedoms.”  Ambivalence, yes, but the 
detection of ambivalence, while a necessary alternative to evaluative reductionism, is too 
common an analytic gesture that risks becoming meaningless if it is not qualified and sketched 
out further.  I would like to argue that Tales of the Foundation, in addition to its implicit 
                                                 
88 See also Mehrez (2005: 8), on the Egyptian novelist as an “underground historian.” 
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criticism of Mustafa Amin – which is obvious enough from the novel’s allusions to the 
Founder’s sexual impropriety and his fetishistic personality cult – can also be read as an homage 
to the father of Egyptian yellow journalism (replete, no doubt, with ambivalence).  I base this 
claim on the novel’s style, which I read as a playful imitation of the kind of sensationalist 
reporting that made Mustafa Amin famous.  Al-Ghitani pays tribute to his former boss by telling 
his story in the style which suits him most. 
 Most commonly, Mustafa Amin’s style of journalism might be called ithārī 
(“sensationalist” or “inflammatory”).  His opponents would rather call it rumormongering, or, in 
the words of his archenemy Salah Nasr, the former head of Egypt’s General Intelligence Agency, 
Amin’s Akhbar al-Yawm was as cacophonous as “the howling of wolves and the screeching of 
crows” (1975: 6), and sounded like “the seething hiss of vipers with their deadly poison” (81).  
His friends disagreed.  The famous political cartoonist ʿAbd al-Munʿim Rakha, for example, 
called Amin a “writer of caricature” (kātib kārīkātīrī) – in other words, he produced in prose 
what the cartoonist produced in drawing (Abu al-ʿAynayn 1990: 174-175).  This is quite an 
accurate description of Amin’s style as imitated by al-Ghitani in Tales of the Treasure Trove.  If 
I am to give this transgeneric mode a name, it might be “caricature thrice over”: al-Ghitani 
imitating Amin, who was imitating cartoonists, who caricature celebrities.
89
 But it is more 
important to identify the constitutive elements of this style, and speculate on their poetic 
functions, than to be burdened by more neologisms.  Several elements stand out: grotesque or 
distorted bodily images; the exaggeration of affect and emotion; and the objectification of 
women. 
                                                 
89 Or one might want to simply call this parody.  For my full discussion of parody and playful imitation, including 
the unwieldiness of taxonomies that produce terms like “caricature thrice over,” see Chapter 8. 
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Nearly all the characters in the novel are drawn as clownish types with exaggerated 
physical and emotional contours.  If the Founder is spared objectification of this kind, other 
employees, high and low, are not so lucky.  “The Professor,” manager of the Foundation’s 
garage and a major contender for the executive office, gets stuck with the nickname “Professor 
Colcasia” due to the unusual shape of 
 
his totally bald head, with its protrusions and undulations, and its remarkable cavity that 
sticks out like a billboard leaning forward.  Underneath are his perpetually goggled eyes, 
which some claim remain open even when he is fast asleep.  His head is connected 
directly to his shoulders, as his neck is virtually nonexistent, so that when he turns around 
or looks at someone on his left or right, he turns with his whole body.  No less strange 
than his head is the formation of his full, tremendous rump, with the pendulous motion of 
its two halves: one, two, one, two. (T-I: 56). 
 
Al-Namarsi, the pimp, is similarly “repulsive” with a head similar to that of the Professor, except 
that, whereas the latter’s colcasia “folds forward,” the former’s cranium “leans backward” (141).  
Another character, Hamdi al-Izmirli, suffers from a “subtle imbalance in the arrangement of his 
parts,” which distorts him, despite his size, into rather the shape of a child (279).  The remainder 
of the novel’s male characters are more or less malformed; even if we know virtually nothing 
about some of them, we are always given a full physical description. Affect, too, is grossly 
distorted, and is more often shown than told.  Thus, when the Professor becomes aggravated, 
“his head takes a more rectangular shape, or perhaps a rounded shape, depending on one’s 
perspective, and the direction of light” (102).  With these graphic exaggerations, al-Ghitani’s 
prose is rather closely homologous to the representative style of the rassām kārīkātīr or 
(political) cartoonist and, by extension, is a playful imitation of Mustafa Amin’s writing style. 
 Following the novel, one may separate the female characters into a class of their own.  
Almost without exception, they are paragons of beauty, but it is a beauty debauched by a certain 
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meretriciousness, and laced with descriptive threads that weigh rather heavy: Rashida is “an 
explosive female” (123), Safiyya burns with a “devastating flame” (221), and Hanim enjoys “a 
firmness of beauty, a rumbling roar of freshness [zamzamat al-ṭarāwa; an almost nonsensical 
phrase], and a green, human emerald shine” (243).  They are, in other words, sexually 
objectified; they are targets of the male chauvinistic gaze.  This is a representative mode 
common to many of Gamal al-Ghitani’s novels.  But more specifically, the women in Tales of 
the Foundation (and later in Tales of the Treasure Trove) resemble closely the hollow figures of 
fantasy concocted or caricatured by Mustafa Amin in a number of his trashy novels (Amin was 
known not only for his sensationalist journalism but for his numerous memoires and “literary” 
works which blended fact and fiction).  In T-I and T-II, we encounter women with names like al-
Anisa Intishar (“Miss Intishar”), Hanim al-Dumyatiyya (“Hanim the Damiettan” or “The 
Damiettan Dame”), and Rashida al-Nimsawiyya (“Rashida the Austrian”).  They may be 
compared with the shy seductresses featured in books by Mustafa Amin, such as Sitt al-Husn 
(“The Lady of Beauty,” 1976), al-Anisa Huyam, (“Miss Passion,” 1985), and al-Anisa Kaf 
(“Miss K,” 1985).  If at first glance the appearance of objectified women characters in Tales of 
the Foundation would seem to reflect Gamal al-Ghitani’s male chauvinism, a second degree 
reading would suggest that these characters also form an important part of the author’s playful 
imitation of Mustafa Amin’s objectifying and caricatural style. 
 Of course playful imitation does not rule out a measure of critique.  But a careful reading 
of the intertextuality between Mustafa Amin’s notorious sensational style, and Gamal al-
Ghitani’s Tales of the Foundation, cannot help but detect the signs of a more amicable 
relationship between the two.  If it is not the relationship between teacher and student – as al-
Ghitani had said, he does not belong to Amin’s “school” – neither is it the relationship between 
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boss and disgruntled, gossiping employee.  And yet, and yet: the reader can forget everything he 
knows about this special relationship, for the fact remains that it is now Gamal al-Ghitani, not 
Mustafa Amin, who is writing in this peculiar caricatural style.  This is important because there 
are other figures, contemporaries of the author, who become objects of his anything-but-
amicable rumormongering. 
 
Faruq Husni: The Noise and the Seduction 
 
The unusual name “Fayruz Bahari” has the same syllable structure as “Faruq Husni,” Egypt’s 
culture czar for nearly thirty years.  His tenure as the flamboyant Minister of Culture, from his 
appointment by President Mubarak in 1987 until the revolution of January 25, 2011, was marked 
by periodic scandals – some of which, it was rumored, had been ingeniously orchestrated by the 
minister himself.  These include the display of his own rather mediocre paintings in Egyptian 
museums, the alleged renting or sale of Pharaonic artifacts to foreign museums and collectors in 
exchange for personal benefits, a deadly fire at one of the ministry’s theaters in Beni Souief in 
2005, derogatory remarks he made about the hijab in 2007, his expensive and unsuccessful bid to 
become Director-General on UNESCO in 2009, and the theft of a Van Gogh painting from a 
Ministry of Culture museum in broad daylight in 2010.  In addition, his private life has been the 
subject of gossip and crude innuendo in the corridors of power, the national press, and the taxis 
of Cairo – much of which centers on his alleged homosexuality or “sexual deviance.”  The 
rumors are usually embellished with details that the minister keeps a palace full of handsome 
male servants, exploits his office to engage in loud sex orgies, maintains a flirtatious relationship 
with the president’s wife and son, and enjoys close ties to the security services and European 
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organized crime.  All of these details are woven into the character Fayruz Bahari, the 
“Supervisor of the Treasure Trove,” in Tales of the Treasure Trove (T-II). 
 In order to analyze the rhetorical function of this novel in terms of the author’s 
relationship with the former minister, I will first zoom out to get a larger picture of the 
relationship between littérateurs and the state in modern Egypt.  This relationship has been 
studied most comprehensively by Samia Mehrez (2008), with a particular focus on cultural 
politics in the late Mubarak years.  Mehrez notes that littérateurs, and intellectuals more 
generally, have maintained fraught alliances with the “political field” since Muhammad ʿAli’s 
sponsorship of secular civil servants in the early to mid-eighteenth century.  A defining feature of 
this “cultural field” as Mehrez calls it (following Bourdieu), is its dependence upon, and 
manipulation by, the state.  If artists and intellectuals have depended on state funding, the state, 
for its part, has sought to sponsor or control this secular cultural field in order to counter the 
parallel power structure of religious groups and institutions.  As Mehrez puts it, “cultural 
producers maintain the most ambiguous relationship with the state that is at once their patron and 
their persecutor” (2008: 6).  The terms of this relationship have shifted, but not radically 
changed, over the course of the twentieth century: Nasser’s establishment of the Ministry of 
Culture reaffirmed this relationship; Sadat’s sidelining of the cultural field led to a resurgent 
Islamism; Mubarak’s renewed engagement with the cultural field found its boldest expression in 
his constant support for Faruq Husni.  As Minister of Culture, Husni sought to radically reaffirm 
the state’s role in culture, through ambitious and costly projects and campaigns, and by seducing 
many artists and intellectuals into the government’s “pen” (ḥaẓīra, a common characterization). 
 Gamal al-Ghitani, as editor of the literary journal Akhbar al-Adab, launched a heated 
campaign against the minister in numerous articles and editorials beginning in the mid-1990s.  It 
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is reported that at one point, al-Ghitani had gone so far as to describe Husni’s ascendancy to the 
ministry as “no less dangerous to Egypt than the 1967 Naksa.”
90
  Following Mehrez, one might 
read this campaign as a more recent expression of the historical tension between the cultural field 
and the political field: al-Ghitani as the representative of the former, and Faruq Husni as the 
representative of the latter.  This is indeed how Mehrez frames the issue, in particular when 
discussing the battle between the two men over the state’s impounding of literary works (2008: 
15).  What Mehrez leaves out of her reading are the rumors that nearly everyone was saying, if 
not writing, about the minister throughout this period.  But, I argue, one cannot fully understand 
the forms and motivations of al-Ghitani’s battles with Husni with reference to professional 
principles and the dynamics of “fields.”  One must also take into account these rumors – only 
insinuated by the author in Akhbar al-Adab, but made most explicit in Tales of the Treasure 
Trove – which provided the hidden intertexts – heard but not seen – for one of the most 
important feuds in Egyptian cultural politics during the Mubarak years. 
 Why does Gamal al-Ghitani write Fayruz Bahari?  Why does he spread the salacious 
stories about Faruq Husni?  Answers can conveniently be found by analogy to the practices of 
two other characters sketched in the novels: ʿAtiyya Beh, “the rumormonger,” and ʿAbdu al-
Namarsi, “the pimp.”  To begin with, one may read al-Ghitani’s assault on Husni as following 
ʿAtiyya Beh’s slogan, “the bullet that doesn’t hit still makes noise” (il-ʿiyār illi mayṣibsh 
yidwish).  Al-Ghitani fires here not a direct bullet, or principled, accurate reportage – this he has 
already tried – but places his bets instead on the magnitude of the “noise” (dōsha) produced by a 
fabulous story of sex and deviance.  He seeks to defeat his opponent by this alternative practice 
because nothing else seems to do the trick.  Ostensibly, he is intent on dislodging Faruq Husni 
because he represents the state’s assault on the cultural field; but he cannot, he thinks, counter 




this assault merely by publishing accounts of the minister’s financial shenanigans in Akhbar al-
Adab.  So, al-Ghitani takes up the advice of ʿAtiyya Beh: the more salacious the information, the 
noisier the rumor, the more certain its effects will be: thus the novel reports not only that 
Faryuz/Faruq is a “deviant” (shādhdh) and a “sodomite” (lūṭī), but also includes precise details 
about the types of boys he likes (168, 209), the excesses of the parties he calls “freeing the 
reigns” (250), and full visual and audio exposure of him in bed with his partner (244, 248, 260).  
The logic of this tactical noise is anarchic: the powerful must be removed at any cost.  It is 
Machiavellian: the ends justify the means.  It also risks being unethical; it is unethical, since its 
polemical stance towards this “sexual deviant” contradicts the openness towards sexual 
expression that al-Ghitani has so often called for in literature, if not in life.
91
  It is not surprising, 
then, to find the anonymous narrator caught with a measure of ambivalence about this kind of 
critique, however brief: 
 
The more balanced voices, those known for their fairness of opinion, expressed disgust 
[with the rumors]: What does it concern us if he is a deviant or not a deviant?  The 
important thing is his performance, and his competence.  We shouldn’t get into these 
personal issues. 
An expert said: Every tree catches some wind.  Let everyone scrutinize his own past, and 
he will find something shameful that he does not admit.  So why this pretense of 
infallibility, and why this slandering of Fayruz before he has even begun? (152) 
 
Another character, who has launched a website dedicated to exposing Fayruz’s sexual deviance, 
eventually suffers a brief pang of conscience: 
 
So, why does he attack Fayruz?  Why does he take such a fierce position against him? 
Is it because he is known for his sexual deviance?  Or because he has risen to a sensitive 
position? 
                                                 
91 For example, in an interview with al-ʿArabiyya in 2007, al-Ghitani says: “If we go back to the books of classical 
Arabic literature, we will find them much bolder than what is published today, and that society was more tolerant … 
The facts of life were discussed with freedom and elaborateness to the extent that I wish I had the freedom of al-
Jahiz, al- Tawhidi, al-Asfahani, and Ibn Hazm.” Available at: www.alarabiya.net/articles/2007/02/16/31735.html. 
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Every person is free with his own body, but when it comes to filling such sensitive 
positions, it is necessary to perform the proper examinations. 
Examination of what?  Is he kidding himself? 
Examination of what? 
Doesn’t he know that this is the time for all abnormals? (228) 
 
Regardless of these short ethical qualms, it is clear, as other readers have observed (cf. ʿAbd al-
Qadir, Abu Zayd), that the thrust of al-Ghitani’s Tales of the Treasure Trove is a polemical 
assault on Faruq Husni.  The principle strategy of this polemic is the fabulous, exaggerated 
rendering of the rumors around his “sexual deviance.”  This strategy of noise – even if its 
promise is the subversion of state power – is in this case a very problematic one.  As Eve 
Sedgwick has written of a different political context, 
 
it has at various times and for various reasons seemed to gay people that there was some 
liberatory potential in articulating the supposed homosexual secrets of men in power, 
often homophobic men. … It is always an intensely volatile move, depending as it does 
for its special surge of polemical force on the culture’s (though not on the speaker’s) 
underlying homophobic valuation of homosexual choice (and acquiescence in 
heterosexual exemption). (2008: 244-245) 
 
Sedgwick was of course writing about gay liberation movements, not about Gamal al-Ghitani.  
But what she calls a “volatile move” can, I think, be adapted to the ethics of weaponized rumor 
in this case.  If Gamal al-Ghitani’s antagonism towards Faruq Husni is meant primarily as an 
attack on the state’s attempts to coopt or oppress liberal intellectuals, the deployment of such an 
anti-liberal strategy as homosexual “outing” would seem rather problematic.  Not only is it an 
unprincipled move, but it plays on anti-liberal (i.e. homophobic) strains within the culture at 
large.  That is, the rumor’s “special surge” – as Sedgwick called it, or “noise” as I call it – 
depends on an arousal of the very principles it is deployed against.  Not that al-Ghitani intends to 
combat homophobia – a risible notion – rather, the liberal ideology he seeks to protect from state 
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meddling is not in the end well served by whipping up noise around the specter of “sexual 
deviance.”  If rumor is an alternative to more direct or accurate critique, it is in this case, I would 
argue, not a very effective one.  In writing Tales of the Treasure Trove, Gamal al-Ghitani is 
much less felicitous a rumormonger than ʿAtiyya Beh. 
 There is one other figure that may help us understand al-Ghitani’s narrative treatment of 
Faruq Husni, and that is ʿAbdu al-Namarsi.  This “pimp” was drawn into a game of seduction 
with Fayruz Bahari.  He had a prurient interest in sexual secrets, and this interest was aroused 
beyond his control with the flashy appearance of the Supervisor of the Treasure Trove.  In what 
ways does the author resemble the pimp?  Mona Zaki, in her brief review of Tales of the 
Foundation, argues that al-Ghitani “portrays al-Namarsi in the way he would like to present 
himself: a pimp with a personal philosophy on his ‘art’, a connoisseur of the female species, an 
assessor of beauty, an opportunist…” (2002: 14).  Al-Ghitani is not al-Namarsi, but the 
psychological identification is close: he is the only character who plays a prominent role in both 
novels, and one of the few who are given any subjective complexity beyond their caricatural 
shells.  And their seduction by Fayruz Bahari/Faruq Husni is comparable.  Like Fayruz Bahari, 
Faruq Husni has been an elusive figure, always managing to escape the grasp of is critics – even 
after the Revolution of 25 January, he was one of the few former ministers of the Mubarak 
regime to escape trial or imprisonment. And his flashy appearance in the public eye can very 
well be described as having a “hypnotic” effect on some spectators, to use Baudrillard’s word: 
book fairs, television interviews, cultural festivals, new museums, and so forth have been 
interposed and accentuated by his evasion of numerous legal and financial debacles. 
If, following the model of ʿAtiyya Beh, I have read al-Ghitani’s rumormongering as 
abrasively polemical (“noise”), it is by analogy to al-Namarsi’s seduction that I may explain the 
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desirous, indeed obsessive, elements of his verbal challenge.  There had always been scattered 
hints in the press and gossip cafes that there was more to the novelist’s attacks against the 
minister – which he had begun launching from the perch of his journal Akhbar al-Adab before 
the end of the century – than cultural policy.  As early as 2005, as al-Ghitani was still penning 
away at his challenger with allegations of corruption, a former media advisor to Husni released 
an “exposé” of the Ministry of Culture in which he deemed the conflict between the two men to 
be nothing but a big “joke” (ʿAbd al-Wahid 2005: 319).  More eyebrows were raised in 2007, 
when al-Ghitani gingerly accepted a literary award from the Ministry of Culture.
92
  In the same 
year, asked by reporters what al-Ghitani’s problem was, Husni responded coolly, “Don’t ask me, 
ask him.  I don’t have any information about this.”  He went on to add that he did not harbor any 
bad feelings towards the author, and that his critiques were all just part of “the cultural game.”
93
  
In other words, the two were engaged in an exchange of challenges, a game of seduction, each 
attempting to claim the role of seducer and not that of the seduced.  Or perhaps it was only al-
Ghitani himself who was seduced, obsessed with a man who had no interest in taking up what he 
deemed a pathetic challenge.  We might then not be surprised to find animosity so abruptly 
change to admiration.  The novelist appeared beaming at the minister’s personal art exhibit in 
Cairo in January, 2010.  With a sideways smirk, he told television reporters that he had “been 
following the works of the artist Faruq Husni since the ‘80s,” and that he could notice “a 
development in the use of colors and in the manifestation of form.”
94
  Surely these are the 
remarks of a fan – a man seduced – rather than a single-minded detractor.  Just as al-Namarsi 
cannot help but express his admiration for Fayruz’s physical dexterity and mastery of occult 
knowledge, so has al-Ghitani found that, despite his vitriolic attacks on Faruq Husni in the press, 
                                                 
92 http://today.almasryalyoum.com/article2.aspx?ArticleID=66539 
93 http://www.youm7.com/News.asp?NewsID=324697 
94 The interview is available at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mAtPzrZ9d3Q&feature=related. 
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his admiration for the artist-minister’s political and artistic savoir-faire has been difficult to 
contain.   
 Whatever the case, the “real” motives for al-Ghitani’s feud with Husni, including his 
rumormongering in Tales of the Treasure Trove, remain something of a seductive enigma to 
spectators.  I have suggested here that the portraits drawn of ʿAtiyya Beh and ʿAbdu al-Namarsi 
offer useful comparisons for elucidating the author’s own aesthetics and politics of rumor.  
Indeed, to the extent that the author himself understands these comparisons, one might say that 
the two characters are drawn as part of an emergent project of self-stylization and 
experimentation.  Ethically ambiguous, the two are not explicitly endorsed by al-Ghitani, but 
allow him a mode for reflecting on, problematizing, sifting through, redeeming, and occasionally 
embodying an alternative position in the Egyptian republic of letters.  As ʿAtiyya Beh, he 
imagines himself as a gifted manufacturer of noise: a weapon whose consequences I have 
suggested are self-defeating, or at least cynical.  As ʿAbdu al-Namarsi, he imagines himself as a 
master cracker of codes and revealer of sexual secrets.  Also like al-Namarsi, he barely 
acknowledges his own seduction by the object of his critique.  Having departed already from any 
rigorous notion of engagement, he attends to power rather in a mode of engouement, of 
obsession and attachment, both positive and negative, active and passive.  Can the reader stand 
by unaffected? 
 
The Seduction of the Reader 
 
Faruq ʿAbd al-Qadir finds much that he does not like about the two novels: he has called them 
“bad-mouth literature” (adab al-talsin), among other things.  Indeed “the main problem with this 
work,” he complains, “is its vacillation between showing and hiding, between expressing and 
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insinuating, between what the narrator wants to say and what he is able to say” (2003: 148).  He 
goes on to describe this process as “winking at the reader, seducing him to complicity [ighrāʾ bi-
l-tawāṭuʾ]” (152).  Can one have a better description of seduction’s “sole strategy,” the 
oscillation between presence and absence, “to be-there/not-there” (Baudrillard 1990: 85)?  The 
symptoms irrupt immediately on the critic’s own tongue: in the following sentences, he is 
seduced by the aura of secret knowledge, and proceeds to indulge himself by an enumeration of 
the many points of comparison between Akhbar al-Yawm, the Foundation, Mustafa Amin, and 
the Founder.  He is drawn into reproducing the very gossipy discourse he has denounced; he 
cannot resist, such is the hypnotic enigma of Gamal al-Ghitani’s prose. 
 Neither can this reader resist the seduction.  One is drawn by the prose’s “vacillation 
between showing and hiding” by the very obscurity of the novel’s caricatures, who flash 
seemingly significant details like clothing, distinguishing features, and improbable names.  One 
desires to grasp these characters who are so elusive, even if there is not really any there there.  
An interviewer put this question to Gamal al-Ghitani in 2004: “Some critics say that your novel, 
Tales of the Foundation, is in fact tales of the Akhbar al-Yawm Foundation that you work in.  
What do you say?”  He says, “No, it’s much larger than that, and there is no similarity between 
the foundation in the novel and the Akhbar al-Yawm Foundation.”
95
  Baudrillard says of 
seduction that 
 
it can just as well be a direct fascination with the void, as in the physical vertigo of a 
chasm, or the metaphorical vertigo of a door that opens onto the void.  If you were to see 
written on a door panel: “This opens on the void.” – wouldn’t you still want to open it? 
That which looks onto nothing has every reason to be opened.  That which 
doesn’t say anything has every reason never to be forgotten.  That which is arbitrary is 
simultaneously endowed with a total necessity.  The predestination of the empty sign, the 
precession of the void, the vertigo of an obligation devoid of sense, a passion for 
necessity. (1990: 75) 
                                                 




Al-Ghitani says that there is nothing there, that Tales of the Foundation is hiding nothing, or 
referring to nothing in the real world. (Of course he says nothing about Tales of the Treasure 
Trove).  But doesn’t the reader still want to look?  These characters are “empty signs,” yet out of 
a “passion for necessity,” a closing of signification, and of course for the pleasure of the 
challenge and the chase, the reader reads on and into and beyond the text.  The anonymous 
narrator tempts us: there are “other hidden affairs” in the Foundation, “whose seals cannot be 
broken except by direct order of His Excellency … and sometimes, my book” (T-I: 230).  The 
author’s only entrance into his novel is only to seduce us with more secrets.  Aren’t we curious? 
 Who is the Founder?  We are drawn into the archives, obsessed with the arbitrary and 
improbable shreds of evidence that fasten him to the persona and author of Mustafa Amin.  Then 
who is ʿAtiyya Beh, and who is ʿAbdu al-Namarsi?  The novel taunts us with elaborate physical 
descriptions, sheaves of trivia, so we trawl for connections.  ʿAbdu al-Namarsi, the pimp and 
major rival of Fayruz Bahari, “clicks” seductively with Safwat al-Sharif, the former President of 
Egypt’s Upper House of Parliament, which today owns Akhbar al-Yawm.  In fact, in a tell-all 
interview to the state-owned newspaper al-Ahram in June, 2011, Faruq Husni denied the rumor 
that he is a homosexual and pointedly blamed Safwat al-Sharif as its ultimate source.
96
  But it is 
a ruse, ʿAbdu al-Namarsi defers signification further, we are certain, surely he is Mamduh al-
Lithi, underling of Safwat al-Sharif, and also a pimp and rival of Faruq Husni within the regime.  
Mamduh al-Lithi, one of Egypt’s most infamous scenarists and movie producers, is rumored to 
have followed al-Sharif in blackmailing actresses with sexual secrets, and turning them into 
spies.  Al-Lithi (al-līthī) nearly resembles al-layth, “the lion,” just as al-Namarsi nearly 
                                                 
96 “Faruq Husni li-Bawwabat al-Ahram: lastu shadhdhan wa Safwat al-Sharif waraʾ al-shaʾiʿa,” Bawwabat al-
Ahram, June 16, 2011. Available at: http://gate.ahram.org.eg/News/83576.aspx. 
193 
 
resembles al-nimr, “the tiger.” The novel’s physical description fits precisely, too (T-I: 141).  
That which is arbitrary is simultaneously endowed with total necessity. 
 Who is Zahran al-Husni, the character who serves as a stepping stone for Fayruz Bahari, 
and is later moved to work in the Cairo suburb of Giza (T-II: 185)?  Isn’t he Zahi Hawwas, 
former Chief Inspector of the Giza Pyramids Plateau, and caricature of himself in fact as well as 
fiction?  More than anything, we want to know, Who is al-Nabrawi, the capricious figure who 
vocally protests the ascension of Fayruz Bahari on account of his sexual deviance (T-II: 154-
155), but then suddenly reverses his position at a packed meeting of a major cultural club (T-II: 
158-159)?  Al-Nabrawi rhymes with ʿAbd al-Rahman al-Sharqawi (1920-1987), one of the most 
revered littérateurs of Egypt’s twentieth century, and author of the novel Earth (al-Ard, 1954).  
Indeed al-Sharqawi did vocally opposed Faruq Husni’s appointment as Minister of Culture in 
1987, before scandalously reversing his position for unknown reasons, and dying a few months 
later.  The novel reveals about al-Nabrawi/al-Sharqawi “what no one else has discovered” (T-II: 
171): an elaborate story of a lost will, which is thought to prove al-Nabrawi’s ownership of the 
entire Alexandrian shoreline, unfolds over the next several pages.  Somehow, Fayruz Bahari 
promises to help with the legal difficulties so that al-Nabrawi gets his land back (171-176).  But 
before anything else is revealed, al-Nabrawi dies of “an overdose of Viagra” (321), and our sense 
of curiosity is overwhelmed.  We are still seduced: And who is the chief executive?  And who is 
Frédéric, the Frenchman fluent in Arabic, who is encountered sifting through old gramophone 
records near al-ʿAtaba Square, as he is preparing a doctoral dissertation on antique Egyptian 
music (278-279)?  
 By engineering his texts with the mechanisms of seduction – the eclipse of presence, the 
taunting secrecy – Gamal al-Ghitani reproduces the same factors which led many of his 
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characters to obsessively speculate over hidden meanings.  The pull of seduction is thus the same 
on these characters as it is on the readers, and we, tantalized by the pleasure of discovery, are 
interpolated into the practices of gossip and rumormongering that T-I and T-II perform.  We want 
to know more about the figures al-Ghitani is slandering, if indeed he is slandering them, and pin 
them down.  They are there, then not there, and sometimes, we think we have seized back the 





In this chapter, I began by situating Tales of the Foundation and Tales of the Treasure Trove in 
relation to the personal and political life of the author, and went on to propose several readings of 
these novels as “gossip literature” or, more coarsely, rumormongering.  In doing so, I have been 
treading on dangerous ground.  This is not only because the “targets” or intertexts of the novels 
have been the matter of some dispute, to the extent that they were denied by the author himself.  
More generally, “serious” literary criticism tends to abhor these kinds of social and political 
reductions of texts to the immediate experience of their author – in particular when the reading is 
framed as an investigation into “intentions” and “motives.”  Not only that, but writing about 
gossip so easily becomes an act of gossip itself, getting caught up on trivial details and 
digressing into modes of evaluation and critique that lack any real analytic potency. 
 Despite the risks of social and political reductionism, an investigation into literature as 
rumor offers important contributions to the study of cultural politics at the turn of the century.  
Rumor can reveal the much overlooked narrative intertexts, and psycho-sexual dynamics, that 
frame and motivate political action for authors, critics, ministers, and academics, however much 
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work is done to rationalize and reduce this action to the principles of engagement and critique.  
Interpreting characters in T-I and T-II as acquaintances or enemies of the author, I have made 
three claims about al-Ghitani’s art of rumormongering.  First, the peculiar caricatural style 
maintained throughout the novels can be read not just as cheap gossip about Mustafa Amin and 
his successors, but as a tribute to the unique caricatural style that Amin used and encouraged in 
Akhbar al-Yawm, the sensationalist newspaper he founded with his brother.  As an employee of 
Akhbar al-Yawm, al-Ghitani was surely well-acquainted with this style, and found no better way 
to remember his former employer than to compose a novel in playful imitation.  This, of course, 
does not exculpate the author from the practice of rumormongering, given the many similarities 
between characters like Fayruz Bahari and real life adversaries.  So my second argument was 
that, if the novels serve as an homage to Amin, they simultaneously perform a critique of Faruq 
Husni, among others.  The specificity of rumor as a political tool – as opposed to objective 
journalistic reportage, open confrontation, or the literature of engagement – may be understood 
by returning the characters in the novels.  It is also a form of engouement, of obsession and 
seduction, as al-Ghitani was irresistibly drawn to challenge the culture czar.  Third and finally, I 
argued that, in addition to their own functioning as rumors, T-I and T-II seduce the reader into 
the practice of speculative rumormongering, fueling a desire for more information about the likes 
of Fayruz Bahari/Faruq Husni, al-Nabrawi/ʿAbd al-Rahman al-Sharqawi, and ʿAbdu al-
Namarsi/Mamduh al-Lithi. 
 It becomes difficult, after conducting readings of the personalities depicted in the novels, 
to accept al-Ghitani’s own denial about the personal and political targets they engage.  Of course 
we should not expect anyone to confess to participating in this stigmatized discursive practice, 
unless he thinks he can get away with it.  I would suggest that the stigma of the practice is what 
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drove al-Ghitani to write these novels in the first place: he can claim, as he does, that this is the 
“high” art of the novel rather than the “low” art of gossip.  By placing the rumors and scandalous 
reports in the mouths of his characters, the author would seem to distance himself yet further 
from them.  Ultimately, however, it is not my intent to catch al-Ghitani, the man, in a dubious 
act: literature, no less than the everyday gestures and speech acts performed over coffee dregs 
and half-serious cigarettes, allows us to read and write complexity; it is an opportunity for 
suspending the critical urge, to allow things to say something new, to experiment with 
alternatives.  That is to say, the rumormonger is not summoned here to be put on trial, for that 
































“FLIRTING” WITH RUMORS: PLAY, PARODY, AND POLITICS IN CYBERSPACE 
 
 
Among the Egyptians’ most distinguishing traits in the modern era is the spirit of humor 
transmitted in their everyday conversations.  They are passionately fond of joking about 
everything and everyone.  In the most awkward and sensitive moments, the ray of humor 
quickly breaks forth, shining splendid on their faces … Sit among any gathering of 
Egyptians, or in any cafe – especially the popular-class cafes, where both workers and 




Shawqi Dayf (1910-2005), one of the twentieth century’s most distinguished scholars of classical 
and premodern Arabic literatures, writes these words in his introduction to a work of fifteenth-
century burlesque.  He is transmitting a notion with wide circulation in the Arab World that a 
peculiar “spirit of humor” (rūḥ al-fukāha) pervades the manners and customs of modern 
Egyptians, a “people of jokes” (shaʿb nukta) whose sanguinary wit and gay repartees serve them 
well in times mottled with contradiction and adversity.  Re-inscribing a primordial link between 
a particular speech genre and an entire people, this notion might be interpreted as the brighter 
inflection of those comments with which I introduced this dissertation.  Just as Egypt has been 
said to be a “country of rumors,” so Egyptians are said to be a “people of jokes.”  If the former 
claim is deployed as polemic and lament, the latter lends itself more often to expressions of 
national pride, while also serving to rank, dismiss, or exclude the popular classes from more 
“serious” matters both aesthetic and political.  In Dayf’s case, the expression comes close to an 
apology for the licentiousness and colloquial style of the book he is introducing, preempting 
objections from the more orthodox custodians of the Arabic literary canon.   
 National stereotypes aside, Dayf’s remarks allow us to consider the principle object of 
this dissertation in a different light:  holding up the “rumor” (al-ishāʿa) next to the “joke” (al-
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nukta) reveals important points of comparison.  How are we to separate the two as popular 
speech genres?  Must we separate them?  The similarities are certainly many: both are typically 
transmitted orally, or through a mix of media; they are rather difficult to define conceptually, 
both for their capricious genre hopping and multiplicity of styles and sub-species; both are often 
anonymous, with transmitters, tellers, and performers but few identifiable authors; both are 
eagerly consumed, hoarded and exchanged as ready social capital; both would seem to possess 
“magical circulatory virtues” and are captured through similar metaphors of diffusion and 
irruption; they are received through similar standards of evaluation (conciseness, timing, novelty, 
and “accuracy” – they “hit the mark”).  Finally, while both may be cast as typical of “Egyptians” 
in general, they are in many senses illicit, not only through their association with the lower 
classes, internal others, and similar spaces of sociality (the cafe), but also for their widely 
acknowledged subversive potential.  Whether consciously launched against an individual target, 
or conducive to a general atmosphere of resistance and confusion, jokes and rumors possess an 
inflammatory irreverence that threatens, but at many times reproduces, the would-be order of 
things.  Certainly from the perspective of the powerful, the two have often been grouped together 




 It is no wonder that many academic studies of rumor have been unable to avoid noting 
areas of conceptual overlap with popular forms of humor.  Allport and Postman (1947), for 
example, observed early on that “[in] the manner in which they circulate and in the function they 
serve, jokes and rumors are often surprisingly similar,” as both generate “emotional catharsis” 
and may be “equally unfair and unjust to their victims” (192-193).  And while they are able to 
                                                 
97 An early example in Egypt of the state’s surveillance of both “jokes” and “gossip,” during the reign of Ismail 
Pasha (r. 1863-1879), is discussed by Colla (2011).   
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draw a basic distinction between the two forms on the basis of the receiver’s assumption of 
“verifiable evidence,” they admit that there remain many cases of ambiguity, such as “hostility 
rumors that are wittily cast” and “tendentious anecdotes that are merely humorous” (193).  
Drawing the conceptual lines somewhat differently, Muhammad Talʿat ʿIsa (1964) posits the 
joke as a distinct form that nonetheless can serve as an “unconventional medium” for rumor.  In 
such cases, the humorous “exterior” is crafted by an enemy rumormonger to transmit a gravely 
dangerous “interior,” likened to “poison” because it is not detected in the act of consumption.  
Kapferer (1990), in contrast, focuses not on any formal distinctions between speech genres but 
on the intentional activities of social actors themselves.  A single rumor, for instance, may have 
both “passive relays,” “instigators,” and “opportunists” – each engaging the story with his or her 
own degree of credulity and commitment – or it may have what he calls “flirters” – those who 
pass on a rumor they know to be false or improbable for comic effect, or to “play with them … 
enjoying ruffling their public’s feathers” (96-97; my emphasis).  Ultimately, locating such 
elements of humor within rumor’s chain is important, in that it complicates theories of rumor that 
deem “belief” or credulity as essential to transmission.  These theories – implicit in attempts by 
state actors to “combat rumors” – have so often been used as evidence of the “naïveté” of the 
masses: in Shaykh Muhammad Sayyid Tantawi’s words, al-umam al-sādhija, the “gullible” or 
“naïve” nations (2001: 8).  Kapferer’s distinctions, in particular, help us understand that social 
actors transmit ishāʿāt to pursue divergent personal or political aims, through differing 
epistemological or affective modalities, degrees of attention, and measures of agency.  In other 
words, rumor needs not always be a “proposition for belief” as in Allport and Postman’s classic 




                                                 
98 “How strongly must people believe a rumor before we call it a rumor?” The question is posed by Fine, Campion-
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 Part 3 investigates some of the ways in which the coil of rumor becomes wrapped up in 
modalities and performances of humor, generating innovative cultural forms with a political 
edge.  Chapter 7 investigates humorous rumormongering as a kind of “play,” which reveals the 
affirmative potential that al-ishāʿa is often denied.  Chapter 8 investigates how a form of humor, 
which I theorize as “parody,” is deployed against a certain strand of rumors.  In both cases, the 
ethics and politics of noise, and the ethics and politics of the response, are central to these 































                                                                                                                                                             








In this chapter, I follow the online campaign “Mubarak Mat”: a coterie of bloggers, graphic 
artists, musicians, and Facebook users who staged the president’s passing in various forms 
beginning in 2008.  These actors can be understood as rumor “flirters” to use Kapferer’s 
felicitous phrase, a concept I would like to refine with theoretical insights from the study of play 
(Bakhtin 1984; Barthes 1989; Freud 1983; Huizinga 1955; Turner 1982).  As “play,” 
rumormongering in this case engenders a carnival spirit of the “as if,” both experimenting with 
and actually enacting a counter-hegemonic scenario of a post-Mubarak Egypt that, while 
performed in a ritually circumscribed space and time (the “blogosphere”), nonetheless promises 
to exceed these bounds to create more lasting effects.  Although these artists deliberately 
cultivate a self-serving fiction through the socially stigmatized form of rumor, they nonetheless 
expose the artifice and contingency of their own work through irony and expressions of self-
reflexivity.  In this way, such playful rumormongering differs from the more malicious acts 
performed by the likes of ʿAtiyya Beh and Gamal al-Ghitani (Part 2), as well as the official lies 
and myths that they seek to replace.  By following “Mubarak Mat,” then, I emphasize the 
affirmative, rather than destructive, functions of rumor in Egyptian public culture.  In addition, 
by giving more weight to the political effectiveness of this performance, I seek to counter the 
more pessimistic strain in the scholarship on sub-cultures, hypertext, and blogging that dismisses 
such practices as largely complicit, contained, or always already “incorporated” within the 
dominant structures of power.   
 I begin by revisiting the circumstances of the Mubarak death rumors of 2007, which I 
discussed from the perspective of state actors in Chapter 3.  My aim in this first section is to 
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situate “Mubarak Mat” in relation to this chain of hearsay, and emphasize its difference from 
previous contributions, notably the texts of Ibrahim ʿIsa.  In addition, I use segments from ʿIsa’s 
novel The Murder of the Big Man (1999) as a historical document that accurately describes the 
power of Mubarak’s “myth of permanence”: the narrative against which the later blogging 
campaign would be launched.  I then turn to the performance itself, and trace its different 
mutations across cyberspace. 
 
Intertexts: The Myth of Permanence and Fantasies of Resistance 
 
 
Everyone around the president feared his departure or death after thirty-two years in 
power.  People had come to trust that the world stood on the horns of a bull, and that the 
nation rested on the shoulders of the leader.  If he died, grew weary, or just gave up, the 
country would surely perish.  It would fall apart, collapse.  He was the only one they had 
known as president or as leader, and they could simply not imagine the country going on 
without him.  [They could not imagine] waking up in the morning, without finding him 
on the television screen or the front page of the national newspapers, without his statues 
on the main roads and his color portraits on the side streets, without his speeches on the 
radio, without celebrating his birthday, or praying for him on Friday and the anniversary 
of his ascension to the presidential throne. (ʿIsa 1999: 65-66) 
 
 
Published at personal expense and impounded upon release in 1999, Ibrahim ʿIsa’s novel The 
Murder of the Big Man (Maqtal al-Ragul al-Kabir) is a salacious political thriller that penetrates 
into the lurid corruption, and mysterious assassination, of a Middle Eastern head of state.  While 
set in the future and shy on names, its contemporary, real world references are boldly 
transparent: the “big man” of the novel has been president for decades, and while he boasts of 
perfect health and sexual prowess, there is a barely suppressed succession crisis in which his son 
features as a major contender.   
In the passage above, ʿIsa identifies in only slightly exaggerated terms the iconic 
infrastructure of Mubarak’s power.  As a supplement to his regime’s systematic abuse of force – 
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the notorious Emergency Laws, the entrenchment of the military in all sectors of society, the 
widely documented police brutality, and the hiring of street thugs (balṭagiyya) – in addition to a 
fuliginous network of international financial connections – not the least of which was an annual 
aid package of several billion dollars from the United States – Mubarak also projected his 
authority through a proliferation of public symbols and performances.  These were interwoven 
with a reigning narrative of the president as the “Hero of the Crossing” and “Engineer of the Air 
Strike” – in reference to his alleged leading role in the 1973 war with Israel – as well as “father” 
to all Egyptians.  Such symbolic buttresses to power, however, did not need to be entirely 
convincing to be effective.  Indeed Mubarak’s would-be personality cult was infelicitous from 
act one, given his widely perceived mediocrity in comparison to his two predecessors; by the 
final decade of his rule, his public portraits had succumbed to sun bleaching, his billboards had 
descended into kitsch, and the man himself began to recede further from public view.  What held 
the entire artifice of power together in the symbolic realm was, perhaps, more the result of 
inaction than any intentional plan: Mubarak stayed put.  The sheer number of years he had 
accumulated in office, as well as his survival of numerous assassination attempts – including one 
by knife just a few months after a similar scenario was envisioned in ʿIsa’s novel – were the 
crucial facts that tied together the myth of the president’s inevitability, immortality, and 
irreplaceability.  Simply put, this powerful myth meant that many “could simply not imagine” an 
Egypt without Mubarak. 
 The potency of this myth, and its pallid reiterations at multiple levels of public culture, 
must be grasped if we are to understand the subversive potential of a performance like “Mubarak 
Mat” (and, of course, the transgression of a novel like The Murder of the Big Man).  For 
President Mubarak’s permanence was not just a tired rhetorical trope delivered by stolid officials 
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in state media to an un-captive audience.  For many, it would seem to set a tone for an entire era, 
instilling a sense of waqf or “blockage” at each of life’s intersections, in traffic, in bureaucracy, 
in employment, in self-expression and self-realization.  Monotony dug itself in at the level of the 
everyday, and could also be read in the catatonic demeanors of an octogenarian political class, 
the high-register language of state newspapers which continued unchanged for decades and, for 
many members of a younger generation, an overmuch bemoaned mixture of malal (“boredom”), 
khanʾa (“suffocation”) and biḍān (“bollocks”).
99
  If Mubarak’s permanence was imagined, it had 
tangible effects, and if it was clearly a myth, it succeeded in chasing out most others. 
 It was not, of course, invincible.  ʿIsa’s novel, though banned, circulated underground for 
years as if it were rumor itself, until ultimately becoming available publically at newsstands and 
bookstores around 2006.  We may thus read it as an early stab at the fiction of the immortal 
president; a second stab came with the death rumors of August and September of 2007.  ʿIsa was 
involved here too, and if he was no more than a convenient scapegoat, the transgressive potential 
of his words cannot be missed.  Voices scattered throughout The Murder of the Big Man tell us 
as much, with allusions to the murderous force of language.  The Minister of Information, one of 
the many regime cronies whose conversations we eavesdrop on, remarks at one point that he 
“really felt the president had died when the prime minister managed to insult him” (88). Later, 
the narrator tells us that “the people – truly – performed the president’s funeral (shayyaʿ al-raʾīs) 
with jokes that multiplied and burst like bubbles in a lake atop a ready-to-erupt volcano” (143). 
The word shayyaʿ (“to perform the funeral rites”) is from the same root as ishāʿa, rendering 
“rumor” the tool of character and corporeal assassination.  Moreover, the president’s death, after 
taking a final dip in his swimming pool which was poisoned by an unknown engineer, can be 
                                                 
99 In Egyptian Colloquial Arabic, the last two terms, khanʾa and biḍān, are often deployed in (youth) slang as 
emotive ejaculations, indexing frustration, disgust, etc.  See below my discussion of a7a. 
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read in the same way: “poison” has a long tradition of association with rumor and subversive 
speech, from Hamlet’s father (killed by “poison in the ear”) to Muhammad Talʿat ʿIsa’s 
Confronting Rumors.  Here, the president has not only caught poisonous discourse in his ear, but 
has literally drowned in it.  It is not difficult to imagine ʿIsa, in writing this rumor-novel, as this 
anonymous poisoner whose words can kill.  More than simply passing on popular speech, he is 
able to position himself – in a self-effacing manner, tagged with the hearty guffaw of a yellow 
journalist – as regicide, as the individual intending agent who introduces the poisoning substance 
at the appropriate time and place.  He signs his name on this act, and comes away with the 
fantasy that his words have obtained deadly perlocutionary force. 
 But could such lone acts of discursive sabotage really have an effect?  Could yellow 
fantasy and rumors really challenge dictatorship, or did they merely scratch superficially at an 
edifice of authority whose stability had endured for a quarter-century?  Worse, might such acts 
help to re-inscribe this very authority, by agreeing to its terms and figurations?  Might they not 
also sour the already poisoned public sphere, by departing dangerously into fiction and fantasy?  
Not long after the trial of Ibrahim ʿIsa in September, 2007, such questions posed themselves 
again when events materialized “on the ground” that presaged a “real” revolution.  In early April 
of 2008, an uprising in the industrial cities of the Delta reawoke memories of the Bread Riots of 
1977, a spontaneous revolt of hundreds of thousands against the neo-liberal economic policies of 
Anwar Sadat.  The new uprising – which included strikes, sit-ins, and rioting, and was fought by 
the regime with mass arrests, torture, and disappearances – was similarly historic in scale, 
presenting an unprecedented challenge to the regime of Husni Mubarak and his myth of 
permanence; and yet, the events were largely overlooked by major international media outlets, 
certainly when compared to the coverage afforded both to the Bread Riots of 1977, and the 
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Revolution of 25 January.  Instead, they were documented closely by mudawwinūn, “bloggers” – 
a word, less an identifiable group, which was at this time gaining new currency in local and 
regional Arabic mass media, and whose precise meaning and place vis-à-vis the recognized 
fields of culture and politics became subject to renewed contest, and propelled often grandiose 
statements couched in a language of “the new” and “the revolutionary.”  An Al-Jazeera 
documentary appeared in late April, and heralded Arabic bloggers as “the new journalists” for 
their role in exposing police brutality and covering demonstrations and strikes such as those 
which had begun earlier in the month in al-Mahalla al-Kubra.
100
  The Facebook group and 
would-be revolutionary organization Shabab 6 Abril (“The Youth of 6 April”) – which would 
later play an important role in mobilizing the demonstrations of January 25, 2011 – was also 
launched at this time in solidarity with the struggle of the striking workers. 
 Just as the death rumors of 2007 had opened a vent for the expression of popular hopes of 
a post-Mubarak future, so did this uprising inspire new dreams and fantasies about the revolution 
to come.  In addition, just as some had worried that the death rumors (and Ibrahim ʿIsa’s role in 
them), even if the scenario they proposed was ideal, might be unhelpful fictions and self-
defeating talk, so was concern expressed that many of the bursts of imagination and political 
projects expressed in cyberspace during the uprising were veering too far from reality.  This 
concern – that fantasy talk in the virtual world might damage the revolution’s chances – sparked 
a heated debate among strike supporters on the division of revolutionary labor between “internet 
activists” sitting at home in Cairo and factory workers battling police “on the ground” in the 
Delta.  These were the terms invoked by Hossam el-Hamalawy – a veteran activist and journalist 
whose blog “3arabawy” has chronicled workers’ movements in the Egypt and around the world 
                                                 




since 2006 – in a post written on April 27, a few weeks after State Security violently suppressed 
the protests in al-Mahalla al-Kubra.  Taking account of the recent events and their coverage in 
the media, el-Hamalawy compared those who entertain “cyber-fantasies” with the socialists who 
fostered connections “ON THE GROUND” – a phrase thrice-repeated in capital letters.  He was 
not criticizing internet-bound imagination or play as such, only those users that deluded 
themselves and others into thinking their call for a strike on April 6
 
(and later, on May 4) would 
translate directly into revolution without further work.  Addressing fellow bloggers, he 
concluded: 
 
What we are doing is making fools out of ourselves, destroy[ing] our credibility, 
confirm[ing] [the] stereotype about bloggers being “IT nerds who sit in front of their 
computer screens and live in virtual reality” remote from what goes on in the street… and 
caus[ing] demoralization among our supporters… 
 
 
El-Hamalawy’s unfavorable contrast of “on the ground” activists with “IT nerds” expresses the 
anxiety that digressions in the “virtual” may interfere with serious political work.  “Cyber-
fantasies,” such as calls for strikes that never materialized, or political groupings that didn’t 
represent anyone, were essentially parasitic, a kind of noise that was undermining the real plans 
put forward by more committed activists.  Thus the perennial debate between the affirmative and 




 Fantasies of resistance, both online and in the street, flourished during the events of April 
2008.  What is more, the protests of al-Mahalla al-Kubra and their suppression happened to come 
just before the 80
th
 birthday of President Mubarak on May 4.  The date would provide an 
opportunity for the re-articulation of Mubarak’s myth of permanence in state media and 
                                                 
101 Armbrust (2007), too, has called attention to debates on a “new(er) medium’s [such as blogging] capacity to 
promote political change, or … to construct a democratic public sphere or to undermine it” (532). 
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presidential ritual, while also allowing opponents to counter the khanʿa and oppression of several 
decades by taking aim at this iconic lynchpin of dictatorship.  For many, to use Ibrahim ʿIsa’s 
words, this would be an occasion to “perform the president’s funeral (shayyaʿ al-raʾīs)” through 
the sundry artistic techniques available to them: crafted and deployed from the rims, verges and 
crenellates of an emergent counter-culture, and inscribed with a style and an attitude which while 
“revolutionary,” would cut against the grain of conventional “resistance.”  Moreover, while 
departing into the virtual and the imaginary, many of these performances would remain self-
consciously grounded in the world of the possible, which they were rapidly redefining. 
An exemplary expression of such techniques can be found in the virtual campaign 
“Mubarak has Died” (“Mubarak Mat”), which began with a semi-anonymous song of that name 
presented as a “birthday present” to the President of the Republic.  The song first circulated in 
mid-April on blogs and Facebook walls, at once joining in the chorus of discontent with the long 
rule of the soon-to-be octogenarian, and reviving the rumors of the previous fall (August-
September 2007) by means of a contagious artistic performance – one that would quickly 
migrate into other virtual genres and modes of expression.  The song with which the “campaign” 
was launched was performed by the pseudonymous trio Butrus, Bulus, and Maria (“Peter, Paul, 
and Mary”), and was first uploaded to the website “archive.org,” a popular open-source 
depository for books, articles, music, and other media.  It would subsequently be posted on a 
number of prominent and loosely affiliated Egyptian blogs, including “Manal and Alaa’s bit 
bucket,” Hossam el-Hamalawy’s “3arabawy,” Ahmed Naje’s “Wassaʿ Khayalak” (“Widen your 





  Different users of these sites subsequently “played” the song in their own way, whether 
through commentaries, graphic images, or just silent humming.  Not merely a “cyber-fantasy” in 
el-Hamalawy’s sense, nor simply complicit in the myth of the patriarch, “Mubarak has Died” 
remixes the rumors through what I will theorize as “play” (liʿb): a subjunctive and self-effacing 
aesthetic mode with a transformative force exceeding its ostensible temporal and spatial limits. 
 
Playing with Rumors 
 
  
“Play” is a polyvalent term in Western philosophy and social theory, where it has been 
alternately posited as a special mode of human action (Freud 1983; Huizinga 1955; Turner 
1982), or implicated more abstractly in processes of linguistic and textual signification (e.g. 
Barthes 1989).  The latter tradition, developed within Continental philosophy, can provide 
important insight – especially Barthes’ notion of play as “interpretation” and the readerly 
reproduction of the text.  However, I begin this section by engaging with those theories of play 
grounded in some understanding of the social world, embodied action, or human history, which 
is where such performances as we will study actually occur, generate meaning, and call for 
attention.  In addition, an important task in Arab cultural studies, as Tarik Sabry has argued, is 
the building of “epistemic connectivity” (2012: 4) between Arab and non-Arab intellectual 
traditions.  To this end, I engage with local understandings of “play” (liʿb) – primarily the 
writings of Ahmed Naje – which, ultimately, have more claim to the interpretation of 
performances in the Egyptian blogosphere than Eurocentric philosophy. 
 Many modern social scientific studies of play refer back to the work of Johan Huizinga 
(1955), whose theoretical speculations built on the everyday meaning of the term.  For Huizinga, 
                                                 
102 The original song is available at: archive.org/details/MubarakIsDead_284. For subsequent postings, see: 
manalaa.net/mubarak_is_dead (“Manal and Alaa’s bit bucket”), www.arabawy.org/2008/04/20/mubarak_ma/ (el-
Hamalawy’s “3arabawy”), and ahmednaje.net/2008/4/19 (Ahmed Naje’s “Wassaʿ Khayalak”). 
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play could be observed in animals as well as human beings, but his interest lay exclusively in its 
“cultural” functions: play was to be studied “as a special form of activity, as a ‘significant form,’ 
as a social function” (4).  While “free,” it should not be considered frivolous, and while 
“standing quite consciously outside ‘ordinary’ life as being ‘not serious’,” it absorbs the player 
“intensely and utterly” (13).  Finally, while circumscribed in a special, even sacred space within 
a limited temporal frame, “with the end of the play its effect is not lost; rather it continues to 
shed its radiance on the ordinary world outside” (14).  Other aspects which Huizinga deemed 
crucial – secrecy, disinterestedness, order and rules – have less relevance to a performance such 
as “Mubarak has Died.”  What concerns us here is its epistemic modality (its conscious departure 
from reality), spatial dimensions (where it takes place), and transformative potential (its political 
edge), all of which Turner (1982) takes up in his consideration of the liminal phase of ritual 
performance.  Ritual, according to Turner, often involves a temporary move from the 
“indicative” mood characteristic of ordinary life – glossed as a prevailing attitude of “actual fact” 
and serious intentionality – into a “subjunctive” mood of “as if” – understood as action 
concerned with “wish, desire, possibility, or hypothesis” (82-83).  Like Huizinga’s play, the 
subjunctive mood of ritual is consciously not serious, and its performance is separated in time 
and space (in a “liminal” zone) from the indicative everyday.  And yet, with the end of the ritual, 
and the “move… from the ‘subjunctive’ mood back to the ‘indicative’ mood,” the “recovered 
mood has now been tempered, even transformed, by immersion in subjunctivity” (82).  That is, 
the play ceases but, as Huizinga argued, it “continues to shed its radiance” on the indicative or 
ordinary world.  Ritual – or, in our preferred term, play – would be a kind of experimentation 
with alternative presents and futures, consciously removed from “reality” but ultimately 
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encroaching on it through a tactical exploitation of the possible, the suppressed, the discarded, 
and the grotesque.   
 Freud, while not fully articulating this transformative potential of play beyond its own 
imaginative confines, nonetheless argues that the player “rearranges the things of his world in a 
way which pleases him.”  He does this, however, not through a flight into the frivolous but by 
“linking” his “imagined objects and situations to the tangible and visible things of the real 
world.”  For Freud, this “linking” is what separates mere “fantasying” from the more serious 
“play” (1983: 25).  It is also what separates a campaign like “Mubarak Mat” – a playful 
performance grounded in potentials and aware of its own contingency – from what Hossam el-
Hamalawy called “cyber-fantasies” – dangerous acts attached to the impossible through self-
delusion.  Yet it is necessary to add that if such play is to enact its potentials, and succeed in its 
transformative force, it must also recognize that Freud’s “real world” or some aspect of it is 
transitory, contingent, and replaceable.  To use Turner’s terms, the players must recognize that 
the “indicative” or ordinary world is just another version of the “subjunctive,” a ritualistic mode 
not to be taken as permanent, immortal, or entirely serious.  Through play, the realm of the 
possible is expanded. 
 To fully appreciate the aesthetics and ontology of play, however, we must not fail to draw 
out the humorous streak which pervades it in many cases.  Here the writings of Mikhail Bakhtin 
on medieval laughter offer invaluable insight.  He contrasts the “official and authoritarian” 
nature of “the serious aspects of class culture,” and its “element of fear and intimidation,” with 
the liberating power of folk laughter (1984: 90).  His words deserve quoting in full: 
 
Through this victory laughter clarified man’s consciousness and gave him a new outlook 
on life. This truth was ephemeral; it was followed by the fears and oppressions of 
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everyday life, but from these brief moments another unofficial truth emerged, truth about 
the world and man which prepared the new Renaissance consciousness (91) 
 
 
Medieval folk laughter, then, not only subverted the official truth, but offered up its own 
alternative.  And while this alternative “unofficial truth” was “ephemeral” and limited – like 
Huizinga’s play and Turner’s ritual – in time and space, it served the important function of 
“preparing” its participants for what Bakhtin calls “the new Renaissance consciousness.”  In 
other words, it would make possible a revolutionary new configuration of culture and politics, in 
which the ludic and the carnivalesque would escape their proletarian confines and suffuse “high” 
literature, as generic boundaries of all kinds crumbled (72).  With such lyrical optimism, 
Bakhtin, perhaps, was less concerned about making a positivistic historical argument than he was 
launching an assault on the high seriousness of the Soviet state in his own times; his celebration 
of folk laughter may indeed have been his own experimentation with alternatives, his own act of 
“play.”  This does not make his theory of laughter any less relevant to contemporary culture.  Its 
restoration of a transformative, consciousness-making role to the ludic is important given the 
frequent dismissals of such forms as frivolous.  Finally, Bakhtin observes folk laughter to be 
“universal,” both in its all-inclusive nature and its selection of targets: no one, not even the 
performers themselves, is safe from its ravages.  It thus includes an important self-reflexive 
function that prevents it becoming, like the governing “serious” ideologies, hegemonic and 
exclusionary.  It is saved from descending into Freud’s pathological “fantasying.” 
 The ordinary semantic field of the Arabic liʿb differs little from that of the English 
“play.”  In fact Huizinga did not fail to include Semitic languages in his chapter on “The Play-
Concept in Language,” and made the observation that “in Arabic and Syriac the same root serves 
for the dribbling and drooling of a baby (to be understood, perhaps, from its habit of blowing 
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bubbles with spit, which can confidently be taken as a form of play)” (35).  He was referring to 
the Arabic word luʿāb or “saliva,” which is not, as the passage would seem to suggest, the 
exclusive plaything of infants. The thrust of such remarks, in the end, is to exaggerate in a 
classical philological manner the otherness of Arabic against the ordinariness of the Indo-
European.  A more local sense of liʿb is to be found not in etymological play; rather, the true 
theoretical and semantic value of the term can best be sought by tracing its movement in context 
– that is, in the special “space” that Huizinga, Turner, and to a lesser extent Bakhtin deem 
necessary to the unfolding of play. 
 What, then, is the special space, or “playground,” of “Mubarak Mat”?  Arabic terms, and 
their English approximates, such as al-faḍāʾ al-iftirāḍī (“cyberspace,” literally “virtual-space”) 
or al-faḍāʾ al-saybarī (“cyberspace”), are too wide to designate this area.  “The (Egyptian/Arab) 
blogosphere,” or faḍāʾ al-tadwīn (al-maṣrī/al-ʿarabī), comes closer.  It is a contested space, with 
different frames deployed to grasp it, whether from within – through aggregators, histories, or 
political campaigns
103
 – or from without – through maps, documentaries, or policing and 
torture
104
.  It is not always or exclusively a space of play: networks overlap with networks, as 
they do with the “real” world political struggles they help mediate.  In some corners of the 
Egyptian blogosphere, one is more aware of flows and connections to the wider material-
semiotic fields of commerce, consumer culture, national politics, and religion.  However, in 
others, the element of play is unmistakable: a density of hyperlinks and character work gives the 
feel of a more local, close-knit community or shilla (“small group” or “gang”); symbols and 
discourse point to themselves; inside-humor takes shape; and a more nuanced if still imperfect 
                                                 
103 Respectively, the aggregator “Omraneya” (http://www.omraneya.net/); and Naje (2010), a history of the Arab 
blogosphere, including a review of attempts to politicize bloggers along traditional partisan lines. 
104 Respectively, Etling, et. al. (2009), a statistical study published by Harvard’s Berkman Center for Internet and 




comprehensibility between members comes together.  In fact at the very moment of entry, there 




 Blogging as liʿb – and the blogosphere as malʿab (“playground,” or athletic “arena”) – is 
a notion most clearly articulated by Ahmed Naje in his blog “Wassaʿ Khayalak” (“Widen your 
Imagination”
106
).  Naje, who is also a novelist, literary journalist, and “historian” (muʾarrikh) of 
the Egyptian blogosphere, has often in his posts displayed the eccentricity, perversion, and 
tactical irony of a trickster – a posture expressed in the blog’s slogan, ʿīsh kaʾinnak tilʿab! (“Live 
as if you’re playing!”).  Liʿb, a term dropped sporadically by Naje but never explicitly given 
definition, would be both action and attitude, associated with equally elastic words like mutʿa 
(“pleasure”), fann (“art”), and khayāl (“imagination”), and contrasted unfavorably with malal 
(“boredom”), burjuwāziyya (“bourgeois/conventional lifestyle”), or even ʿaṭan (“putridness”) 
and ruṭūba (“humidity”) – in other words, the reigning affective states of Mubarak’s regime.  
The contrast between liʿb and the ordinary can also be understood as the contrast between ḥītān 
(“whales”) and ḥīṭān (“walls”), two metaphors that Naje often invokes but never explicitly 
juxtaposes: the former signifying a ludic, post-human freestyle, and the latter, dichotomous 
rigidities of all sorts.  None of this means that liʿb is merely frivolous; quite the contrary, it is 
invested with transgressive and transformative potential.  This message is delivered clearly by 
Naje in a post from July, 2006, refuting Hezbollah’s invocation of the word “resistance” 
(muqāwama) during its war with Israel.  “Resistance” for Hezbollah, as well as for many other 
Islamist and Arab nationalist movements, has been narrowly interpreted as only armed struggle.  
Naje responds: 
                                                 
105 See Al-Ghadeer (2011) on bloggers as fictional personas. 
106The phrase wassaʿ khayālak could also mean “widen your shadow,” i.e. “live large.” Naje also uses khayāl in the 




The mother that reads a story to her child: this is resistance [muqāwama].  Building a 
small house: this is resistance.  Singing at night is resistance.  Having sex is resistance.  
Resistance is not just bearing arms; it is also the ability to adhere to the virtue of play 
[faḍīlat al-liʿb] and to relentlessly pursue the pleasures of life. 
 
 
Play or liʿb, in other words, is posited as an alternative to armed resistance and ideological 
commitment – that is, politics (and aesthetics) by conventional means.  It unfolds as a release 
from grand narratives, while sticking out its tongue at those who take themselves too seriously.  
It also cuts ironically at itself, claiming the self-righteous status of “virtue” (faḍīla) that it can 
only pronounce with tongue in cheek. 
 Crucially, too, Naje’s writings give us a sense of how the blogosphere – the malʿab or 
“playground”
107
 – is “staked out” to use Huizinga’s words: it enjoys a kind of “sacred space, a 
temporarily real world of its own … expressly hedged off for it” (14).  This spatial work is often 
performed in reaction to external claims made on the blogosphere, usually by mainstream media 
pundits or politicians, as merely an appendage to conventional ideological battles and 
commitments.  Such was the case of an Al-Jazeera documentary produced on “Bloggers without 
Borders” in September, 2006.  To this, Naje responded: “Blogs have been able to enjoy a space 
of play [masāḥa min al-liʿb] free from the demands of politics and the media – this is, until Al-
Jazeera came out with this ‘bomb’ or fierce goosing [baʿbūṣ] for reasons that remain unclear.”  
This is not to deny that blogging can have any politics, or that play in al-malʿab is to be denied 
any transformative influence on the outside world.  Rather, this spatial independence is necessary 
to sustain the mood of “as if” in which different roles and scenarios for the present and future can 
be tried out, free from the constraints of society’s dominant myths and hegemonic seriousness.  
Nor does “staking out” such a space necessarily involve exclusion.  The few that are explicitly 
                                                 
107 See also Naje (2010: 30) for an explicit reference to the blogosphere as al-malʿab. 
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excluded – such as the nonagenarian journalist, former confidant of President Nasser, and current 
Al-Jazeera pundit Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal – are done so not on the basis of age or even 
technological illiteracy, but because of their inability to acknowledge or participate in the play 







From within this malʿab – the Egyptian blogosphere – the artists behind “Mubarak Mat” play 
with rumors of the president’s death.  This begins with a song of that name, to which we now 
turn.  Through a multi-layered musical parody, the artists perform a transgressive fiction, cutting 
down Mubarak’s myth of permanence while also laughing at the potential infelicity of their own 
performance.  The song opens with an announcement read by an exaggeratedly deep and slow 
male voice: 
 
 ayyuhā al-muwāṭinūn 
Citizens! 
laqad faqada al-waṭanu ragulan min ashgaʿ al-rigāl, ragulan min arṣan al-rigāl 
The nation has lost a man, one of the most courageous men, one of the strongest men, 
ragulan ʿurifa bi-mawāqifih, wa kāna bashar 
A man who was known for his positions, and was all but human. 
 
                                                 
108 In this corner of the Egyptian blogosphere, Haykal often features as a sort of viagrated dinosaur whose frequent 
pronouncements on blogging are helplessly out of touch with reality.  See, for example, any of Naje’s posts on 
Haykal (July 1, 2009; June, 18, 2011).  It is understood that Haykal, in any case, already enjoys his own “virtual 
playground” as performed in his numerous memories and books on modern Egyptian history, which are often 
criticized for their self-indulgent departure from reality. 
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Such is the high-register, grandiose rhetoric of state news broadcasts, forged in the radio 
announcements and communiques of the 1950s and dominant ever since, and whose tropic 
introduction was always ayyuhā al-muwāṭinūn, “O Citizens!”  But the resonance in this case is 
more specific.  These were the approximate words with which Anwar Sadat somberly announced 
to the nation the sudden passing of President Nasser on September 28, 1970.  “Mubarak Mat” 
parodies this memorable broadcast for an obvious effect: the legendary figure of Nasser towers 
over the rather mediocre Mubarak; it is a juxtaposition often performed in popular jokes.
109
  
Mubarak’s ineloquence, grammatical mistakes, lack of a redeeming ideological vision like Arab 
nationalism or anti-imperialism, and failure to leave his developmental imprint on Egypt, are the 
most oft-cited marks of his ineffectual leadership, indeed personal blandness, when compared to 
his predecessors.  The song brings these contrasts into relief by mimicking the form of the 
famous announcement made in 1970.  
The Sadat-like voice continues, announcing the closure of the many public buildings and 
foundations that bear the president’s name, before adding that sa-yakhlufu mubārak mubārak 
(“Mubarak will succeed Mubarak”) – a confirmation of the popular fear that the president’s son 
Gamal was being groomed to replace him.  Next, a hiss of static transitions to the voices of the 
three musicians who take over for the remainder of the song.  The lead singer, accompanied by 
banjo and harmonica, begins: 
 
 mubārak māt, mubārak māt 
 Mubarak has died, Mubarak has died 
 ʾākhir khabar fi r-rādiyuhāt 
                                                 
109 Nasser had defiantly said to the forces of colonialism, “Choke on your own rage.” Sadat had famously said, “I 
am prepared to speak in the Knesset.”  Mubarak had famously said, “Present, sir,” when called upon at his trial. 
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 The latest news on the radio 
 wa fi sh-shawāriʿ wa l-maṣāniʿ wa l-ḥawāri wa l-bārāt 
 And in the streets, and the factories, and the alleys, and the bars 
 mubārak māt 
Mubarak has died 
 
For those familiar with Egyptian popular music, these lines are instantly recognizable as a tip of 
the hat to the song “Jifara Mat” (“Guevara Has Died”), written by popular poet Ahmad Fuʾad 
Nigm (b. 1929) and performed by singer Shaykh Imam (1918-1995) in the late 1960s.  Again, 
the death of Mubarak is juxtaposed ironically with the death of a great political and culture 
legend – here it is Che Guevara who, like Nasser, was for millions truly a figure to be mourned.  
Next to the lionized revolutionary, the president – complicit, according to popular opinion, in 
neo-liberal and imperialist schemes – comes off as a pathetic competitor for popular grief.  Yet 
while both these opening parodies conspire to degrade Mubarak’s stature through comparison 
with a grander deceased figure, they differ in one very important aspect: the figure of the 
mourner.  The duo Nigm and Imam, with their history of opposition to political and cultural 
authoritarianism in Egypt, are an unlikely pair to be lamenting the president, and their invocation 
here departs far into the absurd.  But the parodic positioning of Sadat as Mubarak’s mourner, 
while anachronistic, is at least a plausible scenario: one might very well expect a dictator to 
mourn a dictator.  It would be a truly dark scenario, and it is not difficult to catch the cynicism 
about the post-Mubarak period spoken in these lines.  It would appear that after nearly a half-
century of political and ideological evolution around the world, and decades of linguistic and 
cultural innovation such as the very performances of these bloggers, the state has nonetheless 
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chugged along with the same register of Arabic, the same forms of address, and the same modes 
and genres of communication it has used since the days of radio and print.  Despite the death of 
Mubarak, the old monotony of the regime – transparently hollow and lacking in signification for 
a new generation who is the majority – continues as if nothing had happened.  There is no 
recognition that the address ayyuhā al-muwāṭinūn has long failed to “hail,” in the classic 
Althusserian sense, any real citizen subjects.  And just as language has not changed, so has the 
structure of dictatorship remained firmly in place.  Another patriarch, disingenuous in his 
expression of grief, is set to take over the radio waves as well as the presidential palace. 
 This apparent bleakness, however, does not vitiate the ludic charge of “Mubarak Mat”: 
the song is more carnival than commiseration, and proceeds with a decidedly optimistic attitude 
towards a future unwritten, and hurried forward.  Allusions to Sadat’s announcement and “Jifara 
Mat” need not be linked to cynicism and closed horizons.  Fundamentally, they are anchors 
thrown to the familiar, attempts made to imagine the death of Mubarak and its aftermath by 
playing with some of the most significant cultural texts of the last half century.  The fact that 
these anchors do not exactly catch – indeed, they contrast humorously, as we have seen – leaves 
the future uncertain, and open to more play, to liʿb.  Simply – or not so simply – by treading 
these open waters, the players are transgressing Mubarak’s myth of permanence, and daring to 
speculate on what comes next. 
 The daring look forward is also implicit in the adaptation of “Jifara Mat,” not for its 
melancholic content, but for the work of its artists.  The parody is at once a nostalgic homage to 
the joint aesthetic and political project of Ahmad Fuʾad Nigm and Shaykh Imam, and a 
reactivation of this project for the present.  A shaʿbī (“popular class”) and often vulgar 
performance team who were shunned by state cultural institutions and imprisoned for their 
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controversial lyrics, the two gave expression to the angst of impoverished masses while also 
drawing on themes from national and international politics, such as the struggle and death of Che 
Guevara, that appealed to students and intellectuals.  As Marilyn Booth has argued, Nigm and 
Imam “[brought] together students, workers and other activists through an aesthetic presence that 
remains symbolically potent even now” (2008: 19). In the context of the strikes in the cities of 
the Delta, “Mubarak Mat” remembers fondly the artistic mediation of alliances past, and seems 
to ask whether the current solidarity of online activists and artists with the workers of Al-
Mahalla Al-Kubra will prove to be similarly legendary. 
 The parodic refrain is then interrupted with a bitter and partially untranslatable protest: 
 
yā ʿamm aḥḥa di ishāʿāt 
A7a, man!  That’s just a bunch of rumors! 
wi ʾinn kāt bi-gadd kānit il-arḍ ithazzit 
If it were for real, the earth would quake 
 
The word aḥḥa is a vulgar ejaculation, approximate to “damn it!” but ultimately best left 
untranslated: I render it here as “a7a” to preserve its association with a particular context of use, 
namely social networking sites and text messages, where “7” is often substituted for the Arabic 
letter ḥāʾ ( ح)  as a result of the English default on most electronic devices.  “A7a” is “vulgar,” 
though because of its high frequency of use in youth slang, the sense of revulsion and moral 
offense it produces in more general audiences may be less pronounced.  It here signals the sour 
disappointment that the rumors are not true, and the sense of having been duped, of having let 
one’s guard down against false news.  This ejaculation also follows in the parody of the “Jifara 
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Mat.”  In that song, the latent emotive ejaculation with which many of the lyrics trailed off was 
āh, a mournful sigh; āh has now become a7a to reflect a new generation’s most frequent reaction 
to adverse circumstances.  The generation which collectively performs this song does not mourn 
its unfortunate circumstances with the traditional melancholy of rithāʾ or elegy.  Instead, in the 
face of Mubarak’s continued reign and his monotonous presence, these singers throw up a 
common vulgarity deployed most often against bad jokes, infelicitous performances, and 
everyday disturbances like traffic jams, failed ignitions, and lost flip-flops.  Mubarak’s 
permanence, once divine, has been taken down to the level of a common nuisance, so that it may 
be endured for just a little longer.  Or rather, it is exposed as no sort of permanence at all, merely 
an unfortunate roadblock soon to be dismantled. 
 The remainder of the song is dedicated to a further exposure of this myth of permanence.  
One of the singers exclaims: 
 
w-ana illi kunt fākir innū ha-yifḍal mawgūd ʿala ṭūl 
And I had thought he would be here forever 
 ṭab mish tiʾūl inn in-nās di bitmūt! 
 You can’t imagine such people could die! 
d-ana min sāʿit m-ana mawlūd 
Since the day I was born 
fī ḥāgtēn sabtīn ma-yitghayyarūsh 
There are two fundamental things that never change 
rabbina, wa-l-qāʾid al-aʿlā li l-guyūsh! 




In a tone of mock disbelief, these lines echo the comment in Ibrahim ʿIsa’s novel that most 
Egyptians “could simply not imagine” the world without Mubarak.  The song returns to the 
chorus – the Nigm-Imam parody – and back again to similar comments that mock the president’s 
permanence and robust health:  “He said the Respected Sir was tough as a horse!” (ʾāl il-bāsha 
salīm wi zayy il-ḥiṣān).  “Suzy” Mubarak – the First Lady – also makes a brief appearance, being 
quoted as saying that the president “did a ‘super supreme’ with me” (ʿamal maʿāya wāḥid kida 
… ṣubir ṣubrīm!) – a tacky euphemism, borrowed from fast food menus, for sexual prowess.  
Such barbs follow through with the thorough trouncing of the president, demystifying his 
exercise of power through the hyperbolic repetition of its own terms, and rendering his body 
human through the exposure of his common reproductive functions.  
The transgressive thrust of “Mubarak Mat” is not exhausted by its lyrics, but is played out 
too in the very structure of the song with its series of “noisy” interferences.  In the beginning is 
the official broadcast.  This is interrupted by radio static (parasite) giving way to the Nigm-
Imam parody. This parody, too, is then interrupted by a discordant ejaculation of a7a, giving way 
to a charivari of youthful colloquialisms, sexual metaphors, caricatures, ventriloquisms, and 
several quips that remain inaudible.  In this way, the song is broken up into three stylistic 
segments.  The interruption between the first two segments – that is, between the official 
broadcast and the Nigm-Imam rendition – quite audibly mimics the performance’s own 
relationship to authority.  That is, it replays the noise – the confusion and interference – that the 
rumors present to the regime: they interrupt its main signal, or Mubarak’s myth of permanence, 
sending it off course.  The ayyuhā al-muwāṭinūn of the introduction fails to gather up its 
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intended receivers, the high-register language is rendered obsolete, and voices of dissent break in 
to sing their own message.  Sadat’s statement to the nation is upended by the popular duo. 
 How, then, might we read the second interruption, the a7a, which comes between the 
Nigm-Imam rendition and the open commentary of the three singers?  That is, what function are 
we to assign this instance of noise?  We might do well here to take seriously Michel Serres’s 
aphorism about the parasite: he is the one who “has the last word, who produces disorder and 
generates a different order” (1982: 15).  The “victorious” parasite, for Serres, has the last word, 
that is, he is the final interruption in a sequence of interruptions: “the one in the last position 
wins the game” (13).  In his more optimistic moments, Serres proclaims that the result of the 
noise is an evolution in the order of things – indeed, a satisfactory improvement in a 
fundamentally unstable, noisy system.  It is progress; an interpretation which takes Serres’s 
proclamation to heart would read a similar move forward in the series of jolts that breaks up 
“Mubarak Mat” into three segments.  Segment 1: the once authoritative, but now hollow and 
obsolete, form of radio broadcast, is parasited by Segment 2: the counter-cultural, but by now 
canonized – even quaint – Nigm-Imam phenomenon, which is parasited by Segment 3: the 
improvised musical sketch in the playground of the Egyptian blogosphere.  Each segment gives 
way to a more innovative one, in a noisy evolution from master to intruder, where “the one in the 
last position wins the game” and generates a new game, a different play on art and politics.  In 
this progression of three segments, we follow the major reconfigurations of technology and 
power in Egypt over the last 60 years, from radio’s prominence in the 1950s and 1960s (“The 
Voice of the Arabs,” etc.), to the mix of electronic and oral forms of the 1970s, to, finally, the 
walls, reels, texts and frames of cyberspace.  Each of these forms has left its mark, and at its 
height claimed to define resistance (muqāwama), only to be overcome by the next form.  The 
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three-segment progression also precisely exhibits the gradual defeat of monologism, moving 
from the single, authoritarian voice of Segment 1, to the twin voices of the Nigm-Imam duo in 
Segment 2, and finally, to the three voices of Butrus, Bulus, and Maria in Segment 3.  The 
victorious third parasite in fact inaugurates an indeterminate explosion of discourse, adopted and 
reworked by other players in the blogosphere.  The victory of this “parasite,” which has the last 
word(s), is the victory of “play.”  Our two concepts thus perform a comparable function:  each is 
the acting out of a new scenario, a new order, through free movement or chaos.  Segment 3 has 
interfered (produced noise) and triumphed, just as the playing of a post-Mubarak future has 
asserted itself over the president’s myth of permanence. 
Listening to “Mubarak Mat” in this way – as a sequence of 1, 2, 3 – obviously assumes a 
simplistic linearity of movement.  But an important qualification must be made.  While Segment 
1 – the official broadcast – introduces the song and never repeats (it is interrupted, and stops), 
Segments 2 and 3 in fact alternate with each other.  It is thus not accurate to claim that the Imam-
Nigm parody is overcome or rendered obsolete by a victorious carnival of a7a and insults.  
Rather than interpreting the song’s structure as a victorious progression of noise, it is more 
suitable to posit a playful alternation between the final two segments.  The alternation is between 
the Imam-Nigm parody (Segment 2) – an attempt, as I have argued above, to imagine the 
president’s passing – and the series of quips and barbs (Segment 3), which both celebrates the 
passing, but also doubts the veracity of the news (“A7a, man! That’s just a bunch of rumors”).  
Neither segment truly displaces the other; instead, through this vacillation between two styles, 
the song manages to communicate a disorienting ambivalence, to entertain uncertainty, and leave 
the stage open for more play.  These final two segments are only two possible reactions to an 
imagined future, and neither takes itself entirely seriously. 
225 
 
The last word, in any case, is an elated “mubārak māt!” – reaffirming the collective wish, 
the “as if,” which is the song’s overriding mode and message.  With the end of the song, 
however, its subjunctive repetition of the rumors would continue, echoing through a number of 
other digital forms.  Several other bloggers would also “play” “Mubarak Mat” in Barthes’s sense 
– they would interpret its text in their own medium, as one “interprets” a song by replaying it on 
a different instrument (1989: 62-63).  These further interpretations – including those by Ahmed 
Naje and Muhammad Gaber, to which we now turn – would extend the ludic atmosphere 
performed by Butrus, Bulus, and Maria, supplying it with new acts and actors.  By “playing 
along,” these bloggers sustain the subversive stretch of imagination drawn from the chain of 




One of the first bloggers to catch on to the contagious chorus of Mubārak Māt was Ahmed 
Naje.
110
  Entitled “The Official Song of May 4: Mubārak Māt … Let’s Sing Along Everyone!”, 
Naje’s post on April 19
th
 contributes with a parodic profile of each of the song’s performers: the 
pseudonymous trio Butrus, Bulus, and Maria.  May 4, we will recall, would be Mubarak’s 
eightieth birthday – a day for which some activists had called a general strike to reignite the 
protests extinguished earlier in the month in the Delta.  Neither the protests of early April, nor 
the would-be strike of May 4, 2008, were deemed to have succeeded in the short term – and yet, 
as I have argued above, they provided the opportunity for unprecedented expressions of dissent, 
and stoked aspirations for revolution both aesthetic and political.  It is to these aspirations, and 
                                                 
110 Naje’s relation to “play” is also performed in his occasional online moniker “Bisu.” Bisu is a pseudo-diminutive 
form of iblīs (“Satan”), the original trickster.  Perhaps iblīs is also i-bliss: “i” (for Internet) or the self, a common 
suffix for digital devices (i-pod, i-phone, i-pad); and “bliss” or jouissance, the Barthesian pleasure of the reader’s 
play with the text. 
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the embattled optimism from which they emerged, that Naje p(l)ays tribute in his profile of the 
three musicians.  
 “Maria,” writes Naje, is a “bright flame of zeal and patriotism,” who is reported to have 
chanted “Down with Mubarak!” (yasqut yasqut husnī mubārak) in Tahrir Square – this at a time 
when such displays of dissent, engaged by several dozen at the most, would be encircled and 
muzzled by police in a matter of minutes.  The emphatic consonants /ṭ/ and /ḥ/ are graphically 
omitted in Maria’s chant, replaced with their non-emphatic counterparts /t/ and /h/; this betrays a 
degree of either immaturity or youthfulness, privilege or innocence, that contrasts sharply with 
the boldness of the act.  “Bulus,” according to Naje, is responsible for a number of “operations” 
no less legendary.  His most famous was known as “Operation Mangy Cat,” in which he is 
alleged to have hacked the audio recording archives of State Security – Egypt’s notorious secret 
police.  “Butrus,” finally, is identified as an “international terrorist” equipped with a potent 
“voice rifle.”  A master of disguise, he is pursued by intelligence agencies around the world.  All 
three subversives are associated with the terrorist “Organization of 30 February” – in reality an 
amorphous association of bloggers and activists whose real-world, nonviolent battles with the 
police and security services have been sympathetically parodied by Naje and others over the last 
half-decade.  In the comments section below the post, fellow bloggers play along with the 
author’s facetious criminal profiling.  “A Coptic conspiracy!” declares the first commentator, to 
whom Naje responds: “No, sir, these ain’t no Copts.  They’re Jewish members of Hamas 
planning to overthrow the regime.”  And so goes the liʿb. 
 The labels and images that Naje and the commentators deploy in their caricatures of 
Bulus, Butrus, and Maria come from a familiar source.  They are drawn from the stock of 
accusations that the Egyptian regime has, since the 1950s, leveled at its enemies, whether foreign 
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armies, alleged spies, or domestic journalists – invariably characterized as conspirators, 
terrorists, and agitators.  It is the same paranoid language that Egyptian security officials have 
deployed more recently to interpret the activities of bloggers, even those who, like the artists 
behind “Mubarak Mat,” are “just playing.” By so effortlessly speaking in this language, and by 
pointing to its frequent contradictions – the Jewish members of Hamas, for example – Naje and 
fellow bloggers expose its senselessness.  They mock the regime’s inability to understand what 
goes on in the malʿab – in fact, one of the common characteristics of “play” of this sort is that it 
refuses to be understood, that it denies understanding to outsiders, to those who do not play 
along.
111
  Actually, what Naje mocks so successfully in this post is the very “plot theory” of 
rumors.  The dominant interpretive practice of mukāfaḥat al-shāʾiʿāt (“combating rumors”), the 
plot theory, which I analyzed at length in Part 1, posits a conspiracy of identifiable agents behind 
every case of anonymous noise.  The song “Mubarak Mat,” as a semi-anonymous string of 
rumors, incites practitioners of this theory to search frantically for a responsible agent, diagnose 
his motives, and produce him before a judging audience.  Anticipating and ridiculing such a 
response, Naje performs the complete analysis by himself in his brief post. 
The purpose of these profiles – Naje’s “play” or “interpretation” of the rumor-song – is 
not simply to mock a dominant interpretive practice and its common vocabulary, but also to 
laugh both with and at the so-called “Butrus, Bulus, and Maria.”  The “bad ass” labels 
(“terrorist,” etc.) and superhero-like adventures (or “operations”) assigned to the three are key 
elements in the aesthetic of character work, laced with insider humor, which is meant ultimately 
for consumption within the malʿab of this corner of the Egyptian blogosphere.  Naje laughs with 
the musicians, performing a tribute to their artistic genius by playfully inserting background 
                                                 
111 For example, Hebdige’s seminal book on subcultures concludes by noting the resistance of such forms to outside 
analysis, submitting that “the sociologists and the interested straights … threaten to kill with kindness the forms 
[they] seek to elucidate” (1979: 139). 
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details.  He laughs at them in the same way, as one must note the stark contrast between the fame 
and influence of “real” terrorists on the one hand, and the improvised song of a few amateur 
musicians.  The latter, it would seem, are just playing.  But this is not dismiss them as frivolous 
and irrelevant; rather, it is a stroke of self-reflexivity imbedded within the play.  We can say, in 
other words, that Naje’s laughing at is the self-effacing admission that liʿb is not real, but this 
does not deny the optimism inherent in the laughing with.  A hope remains, that in this play, a 
real act of transgression, and transformation, is actually being performed.  The possibility of 
influence, in the end, is not to be denied to this song, even if it would seem to make a laughable 
comparison to “real” terrorism. 
Ahmed Naje’s post closes by proclaiming “Mubarak Mat” “the official song of May 4”: 
“Participate in the strike or don’t participate, wear black or don’t wear black, but sing and listen 
to ‘Mubarak Mat.’  Sing with all your heart!”  The elation of the song, its affective charge, 
jingles forth; regardless of ideology and independent of any real political commitment, it calls 
upon more actors to join in the play.
112
  By now we, too, are singing “Mubarak Mat.”  And so 
goes the liʿb, even as May 4 comes and goes.  The form circulates through virtual paths easily 
traced by the hyperlinks provided in each post, but at each relay it does not remain the same. It is 
contaminated by the accent of each artist, interpreted, refigured, stymied, reinvigorated.  It is 
parasited, and it parasites.  It cannot remain fixed in a musical genre alone, and its transgeneric 
movement is demonstrated by the next rumor player, Mohamed Gaber. 
On May 6, after the protests in the Delta had dissipated and two days after the president’s 
birthday, blogger and graphic artist Mohamed Gaber created his own interpretative play on the 
song.  Gaber – whose online aliases include Guebara (a blend of his name with that of Che 
Guevara) and Yasari Masri (“Leftist Egyptian”) – is a major personality in the Egyptian 
                                                 
112 “Rumor is a pipe / … The still-discordant wav’ring multitude / Can play upon it.” Henry IV, Part 2. 
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blogosphere, and has since become known as graphic director for the blog-to-print magazine 
Wasla and for his production of a wide range of revolutionary paraphernalia seen often in Tahrir 
Square.
113
  In the malʿab, it may be said that he runs close to both Hossam el-Hamalawy’s 
“3arabawy” and Ahmed Naje’s “Wassaʿ Khayalak.”  Like the former, he cultivates a decidedly 
Marxist-Leninist persona, but with a more ironical stance; like the latter, and like Butrus, Bulus, 
and Maria, he has alleged links to the Organization of 30 February.  The image I discuss here 
plays along with the rumors of the president’s death and their musical rendition, linking to the 
chain another ring of sarcasm, ambivalence, and noise. 
Published on Guebara’s Flickr account, the image “interprets” “Mubarak Mat” in a visual 
idiom, superimposing graffiti-like slogans on a smoke-stained or oil-soaked background.  In the 
lower-left hand corner lurks a faded newspaper photograph of President Mubarak with mouth 
open and right hand raised, which holds a pen and points, as if he is lecturing pedantically or 
giving orders.  Over this photograph are scribbled the twin phrases mubārak māt and aḥḥa yaʿnī 
(“like a7a”), which graphically reproduce the song’s most striking lines.  Rendered in black-and-
white halftone, this photograph, we can tell, comes from a newspaper.  The words mubārak māt, 
then, must be kalām garāyid or “newspaper talk”: Egyptian slang for a story that no one in their 
right mind should believe.  It is rumor; we judge it false, but wish or behave as if it were true.  
The “a7a” here again registers how fed-up an entire generation is with Mubarak, and the reigning 
affective state of khanʾa; the “yaʿni” casts a tentative “as if” over the canvas, and marks the a7a 
as a quotation of a previous utterance – it is something which is repeated, and will be repeated, as 
a gut response to a collective (lack of) stimulus.  “a7a yaʿni”: the man in the picture emits a 
drone that is equally dull and oppressive, a noise that must be interrupted, parasited, by a chorus  
                                                 




















of a7as.  The sensation is translated into a political register in the upper-left hand corner, in the 
phrase yasquṭ yasquṭ..! (“Down with…!”), a common slogan shouted at this time by the masses 
of demonstrators in Al-Mahalla Al-Kubra, and by smaller numbers in downtown Cairo 
(including the so-called “Maria”).The impatience of millions, and their readiness for relief, finds 
as many ways to express itself.  One of these materializes in the image’s lower-right hand corner, 
in the phrase kifāya / mūt baʾa..!!! (“Enough! Die already!”). “Enough” (kifāya) is also the 
moniker of the “Egyptian Movement for Change,” an alliance of artists and intellectuals formed 
in 2004 in opposition to the Mubarak’s re-election bid and the planned succession of his son to 
the office.  The group, while fledgling at this time and losing out in media coverage to “internet 
                                                 
114 Available at: http://www.flickr.com/photos/yasary-masry/2471467732/. 
231 
 
savvy” coalitions like The Youth of 6 April, nonetheless remains an important icon of resistance 
to the person of the president and his regime.  Mūt (“Die!”) is a direct verbal assault on 
Mubarak’s myth of permanence, with a perlocutionary edge as sharp as Ibrahim ʿIsa’s novel, The 
Murder of the Big Man.  It is a command, and since kifāya / mūt baʾa..!!! is the only phrase in 
Guebara’s image produced in type (the rest are splashed or sprayed as graffiti), it would seem, 
ironically, to match the commanding pose and newspaper photograph of Mubarak himself.  
Through this cunning act of ventriloquism, the artist renders the president not only suicidal, but 
already dead, as the subject is split from his discursive authority, subject instead to his own 
“subjects” and their collective wish.  This is the force of rumor as we have seen in previous 
chapters: it is potently ventriloquistic, a parasite forcing its victims to say things against their 
individual will.  Finally, in the upper-right hand corner is splashed a red hammer-and-sickle, 
Guebara’s insignia.  This is not the fixed icon of a rigid Marxist ideology; rather, it should be 
interpreted in terms of what Barthes called the “third meaning”: an aura of contextually activated 
associations, locally construed, and homologous to the other signs and inscriptions installed in 
the image.  Hammer-and-sickle does not mean “Marxist,” but “anti-Mubarakness,” “resistance,” 
“international solidarity,” “modernity,” and even “play.”  On top of the hammer-and-sickle is 
scribbled the phrase mubārak ḥayy lā yamūt (“Mubarak lives, He does not die”), a parody of the 
phrase allāh ḥayy lā yamūt (“God lives, He does not die”), originally spoken by Abu Bakr, the 
father-in-law of the Prophet Muhammad, upon the latter’s death.  Mocking the deification of the 
president and his myth of permanence, the phrase also rests awkwardly over the artist’s insignia.  
It is possible that the unwitting imposition of such words upon the very sign they contradict 
points to the unruliness of rumor as a tool of resistance.  The artist-rumormonger, and not only 
232 
 
the president, has been made to say things he does not intend.  “Mubarak lives” over and above 
those who resist. 
 With these mixed signals – graffiti announcing Mubarak’s death, and other inscriptions 
declaring his immortality – Guebara’s image translates graphically the same uncertainty and 
ambivalence played by the original song.  And yet, also like the song, its transgressive force lies 
precisely in its pushing at the boundaries of the real beyond the presence of Mubarak, in addition 
to its insistence on a solid, if muddied, optimism.  With Guebara, the rumor-play gains a visual 
dimension that, despite its “virtuality,” prepares for and presages a post-Mubarak real.  Indeed 
many of the artist’s other designs were already being spray-painted on “real” walls in Cairo and 
Alexan dria, before going viral on t-shirts and urban spaces during the 18 days that sealed 
Mubarak’s fall.  The viewer laughs at the image’s multiple jabs at a dominant myth, and perhaps 
flips by after a few seconds – but even in the brevity of a passing click, there flashes a certain 





Gaber’s image, and the song it visualized, would have their hopes delayed when Mubarak 
survived the protests of April and May 2008 to enjoy nearly two more years of perfect health.  
However, in early March, 2010, rumors of the president’s death erupted again after he had 
suddenly taken ill during a visit to Germany.  Speculation swirled in and out of Heidelberg 
University Hospital concerning the octogenarian’s health, and it was eventually revealed that he 
had undergone an operation for the removal of the gall bladder and a duodenal polyp: in this 
context, “Mubarak Mat” would gain new life in cyberspace.  On March 12, Mohamed Gaber 
founded a Facebook page with the title “Mubarak Mat” to channel rumors and every manner of 
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gossip and innuendo about the president’s health.  The page’s profile image is a stylized black-
and-white image of a silent Mubarak, with the black ribbon of martyrdom in the upper-left hand 
corner; its official description is simply sa-yakhlufu mubārak mubārak (“Mubarak will succeed 
Mubarak”), and the “contact information” provides a link to the 2008 song.  Other Facebook 
groups with similar titles and varying degrees of participation would also funnel these 
explorations in the subjunctive, playing along with the possible. 
 In this section, I have argued for a particular affirmative function of rumors, namely, their 
use as experimental fictions on their way to becoming fact.  I have found insights from the study 
of “play” or liʿb useful in capturing the particular epistemic modality with which certain bloggers 
engaged rumors of President Mubarak’s death beginning in 2008.  First, play has allowed me to 
situate these performances in relation to a space – the malʿab of the Egyptian blogosphere – 
where its attitude and stylistic register can be maintained and shared by loosely affiliated players.  
The emphasis on space, however, is not to impose artificial limits, but to reach at a more viable 
or local sense of location that broader labels like “cyberspace” or “the Arab Internet” can deliver.  
Second, I have stressed the notion that while play is not “real” in any strict sense – I have called 
it, following Turner, “subjunctive” – those so engaged recognize their departure from reality by 
adopting a self-critical attitude.  Thus it should be distinguished from the more self-serious 
fictions of Mubarak’s permanence and legitimacy, as well as what Hossam el-Hamalawy has 
called “cyber-fantasies” – a distinction the latter also acknowledges in the song “Mubarak Mat,” 
which he posted and celebrated (indeed, played with) on his own blog.  The strain of rumors that 
I have analyzed here are not simple fictions; rather, they are playful, enabling fictions with a 
critical and transformative edge.  While I have often alluded to this transformative potential of 
the “Mubarak Mat” players, I find it necessary to elaborate on it further by way of conclusion. 
234 
 
 Against the dominant myth of Mubarak’s permanence, these performances of 
rumormongering cut into the fabric of apparent reality to assert alternatives.  This play entails, on 
the one hand, a thorough exposure of the myth’s absurdity, whether by noisily interrupting its 
delivery, mocking the president’s sexual fitness, or parodying familiar slogans.  It also involves 
fishing around for possible scenarios, whether these are drawn from the resonant texts of radio 
and television, or cobbled together in more subtle combinations of insider humor.  In this way, 
mental maps are prepared for the future, and the “as if” is brought closer to the “may be” or even 
“is.”  But beyond this, I am arguing that “Mubarak Mat” manages to enact the scenario it 
proposes by engendering an absorbing, repeatedly renewed set of aesthetic practices and 
affective states.  To the extent that “Mubarak’s permanence” imposes a pervasive sense of 
khanʾa and waqf, the collective play of Butrus, Bulus, Maria, and others effectively assassinates 
the president and what he stands for.  Through the movement of these rumor-plays, a release into 
carnival is performed and lived out, rendering the signs of the president’s presence greatly 
reduced, if not totally expunged from the realm of consequences.  If the man himself remains 
alive, these innovative spasms of art nonetheless enable a tangible sense of his death.  This sense 
is sustained and deepened – unlike Ibrahim ʿIsa’s single, if repeated, writerly transgression – 
through multiple genres and expressive media.  The writing of a post-Mubarak Egypt is on the 
wall, accompanied by its theme song and graphic propaganda. 
 Some qualifications, however, must be made.  Counter-cultural forms, as I have 
discussed above, are haunted by the potential of complicity with the signs of domination they 
apparently contest.  It is easy to see how “Mubarak” could fall prey to such accusations: its very 
repetition of the president’s myths and iconography re-inscribes him at the center of power, even 
if the intention is for him to be de-centered and disempowered.  Butrus, Bulus, and Maria are, 
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after all, those who would, according to Christian tradition, witness the resurrection of a divine 
figure, as much as his death.  The artists could have ignored Mubarak altogether, and thus 
maintained the malʿab as a “space distant from politics” as Ahmed Naje had once called it.  
While it should be clear from my discussion above that I do not share such concerns of 
complicity – my analysis has favored overwhelmingly the transgressive nature of “Mubarak” – it 
is necessary to keep them in mind; I shall return to discuss them in the conclusion to the 
following chapter, where I expand on the problems inherent in scholarly euphoria about blogging 






































In the previous chapter, humor or play was shown to lubricate and expand the pathways of 
rumor.  In this chapter, I investigate the ways in which humor of a comparable sort is deployed 
against it.  I move now to revolutionary Egypt, as the parasite analyzed in the previous chapter 
proved to be “victorious,” and the scenario it proposed virtually came into play on the ground.  It 
was, in turn, to find itself chased by parasite from the opposite direction.  Revolutions thrust 
consumers and producers of mass media into a kind of epistemic fog conducive to the breeding 
of rumors.  This was the case with the July Revolution in 1952, and the Revolution of 25 January 
has been no different.  The appearance in public life of dark horse personalities like Wael 
Ghonim, the generals of SCAF, and ʿAbd al-Munʿim Abu al-Futuh; the signs and slogans of new 
social and political groupings; the roaming of criminal elements like al-balṭagiyya (“thugs” hired 
by counter-revolutionary forces) and al-mulaththamīn (“masked men” held responsible for acts 
of gas-pipeline sabotage); and of course the still uncertain health of the former president: all of 
these have become ready topics of rumor, speculation, and conspiracy theory.  As always, many 
of these stories are of unknown origin; however, a number of tales about foreign plots or the 
treachery of the revolutionaries could be traced to media representatives of the counter-
revolution, and members of SCAF.  Not long after these rumors appeared, artists in cyberspace 
sympathetic to the revolution retaliated with colorful “flirtations” of a different kind.  Here I 
analyze the YouTube videos of cartoonist and animator Ashraf Hamdi which parody the rumors 
and conspiracy theories about Google manager Wael Ghonim and other youth activists.  
Engaging previous scholarship on the aesthetics and politics of parody (Dentith 2000; Genette 
1997; Hutcheon 1987, 1994, 2000; Rose 1993), I focus on these videos’ evaluative stance to 
237 
 
understand how they simultaneously critique and play with the rumors to which they refer.  I will 
also examine the interpretive difficulties involved in Hamdi’s use of parody, and how, in 
Hutcheon’s words, it has been prone to many “misfirings.”   
The significance of this chapter cannot be missed when compared to Part 1 of my 
dissertation.  Parodies like those designed by Ashraf Hamdi – there have been others – provide 
an alternative strategy to the violent rhetorical and disciplinary practices pursued by the regime 
under the pretext of “combating rumors.”  While false accusations, campaigns of distortion, and 
parasitic “noise” are as potentially destructive for the democratic agenda of the young 
revolutionaries as they are for the authoritarian regime they oppose, the former respond with an 
altogether different rhetoric.  This new rhetoric, I argue, is able to remain inclusive while 
retaining its critical edge.  Although it exposes the artificiality, even “stupidity” of the rumors 
and implicitly chastises their agents and transmitters, there is an important qualification.  
Through playful imitation, the artists are able to salvage a form of pleasure from the parodied 
rumors.  In this way, we might say that parody offers a way of symbolically “incorporating the 
parasite,” not only living with the noise but including it in one’s own work, playing with it, and 
evolving into a new configuration of the aesthetic and the political: revolutionary art that accepts 
its “other” as a partner in play.  Such transformations as occur, of course, depend upon a 
felicitous reception of the image’s rhetoric, lest it, too, dissolve into just so much noise. 
 
Intertexts: Rumors between Revolution and Counterrevolution 
 
 
On July 24, 2011, General Hasan al-Ruwayni made a confession.  A member of the Supreme 
Council of the Armed Forces or SCAF (Egypt’s de facto governing body since the ousting of 
President Husni Mubarak in February), al-Ruwayni had telephoned into a talk show on the 
238 
 
commercial television station “Dream 2” to discuss the events of the previous day, when a 
peaceful march on army headquarters in Cairo had been repelled by violence.  Dismissing the 
demonstrators as misled, even treasonous, the general maintained that behind all this commotion 
was what he called “a most dangerous tool”: al-ishāʿa, the rumor.  Someone overhead someone 
talking about atrocities committed by the army in the northern port city of Ismailiyya.  He told a 
friend, and that friend told two, who told four, who told thirty-nine, and so on.  Such is the nature 
of the revolutionary crowd, willing to believe anything, that it can be whipped into frenzy at any 
moment.  Then al-Ruwayni said something unexpected:  
 
I know the effect that rumor has in a crowd ... I myself spread rumors in Tahrir Square, 
when I wanted to calm them down.  I spread a rumor that Ahmad ʿIzz had been arrested 
... and that the Justice Minister had been arrested ... that their demands had been met.  
And the square would go quiet!  I know the effect that rumor has in revolutionary 





Rumors are bad, but I am also “bad,” he seemed to be saying.  The television host smiled (she 
laughed, and was fired several days later).  The Egyptian Twittersphere lit up, and the general’s 
minute-and-a-half boast made its way around YouTube.  “Al-Ruwayni admits to spreading 
rumors and manipulating the revolutionaries”; “Al-Ruwayni: I am the source of the rumors”; and 
similar captions jeered at the general’s bald hypocrisy.
116
   
 Al-Ruwayni’s sexually charged boast struck a particularly resonant chord in a political 
context of increasing complexity and confusion.  Since the beginning of the revolution on 
January 25, 2011, revolutionaries and counter-revolutionaries alike have struggled to navigate 
their way through a public sphere spinning with all manner of rumors.  The predicament is 
captured in similar statements repeated by pundits in private and state-owned media.  “Egypt has 
                                                 
115 Available at: http://www.YouTube.com/watch?v=JUYDlKx9k1k&feature=related.  
116 For more on General Ruwayni and his relation to rumors, see the Facebook page il-ruwēni mish bitāʿ 
sandiwitshāt, il-ruwēni bitāʿ ishāʿāt (“Ruwayni makes rumors, not sandwiches”). 
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become a prime market for rumors since the revolution,” declared the host of a program 
dedicated to the issue on the state-owned Nile TV in June, 2011.  “Have we become a people 
addicted to rumors?” she went on to ask; her guest, a professor of political sociology, declared 
that the rule of law had been replaced by the “rule of rumors” (sharʿiyyat al-shāʾiʿāt).
117
  To 
understand how this perception has been reinforced since January, 2011, it is necessary to review 
some of the loudest rumors of the period, investigate the context of their emergence, and take 
account of the “noise” they have produced.  This will allow us to understand, in turn, the threat 
that rumors have presented to the major ideals and personalities of the revolution, and prepare us 
to analyze the particular modes of response deployed by revolutionary artists. 
 The noisiest of the revolution’s ishāʿāt may be divided into two basic types.  Those of the 
first type would seem to lack an identifiable author or agenda, emerging rather at the confluence 
of local stories, attitudes, and structures of feeling: a context of credibility in which a rumor 
“makes sense.”
118
  A particular strain of rumors linked to “sectarian” violence, with various 
iterations, may be taken as representative.  In early March, 2011, residents of the village of Sul 
burned down a church after hearing that its members were practicing magic to lure away Muslim 
women.  In May, another church was stormed and ransacked, and at least a dozen people killed, 
in the working-class neighborhood of Imbaba in Cairo, after rumors circulated both locally and 
online that a Muslim girl was being held captive inside.  The scenario repeated itself in the Delta 
village of Mit Bashar in February, 2012.  A dominant narrative in the national media quickly 
snapped into place, fitting these events into the familiar patterns of sectarianism (ṭāʾifiyya) and 
general lawlessness feared to have increased since the revolution.  More nuanced readings, 
however, situated the rumors within a local context of belief in magic, shared sites and icons of 
                                                 
117 “Mustaqbal Misr: al-Shaʾiʿat wa Tashkil al-Raʾy al-ʿAmm baʿd al-Thawra” (“The Future of Egypt: Rumors and 
the Formation of Public Opinion after the Revolution”), Nile TV, June 5, 2011. 
118 See my discussion on the poetics of rumor (poésie fabuleuse) in Chapter 4. 
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devotion, televised social and religious dramas, structures of economic and educational 
exclusion, sexual frustration, and traditional mechanisms for the externalization of blame.
 119
  
The “rumor of the kidnapped girl” may also be read as the expression of the desire to uncover the 
real behind iconic sites of secrecy and the sublime – especially as such events occurred in 
proximity to the storming of State Security archives by demonstrators.
120
  Both events derive 
from “the suspicion that someone his hiding the REAL behind the curtain” (Stewart 1999: 13) – 
a key element in the “paranoid style” which I will return to in the next section.  
Whatever interpretations developed around these incidents, they helped to reposition 
rumor as a significant social problem, quite likely to result in violence and anarchy.  In addition, 
they dramatically revealed a shattered epistemic terrain, where traditional folk beliefs lived in 
uncomfortable proximity to the narratives of progress shaped in Tahrir.  As one resident of Sul, 
interviewed by a blogger investigating the rumors that irrupted there, put it, “Those Revolution 
types from Cairo don’t know nothin’!”
121
  For the interviewer, fresh from Tahrir, the rumors and 
the belief in magic were unbelievable; for the interviewee, the rumors made perfect sense.  Two 
different worlds were brought into view, each with its own structure of knowledge and 
believability that made the other seemingly incomprehensible.  In such circumstances, for any 
metanarrative to take shape – whether for enlightenment and progress, or for their antitheses – 
would appear quite problematic.  This kind of rumor thus threatened the revolution, or at least 
those strands which followed a universalizing ideological trajectory, from the very beginning. 
                                                 
119 Cf. Ahmad Abdalla, “Itfih wa al-Khalal al-Miʿmari” (“Itfih and the Architectural Flaw”), at 
blog.ahmadabdalla.net/?p=439, and Zenobia, “Imbaba on Fire ‘Updated’,” at 
egyptianchronicles.blogspot.com/2011/05/imbaba-on-fire.html. 
120 A commentator on Ahmad Abdalla’s post (see previous note) makes this connection between the storming of 
State Security and the storming of churches.  For the commentator (“MOU”: 
http://blog.ahmadabdalla.net/?p=439#comment-5553), both acts are justified according to the same logic. 
121 Ibid, Abdalla, (dūl shabāb min il-qāhira min bitūʿ is-sawra mish daryānīn bi-ḥāja). 
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 If this first type of rumor emerges seemingly spontaneously and without a recognizable 
author, the second type is what we might call “weaponized.”  This would include rumors with 
identifiable authors – such as those deployed by General al-Ruwayni – as well as those whose 
authors are hidden, but which are generally perceived to serve, or to have been exploited by, 
recognizable political interests.  Another example would be the Mubarak death rumors, which 
picked up with an almost surreal frequency after the president’s ouster, but for altogether 
different reasons than before.  At least twice in July of 2011, reports of his imminent passing 
circulated in Egypt’s major newspapers.
122
  An article in the pro-revolutionary al-Dustur al-Asli 
described the situation as “a television soap opera,” whose main character, as it were, kept dying 
and coming back to life.
123
  December heard more of the same, as did most months of 2012.
124
  
The cosmic irony spinning through all these instances, of course, was that the stories were likely 
intended to work in the dead man’s favor by whipping up sympathy before his trial, or testing the 
waters for a possible amnesty.  The sources, as always, were often difficult to pin down, and at 
least in the two cases cited above from July, 2011, the most visible transmitters were journalists 
with a history of opposition to Mubarak: Ibrahim ʿIsa of al-Dustur al-Asli, and Waʾil al-Ibrashi, 
both of whom had been tried for spreading the same rumors for altogether different purposes in 
September, 2007.  Yet fingers pointed at those closest to the former president, including 
members of SCAF, interested in protecting their former patron by all possible means of 
deception.  In other words, the very rumors which the regime had once feared as acts of regicide 
were now being deployed by its remnants in a desperate attempt at prolonging its authority.  
                                                 
122 al-Dustur al-Asli, 7/11/2011, 7/15/2011. 
123 Ibid., 7/15/2011. 
124 See Akhbar Baladna, 12/8/2011 (http://www.baladnanews.com/more.php?newsid=29195&catid=23), and “Once 
Illegal, Health Rumors Now Have Mubarak Die Daily,” The New York Times, 6/12/2012. 
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Such was the dominant suspicion, in any case, even if a sly anonymity kept the rumormongers 
safe from exposure and direct rebuttal.   
In truth, there has been no shortage of this “weaponized” type of rumors since the 
beginning of the revolution.  These have included, among others: rumors about presidential 
candidate ʿAbd al-Munʿim Abu al-Futuh’s links to terrorism; rumors about presidential 
candidate Hazim Abu Ismaʿil’s mother being an American citizen (these turned out to be true); a 
rumor that Egypt’s Islamist-dominated parliament was debating a so-called “necrophilia law”; 
rumors of a “plan to divide Egypt”; rumors about the “foreign agendas” being pursued by 
revolutionary groups and personalities like The Youth of 6 April, so-called “anarchists,” and 
Wael Ghonim.  It is these latter rumors which interest us here, as they have become the object of 
anti-rumor parodies in cyberspace.  It is worth elaborating on the media landscape across which 
they spread, before narrowing in on one particular rumor for closer analysis.  I will then outline a 
framework for the reading of parody, as it has been deployed against this and similar rumors. 
 The moment crowds headed towards Tahrir Square on January 25, 2011, the media 
organs of the state and pro-regime groups set in motion a machinery of noise aimed at 
discrediting the nascent revolution.  Both as author of propaganda and exploiter of negative 
rumors already in circulation, the broadcast voices of the “counter-revolution” (al-thawra al-
muḍādda) took advantage of several principle sites of dissemination.  Their center was often the 
state-run Egyptian Radio and Television Union (ERTU), with its several national and satellite 
channels, and which is usually referred to simply as “Maspero” after the building which houses 
its headquarters.  During the 18 days of demonstrations in Tahrir, Maspero grew beyond its 
regular pro-regime perspective into a veritable theater of the absurd, alternately casting the 
demonstrators as foreign agents, or ignoring their slogans and presenting them as pro-Mubarak.  
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Confessions and testimonies of alleged revolutionaries were aired to support accusations that 
they had accepted foreign funds, espoused extremist ideologies, and resorted to violence, while 
(erstwhile) pop-musicians and soap-opera stars were recruited to lament the many 
inconveniences caused by the demonstrators, such as traffic congestion, the disruption of the 
“wheel of production,” and the stalling of consumerism’s daily rituals of fast-food and cheap 
entertainment.  But Maspero’s machinery of noise was not dismantled after the fall of Mubarak, 
as its hastily reshuffled management quickly declared allegiance to the generals of SCAF.  This 
was no more apparent than it was on the night of October 9, 2011, when a demonstration outside 
of Maspero headquarters led largely by Coptic Christians was attacked by military and security 
forces.  Even as tanks ran down peaceful demonstrators and police fired live ammunition into the 
crowd, Egyptian television continued to report that casualties had been suffered by the army, 
rather than the 28 deaths and more than 200 injuries eventually counted among the 
demonstrators.  More than this, Maspero news anchors incited viewers against the demonstrators 
using fiercely sectarian language, as they called for the defense of “our army” against “the 
Copts.”  The massacre reaffirmed the complicity of state media in the counter-revolution waged 
by SCAF. 
 Two other features of the media landscape, active in the counter-revolutionary rumor-
mill, deserve note.  The first, privately-owned television stations with regime sympathies, finds 
an extreme expression in Qanat al-Faraʿin (“The Pharaohs’ Channel”).  Its garrulous owner and 
presenter Tawfiq ʿUkasha, whether in his long-winded monologues or conversations with the 
effete prince of kitsch Ahmad Sibaydar (“Ahmad Spider”), has become infamous for emitting 
dizzying plumes of conspiracy theory around the revolutionaries.  When mouthed by Sibaydar, 
these conspiracy theories have concentrated obsessively on the freemasonry of Google executive 
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and activist Wael Ghonim.
125
 The second major peddler of such rumors has been the media 
organs of the Muslim Brotherhood.  While members of the group participated, albeit belatedly, 
in the 18 days of protests in January-February, 2011, its leadership has since adopted a rhetoric 
of demonization aimed at those who insist the revolution continue.  It has, in addition, been 
responsible for espousing the same brand of fantastical fear-mongering as Qanat al-Faraʿin, most 




From these many outlets, rumors against the major representatives of the revolution, 
ranging from the mundane to the fantastic, have taken shape, been launched deliberately, or 
given wider circulation.  One particular rumor – a series of online images which detail Wael 
Ghonim’s connections to freemasonry, Zionism, and Western imperialism – will be the focus of 
my analysis here.  While the originator of these rumor-images is unknown, they visualize the 
accusations launched by many of the media outlets we have identified, and have circulated on a 
number of internet forums, Facebook pages, and blogs. 
 
Waʾil Ghunem Masuni (“Wael Ghonim is a Freemason”) 
 
 
Wail Ghonim (b. 1980) attained prominence as a leader in what he, among many others, deemed 
a leaderless revolution.  In 2010, while a marketing manager at Google, Ghonim founded the 
popular Facebook group, “We Are All Khaled Said,” dedicated to the memory of the 
Alexandrian youth murdered by police earlier that year.  Through this group, and through  
                                                 
125 Ahmad Sibaydar famously claimed in an interview with Tawfiq ʿUkasha that “Wael Ghonim’s given me a hole 
in my brain,” and that “Wael Ghonim is my whole life.” See: www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZrTkNXQRWT8. 
126 The Brotherhood’s newspaper, al-Huriyya wa al-ʿAdala (Freedom and Justice), featured a headline on January 
21, 2012 that accused revolutionaries of being in league with “anarchists,” whose secret sign was the “V-for-
Vendetta mask,” famous from the eponymous film.  The headline attracted mockery because of its erroneous 
















contacts with activist groups like The Youth of 6 April, he helped organize for the 
demonstrations on January 25, 2011, and was detained by the regime for an eleven-day period 
during the uprising.  After his release, Ghonim’s emotional interview on the commercial channel 
Dream TV, in addition to subsequent media appearances, cast him as a major representative of 
the revolution, even while he rejected any particular political affiliation or agenda beyond his 
general organizational and technological work.  Given his sudden rise to fame – even to many 
bloggers and youth activist groups he had been a relative unknown – Ghonim’s origins, 
intentions, and affiliations quickly became the subject of both deliberate campaigns of 
defamation and spontaneous eruptions of rumor. 
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 Sometime in early February, 2011, several image collages began circulating on Internet 
forums and Facebook walls allegedly revealing the “truth” about Wael Ghonim.
127
  Each collage 
juxtaposes photographs of the Google manager with photographs of several presumed 
representatives and icons of al-māsūniyya (“freemasonry”).  Circles are drawn around certain of 
Ghonim’s gestures, articles of clothing, or accessories, each of which is connected by arrow to 
identical forms as they appear in their original “Masonic” context.  Three basic collages may be 
identified, often but not always appearing together on the same website.  The first places several 
photographs and screen captures of Ghonim, in which his left arm is raised and a green gel 
bracelet adorns his wrist, next to images of White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs, who 
wears a purple gel bracelet.  The gel bracelets on both Ghonim and Gibbs are circled, with some 
connected by arrows.  The collages are often without text, save for the comments of various 
users, but the gel bracelet collage comes variously with superimposed captions, such as “You 
think it’s just a coincidence??” (tiftikru mugarrad ṣudfa??) and “I’d love to get one explanation 
for what we see here / No comment” (nifsi fi tafsīr wāḥid li-lli iḥna shayfīnu / wa lā taʿlīq).  The 
second collage juxtaposes pictures of Ghonim wearing a t-shirt with a lion logo, and a picture of 
him with his children wearing the same t-shirts, with a photographic of a Masonic temple.  The 
lion logo on the t-shirt nearly matches a metal coat of arms with two lions on the temple’s 
façade; both are circled and connected with arrows.  In the third collage, Ghonim appears 
holding up both hands with fingers outstretched – a gesture seemingly imitating typing at a 
keyboard.  The juxtaposed images show Presidents George W. Bush and Bill Clinton making the 
“sign of the horns” hand gesture; Pope Benedict XVI making a similar gesture; and a demonic 
cult drawing with the sign of the horns. 
                                                 
127 For example, http://www.almstba.com/vb/t11409.html. The analysis below concerns the images on this site. 
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The rhetoric of these rumor-images clearly follows in the tradition of conspiracy theory 
and the “paranoid style” of politics, which I have discussed in greater detail in Part 1.  Such a 
tradition responds to a number of historical and psychological factors: the real history of 
imperialism and foreign plots in the Middle East; a feeling of dispossession or political 
disenfranchisement, and a lingering anxiety over the “real” sources of agency over the individual 
and society; a desire to resolve this anxiety through fixing a strong image of the enemy.  In 
addition, these collages allow us to analyze two other aspects of the paranoid style: its 
epistemological structure (its interpretive relation to the “facts”), and its resonance with socially 
significant objects and themes.  
 According to Kathleen Stewart (1999), conspiracy theory develops as a “skeptical, 
paranoid, obsessive practice of scanning for signs and sifting through bits of evidence for the 
missing link” (14).  The conspiracy theorist, as consumer of mass media or surfer of the internet, 
is convinced that the “real” can be located in the proliferation of images that he encounters, that 
it can be cracked like a code or pieced together like a puzzle.  The smallest details – Ghonim’s 
clothing, his gestures, etc. – become significant.  Conspiracy theory does not eschew evidence; it 
is obsessed with it, as Hofstadter (1996) noted in his seminal article.  It carefully outlines its 
claims, whether with copious footnotes, or, in the case at hand, with photographs linked by 
circles and arrows.  The difference between logically presented scholarship and the “paranoid 
style,” as Hofstadter observes, is that the later executes a “big leap from the undeniable to the 
unbelievable” (38) – that is, it proceeds from observable facts like wristbands and lions to 
fantastical claims like freemasonry.  This is similar to what Barthes (1988), in his study of 
classical rhetoric, has identified as the enthymeme: an arrangement of proofs that, unlike the 
syllogism, remains “incomplete,” leaving out one or several of the “steps” made towards the 
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apparently logical conclusion.  Its persuasion relies not on “scientific” reasoning, but on what the 
“public” finds “plausible” (57-58).  Barthes also locates a “pleasure” in the enthymeme just as 
Stewart locates a “pleasure” in the practice of conspiracy theory.  Following the enthymeme, 
“one has the agreeable feeling (even under duress) of discovering something new by a kind of 
natural contagion, of capillarity which extends the known (the opinable) toward the unknown” 
(Barthes: 60); practicing conspiracy, one finds pleasure in “the speculating, the hypervigilant 
scanning, the scheming, the meticulous planning, the lists, the inventories of equipment, the 
clever bricolage of making do, the invention of new tools out of ordinary household products…” 
(Stewart: 14).  The Ghonim images stimulate the viewer by such meticulous, but also very 
accessible and “do-it-yourself” tactics as collage and drawing arrows.  Indeed, we should add, 
the viewer is empowered with the very agency that he is denied by a still entrenched 
authoritarianism.  Anyone can wield these most simple, democratic tools to expose the powers 
that be.  Thus while conspiracy theory posits a nearly omnipotent enemy, it stops short of total 
pessimism (Hofstadter: 30), retaining the possibility of salvation through hypervigilance and 
critique. 
 The conspiracy theorist gropes around for evidence, and finds pleasure in connecting the 
dots.  But this is not a totally random process; rather, the evidence is drawn from objects and 
themes glittering with social, psychological, and historical significance.  Prime among these is 
the alleged māsūniyya (“freemasonry”) of Wael Ghonim, used to characterize his treasonous, 
conspiratorial designs.  Given the activist’s sudden emergence from obscurity onto the public 
stage, the theory of freemasonry places him in a familiar narrative of secret plots, providing a 
background story, filling in the missing details, and inserting a legible agenda “behind” his 
actions.  Moreover, freemasonry gives structure and leadership to a revolution that famously has 
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lacked both – how else can one make sense of such heterogeneous crowds? There is also a glint 
of reality in these claims, since Ghonim’s actions, and those of most revolutionaries, can 
accurately be described as “secret plotting,” given the often anonymous nature of online 
organizing.  But what privileges “freemasonry” as a credible suspicion is its historical resonance 
both globally and locally.  It is no coincidence that Hofstadter, in his seminal article on the 
“paranoid style” in American politics, cites as his first example the conspiracy theories 
surrounding Masonic lodges in the United States that have circulated since the eighteenth 
century.  Locally, in Egypt, freemasonry has a real history stretching back to the French invasion 
of 1798 (Wissa 1989).
128
  However, after the 1952 military coup, the freemasons were among the 
many groups and associations tainted by an aura of cosmopolitanism that quickly became the 
target of attacks by the new regime, and were eventually abolished by President Nasser in 1961 
(Wissa: 143).  Memories of the regime’s violent campaigns against the alleged plots of 
freemasons have secured the group’s place as a recurrent theme in contemporary conspiracy 
theories. 
 Each of the three objects circled in the images – the gel bracelet, the lion insignia, and the 
sign of the horns gesture – are proposed as “sure signs” of freemasonry, though their privileging 
as such is by no means random.  In many cultures, their shifting signification has become the 
object of contestation, speculation, and fantasy.  Like Wael Ghonim himself, these objects are 
floating signifiers that possess a peculiar, seductive shine, due perhaps to their novelty, sudden 
proliferation, uncertain origin, exclusivity, or seeming reticence to pronounce on themselves.  
They are even “uncanny” in one of the senses Freud allows the term: one encounters them 
                                                 
128 Both British- and French-affiliated Masonic lodges began to mushroom in the middle of the nineteenth century, 
attracting large swaths of the country’s social and political elite.  Rather than vehicles of foreign penetration, the 
lodges were most often considered social and political clubs for nationalist leaders like Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and 
Saʿd Zaghlul (Wissa 1989). 
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repeatedly in odd places – “You think it’s just a coincidence??” (tiftikru mugarrad ṣudfa??); thus 
they call out for explanation.
129
  Various styles of the gel bracelet, for example, have given rise 
to moral panics in the United States, in particular since their sudden rise in popularity over the 
last decade.  Fearfully labeled “sex bracelets,” they have been interpreted as indexes of youth sex 
practices, with different colors signifying a different degree of promiscuity.
130
  The gel bracelets 
worn by Wael Ghonim and Robert Gibbs, however, belong to the style made popular by Lance 
Armstrong in 2004, which may advocate any number of social causes.  The “sign of the horns” 
gesture, too, has been subjected to various and often heated resignifications in many locations 
(Morris 1979: 120-124).  In the Ghonim collages, it is executed by Presidents Bush and Clinton 
as the “Hook ‘em Horns” signal of the University of Texas; elsewhere, it signals sexual infidelity 
or “cuckolding.”  Finally, the lion insignia worn by Ghonim – in fact, the logo of the Hong 
Kong-based clothing store Giordano – lends itself easily to a hermeneutics of suspicion on 
account of its ambiguity.  It belongs to a class of commercial and corporate logos that have 
generated rumors, most famously those which read Satanism into Proctor and Gamble’s moon-
and-stars logo in the 1980s (cf. Coombe 1997; Kapferer 1990). 
 Through the enthymemic pleasures of presentation and connection, and through dialogue 
with themes and objects that excite popular speculation, these image collages grab Wael Ghonim 
in the act of conspiracy, pinning to him a direct and deliberate agency over current events.  By 
such means, a resolution is sought to the complexity of the revolution, and a particular character 
is targeted with assassination.  And yet, despite their dangerous rhetoric, the images would 
provide the tools for their own dismantling.  Engaged by numerous artists through modes of 
                                                 
129 Freud speaks of “otherwise … innocent” things that, when encountered repeatedly, become surrounded with an 
“uncanny atmosphere” and force “upon us the idea of something fateful and inescapable where otherwise we should 
have spoken of ‘chance’ only.”  He goes on to say that most people in this situation “will be tempted to ascribe a 




parody, the rumors about Wael Ghonim would find themselves combatted in their own terms, 
and deflected back to their source. 
 
Parodies of Rumor 
 
 
“Parody,” like other key words in contemporary literary and cultural theory, enjoys a classical 
Greek provenance, and a long history of scholarly interest.  Historical reviews of the term have 
traced its evolution as a rhetorical trope in art, literature, and other cultural forms, comparing and 
contrasting it to other intertextual modes armed with a humorous or critical edge (Dentith 2000; 
Genette 1997; Hutcheon 2000; Rose 1993).  Parody is often distinguished from similar modes 
like satire and pastiche on the basis of its formal properties, such as the manner in which it 
registers difference from the work it critiques (tone, accent, timing), the degree of such 
difference (subtle change versus radical transformation), or the nature of the target it selects for 
critique (a person, another text, or an entire tradition).  While some scholars make only very few 
such formal distinctions – Hutcheon, for example, separates parody from satire on the basis that 
the former is used to comment on another aesthetic work (its target is “intramural”), while the 
latter is used to comment on a political or moral issue (its target is “extramural”; 2000: 54) – 
others, like Genette, engage in a taxonomical frenzy, seeking to separate parody from satire, 
caricature, pastiche, etc., in the most absolute formal terms possible.  Such distinctions, however, 
are unlikely to hold in all cases, and are often a matter of convention.  It is sufficient for our 
purposes to settle on a broad definition: in parody, one performance playfully imitates another, 
while applying a critical edge. 
 There is a more important reason for maintaining this broad definition.  As Dentith 
argues, excessive concern with the formal distinctions between parody and similar modes 
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distract us from the more important issue that parody raises: its evaluative and political work 
(2000: 14).  Indeed this is primarily what interests me in my analysis of parodies of the Ghonim 
rumor-images.  The issue of parody’s evaluative stance and its politics has been the subject of 
some scholarly dispute.  While standard definitions of parody have insisted on its mocking or 
negative attitude towards a particular target, more recent theories have attempted to be more 
inclusive, posing a plurality of ethical stances for the practice, not all of which are negative.  
Hutcheon (1987) observes that there are “many possible pragmatic positions and strategies open 
to parody today … from reverence and mockery” (204); Dentith (2000: 6) and Rose (1993: 47) 
have made similar observations.  For example, as I have shown in Chapter 7, the parody of Nigm 
and Imam’s song “Jifara Mat,” embedded in the performance of “Mubarak Mat,” unfolds in a 
mode of referential homage rather than derision.  At the same, it cuts derisively at the figure of 
the president.  Thus while imitation is crucial in conceptualizing parody, its relation to its 
target(s) can remain ambiguous.  It is not always apparent when confronting a work of parody 
whether it is intended to tentatively appraise, quietly applaud, elbow in the side, or hack to pieces 
the work it imitates.  It remains the task of the analyst to both determine a probable evaluative 
stance, and register the ambivalence and even indecision which surely must be allowed to all 
artists.   
As a consequence of its evaluative stance, parody has often been imbued with a political 
trajectory that is equally the subject of dispute.  If parody is directed scornfully at a dominant 
text, practice, figure, or tradition, it may be treated as a democratic, “subversive” force – for 
example, Ahmed Naje’s parody of the “plot theory” of rumor in Chapter 7.  It may conversely be 
considered “conservative” if its scorn serves to lay siege to innovative forms and uphold what it 
considers the norm.  It may also be suspected of conservatism if its evaluative stance is no more 
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than fawning nostalgia, or a reactionary glorification of the past (Dentith: 19-20).  Many of 
Gamal al-Ghitani’s novels might be (mis)interpreted in this way.  The politics of parody, 
ultimately, cannot be determined in the abstract.  It remains, together with evaluative stance, the 
guiding question through our study of rumor parodies, beginning with the work of Ashraf 
Hamdi. 
 Dr. Ashraf Hamdi (b. 1982) graduated from Cairo University’s School of Dentistry in 
2005, and since 2001 has worked professionally as a cartoonist in a variety of formats, including 
simple editorial cartoons (kārīkātīr), young adult literature, graphic short stories, and digital 
video.  Since 2011, he has served as the Egyptian manager for Kharabish, a workshop for young 
cartoonists around the Arab World that has produced a series of popular YouTube videos 
parodying the major figures and events of the Arab Spring.   While “parody” lacks an exact 
equivalent in Arabic, many of Hamdi’s works would be characterized colloquially as sākhir(a) 
(an adjective alternately translated as “sarcastic,” “mocking,” “satirical,” or “parodic”), which is 
also the word the artist himself has used to describe his parodies of the Ghonim rumors.
131
  To 
label a drawing, novel, or other aesthetic form sākhir does not imply any particular formal 
relation between the work and its object: it could refer to parodic imitation of another text, or a 
formally distinct commentary.  In the case of the Ghonim rumor videos, however, Hamdi clearly 
has parodic imitation in mind.  In his own words, his mode of engaging the original 
rumormongers was to “go along in the same path that they took, [and to] exaggerate what was 
going on” (amshi maʿāhum fi nafs il-sikka illi humma kānu mashyīn fīha wa inn ana abāligh fi 
illi kān ḥāṣil).  This describes the formal operations of the parody.  But what of its evaluative 
stance?  The word sākhir almost always implies a stance of mockery towards the object, and in 
                                                 
131 This and the following quotes from Ashraf Hamdi are taken from his interview with the comedian Bassem 
Youssef, available at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6COQTPwHbA8. 
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fact, Hamdi’s stated aim was to “mock this style of thinking” (askhar min il-uslūb da fi il-tafkīr) 
– that is, to criticize the paranoid style of conspiracy theory.  Nevertheless, mockery is only part 
of the evaluative work performed by his parodies, and it is an issue we will return to in the 
analysis.  We will also investigate the “felicity” of the performance, that is, whether it achieves 
its aims of discrediting the rumors, or falls victim to miscomprehension. 
 
al-Haqiqa waraʾ Waʾil Ghunem (“The Truth Behind Wael Ghonim”) 
 
 
Beginning in late February, 2011, Ashraf Hamdi created two YouTube videos parodying the 
rumors circulating about Wael Ghonim and other youth activists.  The first, uploaded on 
February 21 and entitled “al-Haqiqa waraʾ Waʾil Ghunem” (“The Truth Behind Wael Ghonim”), 
responds directly to the image collages we analyzed above, imitating its technique of circling the 
apparent signs of the activist’s connection to international conspiracy.  The video presents a 
sequence of slides, each fading into the next, in which circles and arrows are animated to 
highlight different indexes of freemasonry, Zionism, and other suspect political movements.   
The title slide (al-ḥaqīqa warāʾ wāʾil ghunēm) fades into the first exhibit: a photograph 
of Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg sitting cross-legged with an Apple MacBook, opposite a 
photograph of Ghonim in a similar pose, also with an Apple MacBook.  The Apple logo is 
circled in both, and a caption appears: “Just a coincidence?!” (mugarrad ṣudfa?!).  The next slide 
marshals a startling array of evidence: Ghonim’s goatee (his laḥya or beard) “confirms his 
membership in the Muslim Brotherhood”; his “masonic gel bracelet” is green, “which means he 
is one of the founders of freemasonry and one of its most important leaders”; his middle and 
index fingers execute the peace sign (or victory sign), and are separated by “exactly 30 degrees” 
(“What could this mean?”); he holds an Egyptian flag, but “is keen on showing its red color, 
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which indicates that he is a communist”; finally, “despite his attempt to hide his agenda [ajinda], 
it appears just underneath his clothes” – a play on the Egyptian Arabic word ajinda, which 
means both “political/ideological agenda” and “agenda-notebook.”  A caption is superimposed 
on the entire exhibit: “Is this all just a coincidence?!”  The remaining slides reveal that Ghonim’s 
clip microphone is an “Israeli espionage device” – evidenced in a photograph of Israeli Prime 
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu also wearing a clip microphone – and that he is suspect in the 
assassination of John F. Kennedy – evidenced in a grainy photograph of Ghonim seated behind 
the president.  Ominous music plays from beginning to end. 
 With its simple but still professional design – evident in the animation, mix of media, and 
flow between elements – the video differs from the marked amateurism of the collages it 
parodies.  A subtle element of play may be detected in the slightly indulged font (Adobe Arabic 
bold), and the light bounce of the images against their backgrounds upon entrance.  But Hamdi’s 
video is otherwise a careful imitation of the original.  He “goes along in the same path” as the 
collage-mongers.  That is, he copies their vernacular, enthymemic practice of building evidence 
up through pictures, signs, and circles to the grand conclusion of freemasonry: he makes what 
Hofstadter called the “big leap.”  In an interview, Hamdi cheerfully ridiculed this practice as 
istintāgāt wa alghāz wa ḥāga zayy difintshi kūd (“inferences and puzzles and something like The 
Da Vinci Code”).  The practice enjoys a provenance both local and global, since the book and 
film The Da Vinci Code – famous for its detection of a grand conspiracy in an over-analyzed 
painting – has enjoyed as much popularity in Egypt as it has in many other countries.  Hamdi 
shows that he, too, can wield such analytic tools.  However, the artist marks his difference from 
the original collages through what he calls mubalgha (“exaggeration”): the evidence-mongering 
is taken to its extreme.  The exaggeration takes a number of forms.  Sometimes, the same piece 
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of evidence is circled, but it is given an exaggerated interpretation – the gel bracelet becomes not 
only an indication of freemasonry but of Ghonim’s pioneering role in the organization.  Other 
times, the exaggeration is performed by the choice of objects.  In the original, evidence was 
drawn largely from ambiguous or unfamiliar objects; in the parody, Hamdi chooses objects like 
the clip microphone and Apple MacBook that a relatively unambiguous and have familiar 
meanings.  Or, evidence of the totally impossible is concocted, such as the Kennedy photograph.  
Finally, the “grand conclusions” themselves contradict each other, as Ghonim is simultaneously 
connected to rival political groups like the Muslim Brotherhood and communism.  Through these 
various forms of exaggeration, Hamdi stretches the interpretive practice until it breaks.  He 
exposes the analytic feebleness of collages and circles, undercutting their claims of arriving at 
“the truth behind.” 
 Ashraf Hamdi’s second video appeared on March 9, and while we will also call it a 
“parody” of the Ghonim rumors, it differs formally from the first.  Rather than imitating the 
image collages directly, it presents their content in the separate genre of television advertisement: 
“The Command Center of the Egyptian Revolution” (a fictitious group), in cooperation with its 
“Tunisian counterpart,” announces the beginning of “a training course for the overthrow of 
governments” (dawra tadrībiyya li-qalb niẓām al-ḥukm).  The phrase qalb niẓām al-ḥukm (“the 
overthrow of governments/the regime”) is a more “criminalized” or illicit expression than thawra 
(“revolution”), and plays along with the exaggerated claims of the revolutionaries’ criminality.  
The subsequent frames replay similar claims, announced by a female voice (Riham Zidan), and 
depicted in various graphic formats with text.  The course is led by Wael Ghonim, who “ignited 
the flame of the Egyptian Revolution” with support from “The Muslim Brotherhood, Zionism, 
Iran, Mozambique, Afghanistan, Freemasonry, and a hypnotic spiral” (bi-daʿm ikhwānī suhyūnī 
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īrānī mūzāmbīqī afghānī māsūnī ḥalazūnī mushtarak).  Icons for each of these conspiratorial 
groups are displayed, multiplying Ghonim’s dubious links into absurdity with random additions 
like Mozambique and a “hypnotic spiral.”  The groups also, of course, make for strange allies, as 
they represent rival political and ideological streams.  Students who enroll are provided with a 
series of items, each reflecting rumors and accusations made against the revolutionaries at 
various points.  These include a meal from Kentucky Fried Chicken (wajbat kintākī), which pro-
regime media personalities had held up as evidence of the economic and nutritional privilege 
enjoyed by demonstrators in Tahrir Square.  Students are also provided with 50,000 Euros, a 
token of their foreign funding, as well as the masonic gel bracelet, masonic lion logo, protest 
posters, and a 2011 agenda-notebook (ajinda).  The advertisement closes with the image of a 
menorah (indexing Israeli influence), and the names of the artists: Ashraf Hamdi and Riham 
Zidan.  “Hava Nagila,” the Hebrew folk song, plays throughout, also indexing Israeli or Zionist 
influence over the revolutionaries. 
 As a derisive parody of rumors, these two videos adopt a particular evaluative and 
political stance.  In the paranoid image collages, the artist encounters the expression of an absurd 
“style of thinking” that needs to be countered, not necessarily out of any personal sympathy for 
Wael Ghonim, but because of the threat the collages pose to the reputation and message of the 
revolutionary youth.  If the particular author of these rumors is unknown, it is easy to locate them 
as an important stream in the “noise” deployed by counter-revolutionary forces to win the battle 
over public opinion.  Combating this counter-revolutionary noise becomes an important political 
act.  Ashraf Hamdi thus adopts his critical, mocking stance towards the rumors.  However, he 
finds himself confronting a style that he cannot counter directly with his own voice.  To respond 
in a pedantic manner – for example, a carefully syllogistic article outlining the folly of the 
258 
 
rumormongers’ claims – would in a sense be hypocritical, since pedantry (particularly of the 
patriarchal variety) has always been the rhetorical strategy of the political regime that the 
revolution seeks to overturn.  It is a violent rhetoric that the artist knows will backfire. In 
addition, as Hamdi explains in his interview with Bassem Youssef, his own artistic powers of 
exaggeration cannot compete with the paranoid style of conspiracy theory.  Hence “the most 
appropriate way” (ansab ṭarīʾa) to counter such a style is to follow its own terms – to “go along 
in the same path” – that is, to imitate through parody.  It is indeed critical mockery that Hamdi 
intends as his evaluative stance, and finds in parodic videos a potentially potent manner to 
express this. 
 But there is a risk in parody that I would like to explore, before returning to elaborate on 
the politics of Hamdi’s work.  Linda Hutcheon’s comments on the “risky business” of irony 
apply equally to parody.  Hutcheon, following Stanley Fish, calls irony “risky” because there is 
no guarantee that the audience will understand the artist’s real intention (1994: 11).  The reason 
for this is irony (and parody) says something that it does not mean.  Ashraf Hamdi’s videos “say” 
that Wael Ghonim is a freemason.  They “say” that the revolutionaries are enacting foreign 
agendas.  But they “mean” that these are in fact spurious accusations, and that the “style of 
thinking” which leads to them is absurd.  But how are we to tell?  This is not so simple a 
question.  As I have indicated in my discussion above, Hamdi’s parodic imitations are careful to 
reproduce the conspiracy theories.  They differ only in their application of exaggeration 
(mubalgha) of various forms, and by such means aim to expose the fragility of paranoid logic.  
But this is still no guarantee that the audience will “get” (Hutcheon’s term) the parody.  There is 
no guarantee that they will comprehend the unsaid message that Ghonim is innocent and 
rumormongers are ludicrous.  And in fact, this is a “risk” to which Hamdi’s parody fell victim. 
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 In his interview, Hamdi complains that while most of his audience responded positively 
to the parody, a number of the commentators on his YouTube videos interpreted them as just 
more “evidence” of Ghonim’s masonic agenda.  (These comments do not in fact appear on the 
first video because, as the artist says on his YouTube page, the video had been deleted several 
times – presumably because of complaints lodged by offended users).  Hutcheon speculates on 
why this might be the case – why parody might “misfire.”  She eschews previous explorations of 
the subject that have interpreted miscomprehension of parody as “incompetence” or “ignorance” 
– indeed, quite a number of comments on the YouTube videos berate miscomprehending users 
for their “ignorance” or for having “lost their sense of humor.”  Her own suggestion is that  
 
perhaps what is called ignorance (and even lack of practice or context) is simply a 
question of the ironist [or: parodist] and the interpreter belonging to different discursive 
communities which do not intersect or overlap sufficiently for the comprehension of an 
utterance as ironic [or: parodic] to occur (1994: 93) 
 
 
Hutcheon uses the word “discursive communities” as widely as possible – there may be many, 
and they can be transitory, fluid, and overlap (or not).  What she suggests, in other words, is that 
the comprehension of the artist’s parodic intent requires that the viewer inhabit his same social 
group, or one that overlaps with it, and thus share the same conventions of aesthetic practice, 
frames of reference, and standards of probability.  The viewer must also share the artist’s sense 
of propriety, for even if he possesses an understanding of parody in certain contexts, he may fail 
to understand the parody of something he considers inappropriate.  Ultimately, what these cases 
of miscomprehension reveal is that “discursive communities” exist other than those inhabited by 
Hamdi and his fans.  It reveals a kind of shattered epistemic terrain: different worlds with 
different structures of belief, some of which accept as plausible what others disparage as 
“rumor.”  This would seem to point once again to the irascibility of al-ishāʿa, since to combat it 
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would entail the difficult task of bridging together different discursive communities.  For mutual 
comprehension, for agreement on what is plausible, the communities would have to overlap.  
And yet, what these cases also reveal is that these alleged miscomprehensions were few and far 
between – indeed, the degree of miscomprehension may have been exaggerated.  Thus the 
“problem” of paranoid belief, the problem of rumor and its degree of penetration, would seem 
much less serious that it is so often made out to be.  Rather than “gullible masses,” what Hamdi’s 
videos expose are a few cases of YouTube users whose discursive communities happened not to 
overlap with his at a particular moment.  A few might not “get” the parody in one viewing, a few 
may believe it is evidence of freemasonry, but this does not mean rumor rules Egypt. 
 “The Truth About Wael Ghonim” is a parody that risks miscomprehension while 
attempting to combat a dangerous rumor.  Its evaluative stance is critical and mocking, but there 
is the possibility that this critique will not be understood, and that the combat will fail.  This 
brings us back for another reading of Hamdi’s evaluative and political work.  The critical edge of 
the videos has been shown to be liable to misfire, and the artist understands this.  What other 
functions might these videos then perform?  As I have noted already, parody may enjoy a range 
of evaluative stances.  So in addition to its obvious negative stance towards the rumors, I will 
argue that Ashraf Hamdi’s work also plays with them blissfully, and that this has important 
political consequences. 
 The parody “plays blissfully” with the rumors: certainly by this I mean, in part, Barthes’s 
notion of play as interpretation.  But more specifically, what I have in mind here is the pleasure 
of the paranoid style that Ashraf Hamdi imitates, and indeed partakes in.  There are several 
reasons for this pleasure.  I have noted above Barthes’s words on the pleasure of enthymeme, 
which derives from the discovery of something new in the ordinary, and Stewart’s observation 
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that conspiracy theory is a practice shot through with the thrill of investigation and thriftiness.  
We may add to this George Marcus’s assertion that the paranoid style thrives through its 
“revitalization of the romantic, the ability to tell an appealing, wondrous story found in the real” 
(1999: 5).  That is, the realm of the ordinary and the mundane is revealed to hide glittering 
possibilities just below the surface, and these can be unearthed to give life more texture (a mixed 
metaphor, but I mean “texture”: a textual, narrative density).  Conspiracy theory is indeed a 
vernacular generic relative of romance, but made relevant and resonant through attachment to 
everyday objects: a gel bracelet, a goatee, a simple primary color: any of these can make life 
much more interesting, more storied, indeed.   
It is not difficult to see how Hamdi’s videos take part in this pleasure.  They take it to an 
extreme, playing along with the original image collages, finding new connections and new links 
to the wondrous.  This is all done ironically, of course, but the pleasure is as tangible as it is 
contagious.  We hear it too in the “Hava Nagila” that carries the second video: in colloquial 
Egyptian Arabic, it may be rendered yalla nhayyaṣ (“let’s rejoice/make noise”), an open 
invitation for carnival.  It is apparent then that in addition to cutting critically at the rumors, 
Hamdi’s parody also enjoys them, as must his audience members.  In this way, what his 
performance reveals to the rumormongers is not just the absurdity and feebleness of their 
paranoid style, but also its pleasure.  An optimistic reading would thus assert that the parody 
does not just leave the addressed rumormongers feel attacked and offended, but also offers a way 
for them to reconsider blissfully their own practice.  If questioned, if mocked, the serious 
practitioner of the paranoid style may respond that he was simply playing. 
So “The Truth About Wael Ghonim” is a parody whose critique remains, but it is a 
critique that does not cast its objects into a realm of irreversible condemnation and alterity.  It 
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plays blissfully and shows that this play is available.  This has important political implications 
that can be elaborated by returning to Michel Serres’s notion of parasite.  For Serres, parasite – 
“noise,” which in our case is rumor – is an abusive guest.  It interferes and threatens chaos.  
Certainly this threat cannot be denied: for the revolutionaries, the rumors we have discussed here 
not only ruin their reputation, but threaten to distract public opinion into fearful notions of 
conspiracy.  These rumors are parasites on the revolution; they are counter-revolutionary.  
“Noise [parasite],” says Serres, “destroys and horrifies.  But order and flat repetition are in the 
vicinity of death” (1982: 127).  In other words, although noise is threatening, we should be 
careful with our response: to attempt its eradication is to tempt death.  The rumors pester our 
revolutionary feast – as Hamdi says, “they enrage me” (bitghiẓni) – but to attempt a direct 
rebuttal would surely backfire.  Fortunately, Serres reminds us, there is a way out: 
 
The parasite gives the host the means to be safe from the parasite.  The organism 
reinforces its resistance and increases its adaptability.  It is move a bit away from its 
equilibrium and it is then even more strongly at equilibrium.  The generous hosts are 
therefore stronger than the bodies without visits; generation increases resistance right in 
the middle of endemic diseases. (205) 
 
 
Rather than expelling the abusive guest, we must make space for him, and adapt to his presence.  
In the process, we, the host, become stronger.  We grow together with our parasite, evolving into 
something new.  This is the quintessential post-human ethic, which looks for ways of adapting to 
all variety of irreconcilable “others,” not through isolation or antagonism but through a studied 
recognition of the space we inevitably share.  It is also, I am arguing, the politics of Hamdi’s 
parody.  Rather than pedantically scorn the noisy conspiracy theories, “The Truth About Wael 
Ghonim” plays with them, that is, it recognizes their mode of operation and incorporates it with 
its own.  It recognizes that, for the time being, malicious rumors are part of the political and 
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cultural environment.  Rumors and revolution go together; they are part of the noise that pushes 
events forward, if carefully treated.  The solution is to adapt through an ethical and aesthetic 
hospitality.  This does not mean that Hamdi’s parody abandons its critical edge – this is as 
important as its blissful play, and is what separates it from cynical submission.  Rather it means 
that the critical edge cannot be bluntly and directly applied, lest the parasite retaliate and the 
rumormongers, stung to the quick, fire back out as sense of exclusion.  The rumors remain alive 
in the videos, and give them an undeniable vitality.  The result is the innovative and genuinely 





Dr. Ashraf Hamdi’s parodic rendition of the Ghonim image collages has been only one of many 
playful responses to counter-revolutionary rumors.  These vary widely in their degree of 
sophistication, aesthetic technique, and evaluative stance.  The simplest, found on a number of 
Internet forums and Facebook pages, merely create their own image collage to mock the 
evidential style of the original: for example, a photograph of Wael Ghonim wearing a tie, next to 
a photograph of President Obama who coincidently also wears a tie.  More complex parodies 
have been performed by MonaTov – the unfortunately short-lived YouTube comedian who 
appeared early in the revolution, and whose fifth and final episode was dedicated to naẓariyyat 
al-muʾāmara (“conspiracy theory”) – and Bassem Youssef, whose television program Il-




                                                 
132 There are too many brilliant examples to list here.  Others include: the graffiti artist Kaizer; Mohamed Rabie and 
Yusuf Rakha in literature; and the Facebook group “Tallaʿt ishaʿa ʿala Abu al-Futuh innaharda?” (“Have you spread 
a rumor about Abu al-Futuh today?). 
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 In a tweet on August 3, 2011, Wael Ghonim himself declared that “we are a people that 
have earned a doctorate in conspiracy theories” (iḥna shaʿb wākhid dukturā fi naẓariyyāt il-
muʿāmara).  As the revolution entered a new phase with the trial of former president Husni 
Mubarak, rumors swirled once again about his life or death, including a claim by an obscure 
public prosecutor that the man in the courtroom was an impostor: the real Mubarak had allegedly 
died seven years earlier.  The paranoid style was generating fascinating new acts, and its noise 
was interfering with the cause of justice.  Yet if the problem was not new, the responses crafted 
by a new generation of artists departed radically from those of decades of “combat.”  As I have 
demonstrated in Part 1 of this dissertation, representatives of the Egyptian state have for over 
sixty years repeatedly identified “rumor” as a mortal threat to both “revolution” and reputations.  
The dual violence of demonization and incarceration has been the dominant mode of response to 
what was perceived as an unbearable noise.  The result, however, was what Michel Serres would 
have called a kind of “death”: monotony, a sickened order, and an inflation of the parasitic 
infestation.  These are not only metaphors, but accurately describe the cultural and political 
disorder of things under military rule. 
 In contrast, the anti-rumor campaigns of artists like Ashraf Hamdi seek incorporation 
over combat.  In fact they are much less “campaigns” than open play, and they are much less 
“anti-rumor” than careful vaccination.  The threat of noise is the same to these revolutionaries as 
it was to those of July, 1952, and the need to critique this threat is also the same.  Hamdi’s work 
critiques the “style of thinking” that breeds rumors, but it is not naïve, and recognizes their 
ultimate intractability.  Parody would seem the most appropriate way to engage them: following 
in their own style, while simultaneously entertaining different evaluative stances towards them.  
The parasite is admitted as an important enabler of the work, and it has to be for the artist to 
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survive.  He lets it live so that he may too, but neither remains the same.  They are transformed 
through artistic coexistence into something new.  This outcome, too, need not be merely 
metaphorical, but it remains speculative.  We may judge Hamdi’s work itself to be Serres’s 
“evolved” form, the positive and strengthened arrangement of things that emerges from a careful 
incorporation of the parasite.  To say “evolved” evokes a particular evaluative stance – an elitism 
– that I do not intend.  But I do argue that the parody, as an innovative balance of different 
evaluative stances and aesthetic forms, is an improvement over previous, dominant modes of 
aesthetic and political engagement with the “noise.”  It is a revolutionary form that succeeds in 
restructuring the relations between self and other, subject and object, problem and solution, art 
and the world. 
In making these positive claims for humor and rumor in a virtual environment, I am sure 
to have raised some concerns among readers about having overstated my object – in particular, 
one in such a fashionable field as “the Internet in the Arab World.”  These concerns can never be 
laid to rest.  They have been a perennial feature in the scholarship on digital or new media since, 
and even before, their inception.  Two related concerns may be addressed here: the first, whether 
“virtual” forms are divorced from the “real” world; the second, whether overmuch attention paid 
to digital forms distracts scholarship from more important sites of resistance, art and politics.  I 
have already addressed the first concern in Chapter 7, in my discussion of “Mubarak Mat,” 
arguing that the choice between “fantasy” and “real” is a very limiting one.  Very often, the 
Egyptian blogosphere is a space for play, for liʿb, through which fictions and fantasies are 
explored and grafted onto the real.  The second concern can be detected in Walter Armbrust’s 
recent review of the field of Arab media studies.  Calling for a wider historical perspective on 
Arab media – a call with which I strongly agree – Armbrust asserts that “literature on new media 
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in the Middle East focuses narrowly on post-1990s digital media – satellite television 
broadcasting and the Internet” (2012: 42).  The footnote Armbrust attaches to this sentence, 
however, references only works on television.  He is right, of course, that there is no shortage of 
scholarly works published on the Internet in the Middle East.  And yet, with few exceptions (e.g. 
Al-Ghadeer 2006, 2011; Edwards 2011; El-Ariss 2010), this body of scholarship neglects the 
kind of intricate connections between aesthetics and politics that I have explored in this chapter.  
What I hope to have contributed here is a thicker description of space in the “Egyptian 
blogosphere” (al-malʿab), a more careful appreciation of form (including language), and a more 
thorough speculation about politics than is often allowed in the field. 
 Finally, the cultural forms I have analyzed in this chapter and the previous one present 
the scholar with a difficulty of a more general nature.  It is the difficulty of writing about cultural 
forms activated in modes of play, humor, irony, bliss, and so forth.  As Hutcheon remarks about 
her object, “the analysis of irony is usually complex and laborious … but the practice of it 
appears deft and graceful” (1994: 6).  In part, this is a concern with forging a language adequate 
to the task of registering the complexity and capriciousness of new cultural forms that challenge 
established scholarly lexicons of subjectivity, agency, space, and epistemology.  But it is also a 
concern with the appropriateness of analysis as such – the very urge to take apart these forms, 
route them through dominant paradigms of Eurocentric discourse, and re-articulate them in the 
terms and syntax of a superior meta-language.  I have, of course, included the comments of the 
artists themselves to the extent possible.  But a certain incongruence remains that is not reducible 
to mere “misrepresentation.”  Ultimately, I would suggest, ludic performances such as those in 
this chapter cannot be “analyzed” nor even “deconstructed” in an academic style, but can only be 
“played” in Barthes’ sense of interpretation.  Not analysis because they do not mask a “deep 
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structure” or unfold according to a grammar, unconscious, or hidden hand detectable only by the 
scholar; not deconstruction because they have not the pretense of wresting meaning from the 
shackles of an uneven binarism.  (They can be submitted to such readings, but at that moment the 
play stops, its special ontological and phenomenological status evaporates, and the analyst is 
suffocated).  Part 3 promises only to have been an imperfect “play” of the game of rumor 





































“The monger of rumor is wicked by nature, aberrant in his ambition, sick in his soul, 
foolish in his philosophy, insolent in inclination, evacuated of valor, craven in creed.  He 
drips with depravity and decadence, and spleen has lain as sediment in his bowels.  He 
does not rest until he foams and froths, corrupts and corrodes … He spreads like fire 
through hay, he camouflages like a chameleon, and sprays his poisons like a slithering 
serpent.” 
 
– Anonymous  
 
 
“There’s something called a white lie, and it doesn’t hurt anyone.  On the contrary, it 
could prove rather helpful to people.” 
 




Does rumor affirm or destroy?  It is a false choice: rumor rends, repairs, salvages, seduces.  It 
dives, and resurfaces; it burrows, buttresses, defers, consolidates.  Skewed by the overturned 
carapaces of cosmic irony’s rebuttal to the chase, it stakes its claims far from the expected 
tunnels and turrets of the social imaginary, while also sprouting there too, taking root, 
disentangling itself from the backrooms, and salivating on the limens of the political moved 
along one word further.  Rumor is in public culture, it is public culture, not only its unraveling 
but its progressive knotting forward through strategy, combat, paranoia, and play. 
 But the balance of human judgment leans decidedly against it.  Much work has been done 
to extract al-ishāʿa and its sisters from the order of things, and to justify their removal by a 
marshaling of testimonies – moral, aesthetic, social, political – on their collusion with disorder –
a concept sensed first in the nerves, negatively, before enunciation – and care and philosophy are 
denied the chance, the coincidence, to speak of chance and coincidence and surprise.  The above 
anonymous quote is typical. It appears on a number of Islamic websites, dating at least from 
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2007.  My translation is made from the book Rumors and Psychological Warfare (ʿAbd al-
Hamid and Nagi 2009: 12), whose authors have probably plagiarized one of several sermons 
published earlier online.  The negation of rumor and its agents serves more than the immediate 
goal of public silence.  Putting al-ishāʿa in the docks and giving it a sentence is one way for the 
would-be authorities of society and state to assert their ability to judge, evaluate, interpret, use, 
and abuse speech in public life.  It is a prop against which one’s own discursive power, 
credibility, and public persona are constructed, not once but repeatedly through complaints, 
communiques, rituals, and drama all crafted in the service of combatting rumor and concealing 
vacuity and vice.  This is just as true for the politician as it is for the social scientist, whose 
unique ability to detect threats to the public, analyze them, and extract their essence provides him 
with an undeniable claim to the state’s attention.  Combatting rumor is also an art suffused with 
pleasure, as one cannot deny the untempered excitement an author must feel when pronouncing 
that the rumormonger “drips with depravity and decadence, and spleen has lain as sediment in 
his bowels.”  And while there are good reasons for the systematic animosity unleashed on hurtful 
speech, this is more often than not the expression of an unthinking reflex, which closes down the 
possibility for serious inquiry before it might begin, insulates the self from the charged social 
complexity that makes it a self in the first place, and misses the chance for an encounter with the 
inharmonious thresholds of progress and becoming-with-noise. 
 Much rarer are pronouncements of the kind made by Yusuf Wahbi’s character in the 
1960 film A Rumor of Love (Ishaʿat Hubb).  The plot revolves around the boorish Husayn 
(ʿUmar Sharif), whose uncle ʿAbd al-Qadir (Yusuf Wahbi) concocts a rumor of his nephew’s 
affair with the actress Hind Rustum.  The rumor is a conceit to make Samiha (Suʿad Husni), 
ʿAbd al-Qadir’s daughter, become jealous of Husayn, who is in reality romantically 
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inexperienced, and so fall in love with him.  The film is a veritable celebration of the affirmative 
power of rumor, and of parasite in its different meanings: noisemakers and difficult guests.  
Apart from the rumormongers, A Rumor of Love features Mahrus, a ventriloquist; Bahiga, a 
wealthy heiress who executes a plebian shriek (ṣawwitit bi-l-baladi) famous in Egyptian cinema; 
and Si Lusi, the spoiled (parasitic) youth, who sings in half a dozen languages, arrives as an 
unwelcome guest in the opinion of ʿAbd al-Qadir, and whose flirtation with Samiha is the noise 
that sets the plot in motion, motivating the counter-noise of rumor.  Parasite and rumor also find 
expression in the names of the film’s location and characters: Ismailia, the setting, is not only a 
port city (an archetypal node of rumor transmission), but also contains the phrase ismaʿ lī (“listen 
to me!”); Samiha, whose name is little more than an unvoicing away from sammīʿa (“listeners”); 
and Si Lusi, whose name slips into salāsa (“flexibility, elasticity”), sūs (“rot; parasites 
[worms]”), and waswasa (“demonic whispering”).  A Rumor of Love is imminently subversive, 
undermining a dominant tradition of “combatting rumor” in post-1952 Egypt by rendering 
visible the art, bricolage, play, and pleasure of this irrepressible cultural form.133  As an art, the 
rumor mixes different genres and technologies of mediation, beginning with backroom whispers, 
and advancing to photographs of celebrities (the Queen of England, Nefertiti, Hind Rustum), the 
forging of romantic correspondences (during which, like Gamal al-Ghitani’s ʿAtiyya Beh, the 
rumormongers engage in forms of gender crossing, with lipstick and perfume), then purloined 
letters, telephones, and the talk of the town.  As play, the rumor imagines a scenario at the verges 
of the possible, and it is victorious: Samiha falls in love with Husayn, and even though the truth 
emerges, the bonds of affection are unbreakable, and A Rumor of Love ends with the two lovers 
                                                 
133 A Rumor of Love also reverses the moral and etiological structure of the introductory “Tale of the Lion and the 
Bull” in Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ’s Kalila wa Dimna.  The jackal Dimna is motivated by jealousy to tell a lie, which is the 
cause for the separation of the Lion and the Bull, “two friends/lovers” (mutaḥābbayn).  Conversely, in A Rumor of 
Love, it is a lie which produces the jealousy, which leads to the uniting of two lovers. 
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chased onto a stage, embracing in front of the audience, fantasy and reality united under the sign 
of al-ishāʿa. 
 These are two opposite views on a singular cultural form, and both are in a certain range 
of feasibility valid.  My main objective in this dissertation was to remain open to the positive, 
affirmative functions of rumor, while also recognizing its complexity and essential ambivalence.  
No doubt any particular rumor could have any range of contradictory effects, depending on the 
actors involved, the temporal frame chosen, the spatial scope under consideration, the epistemic 
modality deemed important, and the political orientation or disorientation of the analyst.  It is 
this ethical and political ambivalence of noise that I would now like to push further with respect 
to each chapter.  In the chapters of Part 1, from the Revolutionary Tribunal, onto the anxieties of 
development and planning, and later in the final years of the Mubarak regime, al-ishāʿa was 
framed exclusively as a destructive force, “undermining the pillars and foundation of the 
Revolution,” then derailing the designs of al-takhṭīṭ, and later causing a “painful flow of blood” 
in the body of the patriarch.  However, it is certainly the case that for the agents of rumor, in 
each of these cases, the practice of myth formation was one of subversion leading to positive 
outcomes, or one of sense-making leading to the affirmative comprehension of an ambiguous 
universe or event.  In 1953, the so-called “Trinity of Rumors” – Ahmad Nasif, Zaki Zahran, and 
Mustafa Shahin – if we are to believe the questionable testimony against them, might 
optimistically be said to have sustained a genuine, if short lived, sphere of resistance, a playful 
counterpublic built around a morally ambiguous cigarette stand.  It is only out of almost total 
randomness, owing to the capriciousness and paranoia of state power, that their act proved in the 
end to be self-destructive (but was this the end? and where did their unexpected sentences and 
syntax take them?).  If rumors were a painful wound in the side of the Free Officers, they were 
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also in a sense a great blessing, for it was against and above them that they managed to claim a 
discursive supremacy, establishing, albeit shoddily and with great risk of popular rejection, the 
artifice of their proximity to truth and control.  Indeed it might even be said that it was rumors 
that had brought the Free Officers to power, not only their own acts of discursive sabotage, but 
also the general state of parliamentary bickering, partisan feuds, backbiting and noise that would 
engender a popular desire for authoritarianism, if only in the short term. 
 In the chapters of Part 2, I analyzed rumors from a number of perspectives, with different 
agents and different intertextual and psychological wellsprings, as portrayed and performed by 
the literature of Gamal al-Ghitani.  Characters in Tales of the Foundation and Tales of the 
Treasure Trove, notably ʿAtiyya Beh and ʿAbdu al-Namarsi, were drawn into the production and 
seduction of al-ishāʿa in ways comparable to the novelist himself in his noisy confrontations 
with actors in Egypt’s culture industry.  While I did not explicitly pronounce on the relative 
affirmative and destructive effects of these rumors, their ethical ambivalence can be noted with a 
review of al-Ghitani’s feud with Faruq Husni.  I analyzed the novelist’s use of weaponized rumor 
as a form of noise, an act of sabotage performed when more conventional politics would seem to 
offer no room for maneuvering, and expressed doubt about the ultimate felicity of the 
performance.  The failure of rumor is the result not only of Husni’s uncanny ability to avoid 
capture, but also the ethical dilemma it contained: the anti-liberal content of the noise (a claim of 
sexual deviancy) contradicted the supposed liberal cultural principles in whose name it had been 
deployed.  Moreover, the form itself (rumor, slander, insult) is one that al-Ghitani has often 
condemned in public statements, and therefore it might be said that this epistemic and discursive 
dissonance is also a cognitive one.134  As a weapon, rumor had failed to defeat its opponent. On 
                                                 
134 See, for example, Gamal al-Ghitani’s recent legal case against the literary critic Sabry Hafez for his alleged 
“libel and slander” (al-sabb wa al-qadhf): “Al-Ghitani Yuqadi Sabri Hafiz,” al-Hayat, 10/5/2012. 
273 
 
the contrary, it would appear that al-Ghitani had been, perhaps unwittingly, performing an 
affirmative function with respect to the minister.  In a 2009 article, the novelist expressed that his 
“conflict” with Faruq Husni revolved around the latter’s concept of “cultural work”: while the 
minister desired “cultural noise” (al-ḍawḍāʾ al-thaqāfiyya), al-Ghitani desired “cultural 
production.”135 Thus in becoming an agent of noise, of publicity and scandal and drama, he was 
in fact surrendering himself to the play as envisioned by his opponent, perhaps never realizing 
that for the culture czar, the czar of noise and deviance, every rumor is a good rumor.  Michel 
Serres asks: “Who is the parasite here, who is the interrupter?” (1982: 14). “The parasited one 
parasites the parasites.  One of the first, he jumps to the last position.  But the one in last position 
wins the game” (13); the parasite is he “who has the last word” (3).  In this game, between al-
Ghitani and Husni, it would appear that the latter earns the title of victorious parasite. 
 In Part 3, Chapter 7 offered its own take on the ambivalence of noise, between the 
affirmative force of play and the specter of complicity and incorporation.  In analyzing the 
virtual campaign “Mubarak Mat,” my emphasis was on the former, owing to its engendering of a 
subjunctive alternative to the dominant myths and affective states to the incumbent regime, and 
ability to temper its departure into fantasy with a self-effacing irony and recognition of its 
contingency.  I also considered the possible counterclaim that this performance, by reinscribing 
President Mubarak at the center of power, is not a departure from domination’s bind but a 
submission to its terms and figures.  It is conceivable that the noise made around the president, 
while ostensibly negative in design, served to perpetuate the myth of his domination over 
Egyptian politics, precisely at a time when his role was being exposed as a mockery of itself, and 
subservient to other hidden sources of agency such as members of his family or the military.  The 
                                                 




critique that “Mubarak Mat” makes, according to this claim, would be blunted or inaccurate 
because it has failed to locate “real” power and the mechanisms of its reproduction.  Finally, in 
Chapter 8, I investigated ishāʿāt launched against the icons of the Revolution of 25 January.  
These rumors and conspiracy theories were conceived as destructive, but again, noise is never so 
simple.  In the short term, these negative social practices provoked the creation of responses 
altogether different from the violent rumor combat of successive authoritarian regimes.  In the 
long term, to draw a lesson from Lefebvre’s study of the Great Fear of 1789 that I described in 
the “Introduction,” one might consider how false, fantastical stories in wide circulation created 
the impetus for an emboldening of the revolutionary spirit, and the increased desire for a new, 
more evolved order.  The surprising conclusion of Lefebvre’s study can be elaborated on in a 
future comparative study of the surprisingly similar rumors that emerged during the French 
Revolution of 1789 and the Egyptian Revolution of 25 January: respectively, rumors of brigands 
and balṭaga, of peasants and slum dwellers, of kidnapped children and abducted Muslim girls, of 
the death of the king and the death of the president, of foreign invasion and neocolonial plots. 
 In speculating on the relative affirmative and destructive functions of rumor, I recognize 
that a variety of equally plausible arguments may be proposed.  Outcomes, trajectories, and 
effects are notoriously difficult issues to broach in the study of rhetoric and mass media, to say 
nothing of other cultural forms likes noise, novels, and academic dissertations.  “[The] question 
of effects,” Lila Abu-Lughod reminds us in her study of television in Egypt, “haunts all those 
who produce and study media and is, in the end, unanswerable” (2005: 26).  The question is not 
“unanswerable,” I would contend, only the answers must be framed as exertions in the Kantian 
category of speculative knowledge.  Still the thrust of my dissertation has not been to decide 
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relative measures of good and evil, but to complicate previous pronouncement on the negative, 
destructive effects of rumor and to remain open to the pleasures of affirmation. 
 In the “Introduction,” I gestured toward a reading of culture through al-ishāʿa that might 
trace, refigure, elevate, and interfere with different sets of action and subjectivity in the world.  
Culture is increasingly, and has been for some time, shāʾiʿa: widespread, ephemeral, shared, 
public, diffuse, a playful performance.  Social and literary theory have long since released 
culture from the shackles of the text, the codex, and the work of art, and have made liberal use of 
terms like “promiscuous,” “rhizomatic,” “hypertextual,” and “parasitic” to envision alternative 
ways of tracing and assembling the world, and yet, Where in the field of Arabic Studies (with the 
exception of the literary and cultural forms themselves) are these modes of knowledge 
production (and seduction) taken seriously?  Where outside of Arabic Studies are they taken 
seriously?  In this dissertation, while maintaining a largely conventional format for presenting 
my arguments, I hope also to have proven more than sincere in my gesture to al-ishāʿa as a mode 
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